STRATEGIC FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002500140003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 129
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 10, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

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June 10, 1975
STRATEGIC FORCES
I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet
strategic weapons programs.
A. This map shows the locations where the USSR's
ICBMs are deployed, with the types of systems
indicated. We believe that
ICBM 25X1
launchers are currently operational. Since-the
signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets have
not increased the number of ICBM launchers.
1. Of the deployed launchers,
the SS-9. F
are for
I I The largest number of
silos, however, are for the smaller SS-11 and
SS-13 systems,
2. The number of operational launchers at any on
time wilifluctuate as the Soviets continue
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their silo modification programs for new missiles.
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VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizable
force of medium and intermediate range ballistic
missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5,
are older systems deployed in the early to mid-1960s.
A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000
nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a range
of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are deployed
at soft launch sites and in launch silos
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1. There are currently
launchers for
for these missiles operational in the
western USSR,-.for use primarily against
targets in western Europe.
2. At one time,: the Soviets had a-,gorce of
MRBM and TRBM launchers located
along the periphery of the USSR. In late
1967, however, they began deactivating
some of the launch sites.
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June 10, 1975
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES
I. In recent years, there have been fewer developments
in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive mis-
siles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
and there is no evidence of any effort to
deploy ABMs elsewhere.
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B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles,
the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen
Houses operating at five sites on the periphery
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I tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose
STRATEGIC BOMBERS
I.' There has been no appreciable change in the capa-
bilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation
over the past few years.
A. The Soviets have a force of nheavy bombers
primary mission is intercontinental operations.
June 10, 1975
They also have
mainly against Europe and Asia.
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The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber
with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range
.of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal
flight conditions. It is best suited for
operations against targets in Europe and
Asia.
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4. As the Backfire is phased into the 'force,
the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long
Range Aviation should begin to decline.
-The,--Backfire 'probably will not replace
the older bombers on a one-for-one basis.
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June 10, 1975
THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about
Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.
A. The most visible military presence is
the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group
of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home
waters.
1. The primary mission of the Squadron is
to provide a strategic defense of the
Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth
Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets
also have a continuing interest in im-
proving their capabilities against
ballistic missile firing submarines.
2. To accomplish these goals the Soviets
maintain an average--including surface
combatants, submarines, and auxiliaries--
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II. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface
forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve
but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the
US Sixth Fleet.
A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack
submarines, cruise missile armed submarines
and modern surface combatants.
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c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier--
expected to be fully operational in
late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean. This
I ill probably
carry V/STOL aircraft and ASW heli-
copters.
(1) These drawings show the size of
the Soviet carrier in relation to
US carriers.
III. As you are aware, the Soviets have begun taking
advantage of recent amendments to Yugoslavian law.
that opens naval repair facilities to foreign ships.
A. To date only a diesel submarine and a submarine
tender have been noted at the port of Tivat but
we expect the Soviets will continue using these
facilities as allowed under the new provisions.
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June 10, 1975
OKEAN '75 NAVAL EXERCISE
I. In April, the Soviets conducted a large-scale naval
exercise named Okean 175.
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Ii : Over 200 surface warships, submarines, and support
vessels took part in Okean '75 operations. Most
of the exercise activity occurred in the Atlantic
and Pacific but the Mediterranean Sea and the
Indian Ocean were also involved.
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It at
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II. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has
slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the
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Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force
goals for the area.
A. There are about-., active divisions in the
immediate border area, compared with 13 in
1964.
1. The five divisions from the Siberian
Military District that could be used as
immediate reinforcements bring the total.
to about-42.
B. For air support, they could call on some
1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in
the border area.
C. The ground and tactical air forces in the
border area now number about.-,365,000 men.
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D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border
reached a peak in the late Sixties1the Russians
have concentrated on improving and fleshing out
the basic force,
E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new
divisions has slowed, they have increasingly
turned their -efforts to developing support
units at the army and front level.
1
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F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend
against any force the Chinese would be likely
to send against the USSR in the next several
years.
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1. As they now stand, however, they would
need substantial reinforcement before
engaging in protracted offensive operations
deep into China.
III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually
expanded the forces in its four northern military
regions since the rapid build-up following the
border clashes in 1969.
A. The force in these four northern military regions
numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops,
over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.
1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well
back from the border. This contrasts with the
Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects-a
clear military superiority and a commitment_____.___
to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply
line which parallels the China border.
2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet
forces with their modern equipment, the
Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery,
and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In
tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than
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4,000 in the border regions against more than
10,000 on the Soviet side.
B. The Chinese have made use of favorable terrain
features to build a series of fortified areas
along the major approaches from the Soviet and
Mongolian borders.
1. This suggests that the Chinese intend to
conduct a determined defense in these areas.
northern military regions, about 40% of their
total force. Most of the aircraft have an air
defense role and are deployed in eastern China
to protect important population and industrial
centers.
D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets
in the border area by more than three to one.
Nonetheless, the Soviets'weuld have a s'ubstanti'al
advantage in any operations other than a deep
penetration of China because of their superiority
in air power and in ground force weapons.
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June 10, 1975
CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS
1. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation
is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China
can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its
periphery by both missile and bomber.
These missiles are of
two types:
1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we
call the CSS-l. As you can see from this
map, this system can reach targets in the
Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia
2. The 1,500 nautical mile;--or intermediate
range--missile we call the CSS-2.
this system
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could strike targets in most of the eastern
USSR, much of India, and Southeast Asia
as far south as Singapore.
3. The map also shows the coverage of China's
bomber force which I will
discuss a bit later.
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F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the
Chinese have
TU-16 medium bombers, which
bomb to a radius of
about 1,650 nautical miles.
about 50 airfields throughout China are
suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers
could be widely dispersed if Peking feared
that an attack was imminent.
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light bombers
IL-28 jet
(Chinese may plan to give a
nuclear role to some of these aircraft--which
have an operational radius of about 550
nautical miles.
cur aecrui
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March 1, 1975
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES
1. In recent years,.there have been fewer developments
in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive
missiles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have a total of lI ABM
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
and there is no evidence of any effort to
deploy ABMs elsewhere.
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B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles,
the Soviets have large radars which we call,Hen
Houses operating at five sites on the periphery
of the USSR{
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 Approved For Release 2004/03/1.8: CIA-RDP80R01731 R002500140003-1.
March 1, 1975
STRATEGIC FORCES
I4 Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet
strategic weapons programs.
A. This map shows the locations where the USSR's
ICBMs are deployed, with the types of systems
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indicated. We believe that I (ICBM C
launchers are currently operational. Since
Ithe. '.signing of the SALT agreements, the Soviets
have not increased the number of ICBM launchers.
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1. Of the deployed launchers,
the SS-9.
are for
The largest number of.
silos, however, are for the smaller SS-11.
and S$-13 systems,
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In-addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a
sizeable force of medium and intermediate range
?t
ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4'and
the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early
to mid-1960s.
A. The SS-4, an MRBM,rhas a range of about 1,000
nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a
range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are
deployed at soft launch sites and in launch
silos
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1. There are currently.
launchers 25X1
for these missiles operational in the
western USSR,,. .for use primarily. against
targets in western Europe.
2. At one time,:.the Soviets had a force of
IMRBM and IRBM launchers located
along the periphery of the USSR. In late
1967, however, they began deactivating
some of the launch sites,
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ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES
I. In recent years, there have been fewer developments
in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive mis-
siles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have ABM
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
and there is no evidence of any effort to
deploy ABMs elsewhere.
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B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles,
the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen
Houses operating at five sites on the periphery
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Approved F
March 1, 1975
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES
I. In recent years,.there have been fewer developments
in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive
-missiles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have
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ABM
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
and there is no evidence of any effort to
deploy ABMs elsewhere..
B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles,
the Soviets h
Houses operat
of the USSR-
ave large radars which we ca11,Hen
ing at five sites on the periphery
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1 March 1975
STRATEGIC BOMBERS
I. There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities
of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past
few years.
A. The Soviets have a force. of heavy bombers and
25X1 tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary
mission is intercontinental operations. They also
medium bombers for use mainly against
Europe and Asia.
1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with
speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to
3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight condi-
tions, It is best suited for operations against
targets in Europe and Asia.
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4.
As the Backfire is phased into the force,
the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long
Range Aviation should begin to decline.
The Backfire costs substantially more than
older medium bombers, and so the Soviets
probably will not replace them on a
one-for-one basis.
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1 March 1975,
~. THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about
Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.
A.. The most visible military presence there is
the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest. group
Fit
of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home
ne-WCRMa
waters.
1. The primary mission of the. Squadron is
to provide a strategic defense of the
Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth
Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets
also have a continuing interest in im-
proving their capabilities against
ballistic missile firing submarines.
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II. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface
forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve
but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the
US Sixth Fleet.
A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack
submarines, cruise missile armed submarines
and modern surface combatants.
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c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier---
expected to be fully operational in
late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean. This
copters.
(1) These drawings
I-will probably
carry V/STOL aircraft and ASW heli-
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show the size of ,"CA
the Soviet carrier in relation
US carriers.
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Zee The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has
slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the
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Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force
goals for the area.
A. There are about 38 active divisions in the
immediate border area, compared with 13 in
1964.
-1. The five divisions from the Siberian
Military District that could be used as
immediate reinforcements bring the total
to about 43.
B. For air support, they could call on some
1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in
the border area.
The ground and tactical air forces in the
border area now number about 400,000 men.
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D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border
reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians
have concentrated on improving and fleshing out
the basic force,
E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new.
divisions has slowed, they have increasingly
turned their strength to developing support
units at the army and front level.
F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend
against any force the Chinese would be likely
to send against the USSR in the next several
years.
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1. As they now stand, however, they would
need substantial reinforcement before
engaging in protracted offensive operations
deep into China.
III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually
expanded the forces in its four northern military
regions since the rapid build-up following the
border clashes in 1969.
A. The force in these four northern military regions
numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops,
over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.
1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well
back from the border. This contrasts with the
Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects a
clear military superiority and a commitment.
to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply
line which parallels the China border.
2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet
forces with their modern equipment, the
Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery,
and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In
tanks alone,.the Chinese have fewer than
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4,000 in the border regions against more than
10,000 on the Soviet side.
B. The Chinese have made use.of favorable terrain
features to build a series of fortified areas
along the major approaches from the Soviet and
Mongolian borders.
1. This suggests that the Chinese intend to
conduct a determined defense in these areas.
aircraft in the
northern military regions, about 40% of their
total force. Most of the aircraft have an air
defense role and are deployed in eastern China
to protect important population and industrial
centers.
D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets
in the border area by more than three to one,
Nonetheless, the Soviets would have a substantial
advantage in any operations other than a deep
penetration of China because of their superiority
in air power and in ground force weapons.
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March 1, 1975
CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS
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1. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation
is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China
can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around-its
periphery by both missile and bomber.
A. We have identified
strategic
missiles. These missiles are of two types:
1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we
call the CSS-l. As you can see from this
'?
map, this system can reach targets in the
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Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia
2. The 1,500 nautical miles--or intermediate range--
.missile we call the CSS-2.
this system could strike targets
in most of the eastern USSR, much of India,
and Southeast Asia as far south as Singapore.
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F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the
Chinese have
TU-16 medium bombers, which
bomb to a radius of
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about 1,650 nautical miles.
about 50 airfields throughout China are
.suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers
could be widely dispersed if Peking feared
that an attack was imminent.
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3. The Chinese also have
light bombers.
he Chinese may plan to give a
nuclear role to some of these aircraft--which
have an operational radius of about 550
nautical miles.
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October 8, .1.974
SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
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I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet
strategic weapons programs.
A. This map shows the locations where the
USSR's ICBMs are deployed, with the types
of systems indicated. We believe that
ICBM launchers are currently
operational. Since the signing of the SALT
agreements, the Soviets have not increased
the number of ICBM launchers.
1. Of the deployed launchers,
for the SS-9. The SS-9, the largest
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The largest
number of silos, however, are for the
operational Soviet ICBM,
smaller SS--ll and SS-13 systems,
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VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a
sizeable force of medium and intermediate range
ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and
the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early
to mid-1960s.
A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000
nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a
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range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are
- deployed-....at-.-..soft_...1-aunch _ s-ites_._ and...,...iYi lunch
silos
1. There are
launchers for these
missiles deployed in the western USSR, for
use primarily against targets in western
Europe.
2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of
MRBM and IRBM launchers located
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along the periphery of the USSR. In late
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1967, however, they began deactivating some
of the launch sites.
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ABM Defenses
XI. In recent years, there have been fewer developments
in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive
missiles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
and there is no evidence of any effort to
deploy ABMs elsewhere.
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To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the
Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses
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operating at five sites on the periphery of the
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Ap
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Strategic Bombers
XII. There has been no appreciable change in the capabili-
ties of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over
the past few years.
A., The Soviets have a force of
heavy bombers
and tankers and reconnaissance aircraft
whose primary mission is intercontinental
operations. They also have) Imedium
bombers for use mainly against Europe and Asia.
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1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber
with speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range
of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal
flight conditions. It is best suited for
operations against targets in Europe and
Asia.
4. As the Backfire is phased into the force,
the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long
Range Aviation should begin to decline. The
Backfire costs substantially more than older
medium bombers, and so probably will not
replace them on a one-for-one basis.
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
XIII. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about
Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area. -
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~. die most visible military presence there is
the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group
of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home
waters.
1. The primary mission of the Sg adron is
to provide a strategic defense of the
Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth
Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets
also have a continuing interest in im-
proving their capabilities against ballistic
missile firing submarines.
2. To accomplish these goals the Soviets
maintain an average--including surface
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XIV. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface
or.ces-in the- Med-..terraneari. corit inue to-.-improve
but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the
US Sixth Fleet.
A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack
submarines, cruise missile armed'submarines
and modern surface combatants.
c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier---
expected to be fully operational in
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late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean.....: .._-This
(will probably carry
V/STOL aircraft and ASW helicopters.
(1)` These drawings show the size of the
Soviet carrier in relation to US
carriers.
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The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has
slowed considerably since the late Sixti.es., and
to about 43.
B. For air support, they could call on
the Soviets appear to have nearly reached their
force goals for the area.
A. There are about 38 active divi.si.ons in the
immediate border area, compared with 13
in 1964.
1. The five divisions from the Siberian
Military District that could be used as
immediate reinforcements bring the total
tactical combat aircraft stationed in
r
the bo
der area.
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._C._---__The-ground -and- taeti-cal_.air -forces in the
border area now number about 400,000 men.
could have almost one million men avail-
able for operations against China.
D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border
reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians
have concentrated on improving and fleshing out
the basic force
E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added
new divisions has slowed, they have in-
creasingly turned their strength. to developing
support units at the army and front level.
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The Soviet forces now in place could defend
against any force the Chinese would be. likely
to send against the USSR in the next several
years.
1. As they now stand, however, they would
need substantial reinforcement before
engaging in protracted offensive
operations deep into China.
XIX. On the Chinese side, Peking has expanded the forces
in its four northern military regions since the
border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969.
A. In the four northern military regions, the
force numbers about 1.6 million combat and
support troops, over 45 percent of the 3.5
million troops in China.
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1. Most of the Chinese troops are defensively
deployed well back from the border. This
contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward
deployment is based on an overall military
superiority and a commitment to the Trans-
Siberian Railway supply line which
parallels the China border.
2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized
Soviet forces with their modern equipment,
the Chinese are deficient in armor and
artillery, and their weaponry is of
1950s design.
a. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer
than 5,000 in the border regions compared
with more than 10,000 on the Soviet
side.
B. The Chinese have established defensive areas
along the major approaches from the Soviet and
Mongolian borders into China.
1. Within these areas, there are numerous.
fixed defensive positions which use
favorable terrain features to protect
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emplaced weapons and troops,.___.-_......-.__...--_._._.__..._...
2. The Chinese evidently expect that these
fixed positions will partially offset the
significant Soviet advantage in weaponry.
defense aircraft in the northern military
regions. Most of these are deployed in Eastern
China near important population and industrial
centers.
XXII. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation
is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China
can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its
periphery by both missile and bomber.
These strategic missiles are of two types:
1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we
call the CSS-l. As you can see from this
map, this system can reach targets in the
Soviet Far East, Mongolia. Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia
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. The 1,400 nautical mile--or intermediate
range--missile we call the CSS-2.
this system
could strike targets in most of the
eastern USSR, much of India, and Southeast
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Asia as far south as Singapore.I I .25X
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F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the
Chinese have
ITU-16 medium bombers, which
about 1,650 nautical miles.
about 50 airfields throughout China are
suitable for. use by the TU-l6s and they
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3. The Chinese also have over 400 IL-28 jet
light bombers.
he Chinese
may plan to give a nuclear role to some
of these aircraft--which have an operational
radius of about 550 nautical miles.
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SS-4 and SS-5
I InfQ.r.mati.on . Sheet.--for tie SS-4
A. Medium Range Ballistic Missile
1. Range - 1,000 nautical miles.
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6. Initially deployed in 1958.
B. Deployed in hardened silos and at soft launch
sites in western USSR.
II. Information Sheet for the SS-5
A. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
1. Range - 2,200 nautical miles.
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6. Initially deployed in 1961.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Draft for Your Consideration for a
mid-October Presentation
TITLE The Philosophy of the US Strategic
Deterrent
Introduction
I am delighted to be here and to share with you
some considerations on the philosophy of the IS
deterrent.
I am well aware that many contemporary thinkers
would criticize ruch a subject by insisting that the
US deterrent is more an object of faith than a topic
for a proper philosophic discussion. I do agree
that deterrence rests heavily on a belief in the
credibility of the threat, but I think we can
honestly address this concept philosophically--that
is by investigating the facts and principles of
reality and of human nature and conduct.
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But I must be candid--such a philosophic pursuit
is not an easy thing to do. What would be easy,
would be for me to stand before you today and lecture
for the next thirty minutes on broad., vapid generalities.
For example, when I began to organize my remarks,
my first temptation--which I quickly dropped--was
to draw upon the approach of a thinker widely re-
garded as the Father of Western philosophy--Plato.
The "Absolutes" of Deterrence
In my mind's eye, I had invited him to the
Pentagon to address our Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
topic of deterrence as a philosophy. Adjusting his
toga, Plato held before my awe struck colleagues
the idea that deterrence was an absolute, that it
had existence outside the mind. He then posed the
postulates of deterrence:
--first, that in the intellectual world the
threat. of retaliation would deter a hostile
act by another party;
--second, that the retaliatory threat, explicit
or implicit, is of sufficient magnitude to.
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make the goal of the hostie act appear un-
attainable, or excessively costly, or both;
--third, that in order to work in the sensible
world, the retaliatory threat must be credible,
believable to the party being threatened; and
--lastly, that the sensual experience must be
augmented by visible, employable military
capabilities.
My hypothetical consultant, Plato, concluded
his remarks with his tried-and-true question and
answer technique. His principal question was:
what precisely does the US Government want its
military forces to deter? I cannot recall the turgid
discourse in detail, but the answers of my philosopher-
consultant went something like this:
--you expect your forces to forestall direct
attacks on the United States,
--at the same time, however, you accept the
equally heavy responsibility to deter nuclear
and conventional attacks on your allies, and
--you also view your forces as inhibiting co-
ercion by nuclear powers, and,'in conjunction
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with other US?and allied forces, helping to
inhibit coercion of your allies by such powers.
Mercifully, that ended the briefing. It also
ended, in my plans, the idea of borrowing Plato's
theory of the intelligible world and the sensible
world. In part, I decided to fire Plato because,
frankly speaking, a number of my colleagues and I
have had some doubts that our thinking about deterrence
and its requirements has really k~2pt pace with the
evolution of recent strategic threats.
Then I had a splendid idea. I would borrow
the approach of one of the world's most renowned
Seventeenth Cent~.ry philosopher Rene Descartes.
His approach,
from doubt and attempt to come to something that he
could not doubt. Descartes' criteria for clear and
distinct ideas seems to me to be a better way to
address our philosophy of deterrence and to high-
light. some of my own doubts about certain arcane
calculations that have frequently supported our con-
cept of deterrence. So I used his criteria to test
several scenarios of modern hostilities.
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The Counterforce Concept
First, the scenario of a disarming, bolt-
from-the-blue first strike.
The clear and distinct fact on this frightening
subject is that neither the Soviet.Union nor the
United States has, or can hope to have, a capability
to launch a disarming first strike against the other.
This is because each possesses, and will possess
for the foreseeable future, a devastating second-
strike capability against the other.
--This almost certainly will deter the deliberate
initiation of nuclear attack against cities,
for it would bring inevitable retaliatory
destruction on the initiator.
--For example, I can say without doubt that.
today, October , even after a more bril-
liantly executed and devastating attack than
we believe our potential adversaries could
deliver, the United States would retain the
capability to kill more than 30 percent of
the Soviet population and destroy more than
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75 percent of 'Soviet industry. At the same
time we could hold in reserve a major capa-
bility against the Peoples' Republic of
China.
In short, and slightly modifying Descartes' criteria
for truth, I can confidently tell you that our basic
deterrent remains intact in regard to a counter-
force bolt-from-the-blue.
The Damage-Limiting Concept
Now, what about another scenario--a damage-
limiting preemptive strike?
This theory, which seemed to be particularly
popular within the Soviet military establishment
in the days before the 1972 SALT agreements, holds
that the most efficient--or at least the least
ineffective--way to employ your strategic forces
would be to fire them when you had incontrovertable
evidence of an irrevocable intention on the part
of the enemy to attack you say, at, midnight tonight.
Or, as our John Wayne would put it; beat the hired
gun to the draw.
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I can't speak for John Wayne, but one of the
doubts Descartes and I would have here is: just
what is hard evidence of an unchangeable plan that
involves mutual suicide? The answer. would appear
to reside in the twisted subconscious, not the
complicated conscious world. And since one must
be at least conscious to be a doubter, we believe
that any such doubts could rapidly be checked out
by a number of means--the "hot line" for one.
--in this regard, I wish to say a few words
which I hope you will not regard as overly
.optimistic. I believe that if both sides
were to maintain continued communications in
the hours-preceding midnight tonight, and
if both were able to describe precisely and
meticulously the nature of the actions
which had fostered such omnious uncertain-
ties, then existential circumstances would
place political leaders on both sides under
powerful pressures to continue to be sensible.
Thus, on the concept of damage-limiting as on
the idea of counterforce, our basic deterrent seems
to remain a sound principle.
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The Launch-On-Warning Concept
Another strategic consideration we may wish to
stack up against our criteria test of deterrence is
called launch-on-warning.
This is the scenario in which one side detects
a massive launch against his forces and, in rapid
reaction, fires all available units at the perceived
enemy before the enemy's forces hit his. For the
US and the Soviet Union, we are talking in terms of
about 15 minutes at the most.
It should not surprise any of you to hear me
say that Descartes did not write anything about -IL---h
subject of launch-on-warning. The speediest inter-
continental weapon system his contemporaries had to
worry about was seapower under sail. But.Dne Soviet
military writer, who works in their civilian think
tank called the USA Institute, has cogently ad-
dressed this subject. A few years ago he wrote that
the time involved from the detection of a hostile
launch to the order to release a nuclear counter-
strike was so limited that the nuclear-release
authority would have to pass from humans to computers.
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For this Soviet writer, the technical systems needed
for launching on detection "made real the worst
catastrophies of science fiction."
I share such a conclusion, and from a philosophic
viewpoint--particularly one involving sound political
philosophy--relying on technical means to detect
and then respond to a nuclear contingency is simply
outside the realm of sensible political conduct.
The Concept of Assured Destruction
So, what can we say about the concept of re-
taliation--the one that I have in fact just used
to test the scenarios of counterforce, damage limiting,
and surrender to computers?
The general criteria we have used in thinking
about and planning for retaliation is called assured
destruction. The well worn notion of assured de-
struction has had many attractive features from the
standpoint of sizing our strategic offensive approach.
Our calculations have been strikingly simple:
--First, because nuclear weapons produce such
awesome effects, they are ideally suited to
assure the destruction of large, soft targets
such as cities.
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--Second, because cities contain such easily
measurable contents as people and industry,
it is possible to establish convenient
quantitative criteria and levels of desired.
effectiveness with which to measure the
potential performance of the strategic of-
fensive forces.
--Finally, once these specific objectives are
set, it becomes a relatively straightforward
matter -- given an authoritative estimate
about the nature and weight of the enemy's
surprise attack -- to work back to the forces
required for second-strike assured destruction.
The basic simplicity of these assured destruction
calculations did not, however, mean that our force
planners were at a loss for issues. On the contrary,
important questions--questions that would boggle
both Plato and Descartes (and possibly John Wayne)--
continue to arise about the assumptions from which
these calculations proceed. For a few typical
examples:
--Where, for the sake of deterrence, should we
set the level of destruction that we want to
assure?
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--It is enough to guarantee the ruin of several
major cities and their contents, or should
we -- to assure deterrence -- move much
further and upward on the curve of-destruction?
--Because our planning must necessarily focus
on the forces we will have five or even ten
years hence, what should we assume about the
threat -- that is, the nature and weight of
the enemy attack that our forces must be
prepared to absorb?
--How pessimistic should we be about the per-
formance of these forces in surviving the
attack, penetrating enemy defenses (if they
exist), and destroying their designated
targets?
--How conservative should we be in buying in-
surance against possible failures in performance?
In general, we have answered these questions in
a conservative fashion. But in the expensive pro-
cess, the rather simple and attractive features of
the assured destruction concept tended to strengthen
what some of my colleagues call the cannonical logic
of the Triad.
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First, a few words on the Triad. In order to
ensure the necessary survival and retaliatory
effectiveness of'our strategic offense, we have
maintained a triad of forces--nuclear armed bombers,
submarin? launched ballistic missiles, and inter-
continental ballistic missiles.
--Each presents a different problem for an
attacker.
--Each causes a specialized and costly problem
for his defense.
--All give us high confidence that the force
as a whole can achieve the desired deterrent
objective.
While the triad's reassurances may bring solace
to those who enjoy the simple calculations of assured
destruction, in the judgment of many of my colleagues
(and this is the reason I discharged Plato) our
triad has in effect become a deus ex machina, and
regarded by some as a substitute for thinking about
new challenges to the concept of deterrence.
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Let me go into this with a couple of flashbacks:
--Massive retaliation, as adopted by Secretary
of State Dulles in the Fifties, involved
the use of strategic weaponry in response to
a whole array of possible actions. It in-
volved striking back at any time and place
we chose.
--Massive retaliation was a somewhat different
doctrine from the assured destruction of the
Sixties, for assured destruction tended to
be described primarily in terms of going
against cities.
But once the Soviet Union built up a counter-
deterrent, assured destruction became a logically
incredible kind of threat. It is not necessarily
psychologically incredible, but it is logically
incredible.
We proceed, from a logical point of view, that,
first, the Soviet Union now has rough nuclear parity.
We can wipe each other out after a-first strike.
In another way of looking at it, the bulk of our
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strategic advantages'are now generally offset by
theirs. We have advantages in.
--MIRVs and reentry vehicle technology,
--strategic bombers,
--guidance technology, and
--nuclear weapons technology.
The Soviets have advantages in
--numbers of launchers,
--throw weight, and
--ongoing missile development programs.
Secondly, with this recently achieved parity, Moscow
might believe that Washington would be self-deterred
from making use of its strategic forces. Thus (to
complete the logic of this argument), the Soviets
might regard themselves as relatively risk-free if
our deterrent doctrine, our targeting doctrine,
were to stress only going against cities.
It is precisely this problem of credibility
that highlights new doubts, not just for my parti-
cular Cartesian philosophical approach, but for the
concrete issues my policymakers must face. These
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issues involve the actual decisions about the design
and possible use of the strategic nuclear force.
--Not only must those in power consider the
morality of threatening such terrible re-
tribution on others for some ill-defined
transgression by their leaders,
--they must also question the prudence and
plausibility of such a response when the
Soviet Union is able, even after some sort
of first strike, to maintain the capability
of destroying our cities..
The wisdom and credibility of relying simply on the
preplanned strikes of assured destruction are even
more in doubt when allies--rather than the United
States itself--face the threat of a nuclear war.
The Issue of Retargeting
What I have just been talking about takes us,
of course, to the widely discussed subject of US
strategic retargeting.
First, a bit of background on the retargeting
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--In the past we have had massive preplanned
strikes in which one would be dumping literally
thousands of weapons on the Soviet Union.
Some of those strikes could to some extent
be withheld from going directly against cities,
but that was limited even then.
--With massive strikes of that sort, it would
be impossible to ascertain whether the purpose
of a strategic strike was limited or not. It
was virtually indistinguishable from an attack
on cities. One would not have had blast damage
in the cities, but one would have considerable
fallout and the rest of the horrors of nuclear
effects.
--So what the change in targeting does is to
give the President of the United States the
option of limiting strikes down to a few
weapons. It is to be understood that, if the
United States were,to strike the Soviet Union
in response to some hypothetical act on-their
part, this would not have to be a massive
response. The credibility of a massive response
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was understandable in the Fifties and even
in the Sixties when the United States had
virtually a nuclear monopoly with regard to
intercontinental strike forces. But the
massiveness of those strikes has reduced the
credibility of the deterrent since the Soviets
began to introduce large numbers of missiles
into their force structure.
--They now have a deterrent posture that is
beyond the capacity of the United States to
take away. Some welcome that, some do not
welcome that. But I think it is a fact of
life, and as I
remarks, facts
mentioned in my introductory
of reality make a fit subject
for a philosophic discussion of deterrence.
To repeat, there is simply no way that the
United States can limit damage to itself
against a well coordinated strike by'the Soviet
Union.
Thus, the purpose of our change in targeting
doctrine--a new doctrine which emphasizes flexibility.
and selectivity--is to shore up deterrence.
--The change in tCgeting doctrine serves to
reduce doubts about deterrence across the
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entire spectrum of risk. Consequently, it
reduces the likelihood, which is fortunately
already very low, of any outbreak of nuclear
war.
--We want to keep recourse to nuclear weapons
as far away as possible and our objective
in all these matters is, if conflict were
to come, to keep that conflict at as low a
level of violence as possible. We are using
the strategic forces, as it were, to establish
a framework within which conflict, if it
comes, would be fought at a low level, in
terms of the destructiveness of the weapons
involved.
I am well aware of some European disbelief that
our strategic forces are locked into the security of
Europe, despite our having made that pledge repeatedly
over a period of many years. The decline in the
credibility of our pledge was based on the belief that
the Americans would not use their-strategic forces
if, for example, New York and Chicago were placed at
risk in order to protect Western Europe. While some
Europeans
may still doubt
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our pledge, let me say that the reaction
]in
Europe toour change in targeting doctrine has been
welcoming, because it is recognized that-this change
means US strategic forces are still credibly part of
.the overall deterrent for Europe. That deterrent is
based upon three components:
--strategic forces,
--tactical nuclear forces, and
--a satisfactory conventional capability.
The Issue of Conventional War
In this regard, let me make a few brief remarks
on the contribution of general purpose forces to
deterrence. To do this, I will have to drop Descartes
and lean on Hegel's dialectic.
The allocation of such a large proportion of
our defense budget to general purpose forces may seem
perverse in what has come to be known as the nuclear
age. But there are a number of sound reasons for it.
--With the rise of Soviet nuclear power, which,
as I mentioned a moment ago, has brought
about an approximate parity in US-Soviet
nuclear capabilities, the relative cont_:ibution
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to deterrence.made by our own strategic
forces has inevitably declined, even though
these forces continue to have a unique and
indispensable'role.
--In an era of world-wide US interests, power
e'
politics and nuclear parity, it is preferab], r
to deter or to repel limited threats by
limited means. To do that requires a capability
.to place boundaries on conflicts and exercise
some degree of control over the escalation
of violence in the event that deterrence
should fail. The general purpose forces, it
is agreed in Washington, are best-suited to do
this.
Of the resources we invest in the-general purpose
forces, almost all go.to conventional rather than to
our tactical nuclear capabilities.
--In part, this is so because many of our de-
livery systems--artillery, short-range missiles,
and tactical aircraft--are dual-capable, and
therefore the distinction between their nuclear
and their conventional role is not clear cut.
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--But in greater part, it is because our forces,
iri their conventional role, can be used more
flexibly and contribute more to our defense
posture.
While it is essential to theorize about the
nature of tactical nuclear warfare, we must acknow-
ledge that as a practical matter, the initiation of
a nuclear engagement would involve many uncertainties.
Acceptable boundaries on such a conflict would be
extremely difficult to establish. A nuclear engage-
ment in the theater could well produce much higher
military and civilian casualties and more widespread
collateral damage than its non-nuclear counterpart,
depending, of course, on the character and length of
the engagement. What is more, it is not clear under
what conditions the United States and its allies
would possess a comparative military advantage in a
tactical nuclear exchange.
Why, then, do we maintain such large and di-
versified nuclear capabilities in our main theater
commands? As Saint Thomas Aquinas would respond, the
answer is threefold:
--First, maintaining, these capabilities is
essential to deterrence so long as opposing
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forces maintain similar capabilities. They
help to deter a limited first-use of nuclear
weapons by an opponent and along with the con-
ventional and nuclear forces help.create a
general deterrent against either conventional
or nuclear aggression.
--Second, should deterrence fail, the tactical
nuclear capabilities provide a source of
nuclear options for defense other than the
use of the strategic forces.
--Third, given our doctrine of flexible response,
we do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons
by the United States and its allies in order
to prevent a successful aggression.
Conclusion
Gentlemen, I have used (perhaps abused) several
Western philosophers and one cowboy movie star to
help convey some philosophic considerations on US
deterrence. I would like to conclude my remarks
with what we in America call common horse sense:
--As long as the US and the Soviet Union continue
to behave intelligently and perceptively, the
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likelihood that they would unleash strategic
forces is so low that it approaches zero.
--We are determined, nonetheless, to have
credible responses at hand for any nuclear
contingency that might arise and to maintain
the clear ability to prevent any potential
enemy from achieving objectives against us
or our allies that he might consider meaning-
ful.
--Our plans for deterring such action do not
invite war, they discourage it.
Thank you.
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29 July 1974
SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
I. Let me begin with a brief discussion of Soviet
strategic weapons programs.
A. This map shows the locations where the
USSR's ICBMs are deployed, with the types
of systems indicated. We believe that
ICBM launchers are currently
operational. Since the signing of the
SALT agreements, the Soviets have not in-
creased the number of ICBM launchers.
1. Of the deployed launchers, about
are for the SS-9. The SS-9, the largest
operational Soviet ICBM,
The largest
number of silos, however, are for the
smaller SS-11 and SS-13 systems,
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~- ? I Ithe Soviets--
under SALT--can replace these older launch-
ers with submarine launched ballistic missiles.
VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a
sizeable force of medium and intermediate range
ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4
and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the
early-to mid-1960s.
A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000
nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a
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range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They
are deployed at.soft launch sites and in launch
silos
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these missiles deployed in the western
USSR, for use primarily against targets
in western Europe.
2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of
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located along the periphery of the USSR.
In late 1967, however, they began de-
activating some of the launch sites. I
ILLEGIE
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ABM Defenses
XI. In recent years, there have been fewer develop-
ments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive
missiles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have
ABM
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
and there is no evidence of any effort to
deploy ABMs elsewhere.
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Strategic Bombers
XII. There has been no appreciable change in the capa-
bilities of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation
over the past few years.
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A. The Soviets have a force of ieavy bombers 25X1
and tankers and reconnaissance aircraft
whose primary mission is intercontinental
operations. They also have
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bombers for use mainly against Europe and
1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium
bomber with speed in excess of Mach 2
anda range of up to 3,100 nautical miles
under ideal flight conditions. It is
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best suited for operations against
targets in Europe and Asia.
4. As the Backfire is phased into the force,
the number of medium bombers in Soviet
Long Range Aviation should begin to
decline. The Backfire costs substantially
more than older medium bombers, and so
probably will not replace them on a one-
for-one basis.
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
XIII. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about
Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. As
you are aware the Soviets maintain an extensive
military presence in the Mediterranean area.
A. The most visible military presence there is
the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group
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home waters.
1. The primary mission of the Squadron is
to provide a strategic defense of the
Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth
Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets
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XIV. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface
forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve
but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the
US Sixth Fleet.
A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack
submarines, cruise missile armed submarines
and modern surface combatants.
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c. The first Soviet aircraft carrier--
expected to be fully operational in
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late 1976--will probably operate
primarily in the Mediterranean.
i. These drawings show the size of
the Soviet carrier in relation
to US carriers.
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XX. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has
slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and
the Soviets appear to have nearly reached their
force goals.,for . the area.
A. There are about 38 active divisions in the
immediate border area, compared with 13 in
1964.
1. The five divisions from the Siberian
Military District that could be used as
immediate reinforcements bring the total
to about 43.
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B. For air support, they could call on
0
tactical combat aircraft stationed in
the border area.
C. The ground and tactical air forces in the
border area now number about 400,000 men.
D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border
reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians
have concentrated on improving and fleshing out
the basic force,
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new divisions has slowed, they have in-
creasingly turned their strength to developing
support units at the army and front level.
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F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend
against any force the Chinese would be likely
to send against the USSR in the next several
years.
1. As they now stand, however, they would
need substantial reinforcement before
engaging in protracted offensive
operations deep into China.
XXI. On the Chinese side, Peking has expanded the forces
in its four northern military regions since the
border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969.
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A. In the four northern military regions, the
force numbers about 1.6 million combat and
support troops, over 45 percent of the 3.5
million troops in China.
1. Most of the Chinese troops are defensively
deployed well back from the border. This
contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward
deployment is based on an overall military
superiority and a commitment to the Trans-
Siberian Railway supply line which
parallels the China border.
2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized
Soviet forces with their modern equipment,
the Chinese are deficient in armor and
artillery, and their weaponry is of
1950s design.
a. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer
than 5,000 in the border regions compared
with more than 10,000 on the Soviet
side.
B. The Chinese have established defensive areas
along the major approaches from the Soviet and
Mongolian borders into China.
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1. Within these areas there are numerous
fixed defensive positions which use
favorable terrain features to protect
emplaced weapons and troops. .
2. The Chinese evidently expect that these
fixed positions will partially offset the
significant Soviet advantage in weaponry.
C. The Chinese have tactical and air
defense aircraft in the northern military
regions. Most of these are deployed in Eastern
China near important population and industrial
centers.
XXII. A major change in the Sino-Soviet military equation
is China's growing nuclear capability. Today China
can deliver nuclear weapons on targets around its
periphery by both missile and bomber.
These strategic missiles are of two types:
1. The 600 mile--or medium range--missile we
call the CSS-1. As you can see from this
map, this system can reach targets in the
Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia
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2. The 1,400 nautical mile--or intermediate
range--missile we call the CSS-2.
this system
could strike targets in most of the
eastern USSR, much of India, and Southeast
Asia as far south as Singapore.
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25
25
25
25
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ILLEGIB
E. In addition to their nuclear missile force,LMM
Chinese have
TU-16 medium bombers, which
bomb to a radius of
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about 1,650 nautical miles.
about 50 airfields throughout China are
suitable for use by the TU-16s and they
could be widely dispersed if Peking feared
that an attack was imminent.
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light bombers.
IL-28 jet
the Chinese
may plan to give a nuclear role to some
of these aircraft--which have-an operational
radius of about 550 nautical miles.
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VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a
sizeable force of medium and intermediate range
ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4
and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the
early-to mid-1960s.
A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000
nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a
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range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They
are deployed at soft launch sites and in launch
silos
1. There are launchers for
these missiles deployed in the western
USSR, for use primarily against targets
in western Europe.
2. At one time, the Soviets had a force of
RBM and IRBM launchers
located along the periphery of the USSR.
In late 1967, however, they began de-
activating some of the launch sites.
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ABM Defenses
XI. In recent years, there have been fewer develop-
ments in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive
missiles or submarines.
A. The Russians still have
25X1
fr BM 25X1
launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
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