COMMENTS ON DRAFT OF PROPOSED MEMORANDUM FROM THE DCI TO THE NSC PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001700090006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 18, 1949
• Content Type: MF

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18 October 1949
MEMORANDT 4 FOR: MR. CRIL BB
SUBJECT: Comments on Draft of Proposed Meaorandur
fraa the DCI to the ESC Prepared by the
Office of Counsel
1. To my mind the proposed memo contains the suns of the
deficiencies which were inherent in previous drafts prepared
by some of the Offices of CIA, namely, it does not sufficientl
protect the Director. We must fully recognize that such a
step as he might take in sending a paper of this type to the
NBC is really inviting a "head-roiling" contest, and that he
must be in a unique position of solidarity on every word ex-
pressed by him if he takes such initiative. Thus, when the
attached memorandums uses such words as "refusal" on the part
of the agencies to give certain material, and "blocks" which
the agencies are placing in the way of CIA fulfilling its
designated mission we are lodging very serious indictments
against powerful and long-established executive departments
and agencies of the Government, the heads of which comprise
to some degree the judicial body before whom the Director
places his case, i.e., the National Security Council.
2. I believe we are an very weak grounds in criticizing
the "IAC mechanism." The so-called "mechanism" for the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee is the procedure which we have en-
dorsed and followed in the last few years and is not that pre--
scribed by NSCID No. 1. In commenting on the Dulles Report,
the National Security Council concurred in the observation
and conclusion that the IAdC: was conceived soundly "as an
advisory body." Nowhere in NSCID No. 1,, which created the
IAC, is the thought expressed that the IAC should be other
than advisory in scope. Furthermore., NSCID No. 1 does not
call for unanimity when the Director uses the IAC to test out
the "advice and recommendations" which he may send to the Na-
tional.. Security Council. In fact, NSCID No. 1 not only recog-
nizes, but is sympathetic toward the view that in using the
IAC the Director will not find unanimity, but rather the ex-
pression of individual agency viewpoints which will be looked
upon as "non-concurrences." Hence, instead of asking for a
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revision of ISCID No. 1 to overcome the "board of directors"
philosophy, which has controlled so much of the deliberatioo
of the IAC, what we really need to do is to suggest that the
Director take a definite stand when papers are submitted to
the National Security Council for decision. It is probable
that the stand of the DCI will, in practically an instances,
parallel that of the majority opinion. However, even that i
not obligatory and it is quite conceivable that the occasion,
or occasions, may arise when the DCI in transmitting a paper
to the NSC may concur in the minority viewpoint. We must also
recognize that by the adoption of this procedure, which is
called for in NSCXD Ho. 1, the DCI may adopt a viewpoint whirr
differs materially from any of the advisory concepts ezpresse
by the members of the IAC.
3? My statements are not to be misinterpreted as saying
that the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, a..
written, do not need revamping. My apprehension is on the
point of contending that the revision of 1SCID No. 1 will ove,W_
come t h e difficulties a ci
17-
SHAD; MacCARREY
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21 October 1949
ORaNDUM FOR: MR. CHIN
SUBJECT: Comments supplementing my memorandum oar
18 October 1949 regarding the proposed
report of the Director to the ?Tai
P ac
Considering the lengthy investigative process whict has
been conducted in the intelligence field for the last year F.nci
a half, which culminated in the Dulles report and the it war cc
of the N5C 50, the NSC must be somewhat tired of all of this
"negativeness." Because of the fact that the Dulles report
and the NBC 50 more presumed to evaluate the total intelligence
situation, I doubt if the N5C will be sympathetic toward any
proposal which will start now a chain reaction of new
intelligence investigations and examinations. Regardlea of
our high or low esteem for the Dulles report and the zuSt 50
based thereon, our primary aim at this juncture should be to
work progressively toward strengthening the organization for
intelligence throughout the Federal structure in the intareet
of national security. Any step which we take should not be
the motivating factor for starting internecine squabble --t
high level. God forbad that we should ever be responsibL.e
for starting a "dirty-linen washing contest" in any degree
similar to the struggle on policies and strategy now goi::g on
between the Navy and the Air Force. Even if the National
Security Council's Staff is willing to take our viewpoit:s
and have them sent to higher level, we must remember tha teal
ingrained, antagonistic feelings of some of the Departure. jts
will throw back ideas at us just as hard as 'we sling our sho a
at them. Accordingly., I plead for salutary caution if the
Director is going to take the step which he proposes.
1. To overcome many of the difficulties ccmfrontina the
Director in carrying out the responsibilities awned to hin
under the National Se c:uri ty Act of 1947 and the sul)se quez ,-t
Directives from the N `` , I believe that the total remedy fal.:.?
into. two compartments:
a. Those etc-pis which can be taken today IV the
Director under present authorities and policies and.
b. Those items that need additional clarification
and new Directives.
0 HAS REVIEWED.
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Those stews which, can taken today by the Director
_ to under pre sent authoritie and noliaie s.
(1) For the last few years, the Director has
operated on the very solid principle that coor-
dination by using the cudgel-tactic of direction
will bring little result because of the lack of
goodwill that will result among the agencies being
coordinated. However, experience has shown quite
olearly that the goal of prior agreement has re sulte d
in watered-down products, innumerable delays and cir3uitr+u,
procedures. Thus, I believe today, the Director a tuild
decide that the period of "coordination by prior coc-a-
eration" has ended and that even though the I AL ages- :ies
will still have an opportunity to express their view-
points, unanimity will not be necessary before we
send papers to the 135C for a decision.
(2) In keeping with this concept of strengthens ag
the hand of the Director to assume "forthright
initiative and leadership", the NSC approved the NS(
50 recommbndation to make him, not only a member,
but also Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee. This step on the part of the NSC gives
more potency to the hand of the Director.
(3) Even though the word "material" as used
in NSCID 1.2 is very limiting in its application.,
it seems to me that we can do much more toward
formalizing the authority given to the Director to
make "surveys and inspections of departmental
intelligence material ....."
(4) Much of our difficulty of today stems from
attempting to operate with "leadership" of directives
issued by the leader, i.e., the DGI, when such
directives are puny and weak to accomplish their
objectives. The reason they are so flimsy is the
policy of goodwill which we have followed in allowing
each Agency to have a "crack" at the concepts in an
effort to achieve unanimity of acceptance before
issuance. Because of practical bitter experience,
we should no longer allow the lack of unanimity to
delay the issuance of proposed DCI's. We would
achieve more strength in the proposed directives if
we sent them to the NSC for decision in accordance
with Paragraph 3.g, NSCID 1.
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(5) We should, today., examine our establi3hed
policies and procedures to see if more can be ions
to get "free and unrestricted imterdepartmental
exchange of intelligence information" between
Departments and Agencies of the Government as is
called for in NSCID 2.7.
(6) Have me, up to the present, taken sufficien~,
steps to seek specifically "the assistance of the
1AC intelligence agencies" to minimize the necezsitg
of agencies developing intelligence outside of their
fields of dominant interests? (NSCIII 3.c(4))-
(7) Have ne worked out a production "plan" in
collaboration with the IAC agencies in order to
obtain from them departmental segments in the total
mosaic of national intelligence? WSCID 3-603))-
(8) In the area of producing "intelligence
reports or estimates undertaken mutually", have
we, with sufficient definitiveness and continuous
follow-up, reque sted and received "such special
estimates., reports and periodic briefs or summaries
prepared by the individual Departments or .agencies..."?
(i'[SClfl 3.g (4)). (underscoring supplied)
(9) Have eie, as the central responsible ;oorcd.?t3ti3 t
body, taken the leadership in promoting exchange of
information on projects and plans in the production
of staff intelligence"? (NBC"]} 3.a (5)).
Unless we can furnish non-quibbling, concrete anew $ t
the questions raised in the last few paragraphs, instead of
speaking about departmental negative attitudes, I believ!
the Director might be in a very vulnerable spot in mak`,A
his presentation to the iiSC, unless, in so doing, ce Ole rly
indicates that his actions in these various fields are p.r-
alelling his new decision to coordinately direction.
(underscoring supplied)
Those items that need additional olarification ane- new
Directives
(1) If the DCI is to be responsible for coord ,.iati on
with the potency desired by the NSC., the Council ?st
take certain steps to lend strength to his hand in he
accomplishment of this task.
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(2) The responsibilities of the Director should
be more clearly enumerated so as to make known to
everyone, especially the intelligence Departreents ari-i
Agencies, what is the exact meaning of the function
of "coordination." It should be further clarified
that it is only in this field of coordination that tie
Director is asked to seek the advice of the LC, and
that beyond his duties of coordination are many staf'
functions which are still within the immediate
responsibility of the DCI and are not of operational
concern to the LAC agencies.
(3) Since the directives issued by the DCI are
his implementing policies for operations in specific
fields of endeavor, the inherent weaknesses of the
dire c tive s bring about many of the problems wader
which we operate today. She statement of the NSC
that the DCI directives, when issued, carry the weight
of Council directives is just so many words of noble
vintage unless the implementation function on these
directives is adequately supported. However, this
important and very essential function c of b,
by the DCI because the NSC spe cifi cally states "the
respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible
for insuring that such orders or directives, when
applicable, are implemented within their intelligence
organizations." Accordingly, under present operational
policy, we formulate the ideas, issue the directive and
then assume a complete attitude of indifference as to
the practicality of its application, and that we do
because the NSC so orders.
(4) In discussing the production of Basic I;nte:ligencn
(NSCID 3.1 (5)) the DCI is "responsible for ccordine bi
production and maintenance and for the editing, publ.icat4 4-;
and dissemination. of these National Intelligence Sux treys.... r"
whereas in t aragraph 3.1 (3) of the same directive, it
is plainly established that "changes in the outline or
allocations shall be effected py agre e' t between to e
DCI and the agencies concerned. underscoring supp ied
Thus , the NSC must itself determine whether, in ther
clamor for "forthright initiative and leadership" t:.(;33
will agree to consistency of thought and expression
in their directives.
To direct with strength, or
To direct with prior sugar-.coated
agreement
That is the question!"
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(5) Certainly the timely and adequate
dissemination of vurrent Intelligence is within
the purview of the coordination responsibd.liity
of the D.L. However, regardless of the optional
feature of following the unanimity concept of
NSCIi) 1 as to the use of the IAC IV the DCI,
NSCID 3.lJ2 (3) clearly states "Interagency
dissemination of current intelligence shall be
based on In ra jncv agreement ....." (underscoring
supplied )
(6) The eamei principle of NSC 50 which calls
for "forthright initiative and leadership of the
Director of the Central Intelligence" sanctions
participation by the IAC "more actively in the
continuing coor tion of intelligence act;ivitiea
(underscoring supplied) This combine of suggesting
in the one sentence the accomplishment of results
by "leadership" and then asking for "coordination"
with IAC is somewhat self-contradictory and
neutralizes much of the effectiveness of the NSC 50
recommendations. It is tantamount to saying to the
Director "you do it and be responsible, but in so
doing, you must -work with and accept the view
points of other people." His hands are free but
his feet are fettered. For example, Section 4 of
NSC 50 lists many questions which require "coor-
dination" and hence must be re solved by the ag
active participation by the IAC in seeking and
applying the necessary remedies. This view is
substantiated by the recommendation which calls
for action, not by the DCI "with forthright leader-
ship" but by the "Director of Central Intel3i?enoe
and the Intelligence Advisory Committee."
Conclusion
I reemphasize the element of care and caution in tt
proposed undertaking and because of this apprehension, I
an convinced that if the Director approaches the 11SC wit-t
a position of strength, above and beyond the jurisdictio-ial
differences that exist between departmental and central '-i.ew--
points in,
a) telling the Council concretely about h de cisi >n
to adopt a more hard-hitting type of direction
because of his experiences of the past few years
and,
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b) seeking from the Council-their blessing on
his decision, and specific written clarificatioa
of his responsibilities in some of the fields
causing most of the trouble today, he will
obtain the kind of power and authority which
he needs to accomplish his mission and at the
same time will not have fomented ill will on tba
part of the agencies with which he must still
work.
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E -J-6 2
22 September 19)49
I 40RMDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT : Organization of ICAPS
1. In compliance with your request for comments on the memo and