INTELLIGENCE DAY AT COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, 22 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002100020021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 15, 1976
• Content Type: CABLE

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SUBJECT; INTELLGENCE DAY AT COMMAND AND GENERAL_.S.TAFF QILLEGE,
,we F "ILEAVENWORTH, 2~ MARCH 1976
I, (U) ON 12 MARCH MR. M.. W. 1'A,VLQR VISITED CC,GSC TO DISCUSS
INTELLIGENCE DAY WITH THE STAFF AND FACULTY. IN GENERAL, C&GSC
r' REQUESTS THE SPEAKERS TD1
A. EMPHASIZE THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
DECISION AND POLICY MAKERS.
1w Be KEEP TO A MINIMUM ORGANISATIONAL DIAGRAMS, AND'THE DE-
SCRIPTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS.
Co AVOID DUPLICATION AMONG eRESENTATIONS,
D. ADDRESS SPECIFIC CASES AND TOPICS DESCRIBED IN FOLLOWING
PARAGRAPHS.
(C) ,OR r TG LTERS. RECOMMEND YOU INCLUDE HE FOLLOWING
ww 'IN YOUR PRESENTATIb'
Y'
S
, ., ON A CASE STUDY BASIS, USING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNIT
DESCRIBE THE TRUE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REGARDING
POST MORTEMS
,
~ THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR; THE COUP IN PORTUGAL,, THE TURKISH IN-
VASION OF CYPRUS, AND THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND ELSE1nHERE IN
AFRICA,
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OCI Response to Part 2, Question D, for General Walters
4. Intelligence feeds into the decision-making milieu
in a wide variety of forms and can be loosely categorized as
follows:
a. A score of top officials as well as many others
at the lower echelons are kept abreast of events through
current intelligence, provided both orally and by a varied
array of written products. Several different types of
products and services are embodied in this category,
including broad spectrum reporting, focused coverage by
area or function, and crisis intelligence.
b. Customized service is directly keyed to specific
concerns of policy makers and may be in response to re-
quests levied from the decision maker or may reflect con-
cerns that intelligence officers determine independently.
c. In-depth analysis involves the evaluation of all
available pieces of evidence that seem reasonably to bear
on a problem; seeking the counsel of other specialists;
refining hypotheses and finally recording findings.
d. Predictive intelligence involves a willingness
to think the unthinkable and an ability to forecast dis-
continuities as well as to identify trends.
5. Apart from the intrinsic quality of the intelligence,
the way in which it is used by decision makers depends on other
factors, operating singly or in combination. Does the intelli-
gence coincide with or run counter to preconceptions on the
policy side? How does the intelligence fit in with or conflict
with other counsels and pressures? How "hard" is the intelli-
gence and to what extent does the community agree on it? What
is the state of interpersonal relationships among decision
makers and those who produce intelligence? And finally, are
the decision makers undecided, of the same mind, or divided in
their approach to the problem under consideration? Thus, intel-
ligence quality, the adequacy of communications, and the degree
of policy receptivity all bear upon the impact of intelligence.
Optimum achievement in all three categories is difficult. But
I can cite examples of the successful use of intelligence to
the decision maker.
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OCI Response to Part 2, Question D, for General Walters
6. A sterling example is provided if we look at SALT.
Support by the intelligence community and especially by CIA
has been critical from the very beginning. The SALT agree-
ments were possible because policy makers had confidence in
intelligence verification methods, in appraisals of future
missile force levels, and in the direct support accorded by
the intelligence community during the negotiations.
7. CIA geographers gave crucial support to Dr. Kissinger
in his efforts to bring about an Egyptian-Israeli peace accord
through the detailed maps they produced and through their inti-
mate knowledge of the terrain. Equally, technicians were in-
dispensable in advising on the feasibility and operation of an
appropriate sensory system.
8. A quite specific example of the use of intelligence
occurred in 1972, n a CIA-chaired task force warned--on the
basis hat a squadron of Komar guided missile
boats
was ving rom South China to North Vietnam. US naval
forces intercepted and destroyed the boats.
9. A continuing area of concern over the last six years
or so has been the degree of tension between China and the
Soviet Union and the danger of major hostilities. CIA has re-
peatedly assessed the issue and its findings have been consis-
tently sound, thus enabling the decision maker to chart a ra-
tional course for US policy.
10. In the early 1970s, there was a growing concern over
the levels and direction of our aid abroad. In particular,
the extent of the military threat posed by North Korea needed
to be examined. Intelligence analysis demonstrated a need for
a pronounced change in the mix of equipment going to South
Korea.
11. In the Cuban missile crisis, as you doubtless well
know, intelligence provided the first indication that Russian
missiles had arrived and enabled the government to verify mis-
sile deployment. And during the embargo, intelligence from a
CIA source in the Soviet military gave President Kennedy addi-
tional assurances that Moscow would not go to war over Cuba.
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OCI Response to Part 2, Question D, for General Walters
12. In 1967, intelligence producers both predicted that
there would be a war between Egypt and Israel and that Israel
--even if the US stayed totally out of the imbroglio--would win.
14. These are but a few of the examples of intelligence
successes and they are worth noting because so many things can
go wrong, either on the intelligence side, the policy side, or
in the relationship between them. Unfortunately, it is far
easier to document intelligence failures than to ascertain in-
telligence successes. Being accurate is adjudged normal and
ordinarily is accepted without fanfare; errors or omissions,
in contrast, are greeted with much dismay.
15. Priorities in the intelligence community must bear
a direct relationship to the concerns of the policy maker. If
a problem is on the front burner of the President and Secretary
of State, it must be equally in the forefront for CIA and the
rest of the intelligence community. Bearing this obvious fact
in mind, one judgment that must be made in establishing prior-
ities is to ascertain what kinds of information can be obtained
solely through intelligence, whether it comes from the agent in
the foreign ministry, the satellite in the sky, or the antenna
in the field. Clearly, top priority still goes to intelligence
collection and production that enables decision makers to assess
the threat of war, the state of foreign military establishments,
and related topics.
16. In this day and age, judgments on priorities are be-
coming increasingly complex. We are no longer absolutely cer-
tain, for instance, who are our friends, who are our enemies,
and who falls in between. In the past, our intelligence prior-
ities plainly were focused on our enemies in China, the USSR,
and the rest of the Communist world. Nowadays, the lines are
blurred and what our ostensible friends do may cause us more
grief than the actions of our alleged enemies. There is yet
another factor that complicates our judgments today on intelli-
gence priorities. Although military/strategic questions con-
tinue to be of immense importance, the "wars" of the future
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OCI Response to Part 2, Question D, for General Walters
may revolve around control of scarce or vital resources or
other economic issues. The oil embargo by OPEC made clear
that information on the oil policy of a country might be even
more critical than information on its military posture. Still
another consideration in the mid 1970s is cost, both people
and money costs. Certainly to a greater extent than in the
past, we have to ask ourselves what the overall cost of obtain-
ing and evaluating certain types of information will be.
17. The judgments we make, then, are influenced by many
factors. And we should remember that even when priorities are
established and accepted by the intelligence community as a
whole, they may shift dramatically if a crisis occurs, such as
the 1974 coup in Portugal, in which US interests and the inter-
ests of the West are seen as at stake.
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I. The Intelligence Community and the Yom Kippur War
A. The Intelligence Community's post mortem on Community
performance before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 concluded
that:
1. The Community analysts were provided with a
plentitude of information which should have suggested, at a
minimum, that they take very seriously the threat of war
in the.near term;
2. The assessments which appeared in various intelli-
gence periodicals, spot reports, and memoranda, did not
sufficiently utilize the information available and conse-
quently did not provide a warning of impending hostilities.
3. Instead of warnings the Community's analytical
effort in effect produced reassurances. For instance, the
6 October DIA Intelligence Summary item on Egypt asserted
that:
"Mobilization of some personnel, increased readiness
of isolated units, and greater communications security
are all assessed as parts of the exercise routine...
there are still no military or political indicators
of Egyptian intentions or preparations to resume
hostilities." This was the day the war started.
4. In other words, the principal conclusions concerning
the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those
responsible for intelligence analysis were--quite simply,
obviously, and starkly--wrong.
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B. In probing the attitudes behind the analysis the
Community post mortem identified a number of factors at
work. For example:
1. The Cry Wolf syndrome affected seasoned analysts.
Most of them believed war in the Middle East could resume
at almost any time and almost certainly would. But they
resisted alarms which seemed to non-experts to signal
particular peril but which, more often than not in the
past, had subsequently proved false.
2. There were preconceptions concerning relative
Arab and Israeli military prowess. The June War was
frequently invoked by analysts as proof of fundamental and
permanent weaknesses in the Arab forces and, inferentially,
of Israeli invincibility./
3. Except for some analysts in the State Department,
there was a failure to allow for the possibility that
"rational" men like Sadat and Asad might make a decision to
go to war in anticipation of defeat on the battlefield but
with hope for a victory at the conference table.
4. Other problems included
the breakdown of
coordination of finished intelligence in the last few
days prior to the war; the difficulty of making incremental
analysis as opposed to a quick judgment on the day's
"take"; and various forms of Arab deception.
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C. In the aftermath of the post mortem several proposals
were designed to correct these deficiencies. We will not dwell on
them here; most are of a rather technical nature. But the main
purpose of them has been to improve the Community's analytical
performance because the underlying premise has been that the
major failure was analytical.
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II. Intelligence and the Coup in Portugal
A. The intelligence on Portugal in the period immediately
before the coup of April 1974 was neither particularly good nor
particularly bad.
1. Portuguese society appeared quiescent, and
there seemed to be no great need in the Community to
probe into the country's domestic politics.
2. Nevertheless a spate of articles on the country
appeared in current intelligence publications in the two
months prior to the coup--which suggested that something
in Portugal was coming unglued.
B. In order to have predicted the coup itself--i.e., its
date and character--the Community would have needed more detailed
information about the Armed Forces Movement and the Government
than was at hand.
1. The National Intelligence Officer for Western
Europe believes that the greatest failure by the
Community was its inability to draw up an accurate
and specific description of the philosophies and intentions
of the members of the Armed Forces Movement.
2. The military attaches have been criticized for
failing to develop the associations with Portuguese
officers, particularly younger officers, which might have
provided such information.
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C. Offsetting these failures to some extent were the accurate
descriptions intelligence provided of the growing discontent with
the old regime, particularly among the military, over the country's
policies in Africa, and among conservatives who resented the
government's perceived embracing of more "liberal" positions.
D. Since the coup the Community has tracked the develop-
ments well
? ri-
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III. The Intelligence Community and the Cyprus Crisis
A. The IC Staff's post mortem on Cyprus has reflected a more
positive assessment of the Community's performance than did the
post mortem on the October War.
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3. The Community did well in estimating Soviet
military non-involvement in the crisis--a very important
consideration for US policy makers.
B. But we noted an analytical failing which paralleled
the Community's analytical weakness in the period before the
Arabs' attack on Israel in October 1973.
1. We saw a tendency among analysts to ignore mounting
indicators of a crisis because they persuaded themselves they
had seen similar indicators before and nothing had happened.
2. Beyond this, the analysts, being reasonable people
themselves, entertained a subconscious conviction and hope
that, ultimately reason and rationality wc,uld prevail, and
that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the
Greek-sponsored coup) would not be made by essentially
rational men.
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C. Two points in favor of the analysts are worth. adding
1. The failure to predict applied to what the
Greeks would do--i.e., engineer a coup. No one really
doubted that the Turks would react strongly if the coup
occurred.
2. A number of senior analysts on this area have
posed an interesting question on appraising "rational"
versus "irrational" conduct: If the assumption of
"rationality" in foreign leaders by the Community
occasionally leads to bad predictions, does anyone
seriously believe that the assumption of "irrationality"
in foreign leaders would always lead to good predictions?
There are situations where it is better for an analyst
to be wrong for the right reason than right for the wrong
one.
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IV. Intelligence, Angola, and Africa
A. Until recently events in sub-Saharan Africa have not
been of great interest to policy makers. Faced with compelling
demands to report on developments elsewhere, the Intelligence
Community has devoted relatively little attention to the
region.
1. The Community has, however, reported regularly on
the fighting in the country and on the unsuccessful Portuguese
efforts, late in 1974, to turn formal control of the country
over a reasonably unified African administration.
2. The Community was also aware that the Cubans
had been supplying the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola, one of the contesting factions, with modest
amounts of aid since early in the 1960s.
B. But the Intelligence Community gave no warning that the
Cubans planned a dramatic increase in their military support to
the MPLA or that the Cubans intended to commit their own forces
to the fighting. There are several reasons for this failure.
1. It seemed uncharacteristic of the Cubans to
involve themselves abroad in such a large and visible
way.
2. There was reason to believe, furthermore, that some
Cuban leaders desired better relations with the United States.
Such an improvement could not be pursued if a significant
involvement in Angola were planned.
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C. Once the Cubans became so involved, however, the Community
produced accurate, though occasionally belated, estimates of the
size of the rapidly growing Cuban force.
D. Southern Africa generally,and the fighting in Rhodesia
especially, are now of high priority concern to the Community,
and these subjects are now being covered in a number of appropriate
studies. There is a National Intelligence Officer charged with
responsibilities for Africa (in addition to South Asia); this
was not true prior to the Angolan imbroglio.
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I. Background
A. Congress created the present national intelligence system
by the National Security Act of 1947. It had in mind
primarily the avoidance of any future Pearl Harbors by
setting up the DCI, with a modest staff, to make sure that
all the information available to the US government was
assessed in one place.
B. A great deal has happened since 1947 that Congress could
n o.t
have foreseen and did not provide for.
1. The Cold War and its requirement for
a greatly increased intelligence effort.
2. The central role of intelligence in
making national security policy de-
cisions in peace time (buying weapons
systems).
3. The development of major technical
collection systems that require
centralized control.
4. The expenditure of a substantial
slice of the peace-time budget on
intelligence.
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C. A number of these developments combine to.place the
DCI and the Department of Defense in adversary roles.
1. The DoD controls 80% of the national
intelligence budget.
2. The practical needs of the DoD for
intelligence both in fighting wars
and in preparing for them often
compete with the needs defined by
the DCI at the national level for
intelligence in peace time and ?
preventing crises from reaching the
hostility stage.
3. In particular, the national authorities.
and the field commanders are coining
to compete for the product of major
technical collection systems.
D. The result of almost 30 years of ev rliytion and bureau-
cratic struggle under these pressures has been a com-
pl i cated structure ~rrrrs~rrrcl of i nterl ocki ng
committees that has grown more by accretion than by
design. Moreover, it has become increasingly resist-
ant to change. The DCI has acquired greatly increased
responsibilities but has not been given the authorities
to go with them. Moreover, as the complexity and ex-
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pense of national systems have grown,.he has increasingly
been placed in a position where his objectivity in deal-
ing with communnit resource matters has been compromised
rby the fact that he also represents CIA.
II. The President's Solution As Embodied in E.O. 11905
A. The President made a clean sweep of the entire Community
and committee structure. His intent was to give the DCI
greatly increased authority and give him a relatively free
hand to modernize, discard and retain.
B. Resource management for the Community was centralized in
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
1. The DCI is the Chairman, with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
the Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs as members.
The Committee thus contains the officers
responsible for managing virtually all
of the nation's intelligence assets.
2. It will be responsible for the budget
of the national foreign intelligence
program and for larger policy and manage-
ment decisions for the Community as a
whole. Flow the budget.process will be
worked out to meet the requirements of
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program managers, the DoD, OMB, and
Congress is an exceedingly difficult
question, one we are just beginning
to address.
3. Since the Committee is intended to bal-
ance the national interest with the
departmental interest of DoD, it is
not advisory to the DCI. Rather,
the DCI is first among equals, with
any member having the right to
appeal to the President through the
NSC. Nevertheless, the DCI's role
in management of defense intelligence
resources has been very substantially
increased.
In the production of national intelligence, the DCI's
primarily role has been reaffirmed. His increased
authority in resource management, moreover, should give
him greater freedom of action in improving the quality
of intelligence.
1. The DCI has not yet decided what
changes he will make in the
present structure for intelligence
production, and has requested that
the present machinery be maintained
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2. Almost certainly, there will be some
sort of successor board to USIB,
advisory to the DCI, and the right
of dissent will certainly be main-
tained.
D. To lessen the DCI's conflict of interest problem, he will
be provided with two deputies.
1. A deputy for the Community will
handle greatly increased resource
A
responsibilities and will provide
the staffing for the CFI.
2. A deputy for the Agency will relieve
the DCI of the need to provide day-,
to-day management attention to the
Agency and leave him more time for
his broader responsibilities. At
the same time, this deputy can serve
as the Agency spokesman on Community
resource issues placed before the DCI.
This will relieve him of the necessity
for being both plaintiff and judge.
III. Remainder of Provisions in the Executive Order
A. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee was
set up in 1971 to provide a critique of intelligence by
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its senior customers. It never got off the ground.
It has now been replaced by a requirement that the NSC
itself conduct semi-annual reviews of intelligence per-
formance. (RL Note: I have little faith that this
will be much better.) The DCI is also authorized to
create his own mechanisms for this purpose, and these
are likely to work better than NSCIC because the initiative
is with him and not with the consumer.
B. The 40 Committee, responsible for approval of covert
action and certain technical collection operations, has
been replaced by an Operations Advisory Group.
.1. In effect, the membership is that of
the 40 Committee raised to the principal
level, with the Attorney General and
the Director, OMB added as observers.
2. The Executive Order also calls for more
formal approval procedures and provides
for dissents.
C. The President has also created an Intelligence Oversight
Board within the Executive Branch.
1. "Oversight" here means the pre-
vention of improprieties and illegal
acts.
2. The Board will be appointed by the
President and consist of three
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members from outside the govern-.
ment. Its membership may overlap
with that of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
3. There are elaborate provisions for
reporting to the Board by Inspector
Generals and General Counsels of
the various agencies of the Community.
IV. All in all, the reorganization provides:
A. A streamline9structure, with clearer lines of responsi-
bility and accountability.
B. A DCI with greater authority in the Community management
field.
C. The maintenance and strengthening of a national intelligence
analysis capability under the President, and independent
of the major policy departments.
D. Stronger mechanisms for control, review, and oversight
of intelligence activities.
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
TO NAME AND ADDRESS
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
Remarks:
1~,
e-A
1 14) -I"V- ( ~~ , -,j 4,1
Cd#/A4c-"Ji,/ .
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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