INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001700090013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 14, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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14 June 1?` L
MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTORS
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS
SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for
Psychological Operations
1. Attached for discussion at the Assistant Direct,,rs'
Meeting on Monday, 16 June 1951, is a draft memorandum which
it is proposed. to distribute to the key people in he fit+ld
of psychological intelligence and operations in State, CA
and Defense. The paper was written after discussions wilh
all interested organizations, and the analysis sections
had the benefit of considerable interagency comment.
2. It is requested specifically that the five general
principles listed in paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum e
approved.
JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
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SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for
Psycholog-_-al Operations
1. The attached paper is distributed for information and for
such guidance as it may provide. Recognizing that further ref.nez !nt:,
may be possible it is hoped that this will clarify and stab i.li.e e=~i =-?
ting arrangements, focus attention on any important disagreemernts, j)tr,
isolate component problems requiring further adjustments. Rec__pie1l.
are not asked to indicate their formal concurrence but their ccvmment--
and suggestions will be welcome and appropriate revisions will be
issued. In the event that an agency disagrees with a basic point in
the paper, it is requested to discuss the matter with this office and3,
if agreement cannot be reached, the issue should be framed for dis-
cussion and decision at a higher level.
2. The general principles of the paper, which have been spprc.ve
in CIA, are briefly as follows:
a. Intelligence support for psychological operations Ls r_c:?,
a job to be undertaken by any single agency but shoula be camp,
ative effort of State, CIA and the Military Servicer.(Pp. L-5,
section B, 1-12)
b. In making this cooperative effort each LW agency shou3C
call on the others for intelligence which does not fall within
its own field of dominant interest. (p. 6, para. 2)
c. The coordination of a particular paper in the psyctiolo icc3.L
field, just as in other fields, should be done by the agen.-y
primarily responsible for producing that paper. (p. '', para. +;
d. CIA (O/IC) will assist in making arrangements and ironn;
out difficulties that may arise. (pp.j, 8, para. 6)
e. The Director of the new Psychological Strategy Boa?d sa.t
look directly to the producing agencies for his intelligence sip-
port, but he may call on CIA (O/IC) for assistance as requ red.
(p. 8, para. 7)
JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
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Analysis of the Intelligence Needs of Psychological
0 erations to ether with an Indication of $ow Whey
Shoul Be Me
A. SCOPE
For the purposes of this paper the term "psychological oper-
ations" is defined much more narrowly than in the Presidents
directive of 4 April 1951, setting up the Psychological Strategy
Board. The field of that Board's activities is so broad that it.,
intelligence support muse; draw on the total funds of intellgen
available to the Government. This paper, however, confines its,_
to the particular intelligence needs of the policy officers. the
planners and the operators in the specialized field of props.ganot.
and information. The State Department, the Military Services am
CIA are all concerned with this type of activity as well as witf
the provision of intelligence to support it.
For convenience sake research performed on contract by non-
governmental organizations is excluded from this paper since it
presents a somewhat different problem and will be dealt with els~-
where.
B. ANALYSIS
The following types of intelligence are needed at one time c=?
another to support psychological operations.
It is recognized that.
these categories are not always distinct and that a certain amour*
of overlapping is inevitable. The purpose of the breakdown ij tc
show the extent and the principal kinds of work that are needed
and where it is being done. This will enable us to address, in
section C, the problem of coordination.
1. General Social, Cultural, Political and Anthropological R~sea-:-t
Examples: Level of education, standard of living, poli~ica.i.
views or cultural ties of various groups such as
etc.
This kind of intelligence is clearly the responsibility of the
State Department. Finished intelligence of this sort, hoover.
is of great use to the other agencies; for example, G-2 might,
on the basis of State's analysis of the area as a whole or of
certain civilian groups produce a paper on the level of educa-
tion of the L,_ _
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2. Identification and Elaboration of Psychological Vulnera`)ilittf-
a. Strategic, basic or long-range vulnerabilities:
Examples: Aspirations of social groups, e.g., of p:asant
for rcdistribution of land; oppression of reli-
gious, nationalist and other groups; deprivat of
of liberties; fears and conflicts betweei geoup3
and countries.
This kind of intelligence job would appear to tall cu
the State Department insofar as the vulnerabilities are III
the social, political and cultural fields and the groups
under study are non-military. The identification and
elaboration of a vulnerability within the Soviet Air Force,
based for example on unfair discrimination between zlyinE
and ground personnel, would of course be the respor.,ibiliy
of Air Intelligence. The proper identification of psycho-
logical vulnerabilities is of such importance, however, can
a coordinated attack on the targets selected is so vital
that these targets should be agreed upon interdepartmerte.rl
and, therefore, the finished intelligence that identifies
them should be more than the work of any single agency.
b. Tactical, short-range, current vulnerabilities or t.riemes:
Examples: Failure to reach goals of 5 year plan; Chines?
wheat shortage occasioned by shipments to India;
obstructionism of Gromyko at Paris Deputies'
Meeting.
These vulnerabilities are in support of those menticred
in 2 (a), whether the particular strategic vulnerability
has been specifically listed and studied or not. The rc A
of intelligence in identifying and elaborating these "t.ac?.t`
vulnerabilities is a different one largely because of the
speed necessary. Although the basic division of responsi.cil:.t~
between departments still applies, each intelligence uri`:
should feel free to call this kind of vulnerability to tti
attention of its operating counterparts. Interdepertm?r?A
coordination is not required on the intelligence level tut
can be handled satisfactorily by the operating people wc~r--
ing, for example, through the PCB.
Estimates - predictions with respect to possible futures deve:.
ments.
Examples: How would the Russian people react to ax. Atom-
bombing of Moscow? How strong would be the Yr=.rch
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will to fight if war came in 1952? What woul.
be the effect on the Chinese Army of a p,-opa7-trit
attack on the political reliability of tzeirJ
officers?
The first example is a national estimate and should be produc
much like other NIE' s . The second example is either a natio?a
estimate or, if produced in some other way, should be ccuord-~_nal,ed
between the intelligence agencies. The last example is the
responsibility of G-2.
These studies are of use to the psycholo ical eret
g o
Factual Studies on particular Subjects or Groups
p
but not exclusively so, nor are they ors'
prepared by special psyel=;
logical intelligence support units.
Examples: Land tenure in II economic position of the
Chinese in Malaya, slave labor in Bulgarl-., eta.
The above reports would be produced by the State Departm-ant
whereas a paper discussing recruitment methods in the Soviet
Navy would of course be done in ONI.
5. Opinion and Attitudes of-Key-Groups
Examples: General
the S.viet Army, etc.
Specific - Czech attitude on the A-bomb ' dutch
opinion on trade with the East.
Yugoslav peasants' attitude tos..3rd
Tito, etc.
In this category also much of the work falls on the State Dellq-t-
ment. Where the group studied is a military one, however, the
job is for the military intelligence organizations.
6. Accessibility of Various Groins
Examples: Distribution of radios among
literacy of Chinese soldiers (ref. "level ._if
education" under paragraph 1), the influential
press in Shanghai, etc.
The criterion here is the same as elsewhere: What group s
being considered?
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Current Intelligence
General information on recent events including iitdica ; Ls
of stress in the regime:
Examples: Assassination or defection of a prominent Conc.
munist, new decrees and control measurer, Ls.:-
-and foreign policy statements, etc.
This kind of general information should be p rt s,f the equiii-_-nt
of all psychological operators as well as other offici is zcii-
cerned with foreign affairs. It is supplied in part b;- the 25X1
newspapers and in part by the current intelligence unit in --?_
of the agencies.
Script Material
Unclassified or de-classified information for u
se y t
operators in writing scripts.
Examples: (a) simple biographic information
(b) current raw intelligence
(c) "magazine-type" research
The vast majority of this type of material should be acrumu.Fa;#
and used by the operators without reference to iatelli nce
support. In cases where the operating people do not have th?
information, they should make specific requests on their
supporting intelligence units. In such cases the requests
would fall in one or another of the categories of intelligence
already listed in this paper.
10. Propaganda Analysis and Analysis of Psychologicat 0 erat-ons:
Examples: What is the Soviet line this month? How Much
emphasis is being given to Iran? What ax'- th,,
psychological facilities of the Soviets fer u,.a
in Iran? Report on new techniques and PW
equipment.
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Much of the substantive work in the radio tiortion of t-;is~s5X1
is done b
y
rest is up to the State Department, although the Military WILL
naturally analyze propaganda directed specifically at .he t~rt!d,
Forces, whether in a Theater of Operations or not. Re.,ponc; `~__ity
for reports on foreign organizational arrangements for psy("i:_.-1-
gical warfare and on PW techniques and equipment falls on
or the appropriate military department depending on wh?.t ai~ue
of the problem is being considered. Initiative forlsu(h rulli)r s
may come from anywhere, and the actual production will in rn)
cases be an interdepartmental undertaking.
11. Evaluations of U.S. Psychological Operations
Analyzing both the audience
reached and their reactions:
Examples: How effective is the VOA in lI PW lessons
learned in the Korean war. VOA reception in the
Ukraine.
The major burden of evaluating a U. S. psychological operati,rc
should fall on the operating side of the agency concern,~d. h-/
are in the best position to know what they are doing and ar,!
vitally concerned with its effectiveness. This does no. mew
that their findings should be accepted without question. Ti-
intelligence specialists in the same department shniald.()cca ini
ally examine the results independently, and at interval:; pr ;?
organizations should be asked to check these evaluation;;, fcir
example, by conductinga public opinion survey where this is
possible.
12. Technical Communications (Jamming) Information
This subject has been taken up by NSC. CIA's office of
Scientific Intelligence was given primary responsibility and
working out arrangements for the necessary coordination with
other agencies.
C. COORDINATION
1. A large proportion of all the foreign intelligence coll:?ctel
or produced by the U.S. agencies is of value in planning or
executing psychological operations. Most of this infor atioi
was being produced for military or political purposes long
before there was general recognition of the importance d ps._
chobgical warfare and propaganda. It would be unrealist-; c,
therefore, to attempt to coordinate the production of al- th
intelligence merely on the basis of one of the several purposes
which it serves-psychological operations. At the same time is clear that for propaganda and psychological purposes more
intelligence is needed than would otherwise be the case. The
difference, however, is chiefly quantitative and not one of
kind. An inspection of the twelve types of intelligence listed
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in section B above shows that there is no clear dividing-l-i.n`7
between the psychological and the political--even thou
and thus develop a confidence on the part of the >ther
agencies. Conversely this implies that each agency is
good faith provide full information to the others and
make known any dissatisfaction with their product
Complaints should be taken as high as necessary t)
ae:~ is rte
results.
b . That each agency make extraordinary efforts to give p o s)
attention to the requests of others and not to give pro
cedence automatically to internal requests over tiose
received from other agencies. These decisions on pri-
orities can be made only by the responsible head of the
producing unit, and he can make wise decisions on y i,.'
fully informed by the several requesting offices.
c. That the intelligence people have or get the authority
necessary from their own chiefs to enable lthem to dear
directly and informally with their opposite numbers its
the other agencies.
3. In order to produce the kind of intelligence support ne*ded,
a close relationship should be established between the .syctLc-
logical planners and operators and their intelligence cfunt?r--
parts. Although the Air Force's psychological division dust
look primarily to AFOIN for support, this should not be eon?1rv?d
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to prevent direct contacts by the psychological divisi)n under
AFOIN sponsorship, with State intelligence. It is imprrtant
that all PW planners and operators understand the fie1as of
the various intelligence units and to some extent are ramiL -
with their current production plans. Only in this way can
satisfactory support be provided.
4. Initiative in the field of psychological intelligence ,an tin,
should come from several different places: any one of the
intelligence agencies, any of the operators or planner:, Mr .
Barrett's PCB and its secretariat, and the new PSB with iti
director and staff. The first thing to do with an ides or ri,?
quest in this field is to get it to an intelligence ag?ncy
The departmental operators and planners would naturally go -74,
the intelligence agencies in their own departments. I eas ':?:rr,
PCB can reach Intelligence through any one of a number of ch~c'-
nels, the most usual of which would be from Mr. Barrett ant P
to Mr. Armstrong and R. (The channels for PSB will be iisetu~; ed
below.) It then becomes the responsibility of whatever inteatz.-
gence agency has been approached to get the information reouF.3t.ec.
The principal burden may fall on it or may be passed tc anot_f(>r
agency with more direct interest in the subject matter. In
either case the person ultimately to do the job proceeds to Pot
it done and coordinates with others as needed, calling and
chairing ad hoc meetings if necessary. Thus, neither d-)es tFSt
do all the coordinating nor is it relieved of doing any
5. CIA has several distinct responsibilities in the field ?f ps,y--
chological intelligence. O/PC's interest as a consumer nee=1
not be discussed. 0/0 contributes both raw and evalua d 25X1
intel i ce largely from its
The other collection offices operate as for ;>the=?
types of intelligence and the same is true of the handl ng ,,'n-5
dissemination of the raw and finished product. O/SI is respu:.-
sible for the scientific and technical intelligence on oman-:n
cations and jamming. ONE will coordinate the production of
national estimates in the psychological field as they (Iti in y.;
other. The Office of Intelligence Coordination has a respor--
sibility to see that appropriate intelligence support is prc-
vided for psychological operations and that the intellijancc
activities of the government in this field are properly
coordinated.
6. CIA's coordinating responsibility, which falls on O/IC, ioes
not involve a substantive review of the papers produced -else-
where; nor is it a channel for transmitting the requests or
output of one agency to another. It does provide a neutral
place to which problems and complaints can be brought if the
usual direct approach has been found inadequate. This m=ans
that O/IC is concerned with difficulties and arrangement; ant
should not be looked to for help in coordinating a subst-i.ntir~
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paper where the experts involved can accomplish it thenselven.
O/IC will take such initiative as it can to improve th,~ coci?-
dination of intelligence support for psychological ope~'atianr;,
but it will be forced to rely to a considerable degree on wry:
other agencies to point out defects or, if possible, t(; eft' :J
improvements without reference to O/IC.
7. To whom does the director of the new Psychological Strate&.,
Board look for his intelligence support? In pursuance of ;h
analysis and principles developed in this paper, he should
look directly to the producing agency. Although this paper
has been focused on the information and propaganda aspects o'
psychological operations, the principles are equally alplica')E
to the other fields of the Board's activity. If it is clew
which intelligence agency is responsible for the desired iIiotn:-
ation, this direct approach is simpler and more effective. If
the PSB staff does not know where to get the informatics they
seek, they should raise the matter with CIA (Office of Intel-,i-
gence Coordination), which will either direct them to the prce=r
agency or arrange for the responsibility to be clearly Place-
If the quality of the reports received is inferior, the PSB
staff, like any other requestor, should discuss the matter Arl--
the producing agency. If unable to achieve results this way,
however, they should bring their problem to the attenti,>n of
CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination) and request asisTara
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