LETTER TO GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH FROM J. EDGAR HOOVER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01731R002900430045-9
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 4, 2003
Sequence Number:
45
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 27, 1951
Content Type:
LETTER
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR Approved Foelease 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80RO17I 002900430045-9
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
dc~ Z3.9
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
September 27, 1951
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
General Walter Bedell Smith
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building
Room 123
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Dear General Smith:
I thought you would be interested in. the following
information furnished by an informant who has given the Bureau
reliable and valuable information in the past and which is
purported to represent statements made by a Soviet official
stationed in Europe who, informant believes, is an important
official of the Soviet Ministry of State Security.
According to the informant, the Russians believe
that the older people in the United States want war but the
younger people are against war with the Soviet Union. In
Russia, the younger people want war but the older people
do not want war. The "Comintern' (probably Cominform) is
said to want peace at any price but the members of the Politburo
in Russia are divided three ways. Two thirds of the Politburo
are said to desire war now with the United States. Half
I o.f this group desires war because it is_ believed the USSR
should not give the_ United States time _to_ .be .prepared and
that immediate war would result in defeat of the United States.
The other half of this group wants war immediately because
1they are "panicky" and feel that war now would be better than
waiting a year. The members of this group, representing
approximately two thirds of the Politburo, do not desire to cause
?trouble in Europe but are in favor of concentrating completely
I in the East, including India, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya,
.the Philippines and Burma. They believe that this is where
(they can hurt North American interests most.
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~ ~ W 0b
Another third of the Politburo headed by Staling ~
believes that it would be better for the Communist world \\ ,',, J."
not to have war for twenty or twenty-five years; that the 0~ a
imperialistic world" will "swallow itself and have an ( ~- ` ,,S`
economic crisis. They believe that capitalism is dead. C``
~ cl
It was stated that the people in Russia are
split in about the same manner as the Politburo and that
the older workers in the Communist Party in Russia share
the opinion of Stalin.
It was also stated that while Georgi Malenkov
is in favor of war now with the United States because he
believes the USSR can win the war, he officially is backing ff
Stalin. There is considerable pressure being exerted
in the Politburo to cause Malenkov to officially support
the two-thirds majority desiring war. It was stated that
if this can be done Stalin might also consent to a war and
war would then be provoked.
According to the informant, he was also advised
that if Stalin should die there would be immediate war.
He was also advised that if a certain "colossal thing" is
accomplished by the end of the year "big things" could be
expected in the Far East and America.would not dare to
fight against it. Informant advises that the "colossal
thing" was described as something which "even Jules Verne
or H.-G. Wells never could have foreseen." Informant
believes that this is some kind of a secret weapon and
that the Soviets will know whether it can be developed
by the end of 1951.
According to the informant, the acting Minister
of State Security in Moscow has stated that if the "colossal
thing" is accomplished America represents no physical danger
to the Soviet Union.
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It was indicated to the informant that even if
Stalin does not die he may be won over by the two-thirds
majority of the Politburo favoring war and that if the
United States keeps making trouble and continues to be
"snooty` as in the recent past, Stalin may not stand for
it much longer and will consent to war. It was pointed
out, however, that the Soviets have not given up the idea
of peace and if the Americans are earnest and the Soviets
scan believe the Americans they will still desire peace.
Informant is of the opinion that Georgi Malenkov
is the most important single individual in Russia other than
Stalin. He is also of the opinion from information furnished
him, that the Soviets will start war in the Far East in the
Spring of 1952, if Stalin can be.won over by the two-thirds
majority of the Politburo or if the "colossal thing" has been
perfected by that time. He is also of the opinion that if the
colossal thing" is completed before the Spring of 1952,
the Soviets will not wait until then to attack.
I am unable to evaluate the above information other
than to state that our informant has furnished reliable
and valuable information in the past. This informant can be
expected to furnish valuable information in the future and
for his protection, it is requested that this data be treated
as highly confidential and be given minimum distribution.
The above information has been furnished to
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the
President; The Attorney General; Honorable James S. Lay,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council; Rear Admiral
Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence;' Major General
A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Major General
Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Special Investigations,
Department of the Air Force.
With assurances of my highest regards,
Sincerely yours,
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