ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400140008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 1, 1947
• Content Type: SPEECH

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ANHFORT SPEECH NUT REYIEW DATE: ?
AUTH: HR 7n.9 ---
DATE. t_ t_ _ g e i _aEYIEW
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL TNTXLE$i
LI~
(First speech by member of CIG contingent at the
second Frankfort Conference, May 1947)
By
25X1
25X1
The Central Intelligence Group delegation greatly appreciates the invi-
tation to attend this conference. Meetings of this type promote the over-all
intelligence coordination which is a chief objective of the National Intelli-
gence Authority.
Some members of this audience will almost certainly hold key positions in
the Central Intelligence Group in the future, while others will deal directly
with the CIG. Therefore, CIG is especially glad for a chance to explain some-
thing of its functions and problems. Your understanding and sympathetic help
are assets that CIG will always value.
The Central Intelligence Group was created in answer to a widespread demand
for an intelligence coordinating mechanism. The present organization is best
understood as but one stage in a long-range growth, far from complete. Since
its creation in January 1946, the Group has experienced two radically different
forms of organization, and it may undergo further alteration in connection with
the merger bill now being considered by Congress. As a result of legislation,
the functions of CIG may be transferred and to some extent revised, but the
broad principles of operation which have already proven successful and desirable
are expected to continue without material change.
In attempting to explain the historic deficiencies which made the Central
Intelligence Group necessary, some press writers have suggested that intelli-
gence is a new idea to the American people - that we are by nature averse to
espionage. This strikes me as fiction. It appears to overlook the very funda-
mentals of American civilization. It overlooks the fact that the thirteen
colonies were settled by Englishmen, who were not by nature averse to espionage.
It forgets that American spirtual training is based on the teachings of Moses,
who sent highly organized spies into the promised land. It forgets that the
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American people revere Nathan Hale. It forgets that espionage was fashion-
able in the Civil War, all the way from Baltimore to Louisville.
The American intelligence shortcoming has not been aversion to espionage;
rather, it has been a supreme indifference to the whole intelligence problem,
based on a feeling of secure isolation. This delusion formerly caused a
chronic failure to maintain an efficient intelligence system in peacetime.
The start of each war has caught us unprepared, and brought a last-minute effort
to create an intelligence system overnight. Initial results were invariably
inefficient. For example, at the start of the Civil War there was no federal
Secret Service, and the Departments of State, War and Navy began to hire detec-
tives separately. In this confusion and discoordination of 1861, Allan Pinkerton
was called from his civilian detective agency in Chicago to grapple with the
difficulties in Washington. Under McClellan, he directed the Secret Service
operations of the Army of the Potomac, and he made reports directly to the
President, the Secretary of War, the Provost Marshal General and the General-
in-Chief of the Armies. The country soon had its first great opportunity to
learn that hastily improvised secret intelligence is not a good substitute
for organized coordination of trained intelligence services. The Secret Ser-
vice made huge mistakes in its 1862 reports, invariably doubling the true size
of the Confederate forces. This misinformation misled the field commanders as
well as officials in Washington, so that the campaigns of 1862 were frustrated
by over-caution. If this intelligence failure was not the only cause, it was
at least a major cause of prolonging the war, at the cost of 270,000 battle
casualties after 1862.
The lesson was not heeded - not by the public, nor by Congress, nor even
by the War Department. No system was established for peacetime coordination
and development of government intelligence activities. Military Intelligence
was constantly neglected and its organization was not even continuous. Toward
the end of the 19th century, the Military Information Division was in The
Adjutant General's Office. After the Spanish-American War, intelligence
became temporarily a function of the newly created General Staff, but
soon passed to the War College Division, where it remained submerged for a
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number of years. We entered World War I without an adequate intelligence ser-
vice, and it was not until 1918 that intelligence resumed its place as a
division of the War Department General Staff.
After World War I, intelligence was starved by diminishing appropriations.
Starting with $300,000 for military intelligence activities in 1921, the amounts
declined steadily, falling to less than $58,000 in 1931.
As late as November 1941, the Joint Army-Navy Board was reorganized without
intelligence representation, although G-2 of the War Department General Staff
had recommended that the heads of military and naval intelligence should be in-
cluded. We entered World War II with the Military Intelligence Service not
fully prepared, and in the early stages had to depend largely on our Allies.
However, as in previous wars, a monumental effort was made, and a highly
efficient organization was developed before the fighting ended.
The need for interdepartmental coordination had been recognized before
the war, and the President had appointed General Donovan as Coordinator of
Information. However, his office was shortly changed to the Office of Strategic
Services, and functioned as an operating agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
While it performed important operating services in some theaters, it was not a
coordinating agency and there was considerable duplication between its intelli-
gence activities and those of the departments. The main improvements in coordina-
tion resulted from voluntary action. For example, by its own initiative the War
Department coordinated all American intelligence activities related to German
secret weapons, and coordinated the planning of departmental intelligence objec-
tives in the Par East. Also, the Joint Intelligence Committee took important
steps in coordination of intelligence policy. However,.there was no single
official coordinating agency and the coordination was not complete. A clamor
arose for the establishment of such an agency, backed by unparalleled unanimity
of public opinion that intelligence must form a keystone in the nation's first
line of defense.
Various plans were submitted by the major intelligence agencies, all con-
templating that the proposed central agency would require strong coordinating
authority. There was less agreement, however, on the question of whether the
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central agency should have operating functions. For example, secretary
Stimson expressed the War Department view that the coordinating authority
should not itself engage in operations since its inevitable tendency would be
to expand its own operating functions at the expense of the other agencies.
The divergent views of all the responsible agencies were exhaustively
studied before the decision was reached. Finally, on January 22, 1946, the
President established the National Intelligence Authority by letter to the
Secretaries of State, War and the Navy. It was an exceptionally sound com-
promise. It gave strong coordinating powers, and - while not specifically
mentioning intelligence operations - provided for certain common services to
be performed for the benefit of existing agencies.
The opening paragraph of the Presidentts letter shows that the system
rests upon the existing authority of the Cabinet officers to whom the letter is
addressed. This paragraph reads:
"It is my desire, and, I hereby direct, that all federal foreign intel-
ligence activities be planned, developed, and coordinated so as to assure
the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related
to the National Security. I hereby designate you, together with another
person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National
Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose."
Obviously, the three Secretaries need a staff to handle the details of
this responsibility, and the staff must have a director. Therefore, the Presi-
dents second paragraph created the necessary staff organization, under the
title: "The Central Intelligence Group." The President provided its general
charter by enjoining the three Secretaries as follows:
"Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from
time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective depart-
ments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence
Group and shall, under the Director of Central Intelligence, assist the
National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence
shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelli-
gence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof."
The NIA thus has four voting members - the Secretaries of State. War, and
the Navy, and the President's personal representative - at this time his Chief
of Staff, Fleet Admiral Leahy. The Director of Central Intelligence performs a
dual function: he is a non-voting member of the NIA, and is also the Director
of the staff which assists the NIA. The first Director was Rear Admiral Sidney
W. Souerw, a former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. He was succeeded
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after six months by Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, who in turn was
recently succeeded by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, lately the U.S.
Naval Attache in Paris. These changes have been rapid, but have assured
steady infusion of new thoughts during the organizing period. Once CIG is
established on a firm legislative basis, continuity of policy will be a major
consideration. It is hoped that Directors will thereafter hold office for
five years at least.
The National Intelligence Authority has laid special stress on coordination.
Recognizing the need for daily actions and decisions based on their over-all
direction, the three Secretaries have charged the Director of Central Intelli-
gence as follows:
The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed
to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign intelli-
gence activities related to the national security to insure that the
over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are
properly implemented and executed."
The NIA has also published the following fundamental implementing policy:
"Recommendations approved by this Authority will, where applicable,
govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments repre-
sented herein."
Thus, a directive by the National Intelligence Authority binds each of
the three Departments. It is in no sense an intrusion by an outside agency;
rather, it is a command of each Secretary to his own Department. Thus, the
chain of command is carefully and fully observed.
In view of these relationships, the Director of Central Intelligence must
understand the viewpoints of the departmental intelligence agencies, and must
know in advance how they will be affected by directives of the NIA. Therefore,
the President's letter established an Intelligence Advisory Board, whose per-
manent members are the heads of the intelligence agencies of the State, War,
and Navy Departments, and the Army Air Forces. Also, provision is made to
invite the head of any other intelligence agency to sit as temporary member of
the Board on a matter affecting his agency. Each permanent Board member has a
dual function: in addition to advising the Director of Central Intelligence, each
ordinarily holds the organic position of principal intelligence adviser to the
NIA member directly over him.
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So much for the top structure. Let us now examine the Central Intelli-
gence Group itself. First, where do the personnel come from? In compliance
with the President's letter, each department assigns a quota of personnel to
the Group for tours of duty of about 2 years. These departmental personnel
hold key positions in CIG, thus assuring a coalescence of departmental views
and interests. This is the type of assignment that members of this audience
will be likely to hold from time to time. The other source of personnel is
direct employment by CIG, under Civil Service procedure and from CIG funds.
These employees constitute the preponderance of CIG personnel strength, and
provide the continuity and stability. Some pf these employees will work up to
key positions which are now available only to departmental personnel.
When first organized, CIG depended upon the member departments for budgetary
support; however, CIG now has its own budget which, for security purposes, is
hidden within the departmental budgets of the member agencies.
With this background, we are ready to consider how the Central Intelligence
Group functions. In general, a separate Office of CIG has been established to
carry out each major function assigned by the President's letter. In keeping
with the idea that an Office which coordinates should not also operate, a clear
separation has been made: i.e, a CIG Office which performs coordinating func-
tions does not at the same time perform operating functions, and vice versa.
The Office which handles policy coordination is the Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff - called "ICAPS" for short. Its job is to plan
the over-all coordination of departmental intelligence activities and to work
out recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority for the establishment
of major policies and objectives. ICAPS is headed by a Chief, responsible to
the Director of Central Intelligence. The members of ICAPS are representatives
of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and of the Army Air Forces, designated
by them but under the administrative control of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. This group maintains liaison with the appropriate departments and agencies
and works with agency representatives to develop the programs for adoption by
the NIA. The resulting NIA Directives are published infrequently, but they are
very far-reaching since they announce the over-all policies by which intelli-
gence operations of all the agencies are coordinated.
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Operating coordination of collection and dissemination is accomplished
through a clearing house arrangement which serves the intelligence requirements
of all authorized departments and agencies. This service is performed by the
Office of Collection and Dissemination, called OCD, and headed by the Assistant
Director for Collection and Dissemination. The basic principles are simple.
Each department determines its own requirements for intelligence information.
It attempts to satisfy each of its requirements by using its own resources, except
when it is obvious that the material could be more readily furnished by an out-
side agency. If it is unable to satisfy its own requirement efficiently, it
then appeals directly to the Office of Collection and Dissemination. OCD main-
tains direct contact with all Washington agencies which may have intelligence
material available in their files, or which have field collection facilities.
O CD makes a continual survey of all authorized agencies to ascertain their needs
for intelligence material. It coordinates the requests received, eliminates
duplication, and assures that appropriate file search is made to see whether the
material is already in Washington. If .not, OCD then allocates a field collection
mission to the appropriate operating agency or agencies. These allocations are
based upon the clearly known primary interests and capabilities of the agencies,
and upon responsibilities determined by the NIA. Currently, about 250 requests
are received monthly, and the number increases steadily. Examples of agencies
served include the National War College, the FBI, the Departments of Interior,
Agriculture, and Treasury, the Joint Research and Development Board, the Public
Health Service, the Library of Congress, the Tariff Commission, and others.
The collected material comes to the Reading Center of OCD, which has it disseminated
to the requesting agency as well as to other appropriate agencies. The Reading
Center reviews the daily intake from all intelligence agencies of the Government
and assures that each item is available to every agency having a proper need
for it. It processes more than 8,000 documents a month, not counting multiple
copies, and handles approximately 10,000 cables. The Reading Center is at
present manned only by CIG personnel, but plans under way will shortly make it
possible to invite the major departmental agencies to visit the Center daily, to
select and screen material for their own departments.
SECP r
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We now come to the Office of Reports and Estimates, or ORE, which is at
the very heart of the intelligence problem. This Office is responsible for
complete correlation and evaluation of intolligene relating to the national
security. ORE is headed by an Assistant Director, and is staffed with research
subdivisions organized principally along geographical or regional lines. Copies
of all material received at the Reading Center go to ORE. This includes fin-
ished intelligence studies produced by the depar bnental intelligence agencies,
as well as raw information. ORE depends upon the agencies' finished intelli-
gene as the principal basis for CIG studies. However, ORE researchers must also
read the daily intake of raw information for two important reasons: first, ORE
must be continually expert on the world situation, and be alert to decide when
an estimate should be submitted to the President on CIG initiative; second, ORE
must be continually ready to prepare any intolligence study or estimate on call
from the President or the 11%IA. ORE maintains close contact with the research
divisions of the principal departmental intelligence agencies, and depends upon
them for help in the preparation of national intelligence estimates. In these
estimates ORE attempts to achieve the maximum objectivity; from a neutral posi-
tion, its researchers can evaluate and analyze without regard to departmental
preoccupations or pressures. Nevertheless, it is very important that the
President and the NIA shall have the full benefit of departmental views. There-
fore, all intelligence reports prepared by ORE are reviewed by the intelligence
agencies whose heads are permanent members of theIntelligence Advisory Board,
and substantial dissent by any of them is noted in the published CIG report.
ORE prepares CIG Daily Intelligence Summaries and Meekly Summaries for the
information of the President, the NIA, and other selected high-leval offices.
In addition, it systematically produces intelligence studies based on the current
situation and objectives of t}ie NIA. Some idea of their scope may be gained
from titles selected at random, such as: estimates on Soviet Foreign Military
Policy, the Situation in Korea, the Greek Situation, and the Situation in
Austria; an Estimate on Soviet Capabilities for the Development and Production
of Certain Types of Weapons; several special studies on Current Soviet Intentions;
a study of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia; a study of Revised Soviet
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Tactics in International Affairs; and others of similar variety, ranging
from brief special evaluations to formal estimates.
The CIG activities so far described have been staff or coordinating
functions rather than operating functions. Howevor,the President also charged
the Director with performing, for the benefit of the departmental intelligence
agencies, such services of common concern as the NIA determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally.
For this purpose, two operating offies have been established: the
Office of Operations and the Office of Special Operations. The Office of
Special Operations has special security problems, so I will only summarize by
saying that it performs espionage services for the benefit ofthe appropriate
federal intelligence agencies. will amplify when he speaks to
you later this week.
All the other operating functions of a service nature are concentrated in
the Office of Operations. I believe the most characteristic example of the
type service it renders is the monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts
of foreign powers. The coverage is world-wide, and daily transcripts covering
varied fields of subject matter are distributed at high speed to all authorized
agencies.
8 A.M., are distributed to Washington addresses before sundown. Special sum-
maries, such as world reaction to the President's speech on aid for Greece and
Turkey, are prepared and distributed as required.
his monitoring has frequently brought the first
information on important events behind the iron curtain, such as data on the
Yugoslav-Albanian treaty. Before leaving for Moscow, General Marshall asked CI G
to furnish a 500-word daily digest of Russian and satellite broadcasts relating
to the conference.
SECRET
25X1
i 25X1
4
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Another service is the exploitation of captured Japanese documents - a
function formerly performed by the Washington Document Center. I am sory that
there is not time, this morning, to tell you more about Documents Branch acti-
vities and about still other services already under development or contemplated
for the future. However, those I have already mentioned will give you an
accurate general idea of what CIG is trying to do for the common benefit of the
intelligence agencies of the Government.
The foregoing brief outline completes the story of CIG organization and
functions. I hope it has sufficed to show how t1v establishment of the. CI G
was a necessary step in assuring the security of the United States under modern
military conditions. I hope particularly that I have made clear its two prin-
cipal functions: i.e., coordination of Government intelligence activities, and
common service for the benefit of intelligence agencies. To perform these
functions efficiently, the CIG will need cooperation and help. It is only with
advice and assistance of the departmental intelligence agencies, and with the
constructive help of the best intelligence officers in those services, that
CIG can accomplish the objectives of the National Intelligence Authority.
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