LETTER TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS FROM JOHN F. FREUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001900040017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 3, 1972
• Content Type: LETTER

3 April 1972
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director, CIA
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Dick,
I shall be looking forward with anticipation to seeing you
on Friday. Unless Captain Olsen, my Aide, notifies your office
differently, my chopper will arrive at the Pentagon pad at 1130.
If you could have transportation meet me there at that time,
I would be most obliged.
Warmest regards.
Sincerely,
JOHN F. FREUND
Major General, USA
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 Major General John F. Freund
DEPART~I p offi, {~ .I ase 2003/09/02: CIA-R
UNITED STATES ARMY EFAIR DEEFENSE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
STEWART FIELD, N. Y. 12550
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director, CIA
Washington, D. C. 20505
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CONCLUSIONS
I. TRAINING
1. Great strides have been made in the development of small unit opera-
tions. Today, company and platoon level operations are routine in all of
the divisions. This is not to imply in any way that the current status
is satisfactory. It is, in fact, still unsatisfactory. The trend, how-
ever, is encouraging.
2. Great progress has been made in the training of RF and PF. In some
cases their effectiveness exceeds that of the regular forces.- However,
there is not enough coordination between ARVN and these forces.
C3) Reconnaissance operations are far below acceptable levels by any
standard. Today, while contacts with the enemy are characteristically
infrequent and of low intensity, we should be saturating our local areas
of operations with small reconnaissance teams and supplementing these with
long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). LRRPs are used infrequently
"because we don't have the helicopters for insertion and extraction."
When used, they normally patrol to distances of 5-10 km from their bases
and remain in the field for from 5-7 days. Very rarely do they venture
out of the range of 105mm howitzer support.
7h P, if rums /Iie h14I1/.
Night operations ar completely unsatisfactory. Many people give
ip service" to this mportant area of activity but our level of effec-
tiveness is very low. The very valuable "starlight scope" is rapidly
slipping into disuse. The numbers of these devices available both in
the training base and in the tactical units are inadequate by a factor
of ten. Further, it is the old models which are in general circulation,
rather than the 2d generation devices (which were available at least 3
years ago in prototype form) which are smaller, lighter, more reliable
and which have far greater effectiveness. Generally speaking, starlight
scopes are used infrequently and, even then, in support of base area
perimeters. They are rarely taken on field operations.
5. The training base has many elements of strength. LTG Chinh is perform-
ing with credit as Chief of the Army Training Command. Significant improve-
ments have been effected in the National Training Centers (NTC) and many
of the smaller training establishments have been noticeably upgraded.
Ranges and methods of instruction have been patterned on Fort Benning.
In many cases they are equivalent to this standard. (One NTC, Quang Trung,
may not have made comparable progress.) On the negative side, the effort
devoted to night operations, mines and booby traps, and reconnaissance
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are inadequate. Additionally, continuing emphasis must be directed to
raising the level of combat experienced officers and enlisted men
associated with training. At boa Cam, for example, only about 50%
of the instructor staff has had combat experience. Whir i a,-ov-I,/
C~dYaG7T++~lo? 7~'iG OF a// d.F /-,6g ,hvcrlH+-?q r'4411wr.
II. DOCTRINE, Operation exclusively within the limits of artillery
support, and the employment of fixed fire bases for cross border operations
have been transferred from the U.S. to the ARVN forces as elements of
basic doctrine. Considering the greatly reduced artillery assets now
available and the proven vulnerability of fixed. fire bases in virtually
all of our cross border operations, it would appear worthwhile to
reassess these doctrinal guidelines.
III, PERSONNEL
01 Generally, Vietnamese combat units (particularly infantry) are at
, relatively low strength, and support units are at relatively high strengt
.
-8 y,% An effective individual personnel replacement system has yet to. be
16 ~eveloped. Without such system even the best of the Vietnamese units
`'
'Q S'.9x ? can be reduced to ineffectiveness within a relatively short time while
engaged in low intensity combat.
3. The ARVN units have a very poor capability for sustained combat.
ie I Corps area, for example, the strength of infantry battalions
averages 75%. In low intensity combat (loss of 5 men per day -- half
killed, half wounded), the offensive capability f avthese battalions
would drop to negligible levels after two weeks of sustained action.
In moderate or high intensity combat, the effective period of these
units would be much shorter.
We are, perhaps, making a major error in supporting an armed forces
strength in Vietnam of over one million men. This conclusion may be
substantiated on the following grounds:
a. This total strength appears to be out of balance with the true
threat.
If-
b. This total strength places the current premimum on quantity rather
than quality. High quality cannot be supported in these numbers.
c. In looking to the realistic future, it does not appear reasonable
to plan sustaining U.S. support on the basis of such strength. The transient
effects upon the Vietnamese control system of a sudden reduction in support-
able strength of, for example, 25% could have dangerous repercussions.
d. The current command structure in the RVNAF does not possess the
span of control to cope with the strength, numbers and types of units
implied in this force ceiling on a sustaining basis.
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I's
S. What is required in a smaller force of higher quality -- a force
within our reasonable limits of support for at least the next 3 years.
6. The period between the present and such time in the future when our
advisory strength in Vietnam stabl.izes will be most critical. During this
time it would appear to be in our best interests to restrict the assign-
ment to Vietnam of senior field grade and general officers to those who
have already served at least one tour in that country. We are penalizing
ourselves seriously today by accepting the dead time required in the basic
in-country orientation of new officers.
IV. INTELL IGENCE
11. A strong possibility exists that we may be making serious errors in
assessing the enemy order of battle. This results largely from our very
high dependence (about 90%) on SIGINT and very low access to HUMINT. This
factor, combined with the enemy's ability to infiltrate Vietnamese intelli-
gence echelons, establishes a near perfect environment for the exercise of
deception by the enemy. Our very low access to HUMINT results from an
inadequate reconnaissance program, infrequent contacts with the enemy,
low intensity combat when contact does occur, and inadequate agent net-
works.
2, Many indicators would tend to confirm that the enemy strength in Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia is significantly less than that accepted in our current
order of battle.
In view of the strong possibilities of deception, as indicated above,
infiltration data and logistic flow data as garnered through SIGINT
channels should be considered suspect at best.
V. DANGER POINTS
1) The border camps in the II CTZ (all 12, from Dak Pek in the north to
u Prang in the south) are very vulnerable to attack and reduction by the
enemy. Three of these camps are not now accessible by road and would be
most difficult, if not impossible, to reinforce by air while under attack.
Successful support under such circumstances would be most costly. All of
these camps are susceptible of rapid isolation by the destruction of their
access roads. Not one of these installations provides a return commensurate
with the cost of its maintenance. The loss incurred by their reduction
by the enemy would be many times greater than their value to us. The
camps themselves provide several valuable objectives for the enemy:
a. Great psychological impact.
b. Opportunity to alienate the Montagnards from the GVN.
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c. Valuable cache of weapons and ammunition.
These camps should be destroyed and their Montagnard resources re-
deployed in defense of the general line Dak To, Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me
Thuot, Gia Nghia.
D. 2. The LOCs in Vietnam are most vulnerable. It is within the capability
of the enemy to paralyze traffic on both primary and secondary roads in
relatively large areas at a time of his choosing. The enemy is not
exercising this option at this time because:
a. It is presently in his best interests to foster a sense of false
security and complacency in the cities and countryside.
b. He is not yet ready to exploit the great psychological impact
which such action would produce.
c. Ile is currently using the network of roads in the GVN for the
movement of his own supplies.
CONTROL. Considering our present U.S. force levels in.Vietnam, our
'rate of withdrawal, and our desire to "Vietnameze," we currently have
too many headquarters elements in Vietnam and are being far too slow in
relinquishing control of the war. Vietnamization has generally been from
the bottom up, rather than from the top down. We should turn over complete
control of the war to the Vietnamese immediately and concentrate our efforts
on guiding and advising.
VII. THE ARMY BANK. The Army Bank (See Incl 2, attached) created on 1 Jan
68, siphons off 100 piasters from the pay of all soldiers and officers each
month (more than 1,000,000 personnel). This estabi n nt of the bank and
the arbitrary withdrawal of funds has been ~ ' ' in accordance with
a plan devised by Minister of Defense Nguyen Van Vy. This has not only
resulted in widespread discontent in the military?but in a widening of
the breech between Vy and CaO Van Vien who is very strongly opposed to -?-
these measures. This has become an issue of significant propv+tions ...,
and may well result in the dismissal of Vy from his position as MOD.
C4.
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