PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD (PSB)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001700090010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 1, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
1 J~Ine i,l
RMSiK FUR; Mr, Barr t j State
Mr, D&Tis4 a-$ State
Mrs
Oa., Define
Col iar.i DwvU, befewin
A trsl Stev en a,E JCS
Caul. Phtlb1u, JCS
mro Y*svk 11 CIA
F CU
Psy-: o1 cul I trategf B:)ard (PSB)
Attaccbed hereto is the ttr a1 ed Lion of the r
been c oog ti :I re 8 ' t c 1. i
or works of pls a for t P alctt aal WEII
the
z41. the V,
been 3ubmi d. A -
re .: eltaent of the taper bars
I trust till L2 o w W demge ~ he substan- ve
MwedUtely attac1 sd he:
"Chaff'icia1 Conte encl. ui;ettcw of t
Cc mit e." While is rat; meted that the It o
t re+;cs3s3 .er the per; in the light ? r terse s ejt
It is hopa that tb t eirs vi:.1 be read and at Che r r c
time given ce sider`?iot. as the Board end its Staff rvf
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Ass t Di
Mx el?13. e. C a t: cur
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F,CRET
UNOFFICIAL C')11MENTS AND SUGGESTIONS OF OPC NUBERS OF AD HOC Cot, rrrEE
Our difficulty with the attachments to the memorandum proposer fa
Dullest signature stems from the treatment of the issue descs?d bead in tlhr
attachments as follows:
"Under one vies the Psycholog-cal Straterr Board anc. its
Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among exisk_
i.ng agencies. Under another view the Psi chological Strategy
Board and its Staff would itself systematically plan and dire' t
the psychological strateinr of the ?cold' war."
In disagreeing over this issue the majority of the ad hoc group fey;,N tia.
it might be deferred until after the appointment of the Director. Ultto%Et
we would be perfectly content to have the question deferred urtil t'ie
tor is appointed, we do not believe that this is the action which tie
ity has taken. As we read the attachments, they require the Staff- 'o tr
coordinators rather than planners, and we are fearful that tke ador.:i.or.
these terms of reference in their present form might well jecpazdi. :_' tte
Director's ability to conceive of his functions as being otherwise.
The President's directive indicates that he intended that the :'eyctt
gical Strategy Board be more than a eoo*?dinating mechanism. In our vie,;
the Board is expected to define the objectives which this c untr aiiotrdc
seek i
th
"
ld"
it
ti
n
e
co
war s
ua
on, to develop the glans for attairiin? t
and to coordinate the carrying out of the plans by the responsible Ipera
ing agencies, Thus, the purpose of his directive is "to authoriz; -xnd
er?ent
situation and then of formulating strategic objectives and plar.a. It
we do not start with this we will continue indefinitely on an a-i hoc
approach. This priority should be reflected in the chart of. '4P,:yopcstd
Organization Phase I1" by indicating the immediate creation o' a
.3h
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i CRET
Plans Group and its activation prior to that of the operational
coordination and programming and evaluation group shown on the
chart. The Staff Director should have the authority to staff t ds
group with individuals who are now employed by the Federal Govs?nment
as well as consultants, and the member departments and agencies should
place a very high priority on assisting the director immediatel,- to
obtain the very best talent available..
e. Note (1), authorizes the appointment of deputies to the Board *aber-
ship. Although this is desirable and although, as stated in the
note, the departmental responsibilities of such deputies should by
all means be as broad as the scope of the Board's responsibilities,
it is essential that the Board's business not be turned over to the
deputies. In order to avoid this, we suggest deleting the sec.brd *or.-.
tence of the note and substituting the following:
"For the purposes of a quorum, at least two of the Board's members
must be present. In the absence of the Chairman, the Director -ill
act as chairman."
It is obvious from our previous comments that in our view .,he
first task of the Boa-,d and its Staff is to set our "cold" war :bje:.
tives and develop an initial strategy towards them which will e icoi>,eais
an integrated use of all available "cold" war weapons. Consequ :ntly .
we suggest placing these two problems at the top of the Board's age-^Y'nn-
Since it is likely that the best solutions to other items pressitly c.
7y ei I
the agenda will be found only after the objectives and goner al
strategy towards them have been adopted, we also suggest dererr.ng
these other items for the time being, during which they an be tandicai
as at present,
Although we feel that the treatment of "psychological stra+..eg+ :
the 'cold' war" which appears in the annex is again too heavily weitra.ei
on the propaganda side, we think that the concept of a working; group.
composed as suggested, which would meet outside of Washington d..ring
the summer, is excellent. We suggest that this group be organi,ed
early in the summer and be asked to assist the Director and his Staff
in preparing for the Board the statement of objectives and the =hoed
strategy towards them, which we have referred to several times slsewt+srs.
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S -E -C -R -E -T
1 June 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR: THC DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)
1. Attached are papers which have been prepared interdepart-
mentally and approved for presentation to the Psychological Streteg
Board (PSB) by the principal advisers to the members of that Board.
2. It is our recommendation that you authorize the distribeticr
of these papers to the members of the PSB with a view to calling a
first meeting of the Board in the near future.
3. It is suggested that the agenda for the first meeting cf
the Board might be as follows:
a. To consider the 'proposed interim procedure (TA3 A),
b, To approve the protosed functions and organization :)f
the Director and his Staff as an aid to the new Director in
setting up his organization (TAB B).
c. To note the paper (TAB C) prepared by General Magru ter
regarding his concept of the Board and the organization. chat
which has been developed to implement this concept. They a!~e
put forward to suggest the eventual nature of the Board and its
Staff. It is not endorsed by all the participants and if, as,
and when it is discussed representatives of the departments
and agencies should have an opportunity to present their vi:ws.
There is also attached under TAB C a paper submitted by
Mr. Howland Sargeant of the Department of State commenting o.on
General Magruder's paper.
d. To consider the relationship of the Psychological
Strategy Board to the National Security Council.
To consider future business of the Board (TAB D).
ALLEN W. DULLES
Deputy Director (Plans)
Central Intelligence Agency
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T4W S-E-C-F.-E-T TAB A
INTERIM PROCEDURE
In order to move ahead with the organization of the PSB the
chairman, General Walter Bedell Smith, suggested that informal
meetings be held among the representatives of the participating
agencies in order to outline the field of work of the Board. Three
such meetings have been held. The first under the chairmanship of
General Walter Bedell Smith and the second and third under that of
Mr. Allen Dulles.. This group was composed as follows:
Mr. Dulles, CIA (presiding)
Mr. Barrett, State (or his representative)
General Magruder, Defense
Admiral Stevens, JCS
This group with the help of staff assistants in each agency has
developed the set of papers of which this is a part.
This group is prepared to continue to sit, if desired by the
Board, to deal with any further preparatory measures that may be
necessary pending the appointment of a Director and his assumption
of his duties.
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NW S-E-C-R-E-T TAB B
FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR AND STAFF
In order to give effect to the terms of the President's
Directive of April 4, 1951, the responsibilities of the Director
and the functions of the Staff, subject to the Board, should be:
a. to encourage the responsible agencies to produce
ideas in support of psychological operations which include
those matters envisaged under the NSC 59 and NSC 10 series;
b, as necessary, to coord=inate, expedite, and ensure the
expansion of the planning and implementing of psychological
policies and programs;
c. to initiate and formulate proposals, including pro-
posals for national psychological strategy, which would be
referred as appropriate to the Board or directly to the
responsible operating departments or agencies for develop-
ment and execution;
d. to ensure that the psychological policies, objectives
and programs promulgated by the Board are within the capa-
bilities of execution of the operating agencies or, if not, to
reo end to thcr-B+aardthat such"special-administrative personnel
and logistical support as may be required from appropriate
departments and agencies be made available;
e. to make a broad and continuing evaluation of current
and proposed operations in the light of national plans and to
recommend improvements to the operating agencies based on this
review;
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f. to assure that in the determination, pronouncement
and implementation of political, economic and military polici:::s,
adequate attention is given to their psychological effects
and to existing psychological programs;
g. to assure that the programs of psychological operating
agencies will be furthered by U. S. Government official pronounce-
ments;
h. to encourage, receive, and review proposals and research
bearing on psychological operations from private and official
sources outside the operating departments and agencies and to
make these available as appropriate to such agencies;
is to provide secretariat services, including:
(1) preparation of reports as directed by the Beard;
(2) organization of the business of the Board and
expedition of decisions;
is
(3) promulgation of the decisions of the Board;
to assemble such intelligence and such policy and
operational information as necessary for the performance of
the above functions;
ks to examine continually the functions of the Board anc
Staff in order to ensure that the facilities and resources of
the participating departments and agencies are utilized to the
maximum extent,
(A proposed chart of organization for fulfillment of
these functions is attached hereto.)
-2-
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amd DIRECTOR
Awd imm" I
^O0RD {A t 14
i OPf RATWAL R
NOW, (1) It is expected that each mwmb= of the Board vial designate a deputy vhce responsibilities
jg~jv de all Z%tters over which the B d itself has ci ` 8os~rd cif: the advice of n Board
members at any meetings the Director Will act as
mental consultants as required p
(2) No attempt bus been made to specify which unit or units would perform each of the Staff fcnnctionS
listed an the preceding page. In view of the ssamall size of the proposed Staff this should be left to the
Director Who will allocate them in accordance with the individual gualificotia2z of his ;ssistautso In per-
forming these functions, hovever, the Staff will utilf e to the ? txi. sa extent the f'e4i3.1tiea and resources
of the participating aepa, nts s agencies
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S -E -C -R -E -T
CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE
DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
IN TIE COLD WAR
The attached paper and organization chart has been prepared
by General Magruder and presents a concept toward which the Board
and its Staff might evolve. No new functions as such are envisaged
but it is based on a much broader interpretation of the agreed
functions. While agreeing that "the Board shall utilize to the
maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating
departments and agencies," the group disagreed on what constituted
the "maximum extent." Under the view cxpresseu. in TAB B the PSB
and its Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among
existing agencies. Under the concept in the attacked the PSB
and its Staff would itself systematically program and control the
psychological strategy of the Cold War. This involves a much
larger independent planning role and much more contact with the
detailed operations of the agencies than could be unanimously
endorsed by the representatives.
Also included under this TAB are comments on General Magruder'
paper submitted by Mr. Howland Sargeant of the State Department.
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PLEASE INSERT YOUR COPY
OF GENERAL MAGRUDER'S PAPER,
"PSB" , 21 MAY 1951 (REV.)
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SP.-C E-B-T
POSSEBM CIGAN=AT 0 ITS
BOARD
S e ct,LxIat
and
Administrative
!fie
Cunt
war
aordinatc
Regional &
unctiaral
Speech Cc-
Cat atuNtcm
the Gutex
epar tts and a ci :s.
Diretitar
Board Designees
F%U and/or pert time con tarts
Division C fs ana t ratioual
Coordimatate
Intelligence P: Pvaaustion I I Ideology & Doctrl
11
Eyabi t1czn
Ide a
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COMMENTS OF MR. HOWLAND SARGEANT ON
"CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYNAMIC
PSYCHOLOGICAL, OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR"
The subject paper is a personal expression of General Ma;rudG
designed to be helpful in the establishment of the new Psychologi-;
Strategy Board. While most of the concepts in the paper arc )nes
with which I would heartily agree, there are a few points to rhic
I would take exception. These differences are mainly matters of
degree rather than of kind, but it may be useful to try and c;,-Pre.-,s
them.
The following principles seem to me to be basic to the s,ccef,,_
ful operation of the Board:
1. Our Psychological program will succeed only as person
and offices responsible for detailed planning and implementati nl
perform their functions with greater and greater efficiency. m'o
impose a large super-structure on top of them and
of their functions to regove many new requirements in whole or in part would, I believe, introduce
far coordination and liaison activities, deal a
serious blow to the morale of persons now engaged in psycholog:_cal
operations, and in the end result in diminishing rather than
increasing the efficiency of their work. Activities of the ne=.,
PSB staff can result either in stifling the initiative of lower
echelons or in inspiring them to greater efficiency.
should be made to see that the latter result is achieved,rY effort
2. With respect to psychological programming, the princip~tl
need which the new Board and its staff can fill is that of form -
lating very broad government-wide policies especially such poli,
as are presently beyond the competence of any single department ores
agency. The application of these policies to concrete p inp o
situations should be entrusted to the individual agencies. It
should be noted that the tendency in many administrative structi-res
is to secure the services of competent experts and then to over) ad
them with details to such a degree that th;
and should itself be responsible only for the final formulation :an._
promulgation. Furthermore, this formulation should not attempt
be in "operating" terms if this means that the needs of each med?:nr
must be spelled out, nor should it be in "regional" terns if this;
means that detailed consideration should be given to the dif,_'erinL_T
requirements of each country. The implementation of policy by
various communications media and the requirements of specific
regions could more efficiently be spelled out in detail by eper1
in the existing agencies.
In paragraph 19c, also on page 6, it is said that the staff
should make a continuous evaluation of the results of operations
with a view to making prompt adjustments in the profgraris when,
necessary. My objection may be merely a matter of wording, t?ut 3
feel that the words "make a prompt adjustment" implies a degree o
involvement in operations which was not contemplated by the
Presidential directive. Perhaps it would be adequate to say mere
that the staff should recommend such adjustments to the operetinf
agencies.
Paragraph 20 on page 6 expresses the fear that if the Director
and staff give themselves up to pondering and planning, we wculd
have succeeded only in establishing another Ivory Tower. Herein,
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I believe, there is a difference only in emphasis, but I believe
that this wording might obscure the fact that at the present time
our detailed planning is often far in advance of our long-term
planning. Would it not be better to encourage the Director and
staff to "ponder and plan" as long as this cerebration is harnessed
to the realities of operations. As stated above, we have not given
our most qualified thinkers an opportunity to think. Let us ins,-re
that some of them at least have an opportunity to do so in the staff
of PSB.
Paragraph 21 on page 6 suggests that the staff should include
certain regional and functional chiefs who are outstanding experts
in their respective geographical and functional areas. Certainl,%?
i* is to be hoped that personnel can be found for PSB who will have
certain regional or functional qualifications, but PSB should not
try to compete with the operating agencies when it comes to regional
or functional experts. Instead, PSB policy experts should plan to
rely principally on the regional and functional specialists in th,
various agencies.
Paragraphs 23 and 2t suggest the creation of a "strategy
group," It is my feeling that the entire senior staff of the
PSB,should be considered such a strategy group and that to create
a special organization so entitled within the PSB staff would imply
that the rest of the PSB staff would be concerned with details which
might more appropriately be left to the operating agencies.
In general, my feeling is that the PSB should strive to
conduct its business with as small a staff as possible and should
attempt to perform only such substantive tasks as are in addition
to those now being performed in the operating departments and
agencies. It may be that this conception is not far removed from
that expressed in General Magruder's paper, but that paper may al:o
be interpreted as advocating a large staff which would to a large
extent duplicate or supplant certain functions of existing agencies.
These comments, therefore, are intended only to highlight the dif-
fering interpretations which are possible and to assist in their
resolution.
t -C-R-R-T
E.
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S E C R E T
PROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION
1. The attached list contains substantive problems
which it is suggested the Board should consider. Although
work is already going forward to some extent on all these
items, the amount of progress varies considerably. It is
recommended that the Board select the most important and
urgent ones and direct their staffs to expedite the pre-
paration of papers for PSB consideration.
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I. Substantive Problems
A. Suggestions for Priority Attention
1. The defection of Communist China from the USSR
2. Psychological strategy to be followed on the deat
of Stalin
3. A strategic psychological plan for 0 and measures
for immediate application
4. Psychological policies on public statements with
regard to the Atomic Bomb
5. Subversion, demoralization and defection of Sovie
troops in East Germany
B. Other Items
6. A psychological plan for
II
7, National policy measures designed to increase
desired defections (both in and outside combat
areal; )
8. Psychological strategy with regard to the u:iiverse=l
desire for Peace:
a. c'.esirability of a disarmament proposal
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b. countering Soviet 1951 Peace Campaign
9. Implementation of Project
II. Long-Terra Projects (See attachment)
1. Psychological strategy in the Cold War
2. Psychological measures to insure that constructive
relationships can be maintained and developed
among; the United States and the governments an
peoples of nations, as in NATO, whose cooperat on
is essential to the national security.
3. Campaii to improve the personnel situation in
psychological operations
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+. Survey of policy planning and research in the, fielit
of psychological operations
5. Survey of activities evaluating the effectiveness T
psychological operations
III. Administrative
1. National psychological warfare and special operations
personnel control and allocation
2. Measures to refine operational psychological warfare
techniques
j. Cover and deception in current national psychological
warfare toward USSR (e.g. the utilization of at1ach#e:;,
correspondents and agents)
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SUGGESTED INITIAL PROJECTS FOR PSB
1. Psychological Strategy in, the Cold War
Many individuals working in the field of psychological oper?.-
tions in the Cold War have felt the absence of a "grand-strategy" --
a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all. efforts can
be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a
strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short
period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes
far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists.
These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operatio%-is
planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand
strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board
gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they hove tiad
heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks
of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formu-
late a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the Cold War.
A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:
1. Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's
very best brains from both inside and outside the govern-
ment in the field of psychological operations and making
provision to see that they have facilities for concentrater,
work. The group should also include experts in political
and military strategy. It is felt that the prestige o
the Board will be such that it can command the services
of individuals who would not ordinarily be available
to work personally on such a project.
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2. A working place outside Washington should be designated
for meetings. It has been noted in previous similar cases
that it is much simpler to enable top quality m?r. to cork
on problems of this sort personally (rather thar, d(,;le~atirf:
them to subordinates) if they can be insulated from tie
pressure of routine duties. This insulation procedure is
commonly adopted by such agencies as Brookings and RAI-[)
with a considerable measure of success.
3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad
problem: us the following:
a.
What psychological and other measures can be taken to
restrain Soviet aggression?
b.
What psychological and other measures can b
strengthen our allies and potential alliccT
taker, to
c.
How may the best, statement of U. S. ideolog,;r be
arrived at?
d.
Flow can our Cold War aims be defined?
The following measures should be taken in preparation for
this working group:
a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place,
secretarial help, security, etc.
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b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of
NSC papers and Presidential statements having a bearing
on psychological operations.)
c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, .,is
needed.
5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four
day period at the beginning of the summer and for a thre:: or
four day period toward the end of the summer: In between the
two full meetings sub-groups should be asked to work on
specific phases of the overall problem.
6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be view:d as an
effort to work out a national policy binding on all agen-ies.
It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:
a. From the point of view of psychological operations, ,chat
should our national policy be?
b. How may existing national policy be exploited more
effectively through psychological operations?
II. A Long-Term Campaign to Inprove the Personnel Situation in
Psychological Operations
This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to
improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce
superior personnel who already have the available qualifications torn
enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A
considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been
accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to t,e
second part might be as follows:
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(1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside
the government what their principal objections to enterini;
government service are.
(2) Work out, with all agencies affected, a long-term publicity
program designed to attract first-rate personnel.
(3) Approach key members of Congress with a view to obtainin_
their support in this campaign.
III. Policy Planning and Research Survey
This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary-
PSB with outside advice solicited. as needed, should attempt to answ.cr
the following questions:
1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the
field of psychological operations is currently going on?
2. What basic research for psychological operations in th