[DDCI ADDRESS FOR ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE - GREAT POWER RELATIONS IN THE 70S]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002000090002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 19, 1974
• Content Type: SPEECH

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19 FEBRUARY 1974
DDCI ADDRESS FOR
ACV COMAND AND GENERAL STAFr COLLEGE
GREAT POWER , LATI0NSAN- THE 70s
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FORTUNATELY A. LOOK KrOROSPECTS FOR GREAT' OOER
RELATIONS IN THE MID4970S REQUIRES NO CRYSTAL BALL--
ONLY A GOOD SET OF EYES AND EARS--AND A SENSE OF
EQUILIBRIUM TO KEEP ONE'S BALANCE AT AfilME OF RAPID
CHANGE. FOR NOW IN FEBRUARY 19714, THE MID-70S ARE
WELL UPON US ALREADY. As WE'SAY'IN WASHINGTON RED-
SKIN COUNTRY, "THE FUTURE IS HOW." YEt WE ARE STILL
TRYING TO ADJUST TO THE MAJOR ,SHIFTS 1N GREAT POWER.
RELATIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN-PLACE'IN THE PAST'FEW YEARS,'
ALTERING THE SET PATTERN THAT HAD LARGELY' PREVAILED
&INCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR,
BUT INTELLIGENCEIIUST LOOK AHEAD SO THAT WECAW'
PLAN AHEAD?AS MID-70S GRADUALLY MERGE INTO tHE-LATE 70s
AND INTO THE NEXT DECADE; So' LET US LOOK CAREFULLY ABOUT
US AND SEE WHERE WE STAND WITH THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS,
IN POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND ECONOMIC TERMS, AND
HAZARD A FEW PROJECTIONS INTO THE YEARS AHEAD.
FIRST--SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SITUATION THAT
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HAS COME TO PREVAIL IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE RUSSIANS. THE WORD "DETENTE" HAS GAINED
ACCEPTANCE, AND IS INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED WITH GENERAL
SECRETARY BREZHNEV., WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE SOVIETS' POLICY
OF DETENTE, HOWEVER, A CAREFUL DEFINITION IS IN ORDER.
JETENTE DOES NOT MEAN A CHANGE OF HEART. OR
DOES IT MEAN THAT MOSCOW HAS ABANDONED ITS BASIC OB-
JECTIVES. JETENTE DOES MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE
MADE A REASSESSMENT' OF THEIR SITUATION, SORTED OUT
THEIR PRIORITIES MORE CAREFULLY, AND ADJUSTED THEIR
BEHAVIOR ACCORDINGLY.
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THIS REASSESSMENT HAS HIGHLIGHTED TWO BASIC
FACTS FOR THEM. ONE IS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS
HAVE NOT BEEN CLOSING THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP, THEY
HAVE NOW ACKNOWLEDGED TO THEMSELVES THAT, IF THEY
ARE TO BEGIN CLOSING IT, THEY NEED TO IMPORT AND AB-
SORB LARGE AMOUNTS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY. THE SECOND
BASIC FACT IS HOSTILITY BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR.
MOSCOW SEES PEKING AS REBUFFING ALL SOVIET OVERTURES
FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND THE
BORDER NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN AT SQUARE ONE.
BOTH THE ECONOMIC FACTOR AND THE CHINESE FACTOR
ARE THUS FAIRLY LONG-TERM ONES, AND BOTH WORK IN THE
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a&a. DIRECTION ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. OBVIOUSLY,
NORMAL AND AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ARE NECES-
SARY IF THE SOVIETS ARE TO PROMOTE THEIR ECONOMIC OB-
JECTIVES. MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE WEST WOULD -
UNDERMINE THE CHANCES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL GAIN.
TENSE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST WOULD ALSO EXPOSE
THE USSR TO THE RISK OF PRESSURE ON TWO FRONTS: WEST-
ERN AND EASTERN, SO LONG AS CHINA REMAINS ACTIVELY
HOSTILE, THE SOVIETS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN KEEP-
ING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON AN EVEN KEEL. IN PAR-
TICULAR, THEY WANT TO GIVE AS LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT AS
POSSIBLE TO COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US--
WHICH APPEARS TO THE RUSSIANS AS COLLUSION AGAINST
THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE POSITIVE POLITICAL IN-
CENTIVES AS WELL, DETENTE PROVIDES A USEFUL CLIMATE
FOR THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN WESTERN
EUROPE. IT ALSO SUPPORTS MOSCOW'S CLAIM OF ITS RIGHT
TO BE INVOLVED IN ALL INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, SUCH -
AS THE MIDDLE EAST.
THESE CURRENT PRIORITIES HAVE SOME IMPACT ON RE-
LATIONS WITH THE US, MOSCOW IS NO LONGER SO AUTOMATIC
IN OPPOSING US POLICY IN EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE.
THIS HAS HELPED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIA-
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TIONS IN THE HIDDLE EAST. IT HAS NOT, OF COURSE,
SOLVED MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE AREA, NOR DO THE SOVIETS
INTEND TO DO THAT.
BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE IS COMMITED TO
DETENTE. LAST YEAR HE MADE HIS BIGGEST GAINS WITH -
HIS TRIPS TO BONN AND WASHINGTON. ALL BREZHNEV'S
POLITBURO COLLEAGUES NOW ACKNOWLEDGE HIS PREEMINENT
POSITION, BUT HE IS AWARE HE CANNOT GET TOO FAR AHEAD
OF THEM, AND MUST SHOW SOME FRUITS OF DETENTE. COPING
WITH DISSIDENTS LIKE SOLZHENITSYN POSES A CONTINUING
DILEMMA OF HOW TO SQUARE THE NEEDS OF DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE
WITH FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, ON THE ECONOMIC
FRONT, RECORD GRAIN PRODUCTION LED TO A COMEBACK FROM
A DISMAL 1972 SHOWING, BUT IIOSCOW'S GOAL OF OVERTAKING
THE US REMAINS AS DISTANT AS EVER. THE USSR STILL
PRODUCES ONLY ABOUT HALF AS MUCH GOODS AND SERVICES AS'
THE US WITH A LABOR FORCE 50 PERCENT LARGER.
LOGICALLY, DETENTE SHOULD ALSO LEAD TO A FURTHER
EASING OF THE ARMS RACE. BUT THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED
YET. THE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS REPRESENT A
POWERFUL COMPETITIVE THRUST IN THE AREAS NOT COVERED
BY SALT AGREEMENTS, MAINLY IN THE AREA OF QUALITATIVE
IMPROVEMENT, THUS FAR, 10SCOW SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT
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IT CAN PROCEED ON A VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF WEAPONS MOD-
ERNIZATION WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY GETTING THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF DETENTE.
SO, IN HIGHLIGHTING OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SOVIET UNION, I WILL ADDRESS THREE QUESTIONS:
--WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS DEVELOPING NOW?
--WHAT NEW SYSTEMS WILL THEY DEPLOY?
--WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE TO THE US-
SOVIET BALANCE DURING THE COMING YEARS?
ONE OF OUR VERY RECENT JUDGMENTS IS THAT THE
PACE AND SCOPE OF CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC DEVELOP-
MENT PROGRAMS IS UNPRECEDENTED, PARTICULARLY IN THE
FIELD OF IcBn DEVELOPMENT. THE RUSSIANS ARE ENGAGED
IN A BROAD RANGE OF PROGRAMS TO AUGMENT, MODERNIZE,
AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK.
LET ME PLACE THESE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEXT:
FIRST, THE LARGE SCALE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
OF THE SIXTIES LED THE SOVIETS TO A POSITION OF
OVER-ALL STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN
FACT, IT PLACED THE SOVIET UNION AHEAD OF THE US IN
NUMBERS OF ICEI LAUNCHERS, AND LEFT THE SOVIETS IN
THE PROCESS OF TAKING THE LEAD IN SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED
BALLISTIC MISSILES.
As OF THE FIRST OF THIS MONTH, THE SOVIETS HAD
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A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 1,500 OPERATIONAL ICBH
LAUNCHERS, IN ADDITION, ABOUT 100 MORE LAUNCHERS
WERE UNDERGOING CONSTRUCTION OR MODERNIZATION. THE
NUMBER OF US ICBH LAUNCHERS REMAINS AT 1,054.
IN THE LAST FEW YEARS; THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN
MAKING GREAT EFFORTS IN THE NAVAL AREA. THEY NOW
HAVE SOME 580 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES,
CARRIED ABOARD A FLEET OF 44 NUCLEAR POWERED SUE
MARINES. APPROXIMATELY 200 ADDITIONAL LAUNCHERS
ARE ON SUBMARINES NOW IN VARIOUS STAGES OF CONSTRUC-
TION. THE US POSSESSES 656 LAUNCHERS ON 41 NUCLEAR
POWERED SUBMARINES,
THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER FORCE) ON THE
OTHER HAND) PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE EFFORT TO ATTAIN
STRATEGIC EQUALITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. AND THE
US RETAINS A GREAT LEAD IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS
AND BOMBS BY A RATIO OF ABOUT SEVEN TO TWO.
How, IN THEIR CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ROUND, THE
SOVIETS HAVE FOUR NEW LAND-BASED Ems IN THE FLIGHT
TEST STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. THREE HAVE BEEN FLIGHT
TESTED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-
ENTRY VEHICLES--MRVS--AND THE FOURTH MAY ALSO HAVE
A HIRV CAPABILITY. IF TESTING PROCEEDS SMOOTHLY;
ALL FOUR SYSTEMS COULD BE READY TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT
IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. HARDER LAUNCH SILOS, WHICH
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WILL IMPROVE ICBM FORCE SURVIVABILITY, ARE ALSO PART
OF THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
As FOR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES,
LARGER AND IMPROVED SUBMARINES, SUCH AS THE D-CLASS,
ARE COMING OFF THE WAYS. THE D-CLASS, WHOSE DEPLOY-
MENT BEGAN IN 1973, CARRIES A MISSILE WITH AN OPERA-
TIONAL RANGE OF 4,200 NAUTICAL MILES--OVER THREE
TIMES GREATER THAN THE ONE CARRIED IN THE Y-CLASS,
THE SOVIET VERSION OF OUR POLARIS. THIS NEW MISSILE
COULD REACH MUCH OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
EVEN IF FIRED FROM OR NEAR HOME PORTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION.
IN SHORT, SOVIET PROGRAMS OF THE SIXTIES CONCEN-
TRATED ON QUANTITY. THEIR NEW ROUND OF STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS IS FOCUSING MAINLY ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE NEW ROUND OF
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WAS CONCEIVED LONG BEFORE THE
MAY 1972 SALT INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITING CERTAIN
STRATEGIC ARMS. MOST OF THE NEW PROGRAMS INVOLVED
WERE EVIDENT OR FORSEEABLE AT THAT TIME. THOSE
THAT WE NOW SEE DO NOT VIOLATE THE SALT ONE AGREE-
MENT.
WHY, SOME MAY ASK, HAVE THE SOVIETS ENGAGED IN
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SUCH AN ENERGETIC EFFORT, PARTICULARLY AFTER THEY HAD
ALREADY ATTAINED A CONDITION OF RECOGNIZED STRATEGIC
PARITY WITH THE US?
WE JUDGE THAT MUCH OF THE ACTIVITY REFLECTS
INTERNAL BUREAUCRATIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MOMENTUM--
? PLUS A CONSCIOUS SOVIET LEADERSHIP DECISION TO TRY
TO KEEP UP WITH THE COMPETITION. IN THE AREA OF
MIRVs, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG INDICATED
A FEELING THAT THEY MUST CATCH UP IF THEY ARE TO BE
ACCEPTED AS FULL STRATEGIC EQUALS OF THE US. THE
SOVIETS' EMPHASIS ON MIRVs AND OTHER ASPECTS OF WEAP-
ONS TECHNOLOGY PROBABLY ALSO REFLECTS A NEED TO PLAN
FOR VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES--INVOLVING CHINA AND OTHER
PERIPHERAL TARGETS, AS WELL AS THE US.
BUT, THE CURRENT ROUND OF DEVELOPMENT ALSO IN-
VOLVES AN ELEMENT OF OPPORTUNISM--TO PRESS AHEAD, TO
SEE WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR, TO TRY TO IMPROVE
THEIR POSITION RELATIVE TO THE US. TO GO BACK TO THE
OIRV EXAMPLE, THEY SURELY RECOGNIZE THAT EXTENSIVE
MIRVING OF THEIR ICBMs WOULD EVENTUALLY THREATEN TO
LEAVE THE US BEHIND IN DELIVERY VEHICLES.
NOW TO THE SECOND MAIN QUESTION: WILL THE SO-
VIETS DEPLOY WHAT THEY ARE DEVELOPING? THE ANSWER
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COULD WELL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SALT II NEGO-
TIATIONS. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT LAST JUNE, YOU
RECALL, PRESIDENT NIXON AND BREZHNEV AGREED TO SEEK_
A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
SYSTEMS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.
FACTORS THAT MAY INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO CONCLUDE
A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT ARE:
--A BELIEF THAT A NEW ROUND IN SOVIET DEPLOY-
MENTS ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD PROVOKE OFF-
SETTING US REACTIONS WHICH WOULD DENY THEM
ANY STRATEGIC GAIN, AND PERHAPS EVEN WORSEN
THEIR POSITION, AND
--CONFIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET RESTRAINT WOULD
BE RECIPROCATED ON TERMS THAT WOULD GIVE
THE USSR BOTH THE IMAGE AND THE SUBSTANCE
OF EQUALITY.
OF COURSE, WE CANNOT PREDICT IN DETAIL THE
SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS OF A SALT II AGREEMENT. SOME
FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE LIKELY TO BE PER-
MITTED UNDER ANY PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IT SEEMS
REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL REPLACE
MANY OF THE EXISTING STRATEGIC FORCES WITH THEIR
NEWER, MORE ADVANCED SYSTEMS.
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IF A NEW SALT AGREEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED, THE
SCOPE OF THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE
GREATER. BUT AS I MENTIONED JUST A MOMENT AGO, A
MAJOR SOVIET PUSH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE SOVIET LEADER-
SHIP'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW FAR THEY COULD PRESS AHEAD
WITHOUT PROVOKING US COUNTERACTION.
IN ANY CASE, THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF SOVIET
MISSILE FORCES IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO INCREASE BY SUB-
STANTIAL AMOUNTS DURING THE COMING YEARS.
THIS TAKES US TO THE THIRD QUESTION: WHAT DIF-
FERENCE WILL IMPROVED SOVIET CAPABILITIES MAKE TO
THE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW STRATEGIC BALANCE?
THIS IS A QUESTION OF TECHNOLOGY, OF STRATEGY,
AND ALSO OF POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY, BECAUSE, IN THE
FINAL ANALYSIS, HOW WE AND THEY PERCEIVE THE BALANCE
IS MOST CRUCIAL TO DETERRENCE AND THE EXERCISE OF
POWER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
THE MAJOR US STRATEGIC CONCERN OVER SOVIET FORCE
IMPROVEMENT IS HOW IT AFFECTS THE SURVIVABILITY OF
OUR OWN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. THE SOVIETS NO
DOUBT BELIEVE THAT BY DEPLOYING MORE--AND INCREASINGLY
ACCURATE?MISSILES, THEY CAN IMPROVE THEIR ABILITY
TO ATTACK US MISSILE SILOS.
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GIVEN THE SIZE AND DIVERSITY OF THE STRATEGIC
FORCES DEPLOYED BY BOTH SIDES, HOWEVER, WE JUDGE IT
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR EITHER SIDE TO ACQUIRE A
DISARMING FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST THE OTHER
IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, AT PRESENT, FOR INSTANCE,
THE SOVIETS CAN POSE ONLY A NEGLIBLE THREAT TO OUR
POLARIS AND POSEIDON SUBMARINES. THE SOVIET NAVY
LACKS A DETECTION SYSTEM FOR LOCATING ENEMY SUBMARINES
IN THE OPEN OCEAN, AND ITS OWN ARE UNABLE TO TRAIL THE
QUIETER US MISSILE SUBMARINES. SOVIET EFFORTS TO IM-
PROVE THIS SITUATION ARE, AT BEST, STILL IN THE R&D
STAGE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE NEW ROUND OF SOVIET DEVELOP-
MENT POSES UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE MILITARY AND PO-
LITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THEIR PROGRAMS. OUR EFFORT
IN SALT II IS DIRECTED AT REDUCING THESEANCERTAINTIES
Now, JUST A FEW WORDS ON CHINESE STRATEGIC PRO-
GRAMS BEFORE TURNING TO SOME OF THE POLITICAL DYNAMISM
ERNING RELATIONS AMONG WASHINGTON,' MOSCOW, AND
PEKING. CHINA IS MOVING UP, BUT WITH DELIBERATION.
BY LAST SUMMER IT BECAME APPARENT THAT A MARKED SLOW-
DOWN HAD OCCURRED ABOUT LATE 1971-EARLY 1972 IN A NUM-
BER OF CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND TESTING
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PROGRAMS. THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE) FOR EX-
AMPLE, HAS NOT BEEN TESTED SINCE 1971. CHINA'S ICEI,
WITH A 7,000 NAUTICAL MILE RANGE, HAS BEEN TESTED
ONLY FOUR TIMES, MOST RECENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO ORBIT
A SATELLITE. ONLY THE FIRST LAUNCH WAS SUCCESSFUL.
FINALLY, IN 1972 MONTHLY PRODUCTION OF THE TU-16 MEDIUM
BOMBER WAS CUT BACK FROM TWO TO ONE, AND APPARENTLY SUS-
PENDED ALTOGETHER IN THE LATTER HALF OF LAST YEAR,
AFTER ONLY ABOUT 60 HAD BEEN DEPLOYED WITH OPERATIONAL
UNITS.
THUS, PEKING'S DETERRENT FORCE FOR THE MOST
PART WILL REMAIN MARGINAL. As FAR AS THE US IS CON-
CERNED, CHINA'S. NUCLEAR THREAT THROUGH MID-1978 WILL
CONTINUE TO DEPEND ALMOST ENTIRELY ON A CAPABILITY TO
STRIKE ONLY THOSE US BASES AND OUR ALLIES LOCATED IN
EAST ASIA.
IN RESPECT TO THE RUSSIANS, PEKING THROUGH
MID-1978 WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON A MINIMUM NUCLEAR
DETERRENT, AND ON A DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THE COUN-
TRY IN DEPTH AGAINST A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.
NEVERTHELESS) CHINA'S NUCLEAR ATTACK CAPABILITY
HAS INFLUENCED SOVIET MILITARY PLANNERS, AND SOME AD-
JUSTMENTS IN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE HAVE
RESULTED, WE SHOULD NOTE THAT SOME OF THE SOVIET
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ICBMs AND IRBMS--AND PRESUMABLY SOME OF THEIR MEDIUM
BOMBERS AND OLDER DIESEL POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE
SUBMARINES AS WELL--ARE TARGETED AGAINST CHINA. ALSO,
' SOVIET THEATER FORCES DEPLOYED ALONG THE SINO?SOVIET
BORDER PROVIDE BOTH A CONVENTIONAL AND A TACTICAL NU?
CLEAR CAPABILITY FOR COMBAT IN SINKIANG, OUTER MON? '
GOLIA, AND MANCHURIA. TACTICAL NUCLEAR SUPPORT WOULD
BE PROVIDED BY SCUD AND FROG TACTICAL MISSILES AND BY'
THE LONGER RANGE SCALEBOARD MOBILE MISSILE SYSTEM.
As FOR THE CHINESE, THERE IS GENUINE FEAR IN PE? el'Yjj:ec/A)
KING THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT SPRING A SURPRISE ATTACK,..4.
IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT FORESEE A
MAJOR MILITARY MOVE BY EITHER SIDE IN ANYTHING APPROACH?
ING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
CHINESE DEPLOYMENTS SHOW AN AWARENESS OF .SOVIET
MILITARY' SUPERIORITY, AND ARE FOCUSED ON DEFENSE. HAVING
LEARNED THE 'VIRTUES OF RESTRAINT FROM THEIR DIFFERENCES
ALONG THE BORDER IN 1969, THE CHINESE SEEM LIKELY TO
RESIST ANY TEMPTATION TO TEST MOSCOW'S TOLERANCE,,
FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE ARE STRONG MILITARY
AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD MAKE A PREMEDI?
TATED ATTACK UNLIKELY. MOSCOW HAS TOLD ITS PEOPLE THAT
A DISARMING' NUCLEAR STRIKE AGAINST CHINESE STRATEGIC
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MISSILE LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT BE WITHOUT RETALIATION,
AND A LAND INVASION COULD VERY WELL GET BOGGED DOWN.
POLITICALLY, A MAJOR SOVIET MOVE WOULD END ANY POS-
SIBILITY OF RECONCILIATION WITH CHINA, AND COULD
JEOPARDIZE DETENTE WITH THE US.
EVEN WITHOUT MILITARY CONFLICT, PERSISTENT, OFTEN
ACUTE, SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS LIE AHEAD. CHINA HAS
SERIOUS PRETENTIONS TO BEING A GREAT POWER (ALTHOUGH
IT DISCLAIMS ANY PLANS FOR BECOMING A "SUPERPOWER").
As IT SEES THINGS, ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS CLASH ALMOST
EVERYWHERE IN ASIA WITH THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
PEKING CONSIDERS BREZHNEV'S IDEA OF AN ASIAN SECURITY PACT
AS A DIRECT CHALLENGE, CAPPING THE SOVIETS' LONG-TERM
STRUGGLE TO GAIN PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE IN NORTH VIETNAM
AND NORTH KOREA--AT CHINESE EXPENSE. PEKING FEARS
THAT HOSCOW WILL TRY TO EXPAND ITS PRESENCE THROUGHOUT
SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THAT IT IS ALREADY WORKING TO DRAW
JAPAN INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT,
IF THESE FEARS WERE REALIZED, Moscow WOULD EF-
FECTIVELY RING CHINA. AND THE CHINESE SEEM TO THINK
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THAT THE USSR IS AT ONCE LESS PREDICTABLE AND MORE
'BRUTAL THAN THEY BELIEVED THE .US TO BE EVEN AT THE
HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR. ABOVE ALL, CHINA IS STUCK
WITH ITS LONG, HARD-TO-DEFEND BORDER WITH THE SOVIET
UNION.
Now, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT IF RELATIONS WERE
IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY, THE SOVIETS WOULD NO LONGER
HAVE MUCH REASON TO PURSUE A POLICY OF "ENCIRCLING"
CHINA AND MIGHT BE LESS EAGER TO FLEX THEIR MILITARY
MUSCLE ALONG THE BORDER, BUT TO PURSUE RAPPROCHEMENT
WITH MOSCOW CHINA WOULD HAVE TO COMPLETELY REORIENT
ITS PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY--THE MOST SUCCESSFUL DIPLO-
MATIC STRATEGY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAVE DEVELOPED
SINCE COMING TO POWER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY AGO.
EVEN IF RAPPROCHEMENT WERE SUCCESSFUL, CHINA
WOULD STILL BE THE FAR WEAKER PARTY IN A NEW ENTENTE,
AND CHINA MIGHT END UP IN MANY RESPECTS AS A SATELLITE
OF THE USSR. THE CHINESE THINK THAT DURING THE 1950s,
MOSCOW SACRIFICED PEKING'S INTERESTS AT EVERY CRUCIAL
TURN. THIS IS THE CORE OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S ARGUMENT
AGAINST ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.
CONCERNED ABOVE ALL WITH THE THREAT THEY PERCEIVE
FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THE CHINESE FIND THE UNITED
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STATES A USEFUL COUNTERWEIGHT TO 10SCOW1 Now THAT
THEY ARE NO LONGER ISOLATED, THEY ASSUME THAT THE
SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OUR REACTIONS INTO AC-
COUNT IF THEY WERE TO CONSIDER STEPPING UP THE
PRESSURE ON CHINA, IN FACT, THE CHINESE PROBABLY
CALCULATE THAT IF THEY CONTINUE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
WITH US, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN SUSPICIOUS
OF OUR MOTIVES--AND ANY SLOWDOWN IN THE US-SOVIET -
DETENTE WOULD BE MUCH TO PEKING'S ADVANTAGE, IN ANY
EVENT, THEY BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US,
BOTH SUPERPOWERS WITH WORLDWIDE INTERESTS) ARE EN-
GAGED IN A PERMANENT COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE,
DETENTE NOTWITHSTANDING, THE CHINESE HOPE TO MAKE
DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC HEADWAY ON THE MARGIN OF THAT
COMPETITION, JUST AS THEY SEE US DOING ON THE MARGIN
OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY,
,v
THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE ADAGt "MAKE FRIENDS WITH
DISTANT STATES IN ORDER TO OPPOSE NEIGHBORING STATES"
ALSO COMES INTO PLAY HER( IN FACT, GIVEN THE CHINESE
PREOCCUPATION WITH ilOSCOW, PEKING NOW SEES A CONTINUING
US PRESENCE IN ASIA--AND ELSEWHERE--AS A DISTINCT AD-
VANTAGE, THE CHINESE HAVE ACCEPTED THE LOGIC THAT THE
US POSITION IN JAPAN AND IN WESTERN EUROPE--AND TO A
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LESSER EXTENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN THE MIDDLE
EAST--IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SOVIET POLITICAL AND
STRATEGIC GAINS IN THOSE AREAS. THEY HAVE ARGUED
THIS CASE WITH SUCH ?FORMER FRIENDS AS THE JAPANESE
SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE "MARXIST-LENINIST" PARTIES
OF WESTERN EUROPE.
THE CHINESE ASSUME THAT THE US IS SLOWLY WITH-
DRAWING FROM FORWARD POSITIONS IN ASIA--FOR EXAMPLE,
INDOCHINA--AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY WASHINGTON POSES NO
DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE THREAT. ON THE CONTRARY, PEKING
SEEMS TO HOPE THAT ANY US WITHDRAWAL FROM FORWARD ASIAN
POSITIONS WOULD BE A DELIBERATE AND LONG-TERM MOVEMENT;
A RAPID DEPARTURE WOULD MERELY CREATE OPPORTUNITIES
FOR MOSCOW TO ATTEMPT TO FILL THE VACUUM.
IT IS ENTIRELY LIKELY, OF COURSE, THAT OVER THE
LONG TERM' THE CHINESE HOPE AND EXPECT' TO INHERIT THE
US POSITION, NOTABLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND TAIWAN.
DURING THE TRANSITION, PEKING SEEMS TO BELIEVE ITS
OWN INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY NOT PRESSING TOO HARD,
LEST IT CREATE UNDUE FRICTIONS WITH WASHINGTON, OR
EVEN LEAD NATIONS ON ITS SOUTHERN AND EASTERN
PERIPHERY' TO TURN' TO MOSCOW FOR PROTECTION.
IN SHORT, THE SINO-US RELATIONSHIP AS IT IS NOW
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DEVELOPING IS ALMOST EXACTLY E REVERSE OF THE SINO-
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. CHINESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES,
IN THE LARGER ESSENTIALS, ARE CONGRUENT, NOT CONFLICT-
ING. THEY RUN ON PARALLEL LINES, AND BECAUSE THEY DO,
THE POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS FRICTION HAS DIMINISHED.
AND BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING HERE WITH BROAD QUESTIONS
OF NATIONAL INTEREST, IT ALSO SEEMS LIKELY THAT WHO-
EVER SUCCEEDS MAO AND CHOU EN-LAI IN POWER IN PEKING
IS GOING TO DISCOVER THAT THERE ARE STRONG, PERHAPS
COMPELLING, REASONS TO KEEP THE SINO-US DETENTE ON
COURSE, THESE REASONS PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO
OPERATE SO LONG AS TENSIONS BETWEEN PEKING AND MOS-
COW REMAIN HIGH, OR UNTIL CHINA FEELS ITSELF STRONG
ENOUGH NOT TO NEED POWERFUL FRIENDS--A DISTANT PROS-
PECT INDEED.
BEFORE TURNING FROM CHINA, WE SHOULD GIVESOME
ATTENTION TO THE VENERABLE KEY PERSONALITIES IN PE-
KING. IT WOULD BE HARD TO DENY THAT MAO TSE-TUNG'S
WELL DEVELOPED ANTI-SOVIET BIASES PLAYED' A'SIGNIFICANT
PART IN PRECIPITATING THE PRESENT DISPUTE AND IN
SHAPING ITS DEVELOPMENT. THE REMOVAL--THROUGH DEATH
OR INCAPACITATION--OF THIS ELEMENT OF PERSONAL ANIMUS
FROM THE SINO-SOVIET EQUATION WILL CERTAINLY AFFECT
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THE STYLE OF THE CHINESE APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTA-
TION, AND IT MIGHT AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE
AS WELL. MAO HIMSELF SEEMS ACUTELY AWARE OF THIS POS-
SIBILITY, IN THE PAST YEAR OR TWO HE APPARENTLY HAS
BEEN MANEUVERING TO ENSURE THAT CHINA DOES NOT BACK
AWAY FROM THE DISPUTE WITH MOSCOW EVEN AFTER HE HAS
LEFT THE SCENE.
I SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT IF YOU WERE ABLE TO GET
MAO ALONE IN A CORNER OVER A GLASS OF mitaL, HE WOULD
READILY ADMIT THAT ANY LEADER HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY
WILLING HIS OWN POLICIES TO HIS SUCCESSORS. THERE IN
FACT ARE SOME ARGUMENTS FOR A DECIDED IMPROVEMENT IN
RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, AND THEY ARE NOT HARD TO DISCERN,
CONTINUED EXACERBATION OF TENSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE,
RUNS THE RISK THAT FIRE-EATING ELEMENTS. IN. MOSCOW MAY
AT SOME POINT CONCLUDE THAT, RATHER THAN ALLOW THE
DISPUTE INDEFINITELY TO DRAIN SOVIET ENERGIES, IT
WOULD BE BETTER TO CAUTERIZE THE WOUND.
ALSO, SOME CHINESE LEADERS MAY BELIEVE THAT THE
PRESENT IMBALANCE IN THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN MOSCOW, PEKING AND WASHINGTON WORKS TO CHINA'S
DISADVANTAGE, WITH WASHINGTON PLAYING OFF ONE COMMUNIST
STATE AGAINST THE OTHER.
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FINALLY, THERE MAY BE AN IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND: IT IS BETTER TO COOPERATE
WITH EVEN A "DEGENERATED" SOCIALIST STATE THAN WITH
THE ROTTEN CAPITALISTS, %01kk-OLLA 6
THE CHINESE THEMSELVES CLAIM THAT SOME AT LEAST
OF THESE ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED BY LIN PIA0--MAO'S
OFFICIAL SUCCESSOR--BEFORE HIS FALL IN 1971. THERE,.
ARE, MOREOVER, TENTATIVE SIGNS THAT MAO AND CHOU
BELIEVE THAT SOME ELEMENTS IN THE LEADERSHIP STILL
HARBOR SIMILAR THOUGHTS, IF SO, IT IS LIKELY THEY
ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE MILITARY, LIN PIAO'S FORMER
BASE OF POWER. IN FACT, IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT
SOME MILITARY FIGURES COULD ARGUE THAT THE QUICKEST
WAY TO INCREASE CHINA'S MILITARY STRENGTH WOULD BE
TO REACH A LIMITED UNDERSTANDING WITH MOSCOW, THUS
MAKING THE SOVIET UNION AVAILABLE AS A SIGNIFICANT
SOURCE OF MILITARY HARDWARE. IF ARGUMENTS OF THIS
SORT CAN BUBBLE UNDER THE SURFACE WHILE MAO LIVES,
IT IS ALL THE MORE POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL FLARE UP
ONCE HE IS GONE.
AT THAT TIME, CHINA'S LEADERS MIGHT TRY FOR
SOME RELATIVELY MINOR AMELIORATION OF THE PRESENT
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TENSION IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE SOVIET PRESSURE. MOS-
COW, FOR ITS PART, IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO EXPLORE THE
POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN CHINESE ATTITUDE, JUST AS
PEKING DID FOLLOWING THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV. BUT
CHINESE AND SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD STILL BE
CONFLICTING, AND THIS IS LIKELY TO BE THE CONTROLLING
FACTOR IN ANY EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES.
LET US TAKE ALL THIS A STEP FURTHER. WHAT
WOULD HAPPEN AFTER NOT ONLY MAO BUT CHOU EN-LAI WAS
NO LONGER ON THE SCENE? GIVEN THE RECORD OF THE
PAST EIGHT YEARS, IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO EXPECT A
PERIOD OF INSTABILITY, ONE OR ANOTHER ELEMENT IN
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER MIGHT WELL RAISE QUESTIONS
OF FOREIGN POLICY AS A MEANS OF GAINING AN ADVANTAGE
OVER RIVALS.
Now, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY SERIOUS CONTENDER
FOR POWER WOULD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ADVOCATE A FULL-
SCALE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MOSCOW. THIS COULD BE
PAINTED AS A "SELL OUT" TO THE REVISIONISTS. BUT
SOME CONTENDER MIGHT WELL CLAIM THAT A RIVAL HAD
DONE JUST THAT; AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH SEEMS
TO HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN FOLLOWING DOMESTIC CHINESE
POLITICS--YES, EVEN MORE THAN WE DO--MIGHT IN TURN
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MISREAD THE ACCUSATION FOR A FACT. CONVERSELY, MOS-
COW MIGHT CALCULATE THAT A PROLONGED INTERNAL STRUG-
GLE HAD LEFT CHINA VULNERABLE TO THE APPLICATION OF
INCREASED PRESSURE. THIS TOO, I THINK, WOULD BE A
MISREADING; NOTHING WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO UNITE
WARRING FACTIONS WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
THAN A BRUTAL SOVIET POWER PLAY, BUT THE POINT RE-
MAINS: IN THE EVENT OF INTERNAL CONTENTION IN CHINA
IN THE WAKE OF THE DEATH OF BOTH MAO AND CHOU, A'
MISCALCULATION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD
LEAD TO INTERVENTION OR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH
CHINA. 1 0\\\.
COMPLETING MY PROSPECTUS 0 GREAT POWER RELA-
TIONS IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, I SHALL RETURN TO EUROPE,
THE PRIME AREA OF OUR TENSIONS WITH MOSCOW FOR THE
PAST THREE DECADES. BECAUSE OF THE MASSIVE FORCES
IN US AND SOVIET HANDS FOR MUTUAL DETERRENCE, AND
THEIR LEADERS' INTERESTS IN AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR, I
WILL HIGHLIGHT SOME OF THE ISSUES AND ELEMENTS THAT
MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN A HYPOTHETICAL WARSAW PACT-NATO
CONFLICT SHORT OF AN ALL-OUT NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.
WE SHOULD NOTE, TO START, THAT SOVIET DOCTRINE
ON THE ESCALATION OF A EUROPEAN CONFLICT HAS BEEN
MODIFIED SINCE THE MID-SIXTIES. THE EARLIER POSITION
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THAT ANY WAR INVOLVING NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WOULD
ESCALATE DIRECTLY TO THEATER-WIDE NUCLEAR WAR HAS
BEEN ALTERED TO ALLOW FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD
OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. SOVIET MILITARY WRITERS
HAVE PAID INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF
HAVING ARMED FORCES EQUIPPED AND TRAINED FOR CONVEN-
TIONAL OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE,
IN EITHER A NUCLEAR OR A CONVENTIONAL ENVIRONMENT,
THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT RAPID
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, IN ITS FORWARD AREAS, THE WAR-
SAW PACT MAINTAINS FORCES--SOME 33 DIVISIONS--IMMEDIATELY
READY FOR COMBAT, BUT EACH IS MUCH SMALLER THAN A US
DIVISION. THESE FORCES ARE DESIGNED TO BLUNT A NATO
ATTACK AND THEN TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE. IN ADDITION,
THE PACT HAS ALMOST 30 MORE DIVISIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE,
OPPOSITE THE NATO CENTRAL REGION, THESE ARE UNDERSTRENGTH
DIVISIONS, HOWEVER, THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE FLESHED OUT BY
MOBILIZATION. AT BEST THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY WOULD BE
SOMEWHAT SUSPECT, AND IF THEY WERE COMMITTED BEFORE
MOBILIZATION, THEY WOULD HAVE ONLY LIMITED OFFENSIVE
EFFECTIVENESS AND ENDURANCE.
THE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT, AND POSTURE OF WARSAW
PACT GROUND FORCES ACCENTUATES INITIAL COMBAT AND
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SHOCK POWER. THE DIVISIONS ARE HEAVILY ARMORED AND
HAVE GOOD TACTICAL MOBILITY, ALTHOUGH LOGISTIC SUP-
PORT IS RELATIVELY AUSTERE. MAJOR GROUND FORCE UNITS
HAVE A TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, MOST OF THE
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BASED WITHIN THE WESTERN USSR
ARE MEDIUM BOMBERS AND FIRST GENERATION MRBMs AND
IRBMs, THE SIZE OF THIS MISSILE FORCE HAS BEEN
DECLINING IN RECENT YEARS, BUT THE DECLINE HAS BEEN
OFFSET BY THE ADDITION OF SOME SS-11 ICBMs WHICH WE
BELIEVE ARE TARGETED ON THE EUROPEAN THEATER.
As TO THE FUTURE COMPOSITION AND WEAPONRY OF THE
FORCES, THE PACT IS INCREASING AND MODERNIZING TANK
FORCES AND ITS INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES. DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED IN RECENT YEARS, AND
THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY, NOW
IN TROOP TESTING,WILL PROBABLY SOON BE INTRODUCED.
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AREBEING ENLARGED AND MODERNIZED--
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WITH BETTER LOW-LEVEL ATTACK AND
LOAD-CARRYING CAPABILITIES ARE BEING INTRODUCED, AND
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES ARE BEING IMPROVED,
ALSO, SOVIET MAJOR SURFACE SHIP CONSTRUCTION WILL
CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE MULTIPURPOSE SHIPS. FINALLY,
THE NEW HIGH-PERFORMANCE, SWING-WING BACKFIRE
BOMBER WILL SOON ENTER THE FORCE, ENHANCING
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THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. THE BACKFIRE IS ALSO
LIKELY TO BE DEPLOYED WITH SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION.
TALK OF THE NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE
RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL HEALTH OF THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WE READILY FIND THAT THE SAME
TIDE OF EVENTS WHICH IS SWEEPING THE US AND CHINA
ALONG CONGRUENT COURSES ALSO THREATENS TO WASH AWAY
THE FAMILIAR LANDMARKS OF THE ALLIANCE. THE SOVIET
CAMPAIGN TO MEND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST--BOTH
THE US AND EUROPE--PRESENTS PROBLEMS AS WELL AS OP-
PORTUNITIES FOR ITS EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS.
PARADOXICALLY, THE MORE THE US AND THE SOVIET
UNION GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF WORKING HAND IN HAND,
THE LESS THE EUROPEANS ADMIT THE VALIDITY OF THE
PRIORITY WASHINGTON ATTACHES TO ITS RELATIONS WITH
MOSCOW, AND THE MORE THEY DECRY THE POSSIBILITY OF
A "CONDOMINIUM" THAT THEY FEAR MAY SLIGHT EUROPEAN
INTERESTS.
IF THE EUROPEANS RETAIN THE POTENTIAL FOR A
"SPOILER" ROLE AMONG THE GREAT POWERS, IT IS NOT BE-
CAUSE THEY CAN OUTBID THE US FOR CLOSER TIES WITH
THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, ONE DANGER IS THAT EUROPE
MIGHT DIVERGE ENOUGH FROM A COMMON WESTERN LINE THAT
THE RUSSIANS MIGHT FEEL IT POSSIBLE TO MEDDLE AND
EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.
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ANOTHER DANGER IS THAT EUROPE'S CAPACITY FOR INDE-
PENDENT ACTION MIGHT UPSET UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE
SUPERPOWERS.
EUROPE'S CURRENT SEARCH FOR OIL AND INFLUENCE
IN THE ARAB WORLD ILLUSTRATES THE POINT. THE PO-
TENTIAL DANGER OF UNRESTRAINED EUROPEAN PROVISION OF
ARMS TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEEDS HARDLY TO BE STRESSED.
THE EUROPEANS' FLIRTATION WITH JAPAN--OR, EVENTUALLY
WITH CHINA--ALSO SHOWS THEIR FEELING THAT THEY SHOULD
NOT GIVE UP THE OPTION OF WORKING TOGETHER IN ORDER
TO OFFSET--IN HOWEVER VAGUE A WAY--EXCESSIVE COZINESS
BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS,
WE SHOULD NOW ASK HOW THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A UNITED
@ROPE AFFECTS A EUROPEAN ROLE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS?
IT MUST BE SAID AT THE OUTSET--AND ESPECIALLY
AT THIS TIME OF DISARRAY AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY--THAT THE EVENTUAL SHAPE OF A
WESTERN EUROPE UNION WILL PROBABLY NOT BE CLEAR EVEN
WITHIN THIS DECADE, SO BOTH WE AND THE RUSSIANS WILL
LEARN TO LIVE WITH--AND BE TEMPTED TO EXPLOIT--A
EUROPE OFTEN AT ODDS WITH ITSELF.
PERHAPS, THOUGH, I MIGHT VENTURE A FEW GUESSES
ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE UNITY MOVEMENT.
THE CENTRIPETAL FORCES--NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH
ARISE FROM HAVING TO COMPETE WITH OTHER POWER CEN-
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TERS--WILL PROBABLY OUTWEIGH THE FRAGMENTATION OF
EUROPE EVIDENT IN TODAY'S HEADLINES ABOUT INDIVIDUAL
SCRAMBLING FOR OIL, DISARRAY OVER MONETARY POLICIES,
AND DISPUTES OVER CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMON EC FUNDS.
TENSIONS WILL NEVERTHELESS REMAIN WITHIN THE COM-
MUNITY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING SOME FORM OF FEDERATION
AND THOSE SEEKING TO RESTRICT THE AUTONOMY OF A BUD-
DING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT.
THE END OF THE DECADE MAY WELL SEE SOME REIN-
FORCEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL AUTHORITY, BUT-
TRESSED BY AN INCREASINGLY OUTSPOKEN EUROPEAN PAR-
LIAMENT. A CONSOLIDATED EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE, HOW-
EVER, WOULD SEEM TO DEPEND ON A STRONG EUROPEAN GOV-
ERNMENT THAT COULD--AS THE SAYING GOES--"PULL THE
TRIGGER." WHILE THIS KIND OF A PLUNGE SEEMS A GOOD
MANY YEARS OFF, A PERSISTING THREAT FROM THE EAST--
ESPECIALLY IF PARALLELED BY US DISENGAGEMENT--WILL
FOSTER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF DEFENSE UNITY.
IN THE FAR EAST JAPAN AS BY ALL ODDS THE SINGLE
STRONGEST NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRY PRESENTS QUITE A DIFFERENT
PICTURE. OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS, IT HAS HAD THE BEST OF
BOTH WORLDS--THE BENEFITS OF THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US,
COUPLED WITH NON-INVOLVEMENT IN OUR STRUGGLES
WITH THE COMMUNIST POWERS. WITH THE RELAXING OF
MAJOR POWER TENSIONS, HOWEVER, TOKYO HAS BEEN SHIFT-
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ING TOWARD A MORE ASSERTIVE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY CALCULATED TO ENSURE ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS,
VITAL FOR ITS INDUSTRY. JAPAN, PARADOXICALLY, HAS
BECOME MORE VULNERABLE AS ITS LIVING STANDARDS HAVE
RISEN.
LONG ON THE SIDELINES IN THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY
IN THE FAR EAST, TOKYO NOW FINDS BOTH PEKING AND MOSCOW
INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS TO MAKE USE OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC
MUSCLE. AT THIS POINT, JAPAN IS WELL SITUATED. IT HAS
MORE TO OFFER CHINA AND THE EASTERN USSR IN TERMS OF FINAN-
CIAL, TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES THAN EITHER CAN
OFFER JAPAN.
INDEED, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC POSITION--BOTH POWERFUL
AND VULNERABLE--POINTS UP THE NEW DIMENSION THAT IS
SCRAMBLING SOME OF OUR OLD CONCEPTS OF MAJOR POWER
RELATIONS. THE GROWING WEALTH OF THE ARABS, FOR
EXAMPLE, WILL GIVE THEM A POTENTIALLY DOMINANT ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND MONETARY MARKETS, THIS
YEAR ALONE, WE CALCULATE THAT OIL-EXPORTING STATES
WILL ACCUMULATE $40 BILLION MORE THAN THEY CAN SPEND.
THESE FUNDS COULD BE USED TO CREATE SEVERE PRESSURE
ON EXCHANGE RATES AND INTEREST RATES IF THE INDUSTRIAL
NATIONS CANNOT PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE GOODS OR INVESTMENTS
ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS.
THE SPECTER OF GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION ALSO
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ARISES WITH AGRICULTURE--PARTICULARLY WHEAT, THE
PRINCIPAL FOOD GRAIN TO FEED THE WORLD'S HUNGRY. As
WORLD DEMAND HAS GROWN, EXPORTERS LIKE THE US AND
CANADA HAVE BEEN DRAWING DOWN THEIR STOCKS SO THAT
BY JULY 1 THE RESERVES WILL BE ALMOSTEXHAUSTED.
BREZHNEViS PROGRAM TO GIVE THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE A BET-
TER DIET IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS MOUNTING DEMAND.
AT THE SAME TIME, IN GOOD CROP YEARSLIKE 1973,
MOSCOW HAS READILY USED GRAIN EXPORTS FOR ITS OWN
POLITICAL PURPOSES, SUCH AS IN "LOANING" 2 MILLION
TONS OF WHEAT TO INDIA,
THE USSR AND CHINA ARE RELATIVELY ISOLATED FROM
THE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
AND LARGELY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN PETROLEUM. BUT, AS I
MENTIONED AT THE OUTSET, THEY FACE AN UPHILL STRUGGLE
IN THEIR AVOWED GOAL OF SURPASSING INDUSTRIALIZED
WESTERN COUNTRIES IN TECHNOLOGY. COMMUNIST PLANNERS
ONCE BELIEVED THAT DOMESTIC R&D PLUS "BORROWING" THE
LATEST WESTERN TECHNOLOGICAL IDEAS WOULD LEAD RAPIDLY
TO "BURYING" CAPITALISM. HOWEVER-, THEY UNDERESTIMATED
THE PACE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY IN ERMANY
AND JAPAN, AND OVERESTIMATED THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR
OWN R&D EFFORT. As A RESULT, THE GAP BETWEEN COM-
MUNIST AND WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES ACTUALLY HAS WIDENED,
AND COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
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HAVE INTENSIFIED. I MIGHT ADD THAT, ESPECIALLY IN
RUSSIA THIS ACROSS THE BOARD TECHNOLOGICAL GAP--FROM
ELECTRIC RAZORS TO ICBM SYSTEMS--HAS BECOME A POLITICAL
EMBARRASSMENT TO THE SOVIET LEADERS, INCREASING CON-
TACTS WITH THE MORE DEVELOPED WEST HAVE MADE THIS
DEFICIENCY HARDER TO HIDE, AND PUBLIC LECTURERS IN
Moscow ARE CONSTANTLY BADGERED BY SOVIET CITIZENS WHO
WANT TO KNOW WHY THE USSR CANNOT PRODUCE THE GADGETS
WESTERNERS AND EVEN SOME OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES
ARE SO ACCUSTOMED TO,
THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO CLOSE THE GAP BY ACQUIRING
TECHNICAL DATA, BY EXPANDING CONTACTS WITH WESTERN FIRMS
AND SCIENTISTS, BY MAKING FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT
RESEARCH AND EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL IN-
FORMATION AND--ESPECIALLY--BY PURCHASING MACHINERY
AND EQUIPMENT. NONE OF THESE CHANNELS HAS LIVED UP
TO COMMUNIST EXPECTATIONS, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, WESTERN
EQUIPMENT FREQUENTLY IS NOT AS PRODUCTIVE IN A COM-
MUNIST SETTING AS IT IS ON NATIVE GROUND, ATTEMPTS
TO EXPLOIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL DATA OR COPY FOREIGN
MACHINERY HAVE HAD MIXED SUCCESS, IN SOME MILITARY-
RELATED FIELDS, THE RESULTS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING
HAVE BEEN GOOD; IN CIVILIAN SECTORS, THE OUTCOME HAS
BEEN LESS FAVORABLE,
THE ONSET OF DETENTE HAS DISMANTLED SOME OF THE
TRADITIONAL OBSTACLES TO SOVIET ACQUISITION OF US
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TECHNOLOGY, MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM CREDITS EX-
TENDED BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE 1972 SUMMIT
RESULTED IN A LARGE INCREASE IN SOVIET IMPORTS OF US
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THE RELAXATION OF SOME US
EXPORT CONTROLS SINCE DETENTE CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISE
IN IMPORTS, ALTHOUGH CONTROLS CONTINUE TO LIMIT ACCESS
TO VERY SPECIALIZED AND SOPHISTICATED FOREIGN TECH-
NO LOGY.
THE SOVIET UNION FAR OUTSTRIPS CHINA IN ITS AB-
SORBTION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY) BUT PEKING ALSO HAS
GREATLY STEPPED UP ITS PURCHASES OF MACHINERY AND
TECHNOLOGY. IN 1973, CHINA SIGNED CONTRACTS WITH
US, JAPANESE AND WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS FOR A RECORD
$1.2 BILLION WORTH OF COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS TO
BE DELIVERED OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. MOREOVER,
IN A SHARP DEPARTURE FROM A LONG-STANDING POLICY OF
AVOIDING FOREIGN DEBT, DEFERRED PAYMENTS ARE BEING
USED TO FINANCE TWO-THIRDS OF THE COSTS.
DESPITE SUCH SHIFTS TO HASTEN MODERNIZATION AND
TO ASSURE LONG-TERM SELF-SUFFICIENCY, THE REST OF
THE WORLD WILL NOT BE STANDING STILL. IN SOME
FIELDS--FOR EXAMPLE, THE MORE ADVANCED ASPECTS OF
MISSILERY AND AEROSPACE, ELECTRONICS, AND LASER TECH-
NOLOGY--THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP IS ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT
TO NARROW,
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As BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING TRY VAINLY TO CATCH
UP WITH THE WEST, THE COMPETITION OF CIVIL AND MILI-
TARY SECTORS IS PROBABLY NO LESS ACUTE THAN HERE IN
THE US. IN FACT, RUSSIAN CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN FARING
BETTER IN RECENT YEARS. DESPITE AN AVERAGE 5 PERCENT
GROWTH IN SOVIET DEFENSE AND SPACE SPENDING SINCE
1960, THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN GROWING EVEN FASTER. THE
MILITARY SHARE OF THE SOVIET GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
HAS DECLINED TO 6 PERCENT, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS
GRADUAL DECLINE WILL CONTINUE. EVEN SO, DEFENSE
NEEDS WILL STILL COMMAND RUSSIA'S BEST MATERIALS AND
HIGHEST QUALITY MANPOWER.
IN CONCLUDING MY SURVEY OF GREAT POWER RELATIONS,
I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH MOS-
COW, PARTICULARLY, MUST BALANCE SKILLFULLY DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS, I SPEAK OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN DETENTE AND DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE--WHICH GOES
TO THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM,
IN THE EARLY STAGES OF NEGOTIATION, WHEN THE WHOLE
THING WAS NEW AND TENUOUS, THE SOVIETS TIGHTENED UP
WITH A TOUGH LINE ON INTELLECTUAL DISSENT, AND ISSUED
SHRILL WARNINGS ABOUT THE DANGER OF WESTERN IDEAS.
MORE RECENTLY, THEY SEEM TO BE CONSIDERING THE POS-
SIBILITY THAT THEIR SOCIETY IS NOW STABLE ENOUGH TO
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SURVIVE SOME VERY LIMITED RELAXATION OF CONTROLS.
THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE STILL NOT SURE ABOUT IT, HOW-
EVER, AND ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW MUCH CHANGE THEY
CAN AFFORD. THE EXPULSION OF SOLZHENITSYN TWO WEEKS
AGO SHOWS THEY ARE NOT READY TO GO VERY FAR. GA
LAST SEPTEMBER, THE SOVIET UNION STOPPED JAM-
MING THE VOICE OF AMERICA, THE BBC AND THE WEST GER-
MAN RADIO, DEUTSCHE WELLE. THE RUSSIANS CONTINUE TO
JAM RADIO LIBERTY, WHICH HAS A MORE AGGRESSIVE EDI-
TORIAL POLICY ABOUT SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS THAN THE
OFFICIAL RADIOS DO, AND THIS MONTH THEY RESUMED
SELECTIVE JAMMING OF DEUTSCHE WELLE BECAUSE IT WAS
BROADCASTING EXCERPTS FROM SOLZHENITSYN'S NEW BOOK,
THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, BUT MORE NEWS IS STILL GET-
TING INTO THE SOVIET UNION THAN DID BEFORE DETENTE
BECAME AN ESTABLISHED POLICY.
THE SOVIET PRESS HAS ALSO BEGUN TO CARRY SLIGHTLY
MORE ACCURATE PICTURES OF THE WEST. FOR EXAMPLE,
PRAVDA IN JANUARY RAN A SERIES ON THE US CONGRESS
THAT WAS NOT TOO BAD IN TERMS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS',
IT WAS CERTAINLY AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE OLD STEREO-
TYPE OF "CAPITALIST-BANKERS" CONTROLLING EVERYTHING
BEHIND THE SCENES.
IN AN EVEN MORE CAREFUL AND UNEASY FASHION, THE
POLITBURO HAS BACKED INTO ALLOWING SOME SELECTIVE
EMIGRATION. SINCE 1970, ABOUT 72,000 JEWS HAVE BEEN
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PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE. THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE PER-
MITTED THIS GRUDGINGLY AND UNGRACEFULLY, AND THEY
HAVE HELD BACK ON SPECIAL CASES, BUT THE FLOW HAS
CONTINUED EVEN THOUGH IT ANNOYS THE ARABS AND COM-
PLICATES SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
BREZHNEV AND HIS POLITBURO COLLEAGUES ARE WELL
AWARE THAT THEIR CONTROL DEPENDS STILL MORE ON MAIN-
TAINING POPULAR SATISFACTION THROUGH IMPROVING LIVING
STANDARDS. THE EXAMPLE OF POLISH WORKERS PROTESTING
INCREASES IN FOOD PRICES IN DECEMBER 1970 GAVE THEM
A FRIGHT. THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN ADOPTED SOON AFTERWARDS
GAVE INCREASED ATTENTION TO CONSUMER GOODS AND SER-
VICES. THE HARVEST FAILURE IN 1972 FORCED CUTBACKS
IN THE CONSUMER SECTOR, BUT THE KREMLIN IS DOGGEDLY
STICKING TO THE PLAN'S ORIGINAL GOALS AND IS TRYING
TO GET BACK ON THE TRACK. THE CONSUMER SECTOR HAS
BEEN STARVED FOR SO LONG THAT MUCH OF THE POPULACE
APPRECIATES EVEN MODEST IMPROVEMENTS,
OVER THE LONG TERM) DETENTE IS CLEARLY GOING
TO BRING CONSIDERABLE CHANGES TO THE SOVIET UNION--
WITH POSSIBLE DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES FOR GREAT POWER
RELATIONSHIPS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE AS YET
JUST WHAT THESE CONSEQUENCES MAY BE, BUT THE SOVIET
LEADERS ARE CLEARLY GAMBLING THAT THEY CAN DIRECT
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THE CHANGES., CONTROL THE PACE) AND PRESERVE THEM-
SELVES AND THEIR IDEOLOGY. SO FAR) SO GOOD--BUT
OVER HALF OF THE 70s REMAIN BEFORE THEM.
onAdr.ol 1/?7).--
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