[DDCI ADDRESS FOR ARMY WAR COLLEGE - THE WORLD SITUATION]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002000090003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 4, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

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RRg MRKLEU
6 JUNE 19/3
THE WORLD SITUATION
4 JUNE 1973
GENTLEMEN:
I AM SURE I NEED NOT REMIND YOU THAT THIS IS
THE 6TH OF JUNE--THE ANNIVERSARY OF ONE OF THE
now itteowara r -to -mice echc.a
Emilidahai EVENTS EVER 54444441LON THE CONTINENT OF
EUROPE, THIS IS A FORTUNATE COINCIDENCE, BECAUSE
IT SUPPLIES A STARTING POINT FOR WHAT 1 HAVE BEEN
ASKED TO DISCUSS?NAMELY, THE WORLD SITUATION,
OTHERWISE, WITH SUCH A LARGE SUBJECT, I MIGHT HAVE
BEEN IN THE POSITION OF THE YOUNG ARAB PRINCE WHO
WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY UTILIZING THE ABUNDANTLY
STOCKED HAREM HIS FATHER HAD GIVEN HIM FOR HIS 21ST
BIRTHDAY--HE KNEW WHAT TO DO, BUT COULDNIT FIGURE
OUT WHERE TO START,
LET US BEGIN WITH WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN
AS THE "YEAR OF EUROPE," ACTUALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN
MANY SUCH YEARS, FOR EVER SINCE THAT JUNE DAY IN
1944 CERTAINLY ONE OF THE PRIMARY CONCERNS OF THE
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UNITED STATES HAS BEEN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR
ALLIES OF WESTERN EUROPE. WE CAN GO ON EASILY
FROM THERE TO THE "OTHER EUROPE," ESPECIALLY THE
SOVIET UNION, WHERE ALMOST EVERY DEVELOPMENT IM-
PACTS ON US POLICY, AND FREQUENTLY THREATENS OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY. CHINA, OF COURSE, IS ALSO VERY
MUCH A PART OF THE WORLD SITUATION THESE DAYS, AS
IS THE FESTERING--AND MENACING--STALEMATE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, I WILL CONCLUDE WITH A BRIEF DIS-
CUSSION OF THE OUTLOOK FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN
INDOCHINA,
EUROPE
WHAT, THEN, HAS THIS "YEAR OF EUROPE" SO FAR
PRODUCED? MOST OF WESTERN EUROPE HAS BEEN CON-
SOLIDATED AROUND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES; THERE
HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST DETENTE; AND A
NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES IS EVOLVING.
ONE ASPECT OF WESTERN EUROPE--AND THE MOST IM-
PORTANT--REMAINS THE SAME THE MORE IT CHANGES: THE
PERSISTENCE OF POLITICS, ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ARE MORE WORRIED ABOUT DOMESTIC INFLATION THAN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS. MOST OF THE CONCERNS OVER FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS ARE SHARED CONCERNS: MULTILATERAL
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RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, RELATIONS
WITH THE US, AND RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. WESTERN
EUROPEANS ARE ALSO SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS TO SOCIAL,
CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AT A LOWER LEVEL,
SUCH AS THE FESTERING WALLOON-FLEMISH PROBLEMS, AND
ULSTER.
THE THREE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF THE
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES?FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND
WEST GERMANY--HAVE MUCH IN COMMON, THE THREE
LEADERS ARE ALL CAPABLE MEN, TO BE SURE, BUT NONE ik2.0'APS-kZ(15
OF HEROIC STATURE. EACH, HOWEVER, HAS WEAK--
IF NOT DEMORALIZED?OPPOSITION, AND CAN PROCEED
WITH CONFIDENCE.
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU EMERGED FROM THE PARLIAMEN-
TARY ELECTIONS IN MARCH WITH A SOLID MAJORITY IN THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND WITH INCREASED PERSONAL
STRENGTH, MEN CLOSE TO HIM HOLD MAJOR POSTS AND
THE INFLUENCE OF THE ORTHODOX GAULLISTS HAS BEEN
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY
ACTED TO MEET ITS PRE-ELECTION COMMITMENT TO SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC REFORM. STUDENT AND WORKER DEMONSTRA-
TIONS HAVE DIED DOWN AND ARE UNLIKELY AGAIN TO
THREATEN GOVERNMENT STABILITY. PARIS SHOULD BE
ABLE TO DEAL WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND THE
US FROM A STRONG POSITION.
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A (1e EA-0 (T/tA-1-
IT IthalM0***E PRIME MINISTER HEATH'S GOVERN-
MENT WILL SURVIVE ITS FULL TERM--UNTIL 1975, THE
ECONOMY--HIS PRINCIPAL DOMESTIC PROBLEM--IS SHOWING
SIGNS OF STRENGTHENING. UNEMPLOYMENT HAS FALLEN BE-
LOW THREE PERCENT; ECONOMIC GROWTH IS APPROACHING A
RATE OF 5 PERCENT; AND SOME INROADS ARE BEING MADE
INTO THE INFLATIONARY RATE. MOST OF THE TRADE
UNIONS CAPITULATED TO THE GOVERNMENT-ISSUED GUIDE-
LINES EARLIER THIS SPRING, BUT SEVERAL MILITANT
ONES WILL NEGOTIATE NEW CONTRACTS NEXT FALL. TALKS
ON THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
AND UNION LEADERS WILL BEGIN SOON, AND MAY BE A
CLUE AS TO WHETHER BRITAIN CAN ACHIEVE SUFFICIENT
INDUSTRIAL PEACE TO PERMIT ITS INITIAL ACCOMMODA-
TION WITH EC MEMBERSHIP.
IN BONN, THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL AND FREE
DEMOCRATS--LED BY CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND FOREIGN
MINISTER SCHEEL--HAS A SIZEABLE PARLIAMENTARY MA-
JORITY AND SEEMS ASSURED OF STAYING POWER FOR THE
FULL FOUR-YEAR TERM. As ELSEWHERE, INFLATION HAS
BEEN GROWING AT RECORD RATES, BUT THE CHANCELLOR
SHOWS SIGNS OF GETTING ON WITH DOMESTIC REFORMS; THE
FLESHING OUT OF THE EASTERN TREATIES WILL ALSO HELP
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HIM; AND THE VISITS HE HAS JUST HAD WITH PRESIDENT
NIXON AND WITH BREZHNEV HAVE ADDED TO HIS STATURE.
THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNIfle LAST JANU-
ARY AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, THE SHIFTS IN NATIONAL
POLICIES THAT MADE THAT ENLARGEMENT POSSIBLE, HAVE
SET THE STAGE FOR RESUMING STEP-BY-STEP PROGRESS
TOWARD A WESTERN EUROPE THAT CAN EVENTUALLY BE A
COHESIVE FORCE IN WORLD POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECO-
NOMIC AFFAIRS.
THE SPECIFIC SIGNS OF THIS POSITIVE--IF STILL
PAINFUL MOVEMENT--ARE EVIDENT IN MANY AREAS, SUCH
AS:
--THE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
IN THE BRITISH PRESS;
--THE EXCELLENT PERSONNEL THAT LONDON HAS SENT
TO STAFF THE EC's INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIVE-
LINESS OF THE DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PAR-
LIAMENT;
--THE WILLINGNESS OF BONN TO DISAGREE WITH
PARIS ON EC POLICIES;
--THE IMPATIENCE OF SOME OF THE NEW MEMBERS
WITH THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRUSSELS IN-
STITUTIONS;
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--THE GROWING HABIT OF WORKING TOGETHER IN THE
POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM;
--THE ACTIVITIES IN NATO OF THE EUROGROUP, IN-
CLUDING THOSE OPPOSED BY THE FRENCH;
--THE FORMATION EARLIER THIS YEAR OF THE EURO-
PEAN TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION;
--THE SCHEDULED REVIEW OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY; AND SO ON.
BUT IT IS THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL--NOT THE AR-
RIVAL--OF "EUROPE" THAT HAS INJECTED A NEW AND COM-
PLICATING FACTOR INTO THE UNFOLDING OF DETENTE ON
THE EUROPEAN SCENE, WHEN MOSCOW FIRST ADVOCATED A
CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT
THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED THE "REALITY" OF THE COM-
MUNITI y. ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE FIRST
MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE CSCE WILL CONVENE AT THE
END OF JUNE AS SCHEDULED, THE SOVIETS CANNOT HAVE
BEEN TOTALLY PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE PREPARATORY
TALKS HAVE GONE NOR WITH THE OUTCOME THAT SEEMS IN
PROSPECT. MOSCOW WANTED AN EARLY AND QUICK COMMIT-
MENT TO THE CONVENING OF CSCE, BUT INSTEAD WAS
DRAGGED THROUGH LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OF AGENDA ISSUES.
DESPITE THE QUALMS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES
ENTERED THE CSCEJ THERE IS A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS
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AMONG THE EUROPEANS THAT IS OFTEN STRONGER THAN THE
LURE OF BILATERAL "DEALS" WITH THE RUSSIANS. MORE-
OVER, ALTHOUGH THE EUROPEANS ARE RELUCTANT TO PUT
OUT HARD CASH FOR DEFENSE, THERE IS NO COLLECTIVE
DESIRE TO COMMIT SUICIDE.
OUR ALLIES HAVE REACTED FAVORABLY TO MANY OF
THE MBFR PROPOSALS WHICH WE PROPOSED THAT NATO SHOULD
CONSIDER WHEN THE TALKS RESUME THIS FALL. NEVERTHE-
LESS, THE REDUCTION OF THESE PROPOSALS TO SPECIFIC
GUIDELINES AND TACTICAL APPROACHES WILL NOT BE EASY.
MOST OF THE ALLIES ARE RESIGNED TO--AND SOME GRATEFULLY
ACCEPT--CONFINING INITIAL REDUCTIONS TO US AND SOVIET
FORCES. BUT THEY ARE PROFOUNDLY WORRIED THAT THE
EXERCISE MAY DEGENERATE INTO A BILATERAL ONE AND
THAT IT MAY TOUCH UPON THE FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS
WHICH MAKE POSSIBLE A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY.
THE EUROPEANS ARE PLEASED THAT WASHINGTON AND
MOSCOW HAVE FOUND NEW AREAS OF WIDER AGREEMENT--
PARTICULARLY IN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL; THAT THE US
IS AGAIN FOCUSING ATTENTION ON EUROPE AND THAT WASH-
INGTON HAS FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WANTS A MORE
MATURE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE PARTNERS ARE
"MORE EQUAL." BUT THEY GREATLY FEAR THAT COMMON US-
SOVIET INTERESTS MAY COMPETE INCREASINGLY WITH THE
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MUTUALITY OF US-EUROPEAN INTERESTS; THEY SPECULATE
THAT MBFR AND SALT II MAY RESULT IN A DECOUPLING
OF THE DETERRENT; THEY THINK THEY DETECT AN AMERICAN
IMPATIENCE THAT WESTERN EUROPE DOES NOT SPEAK WITH
ONE VOICE; AND SOME FEEL THAT OUR COMMERCIAL AND
MONETARY DIFFERENCES HAVE CONVERTED ALLIES INTO
ADVERSARIES. THE AMBIGUOUS RESPONSE WHICH WESTERN
EUROPE HAS SO FAR GIVEN TO DR. KISSINGER'S 23 APRIL
SPEECH AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY
STATEMENT REFLECTS THESE SENSITIVITIES.
AS WE PROCEED DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS
SUMMER TO WORK OUT THE OUTLINES OF A NEW ATLANTIC
RELATIONSHIP--WHETHER IT IS CALLED A "CHARTER" OR
SOMETHING ELSE--THE QUESTIONS OF DEADLINES AND EX-
PECTATIONS WILL BE CRITICAL. THE FACT OF THE MATTER
IS THAT EUROPE MUST DO A GREAT DEAL IN A VERY SHORT
TIME. IT MUST NEGOTIATE A NEW TRADING SYSTEM, CON-
TRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM, ADOPT A
POSITION ON AN ACCEPTABLE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE; COMMIT ITSELF TO DO MORE FOR ITS
OWN DEFENSE OR, AT LEAST, TO DO IT BETTER; FIGURE
OUT HOW TO LINK JAPAN TO THE ATLANTIC NATIONS; AND
FINALLY, CREATE A NEW ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.
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ALL THIS MEANS THAT WESTERN EUROPE MUST COMBINE
ITS SELF-INTERESTS WITH SOME MEASURE OF APPRECIATION
OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN INCIPIENT WORLD POWER.
BUT, SINCE THE CONSTITUENT MEMBERS OF EUROPE STILL
HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO TO WORK OUT THEIR MUTUAL RELA-
TIONSHIPS, THE MOST THAT CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR
FUTURE IS THE CONTINUATION OF THE SPECIAL EUROPEAN-
US RELATIONSHIP THAT IS BASED ON COMMON VITAL IN-
TERESTS.
THE SOVIET UNION
You HAVE NO DOUBT NOTICED HOW OFTEN THE SOVIET
UNION HAS CROPPED UP IN WHAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A
DISCUSSION OF WESTERN EUROPE. THIS IS, QUITE SIMPLY,
A FACT OF OUR WORLD--THE RUSSIAN BEAR CASTS A LONG
SHADOW, SO LET US LOOK AT THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND MILITARY SITUATION IN THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH
HAS EVER PUBLICLY THREATENED TO "BURY" THE UNITED
STATES.
THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS STABLE; ITS
RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY HIERARCHY ARE GENERALLY
GOOD. GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S POSITION AS THE
FIRST-AMONG-EQUALS HAS STRENGTHENED IN THE PAST TWO
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YEARS, AND THE POLITBURO CHANGES ANNOUNCED BY THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON 27 APRIL INCREASED HIS AUTHOR-
ITY. HE IS UNLIKELY TO TRY TO SEIZE ALL THE REINS
OF POWER, HOWEVER, LEST HIS COLLEAGUES BECOME RES-
TIVE AND CLOSE RANKS, AS THEY DID IN 1964 WHEN
KHRUSHCHEV WAS OUSTED.
THE INCLUSION OF DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO, FOR-
EIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, AND KGB CHIEF ANDROPOV IN THE
POLITBURO, TOGETHER WITH THE OUSTER OF SHELEST, WAS
INTENDED AS A SIGNAL THAT DETENTE AND COOPERATION
WITH THE WEST COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF ALL MAJOR CON-
STITUENCIES IN THE USSR. BREZHNEV'S REPORT TO THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS ENDORSED BY
EVERYONE WHO COUNTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. MORE-
OVER, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INSTRUCTED THE POLITBURO
TO FORGE AHEAD, TO IMPLEMENT THE "PEACE PROGRAM" AND
MAKE "IRREVERSIBLE" CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION.
IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH BREZHNEV CAN BE
EXPECTED TO PRESS FOR A MAJOR EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION--JUST AS HE DID LAST
MONTH IN BONN. HE RECENTLY URGED SEVERAL US SENATORS
TO CAST ASIDE COLD WAR MISCONCEPTIONS AND SEEK AREAS
OF COOPERATION. BUT HE STRESSED THAT THE "UNLIMITED
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POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION" WOULD REQUIRE
THE MOST SENSITIVE TYPE OF POLITICAL DECISION. IN
THIS CONTEXT, HE HELD OUT THE LURE OF LARGE-SCALE
DEALS INVOLVING THE EXCHANGE OF WESTERN CAPITAL AND
TECHNOLOGY FOR SOVIET RAW MATERIALS.
THIS PUSH FOR DETENTE REFLECTS THE KREMLIN'S
ACCOMMODATION TO SOVIET DOMESTIC NEEDS, AND ITS AP-
PRECIATION OF THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.
IN BRIEF, THE USSR HAS NO SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE
TO A WESTERN ORIENTATION. FACED WITH A DECLINING
ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE WHILE THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOVIET
SOCIETY ARE RISING, BREZHNEV HAS MADE A SERIES OF
PRAGMATIC AND FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES, PRIMARILY ECONOMIC,
THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE WITHOUT EXPOSING
HIS LEADERSHIP TO DAMAGE THAT COULD BE GRAVE--AND
POSSIBLY FATAL.
THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CEASE
THEIR VIGOROUS COMPETITION WITH THE US FOR GLOBAL
INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS NO
SIGN OF LET-UP IN THEIR EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE OUR IN-
FLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ACTION
AND KGB OPERATIONS; NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY INDICATION
OF A DECLINE IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS.
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ASSUMING THAT THE LEADERSHIP REMAINS MORE OR
LESS IN ITS PRESENT COLLECTIVE FORM, MAJOR POLICY
SHIFTS SEEM UNLIKELY. BREZHNEV IS CAUTIOUS BY NATURE,
f(koc,e,5
AND IN ANY COLLECTIVEA)DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED
POLICY IS WRENCHING. IbECISIONS ARE BASED ON CON?
SENSUS--A PROCESS THAT MILITATES AGAINST DRAMATIC
CHANGES.
THIS APPLIES, TOO, TO DECISIONS INVOLVING THE
MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS. No LEADER CAN RISK EXPOSING
HIMSELF TO THE CHARGE THAT HE HAS NEGLECTED DEFENSE
NEEDS--NEITHER CAN HE GIVE CARTE BLANCHE TO THE MILI?
TARY AND THE ARMS PRODUCERS. DEFENSE NEEDS MUST
BALANCE OUT AGAINST OTHER PRIORITIES, AND ONE MILI?
TARY REQUIREMENT MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST ANOTHER.
OCCASIONALLY THIS STRAINS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PO?
LITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS.
GRECHKO'S ACCESSION TO THE POLITBURO NEED NOT
MENACE DETENTE. IN THE SHORT TERM, IT MAY EVEN
STRENGTHEN BREZHNEV'S HAND DOMESTICALLY ON MILITARY
NEGOTIATIONS LIKE SALT AND MBFR BY REASSURING THE
SOVIET PEOPLE THAT THE MILITARY SUPPORT HIS POLICY
IN THIS AREA. IN THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, IT COULD
MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE USSR TO ACCEPT
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CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AT SALT. THE MILITARY NOW HAS
A VOTE, AND THIS CANNOT FAIL TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON
THE TRADEOFFS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE POLITBURO.
THE_QUESTION OF THE ECONOMY
IN DISCUSSING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE
SOVIET UNION, I HAVE SEVERAL TIMES MENTIONED ONE OF
THE MOST TROUBLESOME PROBLEMS BESETTING THE POLITICAL
LEADERS--THE ECONOMY.
IN THE PAST MOSCOW HAS STRESSED ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND INVESTMENT RATHER THAN CONSUMER GOODS. SINCE
1960, HOWEVER, INVESTMENTS HAVE BEEN YIELDING A
STEADILY SMALLER RATE OF RETURN. GROWTH RATES FOR
THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT HAVE DECREASED FROM OVER
6 PERCENT ANNUALLY DURING 1951-60 TO LESS THAN 5.5
PERCENT PER YEAR FOR 1961-70. PRODUCTION OF CON-
SUMER GOODS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS HAS BEEN SLOWLY
GAINING IN PRIORITY.
THIS DECADE WILL PROBABLY SEE AS MANY DISAP-
POINTMENTS AS DID THE '60s. THE 1971-75 PLAN GOT
OFF TO AN INAUSPICIOUS START IN 1971-72. THE GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT GREW BY AN AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF
ONLY 3 PERCENT FOR THE FIRST TWO YEARS, AND IN 1972
GAINS IN BOTH THE GNP AND INDUSTRY WERE THE SMALLEST
SINCE WORLD WAR II.
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THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARY
PROGRAMS ARE BEING AFFECTED BY THE CURRENT ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS, THE GROWTH OF MILITARY SPENDING HAS PROB-
ABLY LEVELED OFF DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, AS
COMPLETION OF A NUMBER OF LARGE STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT
PROGRAMS HAS REDUCED SPENDING FOR MILITARY HARDWARE.
THIS HAS BEEN OFFSET, HOWEVER, BY AN ACCELERATION
IN THE RATE OF GROWTH OF SPENDING FOR MILITARY R&D.
DURING 1973-75, MILITARY SPENDING PROBABLY WILL
RESUME ITS GROWTH AS THE SOVIETS BEGIN TO MODERNIZE
THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES AND AS MILITARY R&D CONTINUES
TO BE EXPANDED ON THE ORDER OF 8-10 PERCENT PER YEAR,
THE AVERAGE GROWTH RATE IN TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDI-
TURES WILL PROBABLY BE ABOUT 3 OR 4 PERCENT OVER
THE NEXT FEW YEARS, WELL WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF THE
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND THE ECONOMY IN GENERAL.
SOVIET ADVANCED WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
LAST YEAR, AS YOU KNOW, THE US AND THE USSR
SIGNED AND RATIFIED THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH
THESE ACCORDS ESTABLISH NUMERICAL LIMITS ON DEPLOY-
MENT OF ABMs, ICBMs, AND SUBMARINE BALLISTIC MIS-
SILES; THEY DO NOT LIMIT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
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OF THESE WEAPON SYSTEMS. THERE IS, IN FACT, NO EVI-
DENCE THAT SALT HAS HAD ANY IMPORTANT EFFECT ON THE
CURRENT SOVIET WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. EVEN
BEFORE THE SIGNING, THE SOVIETS HAD BEGUN TO SHIFT
RESOURCES FROM FURTHER DEPLOYMENT TO R&D PROGRAMS
DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THEIR FORCES.
THERE ARE DOUBTLESS MANY DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS
FOR THESE SOVIET R&D PROGRAMS. A SIMPLE DESIRE FOR
SOME MEASURE OF STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY IS SURELY ONE
FACTOR, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR A
LONG TIME SUFFERED FROM WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED A MILI-
TARY INFERIORITY COMPLEX. ANOTHER MOTIVATION MAY BE
A DETERMINATION TO CLOSE THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD TECH-
NOLOGY GAP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST IN
GENERAL--AND THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR--THAT
HAS PLAGUED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOR YEARS. PUBLIC
LECTURERS IN MOSCOW ARE FREQUENTLY BADGERED BY CIT-
IZENS WHO WANT TO KNOW WHY RUSSIA IS UNABLE TO PRO-
DUCE THE GADGETS 4e5 WESTERNERS HAVE LONG BEEN AC-
CUSTOMED t FINALLY, THE SOVIET LEADERS MUST RECALL
WITH NOSTALGIA THE HEADY DAYS OF THE FIRST SPUTNIK--
WHEN SOVIET TECHNOLOGY DID. SCORE A COUP. 1 HAVE
NO DOUBT THAT THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN WOULD LIKE TO
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PULL OFF ANOTHER SIMILAR SPECTACULAR, AND EFFORTS
TO ACHIEVE SOME SORT OF TECHNICAL BREAKTHROUGH ARE
ALL THE MORE LIKELY NOW THAT SALT HAS PROHIBITED
QUANTITATIVE INCREASES IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS.
MOSCOW APPEARS SO FAR TO BE COMPLYING WITH THE
LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS.
WE ARE QUITE CONFIDENT THAT THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED
ICBM LAUNCHERS HAS NOT INCREASED SINCE THE AGREEMENTS
WERE SIGNED) THAT DEPLOYMENT OF ABMs IS STILL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT CONSTRUCTION
OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, ALTHOUGH CONTINUING,
IS WELL WITHIN THE SALT LIMITATIONS.
ICBM DEVELOPMENT
LET ME NOW DESCRIBE BRIEFLY SOME OF THE NEW
WEAPONS UNDER DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION,
AMONG THESE ARE AT LEAST THREE NEW ICBMs.
ONE OF THESE NEW MISSILES IS LARGE--IN THE
SS-9 CLASS--AND IT MAY CARRY A PAYLOAD SOMEWHAT
HEAVIER THAN THAT OF THE PRESENT SS-9. WE BELIEVE
THIS NEW LARGE MISSILE WILL EVENTUALLY BE EQUIPPED
WITH A MIRV PAYLOAD, ALTHOUGH TO DATE THE SOVIETS
HAVE TESTED IT ONLY WITH A SINGLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLE.
IT COULD BE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT IN 1975.
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TWO OTHER NEW MISSILES ARE SMALLER. ONE IS
IN THE SS-11 CLASS, THE OTHER IS LIKE THE SS-13.
BOTH COULD BE OPERATIONAL IN 1975. THEY, TOO, HAVE
SO FAR BEEN TESTED ONLY WITH A SINGLE RE-ENTRY VE-
HICLE, BUT WE SEE NO REASON WHY THEY COULD NOT EVEN-
TUALLY BE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVs,
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF TWO OF THESE
NEW MISSILES IS THE INCORPORATION OF ON-BOARD COM-
PUTERS FOR A NAVIGATING GUIDANCE SYSTEM--A CLEAR
DEPARTURE FROM EARLIER SOVIET GUIDANCE TECHNIQUES ?
THE NEW GUIDANCE SYSTEMS WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS
TO ACHIEVE BETTER TARGETING FLEXIBILITY AND THE
MISSILES WOULD BE MORE READILY ADAPTABLE TO A MIRV
SYSTEM.
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
THE USSR IS CONTINUING ITS HIGH PRIORITY PRO-
GRAM TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND ITS ALREADY CONSIDERABLE
FLEET OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, UNTIL LAST
YEAR, THIS FORCE OF "MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUB-
MARINES," AS IT IS REFERRED TO IN THE SALT AGREE-
MENT AND PROTOCOL, CONSISTED OF THE Y-CLASS SUB-
MARINES THAT THE SOVIETS BEGAN LAUNCHING IN 1966,
LAST SUMMER, HOWEVER, A NEW CLASS OF BALLISTIC MIS-
SILE SUBMARINE WAS DETECTED IN THE WHITE SEA, IT
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RESEMBLES THE Y-CLASS BOATS, BUT IS LONGER AND HAS
A HIGHER MISSILE BAY AREA. WE CALL THIS NEW SUB-
MARINE THE D-CLASS.
THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED A NEW AND
LARGER NAVAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FOR DEPLOYMENT ON
THE D-CLASS, WHICH HAS ONLY 12 LAUNCH TUBES IN COM-
PARISON WITH THE 16 ON THE Y-CLASS,
WE BELIEVE THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR THE
NEW MISSILE IS NOW COMPLETE--IN LATE 1972 IT FLEW
SOME 4,300 NAUTICAL MILES. SUBMARINES ARMED WITH
IT COULD BE WITHIN RANGE OF TARGETS IN THE US WHILE
STILL IN HOME WATERS.
THE SOVIETS ARE ACTIVELY PURSUING ABM DEVELOP-
MENT IN AREAS PERMITTED UNDER THE ABM TREATY, ES-
PECIALLY IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING SYSTEMS. ONE MIS-
SILE BEING DEVELOPED, FOR INSTANCE, IS BELIEVED TO
HAVE A SLIGHTLY IMPROVED PERFORMANCE OVER THE GALOSH
MISSILES DEPLOYED AROUND MOSCOW, AND THE RADARS
USED WITH IT ARE LESS EXPENSIVE. THE SYSTEM, HOW-
EVER, PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST CUR-
RENT US STRATEGIC MISSILES, BUT--ESPECIALLY IF IT
WERE READILY DEPLOYABLE--IT COULD BE VERY USEFUL IN
DEALING WITH A LIMITED CHINESE MISSILE THREAT.
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IN SUM, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SIGNING OF THE
SALT AGREEMENTS HAS NOT SLOWED SOVIET EFFORTS TO
DEVELOP NEW AND IMPROVED STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THERE
IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDER
THEMSELVES TO BE IN A VERY SERIOUS COMPETITION WITH
THE US, AND THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPON SYS-
TEMS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IS A MAJOR PART OF
THAT COMPETITION. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THEY ARE
PURSUING THIS COMPETITION VIGOROUSLY.
MIR&
IF WE TURN NOW TO CHINA, WE FIND A MUCH LESS
STABLE POLITICAL SITUATION, COUPLED (STRANGELY ENOUGH
PERHAPS) WITH IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN ADVANCED WEAP-
ONS PROGRAMS.
INTERNAL POLITICS
PEKING'S DETENTE WITH THE US IS PROGRESSING
DESPITE THE UNRESOLVED INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION
IN CHINA.
THE FIRM AND DECISIVE DIRECTION THAT HAS GUIDED
CHINESE DIPLOMACY IS LACKING IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.
CLEARLY, PEKING--A FULL 20 MONTHS AFTER THE ALLEGED
COUP ATTEMPT BY FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER LIN PIA0--
IS STILL STRUGGLING WITH THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE
AFFAIR.
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THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA
IS CONSIDERABLE:
--OF THE 25 MEMBERS NAMED TO THE POLITBURO IN
1969, ONLY A DOZEN APPEAR TO BE TAKING PART
IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN A MEANINGFUL WAY;
--THERE IS NO VISIBLE CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS;
THE SECRETARIAT AND ITS TEN OR SO OPERATIONAL
DEPARTMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY RECONSTITUTED.
--THERE HAS BEEN NO DESIGNATED MINISTER OF DE-
FENSE SINCE LIN PIA? FELL, NOR ANY FORMAL RE-
PLACEMENTS FOR THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF OR THE
HEADS OF THE AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND LOGISTICS
SERVICES--ALL OF WHOM DISAPPEARED AT THE SAME
TIME.
--OVER A THIRD OF THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES
LACK AN APPOINTED HEAD.
--THERE ARE SEVERAL VACANCIES IN THE PROVINCIAL
LEADERSHIP.
--THE CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED IN 1969, WHICH
DESIGNATED LIN PIA? AS MAO'S SUCCESSOR, HAS
NOT BEEN REVISED.
THESE MATTERS CLEARLY ARE IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO
CALL FOR A NEW PARTY CONGRESS, BUT NONE SEEMS IN THE
OFFING.
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ONE OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR
THIS YEAR WAS THE REHABILITATION IN APRIL OF TENG
HSIAO-PING, THE SECOND HIGHEST RANKING PARTY OF-
FICIAL PURGED DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THE
MOVE PROBABLY IS AN EFFORT BY MODERATES SUCH AS
CHOU EN-LAI TO MAKE FORMER PARTY LEADERS AVAILABLE
TO FILL HIGH-LEVEL POSITIONS NOW VACANT.
THE ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP
ARE VARIED AND COMPLEX. THE MAIN ONES SEEM TO BE:
--WHAT TO DO ABOUT A WHOLE RANGE OF RADICAL
"REFORMS" INSTITUTED DURING THE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION. SOME HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING
MODIFIED, OR THREATENED WITH COMPLETE
REVERSAL;
--HOW TO RE-ESTABLISH THE PARTY'S PARAMOUNT
AUTHORITY, AND WHO SHOULD TAKE OVER THE
LEADERSHIP POSITIONS;
--THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS;
--REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY;
--THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY IN THE PROVINCES,
WHERE THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE PARTY, THE
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ARMY MUST BE
BALANCED AND WHERE PEKING'S CONTROL IS BEING
RE-ESTABLISHED;
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--THE MECHANISM FOR MANAGING THE SUCCESSION TO
MAO AND CHOU WHEN THEY DIE, AND THE LEADERS
WHO WILL SUCCEED THEM.
CHAIRMAN MAO STILL IS THE ULTIMATE ARBITER, AND
PREMIER CHOU SEEMS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF THE DAY-TO-
DAY ADMINISTRATION. THE CHAIRMAN HAS CLOSELY IDEN-
TIFIED HIMSELF WITH THE PRESENT MODERATE FOREIGN
POLICY, BUT SOME ASPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DOMESTIC
PROGRAMS MAY NOT SIT QUITE SO WELL WITH HIM.
THE EFFECT OF THIS MURKY POLITICAL SITUATION ON
PRESENT AND FUTURE MILITARY PROGRAMS IS HARD TO
JUDGE. WELL-ESTABLISHED R&D ACTIVITY HAS PROBABLY
NOT BEEN DRASTICALLY AFFECTED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
THAT ARGUMENTS OVER PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS IN-
VOLVING MILITARY R&D PROGRAMS CONTRIBUTED TO THE LIN
PIA? AFFAIR, NOR DO SUCH ARGUMENTS SEEM TO BE A PRI-
MARY BONE OF CONTENTION AT THE MOMENT.
ADVANCED WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
IN ANY CASE, CHINA TODAY IS A NUCLEAR POWER,
ALTHOUGH IT STILL LACKS THE CAPABILITY TO POSE A
MEANINGFUL STRATEGIC THREAT TO THE CONTINENTAL
UNITED STATES. THE CHINESE HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED
TWO BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, WITH RANGES OF 600
AND 1,400 NAUTICAL MILES. THESE CAN REACH MOST
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MILITARY TARGETS IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE USSR,
ALL OF JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA, AS WELL AS SIGNIFI-
CANT TARGETS IN INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA,
LCBMs
THE CHINESE ARE PUSHING AHEAD WITH THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF OTHER WEAPONS THAT COULD IN FACT POSE A
THREAT TO AT LEAST PORTIONS OF THE US IN THE FUTURE.
A TWO-STAGE MISSILE, WITH AN ESTIMATED RANGE OF AS
MUCH AS 3,500 NM, HAS BEEN TEST-FLOWN TWICE, IT
WOULD HAVE A GOOD CAPABILITY AGAINST EURASIAN TAR-
GETS, INCLUDING MOSCOW AND MOST OF THE WESTERN USSR.
IT COULD ALSO REACH PARTS OF ALASKA. ANOTHER, LARGER
ICBM CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ANYWHERE IN THE US
IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT, BUT WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL
FOR AT LEAST THREE YEARS.
IN ADDITION, THE CHINESE PROBABLY ARE DEVELOPING
A SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE, BUT WE HAVE
NOT YET DETECTED ANY LAUNCHES FROM CHINESE SUBMARINES.
NUCLEAR WEAPOUS PROGRAM
IN A GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM THAT BEGAN
IN 1964, CHINA HAS SO FAR CONDUCTED 14 NUCLEAR
TESTS. THE FIRST FEW WERE LIMITED TO NUCLEAR DEVICES
WITH LOW YIELDS, BUT THE CHINESE CLAIMED THAT ONE OF
THE DEVICES--DETONATED IN 1966--wAs DELIVERED BY A
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MISSILE. PROGRESS WAS RAPID, AND BEFORE LONG
THERMONUCLEAR DEVICES, INCLUDING SEVERAL WITH
MULTIMEGATON YIELDS, WERE BEING TESTED. URANIUM
MIS IS AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM, CAN THE CHINESE
ECONOMY SUPPORT IT?
THE ECONOMY
ALTHOUGH THIS ECONOMY IS SOMETIMES CALLED
"UNDERDEVELOPED" OR "DUALISTIC," CHINA DIFFERS
MARKEDLY FROM THE CUSTOMARY IMAGE OF A LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRY, ITS RESOURCES HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED, EF-
FECTIVELY FOR THE MOST PART, TOWARD TWO BASIC ECONOMIC
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OBJECTIVES--FIRST, TO DEVELOP ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE
BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND ADVANCED WEAPONS, WITH THE
RELATED INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL BASE; AND SECOND,
TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE, IF AUSTERE, LIVING STANDARDS FOR
THE EVER-GROWING MASSES,
ECONOMIC GROWTH DURING THE FIRST TWO DECADES
OF COMMUNIST RULE, ALTHOUGH ERRATIC, WAS FAIRLY
STRONG, PERIODS OF INTERNAL UPHEAVAL UPSET THE
ORDERLY EXPANSION OF AGRICULTURE, ENLARGEMENT OF
INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION IN ARMAMENTS, AND GROWTH
OF FOREIGN TRADE, THE MOST SERIOUS INTERRUPTIONS
WERE THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD OF 1958-60 AND THE MORE
RECENT CULTURAL REVOLUTION, IN SPITE OF THESE
SET-BACKS, THE CHINESE LEADERS CAN LOOK BACK ON THE
ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF THEIR FIRST TWO DECADES OF
CONTROL WITH CONSIDERABLE PRIDE, HEAVY INDUSTRIES--
THE CHIEF SUPPORTS OF CHINA'S MILITARY PROGRAMS--
HAVE EXPANDED RAPIDLY FROM THE TINY BASE COMMAN-
DEERED BY THE COMMUNISTS IN 1949,
THE PAST THREE YEARS SHOW THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
OF CHINA'S ECONOMY. THERE WERE RECORD HARVESTS OF
FOOD GRAINS AND HIGH INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT IN 1970,
THESE HIGH GROWTH RATES TAPERED OFF A BIT IN 1971,
AND THEN WANED NOTICEABLY IN 1972, ASSUMING REASONABLE
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LUCK WITH THE WEATHER, LAST YEAR'S SETBACKS SHOULD
BE ONLY TEMPORARY, THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL BASE WILL
CONTINUE TO ENLARGE ITS CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS,
THE COSTS OF THE CHINESE MILITARY EFFORT OVER
THE YEARS HAVE BEEN A BURDEN ON THE ECONOMY. MILI-
TARY PROGRAMS ACCOUNT FOR A LARGE PORTION OF ACTIVITY
IN THE ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR--FAR LARGER, FOR
EXAMPLE, THAN IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET
UNION. RECENT LEVELS OF MILITARY PRODUCTION HAVE
PRESSED HARD UPON CHINA'S LIMITED TECHNICAL BASE,
AND THE COUNTRY'S SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER AND TECHNO-
LOGICAL CAPABILITIES CANNOT SUPPORT RAPID DEVELOP-
MENT IN A WIDE RANGE OF ENDEAVORS AT ONCE. CONSE-
QUENTLY THE MODERNIZATION OF THE CHINESE ARMED
FORCES WILL BE A LENGTHY PROCESS. LAST YEAR--FOR
WHATEVER REASON--THE PRODUCTION RATE OF TU-16
MEDIUM JET BOMBERS DROPPED TO ONLY HALF THE RATE
OF PREVIOUS YEARS. C4Iff
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EGYPT AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES WANT ISRAEL TO
VACATE ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THEY WILL NOT
COUNTENANCE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. EGYPT INSISTS THAT
ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE SUEZ CANAL BE TIED TO
AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO PULL BACK.
SOME ARABS FEEL TIME IS RUNNING OUT. THROUGH-
OUT THE EARLY SPRING, EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS AND ACTIVI-
TIES EMPHASIZED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. PRESIDENT
SADAT WAS SAYING THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR AN "ALL-
OUT CONFRONTATION." CAIRO HAS BEEN MORE SUBDUED
LATELY, BUT THE EARLIER RHETORIC WAS COUPLED WITH
SOME OF THE TACTICAL MOVES WE WOULD EXPECT IF CAIRO
WERE PLANNING TO RENEW CONFLICT.
--COMBAT AIRCRAFT FROM LIBYA AND IRAQ HAVE BEEN
TRANSFERRED TO EGYPT.
--BLOOD DONOR DRIVES HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED AND
CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED.
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--MILITARY COOPERATION WITH OTHER ARAB STATES
HAS INCREASED--FOR EXAMPLE MOROCCAN TROOPS
ARE MOVING TO SYRIA.
ALL THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT POINT TO AN EGYP-
TIAN DECISION TO ATTACK AT A SPECIFIC TIME OR IN
A SPECIFIC MANNER. THE EGYPTIANS KNOW THEIR PROS-
PECTS--NEVER GOOD--HAVE WORSENED SINCE THEY EXPELLED
SOVIET ADVISERS A YEAR AGO.
SADAT IS PROBABLY TRYING TO DRAMATIZE--ESPECIALLY
TO THE US--THE NEED FOR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. MEAN-
WHILE, HE WANTS TO FEND OFF CRITICISM THAT HE IS NOT
AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH WITH THE ISRAELIS WE ASSUME THAT
SOME OF THE WAR TALK IS MEANT TO DIVERT ATTENTION
FROM PROBLEMS SUCH AS STUDENT UNREST, ECONOMIC
SHORTAGES, AND THE PRESSURES OF A POPULATION TOO
BIG FOR THE NILE VALLEY.
NONETHELESS, THE PERIOD AHEAD IS LIKELY TO BE
DANGEROUS, PARTICULARLY IF DISCUSSIONS AT THE UN AND
THE COMING US-USSR SUMMIT FAIL TO DENT THE ARAB-
ISRAELI IMPASSE.
WE COULD FIND OURSELVES EMBROILED WITH MOSCOW
IN COMPLEX AND PERHAPS DANGEROUS WAYS IF THE MIDDLE
EAST HEATS UP. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO
KEEP THEIR PROBLEMS WITH CAIRO FROM JEOPARDIZING
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THEIR OVER-ALL STANDING IN THE ARAB WORLD. THEY
SHOW NO SIGNS OF JETTISONING THEIR CENTURIES-OLD
AMBITIONS TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE AREA. FOR
THEIR PART, THE ARABS HAVE NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO
SOVIET AID.
ONLY SEVERAL HUNDRED RUSSIANS REMAIN IN EGYPT,
BUT SPARE PARTS FOR THE EQUIPMENT TURNED OVER TO THE
EGYPTIANS AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FLOW ON, AND THERE
ARE FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND
EGYPTIANS. THE PRESENTLY TROUBLED BUT MUTUALLY
ADVANTAGEOUS RELATIONSHIP COULD CONTINUE FOR SOME
TIME.
MEANWHILE, THE SOVIETS HAVE SHIFTED ATTENTION
TO THE OTHER ARAB STATES, SINCE MID-19721 THEY
HAVE SENT A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF UP-TO-DATE MILI-
TARY HARDWARE TO SYRIA--ALTHOUGH NOT ENOUGH SO FAR
TO POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO ISRAELI
MOSCOW HAS RECEIVED LITTLE IN RETURN. IN SPITE
OF THE SOVIETS' DISPLAY OF THEIR PRO-ARAB CREDENTIALS,
THEY HAVE FAILED TO GAIN BASE RIGHTS IN SYRIAN PORTS
OR EVEN TO CONCLUDE A FRIENDSHIP TREATY LIKE THE ONES
THEY HAVE WITH EGYPT AND IRAQ.
THE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN THE ODD MEN OUT IN
THE MIDDLE EAST. MORE THAN A MILLION AND A HALF
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WORLD, AND SHARPENED ITS CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL'S SUP-
PORTERS--ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES. THE CUTS
IN US DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN TRIPOLI LAST YEAR,
EXPULSION OF TWO US DIPLOMATS LAST MONTH, THE
PROPAGANDA ASSAULTS ON US POLICY THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD, AND--MOST DRAMATICALLY-- THE LIBYAN ATTACK
ON A US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT IN MARCH ARE SYMPTO-
MATIC OF QADHAFI'S VIOLENT ANTAGONISM.
THE LARGESSE HE DISPENSES FROM HIS COUNTRY'S
$1.5 BILLION IN ANNUAL OIL REVENUES MAKES OTHER
ARAB LEADERS RELUCTANT TO OFFEND HIM. THE EGYP-
TIANS, IN PARTICULAR, NEED HIS ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION
TO SUPPORT THEIR WAR EFFORT, AND OTHER ASSORTED
CLIENTS CAN ILL AFFORD TO GO WITHOUT THE MORE THAN
$100 MILLION HE PROVIDES EACH YEAR IN ARMS, SUP-
PLIES, AND OCCASIONALLY CASH.
NEVERTHELESS, QADHAFI IS NOT INVULNERABLE,
THE MERGER WITH EGYPT, WHICH HE IS DETERMINED TO
BRING OFF IN SEPTEMBER, IS NOT AT ALL POPULAR IN
LIBYA. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH HE HAS CALLED FOR JOINT
ARAB PRESSURE ON US OIL INTERESTS AND HAS EVEN
THREATENED UNILATERAL ACTION, HE KNOWS HE COULD NOT
GIVE UP HIS OIL INCOME FOR LONG WITHOUT WEAKENING
HIS HOLD OVER HIS CLIENTS.
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LIBYAN OIL IS ONLY ONE ELEMENT--AND A RELATIVELY
SMALL ONE AT THAT--IN A LARGER MIDDLE EAST OIL PICTURE
THAT WILL REQUIRE MORE AND MORE OF OUR ATTENTION IN
THE YEARS AHEAD. THE FOCUS OF OUR INTEREST, AND THE
INTEREST OF OTHER OIL-CONSUMING STATES, WILL BE THE
PERSIAN GULF.
THE GULF STATES HAVE ENORMOUS SUPPLIES OF OIL--
MORE THAN HALF OF THE WORLD'S KNOWN RESERVES. WE
WILL BE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THIS OIL BY THE END OF
THE 1970s, WHEN WE WILL HAVE TO IMPORT HALF OF WHAT
WE USE.
THIS MEANS WE WILL HAVE A DIRECT STAKE IN PO-
LITICAL STABILITY IN THE GULF STATES--AND THIS STABIL-
ITY IS BY NO MEANS ENSURED.
--OMAN IS FIGHTING A GUERRILLA WAR WITH A
MARXIST ORGANIZATION THAT WANTS TO OVERTHROW
NOT ONLY OMAN, BUT THE OTHER SMALL GULF STATES
AS WELL. SOUTH YEMEN, A MARXIST STATE SUP-
PORTED HEAVILY BY THE SOVIETS AND TO A LESSER
EXTENT THE CHINESE, HELPS THE GUERRILLAS.
--IRAQ IS SUPPORTING SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN THE
GULF, AND HAS BEEN TRYING TO INTIMIDATE
KUWAIT, WHOSE TERRITORY STANDS IN THE WAY OF
FREE ACCESS TO AN IRAQI NAVAL BASE ON THE GULF.
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COOPERATIVE EFFORTS BY IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
COULD DO MUCH TO ENSURE STABILITY IN THE GULF. SO
FAR, HOWEVER, MUTUAL SUSPICIONS HAVE INHIBITED CO-
OPERATION, ALTHOUGH THE TWO DO OFTEN WORK ON PARALLEL
TRACKS.
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF--STILL
PROBING AND EXPLORATORY--IS ANOTHER CONCERN, IN THE
LONG RUN, MOSCOW MAY FIND ITSELF IN SOME STICKY SIT-
UATIONS IN THE AREA. FOR EXAMPLE, RECENT SOVIET
PLEASANTNESS TOWARD IRAN--AN EFFORT TO SHIFT THE
SHAH A DEGREE OR TWO EASTWARD--LIMITS WHAT HOSCOW
CAN DO WITH IRAN'S CHIEF ADVERSARY, IRAQ. MODERN
ARMS SUPPLIED TO MOSCOW'S FRIENDS IN BAGHDAD ONLY
INCREASE THE SHAH'S APPETITE FOR MORE SOPHISTICATED
MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE WEST.
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WITHIN SUCH LIMITATIONS, THE SOVIETS WILL TRY
TO EXPAND THEIR ASSETS IN THE AREA, WORKING PAR-
TICULARLY THROUGH IRAQ AND SOUTH YEMEN. THEY WILL
AIM TO REDUCE WESTERN INFLUENCE AND PARTICULARLY
TO OBSTRUCT THE CREATION OF WESTWARD-LOOKING GULF
ALLIANCES THAT MIGHT BE INIMICAL TO SOVIET INTERESTS.
THEY WILL ALSO WANT TO BLOCK INROADS FROM PEKING.
INDOCHINA
Now, IN CONCLUSION, LET US LOOK AT THE SITUA-
TION IN INDOCHINA. FOUR MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE
THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE OUTLOOK
FOR LASTING PEACE OR STABILITY IN THE AREA IS STILL
UNCERTAIN.
PROSPECTS IN VIETNAM
IN VIETNAM, THE FIGHTING HAS SIMMERED DOWN, BUT
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN REBUILDING THEIR MILITARY
STRENGTH IN THE SOUTH SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE, THE
RAINY SEASON WILL SOON BE IN FULL SWING EXCEPT ALONG
THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL COAST, THE RAINS WILL IN-
HIBIT COMMUNIST TROOP MOVEMENTS AND USE OF HEAVY
EQUIPMENT IN MOST OF THE COUNTRY, BUT THEY WILL ALSO
HAMPER SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR OPERATIONS. EXCEPT IN
NORTHERNMOST SOUTH VIETNAM, THE RAINS WILL SLOW THE
INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM.
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ON BALANCE, THERE SEEMS A PRETTY GOOD CHANCE THE
COMMUNISTS WILL NOT TRY ANYTHING BIG BEFORE FALL,
WHEN THE RAINS END.
BUT WHAT THEN? RIGHT NOW, NO PROGRESS IS BEING
MADE TOWARD ANY FINAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BY THE
THIEU GOVERNMENT AND THE VIET CONG IN THEIR TALKS IN
PARIS. WHILE SOME BREAKTHROUGH CANNOT BE RULED OUT,
IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT EACH SIDE WILL GO ITS OWN WAY.
THERE ARE TWO DANGERS IN THIS. ONE IS THAT THE
CURRENT SMALL-SCALE FIGHTING MAY SLOWLY ESCALATE AND
THE WAR MAY RESUME FULL-BLOWN, IF THIS HAPPENS, THE
SITUATION WILL BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLICATED. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
IS NOT MUCH OF A RESTRAINING FACTOR, AND UNLESS THE
US CAN DIG UP SOME SUCCESSOR FOR THE CANADIANS, IT
MAY SIMPLY FALL APART BY MID-SUMMER. THE OTHER EN-
FORCING ORGANIZATION, THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION
COMPRISED OF GVN AND VIET CONG DELEGATIONS, IS STILL
INEFFECTIVE.
CREEPING ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING WOULD NOT
NECESSARILY CONFRONT THE US WITH A DECISION WHETHER OR
NOT TO INTERVENE, ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT THIEU PROBABLY
WOULD REQUEST AIR SUPPORT IF GOVERNMENT FORCES BECOME
HARD PRESSED. THE NEED FOR SUCH A DECISION COULD ARISE
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QUITE SUDDENLY IF THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD RESUME THE WAR
THROUGH AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE OR EVEN A SERIES OF CO-
ORDINATED MAJOR OPERATIONS. INDEED, SOME INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSTS BELIEVE THAT HANOI HAD SUCH ACTIONS IN MIND
WHEN IT BROUGHT IN NEW TROOPS AND SUPPLIES DURING
THIS WINTER'S DRY SEASON. UNDER THIS THESIS, WITH
THE US MILITARY WITHDRAWAL ACCOMPLISHED, THE COMMU-
NISTS CAN AFFORD TO IGNORE THE CEASE-FIRE, AND THE
POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE VIET CONIG4ttlETVVEerTaM
LITTLE OTHER ALTERNATIVE,
SHOULD THE WAR RESUME SOON, SAIGON WOULD STILL
HAVE A CLEAR ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF GROUND COMBAT
TROOPS--ABOUT 287,000 AGAINST 17,000?BUT THE COM-
MUNISTS MAY HAVE A SLIGHT EDGE IN FIREPOWER. THE
COMMUNISTS HAVE STOCKPILED ENOUGH SUPPLIES FOR ABOUT
SIX MONTHS' HEAVY FIGHTING,
THE COMMUNISTS, HOWEVER, MAY WISH TO HUSBAND
THEIR ASSETS FOR SOME TIME IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A
STRONG RIVAL PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THEIR IN-
TENSIVE RESUPPLY AND ROAD CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY MAY
BE POINTED TOWARD CREATING A SECURE MILITARY ENCLAVE
FROM THE DMZ ALMOST TO THE DELTA, THEY COULD MAKE
OTHER MOVES, ALL WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT, TO TRY TO DEVELOP A FUNCTIONING ADMINIS-
TRATION IN THIS AREA. THEY WOULD HOPE THAT THIS
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VIRTUAL EXTENSION OF THE DRV ALONG SOUTH VIETNAM'S
WESTERN BORDER WOULD GRADUALLY FORCE SAIGON TO ACCEPT
THEIR POLITICAL TERMS, IT WOULD ALSO PUT THEM IN A
STRONG POSITION TO FIGHT AGAIN, IF NECESSARY,
LAOS
THE CEASE-FIRE IN LAOS, ALTHOUGH BY NO MEANS
FLAWLESS, IS HOLDING BETTER THAN IN VIETNAM, BUT THE
COMMUNISTS ARE STALLING IN THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS,
ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA IN
VIENTIANE APPARENTLY IS PREPARED TO SHARE POWER WITH
THE PATHET LAO, AN EVENTUAL COALITION GOVERNMENT IN
LAOS SEEMS A PRETTY GOOD BET, BUT WHETHER IT WILL
WORK ANY BETTER THIS TIME THAN BEFORE--OR WHETHER
IT WILL LAST--IS QUESTIONABLE, MORE TO THE POINT,
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS PULLING
OUT ANY OF ITS 85,000 TROOPS, WITH NO US BOMBING
AND WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD NOT
NEED ALL THESE TROOPS, BUT THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY
INTEND TO KEEP ROADS IN THE LAO PANHANDLE OPEN,
THEY ARE CREATING A NEW NORTH-SOUTH ROAD SYSTEM
ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDE THAT COULD IN TIME
OBVIATE THE NEED FOR THE LAOS COMPLEX, AND ALLOW
SOME FORCES THERE TO GO HOME, THUS, LAOS COULD
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PROBABLY GET OFF THE BURNER IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AND CAMBODIAN SITUATIONS WOULD SO ALLOW.
CAMBODIA
IN CAMBODIA, THERE IS STILL NO CEASE-FIRE.
KHMER COMMUNIST TROOPS, WITH SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE
FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, HAVE INCREASED PRESSURE
ON THE GOVERNMENT'S OVERLAND LIFELINES TO PHNOM
PENH-- INCLUDING THE MEKONG R I VER--AND ARE OPERATING
CLOSE TO THE CAPITAL'S OUTSKIRTS. THE LON NOL GOV-
ERNMENT IN PHNOM PENH IS SHAKY, AND THE MORALE AND
PERFORMANCE OF ITS ARMY ARE POOR. US AIR STRIKES
HAVE BEEN KEEPING THE COMMUNISTS FROM SCORING MAJOR
LOCAL VICTORIES.
A RECENT BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS BROUGHT
BACK SOME MEN OF TALENT, BUT HOW LONG THEY WI LL BE ABLE
TO PULL TOGETHER IS QUESTIONABLE. THEY HAVE NOT
ACCOMPLISHED MUCH SO FAR. IF,HOWEVER, THEY CAN GET
THE CAMBODIAN ARMY BETTER LEADERSHIP AND OTHER FORMS
OF ESSENTIAL SUPPORT, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABLE
TO RESIST THE CURRENT COMMUNIST PRESSURE THROUGH THE
REST OF THE YEAR. ITS SURVIVAL COULD, THEN, INDUCE
HANOI AND THE KHMER COMMUNISTS TO OPT FOR A CEASE-
FIRE IN CAMBODIA--WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AN END TO US
BOMB I NG--FOLLOWED BY SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS.
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As THINGS STAND NOW, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE
BARGAINING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. IF THEY
ENTERED A COALITION GOVERNMENT, THEY PROBABLY WOULD
SOON COME TO DOMINATE IT. THIS COULD IN TIME OPEN
THE WAY TO SHIPPING IN HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT
THROUGH THE SEAPORT OF KOMPONG SUM AND COMMUNIST
ACCESS TO THE COUNTRY'S AIRFIELDS. EXTENSIVE NORTH
VIETNAMESE USE OF CAMBODIA COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE
IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM, AND ON SAIGON'S WILL TO RESIST,
THE GREAT POWER FACTOR
IN ANY OF THESE EQUATIONS, ACTIONS OF THE US MAY
OR MAY NOT EXERT A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON HANOI.
OTHER FACTORS WILL ALSO BE AT WORK. ONE IS THE
EXTENT TO WHICH NORTH VIETNAM CAN COUNT ON ADDI-
TIONAL, AND INDEFINITE, MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ITS
COMMUNIST ALLIES--PRIMARILY THE USSR AND CHINA--
FOR MILITARY ADVENTURES IN THE REST OF INDOCHINA.
THESE ARE QUESTIONS AND FACTORS ABOUT WHICH OPINIONS
DIFFER WIDELY AND EVIDENCE IS SPARSE, BUT THEY COULD
WELL BE A KEY TO WHETHER OR NOT INDOCHINA SOON
SETTLES DOWN.
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