STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE FIRST CLASS, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, 4 FEBRUARY 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400140006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 4, 1948
• Content Type: SPEECH

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STAT1 1T OF THE DIRMTOR OF C TRAL
TeT U.IGENCE BMRE THE FIRST CLASS,
U IT,) STA MILITA1 ACADW, 4
PMFOARY 19
General Taylor, Members of the First Class of
the Academy:
It is with a double sense of pleasure that I
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face you this ma In response to_ tbe more than
kind invitation of your " " . He has asked me
to talk with you on the importance to the national
defense of so-called high level intelligence, to expand
on the general subject of intelligence requirements for
the national security., and to describe to you the work
of our Central Intelligence Agency.
It gives me a xar sense of satisfaction to be
able to come to West Point and enjoy its hospitality.
It has afforded me an opportunity to make a most in-
teresting discovery and that is that all of you sitting
before me are just normal sized hwean beings. My
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recollection of certain events which took place in the
Philadelphia stadium last November is that some of
you were of gigantic, supermen size a collective
colossus running through, around and over a Navy team
which was composed of mere mortals. I am hqw to
note that you are all sitting quietly and will not
be trading over me -- at least until the question
period starts.
To me, moreover, there is a great deal of
significance in being invited to discuss intelligence
with you. Intelligence has achieved the position
which it has so long deserved in your curriculum,
as well as in the curriculum of such advanced service
training schools as the Command and general Staff
School, the Air University, the Naval war College,
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the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War
College. This means at last that the over ..1ming
Which intelligence of play in the
security of the nation is being realized to the
fullest extent.
I want to present the functions of the Central
Intelligence Agency to you in some detail so that
you may understand it as a vibrant going concern
rather them just another group of Washington
letters. Before discussing our task with you,
however, there are certain things I wish to nay
as background. As I have indicated, there has been
an enormous growth over the past few years in the
appreciation of intelligence matters. If, as you
graduate from hare, that appreciation goes with you
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in ever increasing amatmta 4 o mt1nues to grow
th rou aorut your oareer, it rri11 asks an ipportent
contribution to the security of this ooustry.
This increased appreci aticii is due in part to a
full roaliaati'm of our pre-war failures in the
field of intelligence. In ttashiagtas same of it
is due to the reducti oar of our armed forces as
they approach their peace-time 4csgpl+emeart. It is
axiomatic that the more the actual combat forces
are reduced the greater is the role that sstt be
played by intelligence. Commanders in all grades
have expressed a high regard for operational Intel-
ligencre.
As General Spaata said rsoeEtatly, in testifying
before the president's Air Policy Com ssione
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AT INDUSTRY ARMY DAY PROGRAM - DALLAS, TEXAS - 23 JAN 48
IT IS ONLY THROUGH OUR RELIANCE UPON THE SKILLS, ABILITY AND
INVENTIVENESS OF THESE INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIES THAT THE
ARMY CAN HOPE TO MAINTAIN ITS SUPERIORITY OVER THE EQUIPMENT
AND WEAPONS OF OTHER NATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE
HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY TO KEEP US ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF PROGRESS ELSEWHERE.
WE ARE CLEARLY AWARE THAT IT IS ONLY BY TRAINING COMPETENT
MEN IN A LIFETIME CAREER, OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE THAT THE
UNITED STATES CAN HOPE TO DRAW ON THE EXPERIENCE, WISDOM,
AND THE HUMAN RESOURCES NECESSARY TO KEEP US SECURELY INFORMED.
WE KNOW IT IS THIS FACTUAL INFORMATION THAT CAN MAKE THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOD JUDGMENT AND BAD JUDGMENT, BETWEEN
SAFETY AND DANGER.
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"I think Intelligence waist be exploited
to the asximram. We must spend all that
is necessary to got the best Intelli-
ge n
Testifying before the saaoe C i.i d *s1 CI , / rcl
]units suggested that the t issic n
. . . give thought to the importax oe
of intelligene to our national seourity.
The greater the capabilities of our
pies for madden attack, the more
im portent it bears that our intelli-
gene agencies and activities be the
beat, that we cast devise.
From this )mo l dge, gained through the exper-
ienes of the post decade, an appreciation of
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intelligence has apreed through the highest ranks
and egenoies of our Gover t.
I stated at the very beg2nning that the rin-
tandent had asked me to discuss inteUli geaa c* at a
high level. Before I enter into y further raeearks,
I think it is necessary to define exactly at is
meaant. To do this, I would say that the depgrt~ents
of the military establisbmarnt --- Arn y, Navy and the
Air Forces a 1 the Btate Department each need and
receive
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through their ol~ colleosticm activities what could
beet be described as tactical intelligence. It is
that information which each d+epartamit needs for its
oen day-today operations. The heads of each Qovorn-
meat dapartment and agency must be constantly Info
r~sed
of the situation within their can fields to disc
their obligatio s to this Country. But over and
beyond this type of intelligenoe, which we can
departmental intelligence, there is at we Ia'Im as
national intelligence, which in o?aasionally described
as "high level intellige ce" or "strategic intslli-
gene*" or "national security iatellige ". We define
national intelli oe as that oo osite intelligence,
inter-departmental in character, ithich is rep dr ed by
the President and other high officials and staffs to
assist them in detarm1ni% policies with respect to
national planning and security in peace and in war
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and for the advanent of broad national policy.
Nation l intelligence is in that broad political-
economic-military area of concern to more than one
egenay? It not be objective and it must transcend
the exclusive oastpetean+ce of any one departait.
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All intelligence is not sinister, nor is
it an invidious type of work. There are many
ears of illustrating just at intelligence is --
beyond the cold definition of the word. A
maser %hich I have found particularly helpful
is to consider the intelligence estimate of a
nation as a kind of super Jigsaw puzzle. When
first seen, the pieces of this picture are all
confused; the analysts start working and
eventually there emerges a partial solution,
about 7% of the puzzle. This part is the
pieces that are available from overt sources--
books, charts, periodicals, radio broadcasts,
technical surveys, photographs, comnercial surveys,
general information, etc. Now, we have 75% of a
picture, showing that such of the capabilities
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and potentials of our target country. There are
still gaps and omissions and to fill tbase we
gust resort to clandestine and covert methods.
By use of such mecum we can got perhaps 15% more,
thus maldsag our picture 900 c?Mlete. At this
point, by deduction we can get perhaps 5% mans.
The final 5% is most probably unattainsble as
it Omelets of ideas and policies not even
fordulated, existing only in the minds of the
leaders of our target co entry. Nomver, the
95% we do have should give, within narrow limits,
the potential, the capabilities, and the
probable and possible intentions of our target.
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In discussing with you the subject of
national intelligence, I think we must begin
by recalling to mind the chaotic condition of
our intelligence prior to World War Two.
I think it can be said without successful
challenge that before Pearl Harbor we did not
have an intelligence service in this country
co arable to that of Great Britain, or France,
or Russia, or Germany, or Japan. We did not
have one because the people of the United States
would not accept it. It was felt that there was
something un-,American about espionage and even
about intelligence generally.
As the United States found itself suddenly
projected into a global waar, immense gaps in our
knowledge became readily apparent. The word
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"intelligence" quickly took on a fashionable
connotation. Each new r-time- agency as well
as the older departments soon blossomed out
with intelligence staffs of their om,, each
producing a mites of imooordine-ted infonsticm.
The resultant ace etiticn for toads and specialised
personal wee a mon veental example of waste. T!e
War aid Navy Departments developed full Political
and Economic intelligence Staffs, as did the
Research and Analysis Division of 0. S. S. The
Board of Economic Warfare and its successor, the
Foreign Economic Administration, also delved deeply
into the fields of economic Intelligelace. Not
content with staffs in Washington,, they established
subsidiary staffs in London, and then followed those
up with other unite on the Continent and in the
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Pacific areas.
Mm, for exewple, officials requested a
report an the steel industry of Japan or the
econcmic conditions in the Netherlands East Indies,
they had to choose from the reports of the Board
of Economic Warfare, Q-2, ONI, or the 0. S. S.
-- just to name a few. And, because these agencies
had corseted to secure the beat perac+sanel, it was
neeoessar.y for each of them to back up its everts
by asserting that its reports were the beat
available and that the others might well be
disregarded.
During the war, the Office of Strategic
Services -- 0. S. S. -.. was established for the
use of gathering together in of axiaepticmal
background and ability rrho could operate in the
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field of national, rather then departmental,
Intelligence. In weighing the merits of the 0. S. S.,
one should rme:aber that it cam late into the
field. It was a stop-gap. Overnight it was given
a function to perform that the British, for a le,
had been developing aggressively sines the days of
Queen Elisabeth. Wban one considers these facts,
the work of the 0. 4. S. was quite remarkable and
its knom failures must be weighed against its
stc cesses. Moreover, it marked a crucial turning
point in the development of our intellig I g a I systes
and we profit greatly by its experiences and mistakes.
The Joint Congressional Candttee, which
investigated the attack on Hemeii, reached awy
pertinent conclusions, in 1916, regarding the short_
Inge of our intelligence system and male some very
sound recomseendations for its in prov lt. Most of
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these have been incorporated into our present
The Coesittee a owed that sow Very
signnhi isant information had not been correctly
evaluated. It found that same of the evaluated
in ornatio was not panned on to field Q 11 s
But -> over and above these failures were others,
more serious %hi ch went to the very foundation
of our intelligence structure. I em speaklng nnw
of the failure to exploit obvious sources; the
failure to coordinate the collectiola grid disseaeina-
ticn of intelligence; the failure to centralise
intelligenoe.
The Committee recaemmnded that intelli-
germs work have centralization of authority and
Blear-out alloaatim of responsibility. It found
specific fault with the system of dissemination --
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or, more accurately, the lack of dissemination.
It stated that "the security of the nation
can be insured only through continuity of service
and centralization of responsibility in those
charged with handling intelligence."
It found that there is no substitute for
resouroefu mess on the part of intelligence
personnel,, and that part of the failure in this
respect was "failure to accord to intelligence work
the important and sigificsnt role which it deserves*
"
The Ccmmittee declared that "efficient
intelligence services are just as essential in
times of peace as in war."
I can not stress too heavily to you who are
about to graduate the conclusion which the Pearl
Harbor Co ittee reached that "officers be selected
for intelligence work who possess the b ,
penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they
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be m' intained in the work for an extended period of
time in order that they m r bee me steeped in the
ramifications and refinements of their field and
ewploy this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating
material received." The Camittee urged, and the
senior oa ers in our armed forces agree, that
an officer *ho has an aptitude for intellig-enoe
work should serve in this field and that this
service will not lapede his progress nor affect his
prom otiona . Tangible evidence of this feeling that
those aqua serve In intelligence should be entitled
to pramotim toss seen in many grades during the
latter days of the mr. It received poooet+tul support
last month by the nomination by the President of the
Director of Intelligence of the Dcpartment of the
Arses, f or General Stephen J. Ch errlin to the rank
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Of L1teut4sn it Oen.ral. '!'e I put ' Vector of 0sntrr.1
Iutelli?et oe, E. E. Wright, has bin prcamoted from
Ctoloasl to Brigadier General during his 1 . anoy
of that positi oa. Ccntiued se rvios is the 3ntS1 U
limme field has he sh1s> I OXONPIAS such as
Major Oeneral George C. M 1d, 1ilbo as a Oolaesrso1
wd Bri di er Aene"l ims Qa of of Int.111glm o& to
General Bpaats in North Africa, Nurope and Watbisgtou,
az d ourrently serves as a Major Genera 1 as Chief
of Air Intell~ at the h ead quay tars of the
LTnitad States Air Fome. Major Gen e- ml Cl gtoa
Bissell served esi ely as A-2, 0-2 and -
Military Attars in I dcsi, I m sure Gm*i,al
Tsglor grill bear .are out ift: I stat. that en ofYteer
can oCritrt ite great eervi+t bw specializing in
intwu1881106 durix4i
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his military career. The thought that promotion
can only come from service in the line, that one
mast be in command position rather than in staff,
is as obsolete as the sword and cutlass. If I
could but leave this one thought with you above all
and ialprese upon you its seriousness -- if I could
make you see that there are teotiniquea in intelligence
as complex as tactical maneuvers, then: r trip will
have been many times repaid.
The end of the tsar found the United states
in a position of internaticval importance and poorer
in a very unstable world -- and that position main-
tame today. We mist never again find ourselves
confronted with the necessity for developing plans
and policies an the basis of intelligence collected,
compiled, and interpreted by a foreign govern ent.
It is *cum= knowledge that we found ourselves in
Just that positions, as regarded the European Theatre,
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at the beginning of the war. For ontba we had
to rely blindly and trustingly on the superior
intelligence system of the British. Our suooesses
prove that this trust was well placed.
However, in matters so vital to a nation
having responsibilities of a world power, the
United States it never again be forded to go,
hat in hand, begging a foreign gover t for the
eyes -- the foreign intelligence -- with ttich to
Our war earperieaae in the intsllig field,.
they oonclusious of the Joint Oo gressieaa+al. C mdttee
which investigated the Naw inn attack, and the
studios of m' other groups and vaamittees, focused
attention on the need for a centralized intelligence
system.
An most of you know, a National Intelligence
Authority was established by President Truamn an
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22 Jnmry 1946, by RCSoUtivs Directive. The t teal.
Intelligence Gr mm designated as the operating
eg Lay of the Xat1cm3- Intelligence Antbority.
Since the Central Intelligence Qr*W Am n m been
legalized by the National Security Mt of 197
vender the new na w of the Central Intelligence
Agency I aha11 not discuss the old ox", satiaat
further but will proceed to the new.
With this baa+vbgx, would lice to discuss
with you the pertinent provisions of the S'atic nal
Security Act of 19I#7, insofar as they affect the
intelligence picture, This Act establishes for
the first tine on. a legal basis Wow a xatic . Security
Council, the function of %hioh is to advise the
President an the intelgration of toreigii, domestic
military policies relating to the naaticmei security.
The Gail is to be presided over by the President
laMemwWo
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himself, or by ay memaber he air designate. Its
mership is comosed of the President, the
Secretaries of State, Dofen se, the Armor, the Navy,
the Air Force, and the Chair t.. of the National
8eourity Resources ward, together with Certain
others Nho met be appointed at the option of the
President.
The Central Intelligence Agen+Cy is established
under this Omwil. To all intents sad purposes,
therefore, the National Security Coil will take
the plans of the Nationaa]. Intelligence Authority,
tdhiah is specifically abolished by the Ast. The 2Am
does not set forth the powers of the Co moil as thff
relate to our Agency, in the per in trbich the
President's original Emeoutive Order delineated the
powers of the Nation l Intelligence Authority in
relation to the Central Intelligence Group. Kowever,
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the fact that the Agency in placed under the
Council would appear to give the Council the same
general authorities for directing the plallr ng,
development, and awrid nation of all Federal forei i
intelligence activities which the National Intelli.
genes Authority had before it.
The Act specifically provides for a Director
of Neutral Intelligence, tdro is to be appointed by
the President, bp- and with the advice md consent
of the Senate, from either civilian or military life.
Certain additional safeguards are then included, to
that the Director chi 11 not be subject to the usual
supervision,, restrictions and prohibitions. mblob apply
to members of the armed services. It further states
that he in not to possess or exercise aw supervision,
control, powers or functions -- other than those he
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trould exercise as Director -- over amy cagg meant
of the axvesd services. These clauses were lmluded
in order to assure to the satisfaotic of the
Co ss that the Director would be free from
service polities and influence.
The law specifically provides that our Ageeroy
ahe1l h y, no police, Otis, laws aearoorsmant
pcrs, or internal security functions. This
provision woes also in the old Executive Order, and
it is me which we are very happy to have included
in the hear. We have colasistently urged that Central
Intel1i-one e have noth' t atso*ver to do with police
pow" or 'me meted with the internal
security of the United States, The internal security
funaticns are properly a part of the wait of the P. S. I.,
and we have no desire whatsoever to interfere with
this. It is a burden vtuich we do not wish to assume.
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During the Cwgression l hearings etiich
preceded the passage of this Act, Central Intelli-
ge?oe wens under attack as a possible and incipient
Gestapo. We held that this argtagetnt had no basis
in feat, since a Gestapo can arise only 'ahan police
pawners and intelligence are acmbined in an. oa tin. We pointed out tiwe- and again that our
interests are solely in the field of forelgn Intel-
Therefore, as I have said, we welocma this
provision in the law *iah el im hates azW possibility
that our orgnisaticn will merge intelligeoace with
police power, or assvm any f motio s relative to the
internal security of the United States.
And now I wish to discuss with you certain
provisions of the law relating to the specific duties
of the Agency. These duties were anted "for the
purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities
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of the several Go"r a,ntal depart pmts and dies
in the interest of national security." In other
words.,... bearing in aired the great powers to
rerocare-w-bd the integration of foreigit, domestic and
military policies of this Gover .t dl eh have been
assigosd to the National Security Council .... it
beeviceees agent that the -Central Intelligence
Agency is to some as the intelligence advisor to
the Council cn all matters respecting national intel-
lige nce.
The next duty Imposed upon us by the Act is
to awhe reoareeer adores to the Council for the
,coordination of the Intelligence activities of the
Ooverxmllent insofar as they relate to the natio"el
security. tibder the President's Executive Order,
the Director of Central Intelligence wet assisted
by at we kwm as the Intelligence M Yisory Board.
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This Board consisted of the Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and Intell,.i-
genee, the Director of Intelligence of the Amery
Departent General Staff, the Chief of Naval Intel-
lig~eaoe,, encl the Director of Intelligence, 1 ited
States Air Force. To these have now been added
the Director of Security and Intelligence of the
Atomic Haw W CCniesion, Admiral Gingrich,, and the
Director of the Joint Intelligence Group of the
Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Brigadier
General Todd. While there is no specific statutory
provision for the eonti ae of the Intelligence
Advisory Board, the law permits the appointment of
necessary advisory oommlttees, and we will malntatn
this Board and ocxotinue to lean on it for advice
in all phases of our activities. It enables us to
keep in close and intimate contact with the
i9aw-'E'
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departs ntal intelligence Ag neiee of the Gov?
rn..
Wit. In addition,, provision is made to invite the
.
heeds of other intellige agencies of the
Govern-
t than those me ,tioried, before, to sit as steers
of the Advisory Board on all matters Which Would
affeet their agencies. In thi8 manner,, the
Board
serves to furnish the Dirootor with the benefits of
the fledge, advice , rieno?, viewpoints
and
over,-all require is of the depar~ts with
respect to inteU j g ~ These rsctcx~mend ati
vdwa adopted, onu serve as the basis of
of
the Director's reeom madstims to the Cour
+eil for
the ooordlmaf ion of our Qovex ent'a intelligence
activities.
This ply ooordination is of particular
im?rtanoe in date
primsxy fields of intel_
ligee respaibilitie6 of the vari,cus d
ePartuents
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em d agencies. We are --- in the fields of coUeation,
productim, cad dissemination -- wor-lcing to prevent
overlapping futatiosaa; that is, to eiimtaat+
duplicate roles eW aissicros, snd to eliminate
duplicate services in Garryiag out these fcsiaticaiis.
The amt paz'ag h of the l pzv videa for
the correlation aced evaluation, within the
of int l itge oe relating to the nattona security,
This is a major ~t of a auaoesaful Central
Intelligence Agency, +coming under the broad general
beading of production, and i olu 1 the evaluation,
oorrelatlo ?end interpretation of the forei.9i intesl.-
lig Infoxmatioz gathered for the produetic of
intelligence. It involves the process of systematic
and critical edozaacdr tics of intelligence iufar tion
for the purpose of determining its usefulness,
credibility and as ? It involves the synthesis
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of the particular intelligence informatim with all
available related material. It involves the process
of determining the probable significance of evaluated
intelligence.
Informati m gathered in the field is sent to
the dep+atI it, responsible for its collection. As
I stated at the opening of xW remarks, this informs -
tion is necessary to that department in its day-to.-day
operations. It is their tactical -- or, as we call
it, departmental -- intelligence. Xwh department
trust have personnel available to digest this informs..
tier and put it to such use as is necessary within
that department. With this departmental necessity,
Central Intelligence will not interfere. Each depart-
ment tract evaluate and correlate and interpret that
intelligence information which is within its ores
exclusive competence and which is needed for its own
departmental use.
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The importance of research to the Centre.1
Intelligence Agency become evident when we start
to deal with intelligence on a national as die-
tisfguished from a dotal level. The research
provided by the central agency met be turned to
the production of estimates in the field of national
intelligence, which I defined previously as trans-
cending the exclusive occ etenes of any one depart-
One of the greatest contributions which a
Central Intelligence Agency mks is the preparation
of national intelligence estimtes. Such an estimte,
for instance, was prepared by us on the situation In
Turkey at the time when the President expounded the
doctrine of aid to Turkey. Previously, if the Presi-
dent desired an over-all estimate of a given situation,
he had to oall for ex le, upon the War Department,
which would furnish him with military and air
{
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picture; the Navy Department, which would present
an estimate of the naval potentialities and capa-
bilities; and on the State Department, which would
cover the political and sociological picture. But
noulhere would there be an over-all estimate. Eect
department would, of necessity, present an estimte
slanted to its own particular field. Now it falls
to the Central Intelligence Agency to present this
over-all picture in a balanced national intelligence
estimate including all pertinent data. From this
the President and appropriate officials can draw a
men-rounded picture on i!'iich to base their policies.
And it should be clearly borne in a:liirxl that the
Central Intelligence Agency does not make pvlie.
The estimates furnished in the form of
strategic and national policy intelligence by the
Central Intelligence icy fill a moot serious gap
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in our present intelligence structure. These
estimates should represent the most eorxprehansive,
complete and precise national intelligence avail-
able to the 4overmment. Without a central research
staff producing this material, an intelligence sys-
tem would merely resemble a costly group of factories,
each memufacturing cot parts, without a central
assembly line for the finished product.
The Act also charges us with the appropriate
dissemination of national intelligence within the
aovexan?nt. Indeed, dissemination is almys a
major couponent of a successful intelligence opera-
tion. You will recall that one of the great faults
found by the Joint Congressional Committee was the
failure of appropriate dissemination of now of the
wonderful intelligence we had available to us. Just
an there is no purpose in collecting intelligence
information unless it is subsequently analysed and
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worked into a fiiaal product, so there is no sense
in developing a final product if it is not dissemi-
nated to those have need of it. The dissemination
of intelligence is zrmndatory to those officials of
the Government *12o, need it to make their decisions.
A Central Intelligence Agency, properly cogni-
sent of the intelligence requirements of the various
departments and dies, is best equipped to handle
the dissemi tion to all duets of the national
intelligence material to met these requirements.
The co lexities of intelligence, the is -eities
of informtion available virtually for the ssY:iag,
are so great that this intormaticn must reach a
central spot for orderly sad efficient dissemination
to all possible users within the Government.
special mention is made in the unification
act of the fact that the departments and other
agencies of the-Government shell continue to collect,
SE R T
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evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental
intelligence. A little earlier I mentioned to you
the distinction between d.partmieontal intelligence
on the one hand and national intelligence on the
other. We have seen, as I have previously stated,
how two of the major cos onats of intelligene.
13 ly, production and disseeaination -- are
handled in Central Intelligence. I now wish to
turn for a few m mutes to the third major cantonent
-- collection.
The role of the Central Intelligence Agency
is to coordinate, this collection of foreign intel-
ligence information and to avoid wasteful duplication.
The State Departawnt should collect political,
economic, and sociological intelligence in its
basic field. The Department of the Ary should
devote its efforts primarily to the oollection of
military intelligence. There should be no reason,
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for =NMI*, for the military attache to furnish the
1~partt of the AM with detailed political and
politico - eoae analyses, This material should
be collected by the State Dspartt. If a military
attache should receive political inforaatian, he
sh uld hand it right across the desk in the a assy
to the appropriate mes"r of the Foreign Serviem-,
and vice versa.
We are engaged in modna ocntimual surveys of
all oovex tal agencies to ascertain their require-
In foreign intellig l . 11han two or more
age ties have similar or Identical requi~ ts,
the colleotic effort for we em be made to satisfy
all others . The only additional asetian necessary is
the additional dissemination.
I feel it is ,sate to say that in peace time
app tely 75 per sent of the foreigl fs~tel3igee ae
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information neoessaty to s oeessf lil operation can
and should be collected bey overt means. By overt
means, I mean hose obvious, opens methods atiioh
require, basically, a tbor u& sifting and analysis
of the masses of readily s~tai3able material of all
types and descriptions, Into the United States
there is fuelled so vast an amot t of information
from so meat' varied sources that it is virtually
at ring. It envoapaases. every field of endeavor
military, political, economic,, comeereial, financial,
agricul.tuural, mineral, labor, scientific, teo aioal j
amcxiag others -- an endless and inexhaustible supply.
If we fail to take arlcivanatege of these vast
masses of material, we are deliberately exposing
the American people to the consequences of a policy
dictated by a lack of intormativn. We misst realize
also that we are -conveting with other nations who
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have been b ildin vp their intenigame ey teens for
centuries to beep their legs intoriasd of inter..
national, intentions -- to inforee than long before
intentions have zaeaterialised into sotictl.
Aug the prinuT collecting agencies in the
field of foreign intelligmas are the military, air
and naval attaches of the defense establishment, and
the Foreign Service off Leers' of the State Depart nt.
The Oentral Intelligence AgevcV can not and will not
supplant these people. They do at valuable tark
in the field of collection. As national aims and
needs in this field are established, their value
trill be increasingly apparent. This will be par-
. tioularly true as the boundaries of d.par tal
collection becow firsdy defined, and w steful dupli-
cation, and overlap are eliminated or reduced.
As I stated, it is not the province of the
Central Intelligence Agency to take over departmental
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collection activities. This is the type of colleo-
tion 'Which am best be done by the exerts of the
depwbmts in their various fields.
The law provides one section ii h establishes
the right of the Agency to collect certain intelli-
game material, and I shall quote this section
verb tins "To perform, for the benefit of existing
intelligence agencies, such additional services of
con ooncern as the National. Security Council
determines can be mare efficiently aocoeplished
centrally." This section is written primarily to
allow the Agency to engage in foreign claaAdesti ns
operations -- to give to the gaited States, for ttie?
first time, the espionage system which is, unfor-
tunately,, made necessary by conditions in the world
today. In adediticn, it allows us to perform certain
collection ant! other functions ed7ioh would other-
wise have to be done Individually by each of the
Pff
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intelligence agencies of the Gove t State,
Army, Air, Navy, and the rest. However, when these
functions are performed centrally, the savings and
services derived are considerable. As a result,
the various agencies welcome the benefits gained
fro? such centralization and no longer wish to
perform these functions themselves. I will cite
you two examples.
We have taken over the exploitation of captured
foreiga documents. These functions were formerly
performed, in co tion with Japanese documents,
by the Washington Document Center, a joint service
venture. Similarly, we have taken over the German
Document Center, formerly operated by the War Depart-
want. It has been felt that this type of function
can be most economioelly and efficiently performed
by a central agency such as onus, for it pools the
skilled linguistic pereofa',el and the dissemination
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functions.
3eo0ndly, NO have ammd respc ibility for
the operation of the Foreign Broadcast ztelligmoe
Servioe, which monitors app-roxi tely two million
wards of foreigla Droadassts a day. This service
rested with Federal ivaticns Ossian
during the war, and was subsequently transferred
to the war iwky ar'twent. The ArvW and Navy Depart-
eeents are both big users of this material, but the
State Dqwrtamt is perhaps the biggest user of the
three. Therefore, this funatlaa um an tmausrreaated
burden on acne d+rpartmetital bR pet. It is ftsis3ly
detexsined to centralise the operation In the Omtral
Iatelligeaa e Oro pas one which could best be per-
formed centrally. Tb as MOW egenales of the Govern.
moat receive this service. I hasten to add that the
monitoring of -foreign broadeaats is beoooing an
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increasingly important source of information. It
is able to bring in valuable information a great
deal faster than normal attache channels. Moreover,
a continual study of a country's broadcasts over a
protracted period of time brings further intelli-
gence which can be secured by no other means.
To give an a le of the worth of this monitor-
ing, I can cite the fact that actin the Secretary of
State, General Marshall, waont to Moscow last March,
he requested and we furnished him with a daily
roundup of 500 words on Soviet broadcasts rsgarding
the German and Austrian treaties, Vkm the President,
shortly after General Marshall's departure, esum iated
the Trumseun Doctrine, we added monitoring reports of
foreign reaction to the Doctrine to our daily roundup
for the Secretary in Moscow.
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Ree mtly the Arsb Lqegw he)d a
s.~
!Cairo. In a br at intercept in
i a~parmt1y we an- re t in the
security of the Arab Xaqpw Oo, t.reaaoe,
the text Of the dsoisiaos teas released. 'mere were
- s t ~I ate or ra an the Arab
League Wi,fr e . Q tr1 i t *it the mmitor-
Ing servioe of the FM this lnforlmatiar Ml"Ju1d not
have bean avail~sbie to us for weeks, if ever.
In October yot' 1947, TABS, data 8aviet no me
ageeae 7, broad st a ec amiqus Wob ortsd the
foralsticn, of the O i.1nt'oz. The FAU, haves umdtored
the TABS o+o?e niq e, isesd ate],Cr set to work to
deter the reastim of radios On a u&aEat the
T
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world. On the followim day the FM was able to
present a cross section of world reaction and within
the next two days the Soviet reaction was broadcast
as an excerpt from O~iOLKAXA PRAVDA-. CIA had
the information 2 or 3 days ?earlier than would have
been the case without FBI$ manitorimg.
At about the now, ti that the Ccmfafoz was
front-page now with Commercial press services the
PM picked up the first notice of the Cor>mist
worldwide attack an Socialists vhm it heap! Radio
Bratislava tae the arrest of Czechoslovakian
right-wing democrats.
Two ales of specific intellig e~aae gleaned
from broadcasts over a long period are the reports
on the, "Soviet Transportation System" and the "Statue
Of Soviet Agriculture", in which all of the data on
one subject from one source were presented in brief
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force for use by- research analysts a *" g studies
based oCl t.1 sources .
Finally, I have stated that this section of
the lax? dish instructs us to perform certain
f ations oentrally, is used as the cloak to hide
the right to operate the clandestine services of
the .ted States tttl h have been assigned to us
by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947
The oollectian of information by this scans
has been over-drammtia d, and mfort ately, over-
publicised. Rummer, I believe we eheuld frankly
acknowledge the need for and provide the means of
collecting that intelligrence .ch am be obtained
only by clandestine aethods. In this we only follow,
late by mnna years, the policy and axle of every
major foreign power. Vbm properly provided for md
established, these operations enat be ceeattra ized
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SAM - W-- -
in one org&iisatican. The experience of the British
Secret Intelligence Service over hundreds of years
proves this. The Gaimms violated this principle
an did the Italians and the Japanese -- with
disastrous results for themselves.
Failure always me$cs a tsiltiplicity of secret
intelligence organizatio s . Study of meter intel-
1lgence systems ttir out the world, tal1m with
those wdao have operated in the field of secret
intelligence for long periods of time, and post-war
interrogations of high intelligence officials in
the Axis countries, have sheu conclusively that
there are separate services, the result is
chaos, so far as production of informstioa is can-
oerned. Internal biekering, with c ntinual sniping,
develops between the various services. There were
too many Germ a spy organisations, each of them
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jealous of the other. They all deeloped a policy
of seoiecy, so that each might be the me to present
saws Juicy tidbit of intor ation to the leaders.
Ooordtnatian wmt out the wriridow.
If the United States is to enter clandestine
operations in arq area abro d, then such aperetti e
should be centralized in sae agaaay to avoid the
wistskss iffiiasted, and we should follow the esperie oe
of the intelligence org ,izations of other eomtri.s
wisiah have proven.sulgceeafbl in this field.
I have spoken quite frankly to you of the tact
that your vouch r is stag ed in espionage. As
future otticers, you shDUlld know this. But rawalder
that this is secret information - not for discussion,
!fir ors and oolmo fists have guessed at it. It
has serer been officially adaitted -- it never will be.
Forget it.
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We have been using bi,g words and hi & 'i sow 1-
:ise phrases. Suppose in closing, that I leave
these tests for you to remember:
First, that, in sQ opinion, the field of
intelligenoe has at last rid the stage wire
it offers to the graduates of this AcadeaW a service
catwr, sioond to n t in inq ortame.
Second, that there is the daily need in the
Militsxy Zitabli t and the State Dspartmemt for
tactical or deap~tsi intelligence. But over and
beyond that is the need of the president and the top
officials of the goverrma nt for objective national
intelligegsae trensa ding the interests and ca"tence
of one department of the gavernmut.
Third,, that aatiaaal intelligence is prepared
by the Oentral intelli.genae Agency. The Agency
breaks down into the three basic fundamentals of
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i-ntellige nee -- cort&In hypes of oolleotion, praduo-
tiara, and disse?inatioea.
Finally, lot me am up sw ocrmept of that a
suoaessful naticns;l 1ntell,4Pnoe eat1amte should be
in the lines of "Tore E1ephese it' a Qtild," by Riztyard
tripling, tdw said t
"I keep six honest serving sari.
( t* ht a e all I know.)
Their names are W bat m d 1
And Row . More and Mo."
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