LETTER TO HON. JAMES FORRESTAL FROM WILLIAM H. JACKSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002900440062-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: November 14, 1945
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R002900440062-9
November 14, 1945
?
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Hon. James Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
In view of your recommendation of a central intelligence
agency, I am taking the liberty of summarizing some thoughts
that I have previously expressed on this subject. Last spring, I
made a report on the British system of coordination of intelli-
gence functions. You may have seen a copy of this report which
had a limited circulation in Washington. In any event, as a re-
sult of work on this subject I became interested in the various
proposals for a central intelligence agency in America.
The following summary expresses my-views. Although these
views have been somewhat influenced by the study of the British
system, you will notice that I recommend a system for achieving co-
ordination of intelligence functions which is substantially dif-
ferent from the British system.
Consideration of most subjects starts today with the con-
jectural effects of the atomic bomb. This is surely appropriate
when the subject is intelligence. Assumptions are made as to these
effects which are considered basic in the planning of a modern
intelligence system.
It is assumed that the atomic bomb will not relieve the
United States or any other first class military power of the need
for a first class army, navy and air force. If this assumption
is justified, it follows that the commanding officers of each of
these forces should have an intelligence organization qualified to
render informed and reliable estimates as to potential enemy cap-
abilities affecting their respective missions. It is believed that
air officers trained in intelligence are best qualified to esti-
mate the capabilities of enemy air forces and that the same is
true with respect to ground and naval forces. Each military serv-
ice should have responsibility for intelligence within the scope
of its mission in the same manner that intelligence responsibility
devolves down through the lour echelons of a single military
service. It is not believed that any central intelligence agency
should attempt to relieve the military service of their appro-
priate intelligence responsibilities.
It does not follow, however, that each of the military
services should maintain complete, independent and isolated in-
telligence organizations. This would involve needless duplication
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of facilities and confusion of intelligence opinion on matters
affecting two or more of the military services and, perhaps,
other departments of government. In the language of General
Marshall "The national security is a single problem, and it can-
not be provided on a piece-meal basis." Intelligence, as an
essential function of national security, can be adequately pro-
vided only through a comprehensive and integrated intelligence
system. If the lessons of Pearl Harbor were not accepted as proof
of the urgent necessity for coordination of intelligence functions
between branches of the military service, and between the military
services and other departments of government, the use of atomic
energy and the threat of yet undeveloped products of scientific
research must now supply that proof beyond shadow of doubt.
The collection, evaluation and interpretation of information
relating to scientific, military, economic and political develop-
ments throughout the world have now been recognized as presenting
a major problem in the United States. This problem cannot be solved
by the separate military and civilian intelligence agencies which
functioned in the past with inadequate coordination under obsolete
and disintegrated intelligence procedures, unworthy of being des-
cribed as an American system of intelligence. We assume, then, that
America must in some manner achieve coordination of intelligence
functions if foreign policy and military preparation are to be
synchronized on the basis of a common understanding of the capa-
bilities and intentions of potential enemies.
On these assumptions, we approach this problem with the ob-
jective, on the one hand, of imposing intelligence responsibility
on the military services within the scope of their missions and, on
the other hand, of compelling the coordination of intelligence
functions under one national intelligence system.
There are, it is believed, four aspects of coordination which
are in:Volved4
(1) Coordination in the collection of information.
(2) Coordination in the evaluation and collation of such in-
formation.
(3) Coordination through centralization of intelligence
facilities of use to two or more military services and depart-
ments of government.
(4) Coordination of intelligence opinion in general estimates
of a broad strategic nature.
Coordination in these four aspects can be achieved, it is
submitted, in an integrated intelligence system revolving around
a central intelligence agency set up along the following lines:
Authority over this agency should be vested in the Deptrtment of
Defense if it is created, in the National Security Council if the
proposal of the Secretary of the Navy is adopted, or in the
Secretaries of State, War, Navy and the Assistant Secretary of War
for Air if the present military organization remains unchanged.
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The active direction of the Central Intelligence Agency should
be in a Directorate of Intelligence, consisting of the chief intel-
ligence officers in the Army, Navy and Air Forces, a representative
of the State Department and, perhaps, representatives of other
departments such as the Treasury and the Department of Justice if
they perform or are to perform intelligence functions having a
direct relationship to the national security.
Acting under the general supervision of the Directorate of
Intelligence would be the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. This Director, a man of the highest intelligence quali-
fications available in the United States, regardless of military
or civilian background, should'be appointed by the President upon
the advice of the Department of Defense, or the Council, or the
various Secretaries described above.
The Central Intelligence Agency, which should be run by the
Director, would have various departments comprising the intelli-
gence facilities and services of common usefulness. The number
and scope of these services and facilities should be determined
on the initiative of the Director, with the supervision and agree-
ment of the Directorate, and subject to the final approval of the
Department of Defense. Their number and scope cannot be fixed at
this time, nor would they remain static in the future. In general,
the Central Agency might have departments of economic intelligence,
political intelligence, scientific intelligence, radio intercept,
topography, a central photographic interpretation unit, etc. Such
a list is deliberately incomplete and may, on the other hand, in-
clude fields such as political intelligence which might better be
placed in the Department of State. The principle, however, would
be to place intelligence facilities and services of common use-
fulness in the Central Agency.
In addition to its function of centralization of certain-in-
telligence facilities and services, a second and equally important
function of the Director and the Central Intelligence Agency would
be the coordination, through the Directorate, of the collection,
evaluation and collation of all intelligence, and the submission
over the signature of each member of the Directorate of general
estimates of over-all enemy capabilities.
Returning, then, to the four appects of coordination:
Collection. The Central Intelligence Agency would not
supersede or interfere with the normal collection machinery.of the
various services or governmental departments. Coordination in col-
lection should be achieved by the Director through the Directorate
of Intelligence. The essential elements of information required
by the various services and departments represented on the Direc-
torate should be discussed in meetings of the Directorate where
collection procedures should be coordinated with full knowledge of
current plans of the Chiefs of Staff and of American foreign policy.
The Director would be responsible for seeing that the collection
procedures agreed upon in the Directorate are carried out and that
prompt and appropriate distribution of the collected information
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? is effected both within and without the Central Agency. For example,
the Director must see that the Air Forces get raw intelligence bear-
ing on enemy air capabilities which may be collected outside of Air
Force channels.
In general, the Central Agency would not itself handle collection.
It certainly should not be a central agency for collection. It is
believed that diversification in collection will be far more effective
and that service responsibility in intelligence cannot be maintained
if the military services give up their own collection machinery, such
as the system of military and naval attaches. This is predicated on
the assumption that coordination in collection can be achieved through
the Directorate and that prompt and appropriate distribution can be
assured.
Specifically, in the case of radio intercept, the entire machinery
of collection should be. centralized in the Central Intelligence Agency.
In other specific fields, such as economic and scientific intelligence,
the Central Agency might do its own above-cover collection.
This brings up the question of the organization of secret intelligence
and the use of under-cover agents. It is believed that secret intelligence,
including both positive intelligence and foreign counter-intelligence,
should be under the control of the State Department. Regardless of what cover
might be used, an official of the State Department, presumably its repre-
sentative on the Directorate of Intelligence, should be responsible for
? secret intelligence. It is obvious that coordination should be achieved
by having officers of the Army, Navy and Air Forces assigned to work in
secret intelligence. General coordination of Secret Intelligence require-
ments in the light of full knowledge of American military plans and foreign
policy should be achieved on the initiative of the Director through the
Directorate of Intelligence.
Coordination in the evaluation and collation of intelligence
material. In this aspect of coordination the function of the Director
under the supervision of the Directorate would be comparable to the
function cf coordinating collection. For example, evaluation and
collation of intelligence material directly affecting enemy air
capabilities should be handled by the intelligence organization in the
Air Forces. The same would be true in the case of the'Army-and Navy.
In some fields of common usefulness, evaluation and collation should be
done in a department of the Central Intelligence Agency. There will, of
course, be borderline cases such as scientific intelligence. Evaluation
collation and final interpretation of scientific material of general
application should be done in the Scientific Department of the Central
Intelligence Agency. There will, nevertheless, be scientific intelligence
0
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? of special application to enemy ground, se& or air capabilities which
should be handled by the intelligence organizations of the respective
American services. The Director, through the Directorate, must insure
a free flow of the collated material and a free interchange of scientific
opinion between the various services and between the Scientific Department
of the Central Agency and the military services and other interested
departments of government.
Coordination through centralization of intelligence facilities
or services of common usefulness. As has been stated, this centralization
would be achieved through the various departments of the Central Intelligence
Agency under the principle of placing intelligence facilities and services
of common usefulness.in the Central Agency. The scope of the work of
the various departments would not be of equal extensiveness. For example.,
the departments dealing with political, economic and scientific intelligence
might properly evaluate, collate and finally interpret all such intelligence.
In the case of photographic interpretation, the Department might only
provide a central unit for expert and detailed examination of photographs
which would be forwarded to the appropriate users. In the case of radio
intercept, the departmental function of the Central Agency might be re-
stricted to collection and distribution within and without the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Coordination of intelligence opinion in general estimates of a
broad strategic nature. In the Central Intelligence Agency the Director
should have a department or preferably a top staff consisting of military
and civilian personnel qualified to assemble and draft general estimates
of a strategic nature. An example would be an estimate of the military
capabilities and intentions of a potential enemy country. The part of
the estimate dealing with air capabilities would be drafted in the first
instance by the intelligence organization of the Air Forces. The same
would be true of the ground and naval services. The economic, political
and scientific portions of the estimates would be drafted in the appropriate
departments of the Central Intelligence Agency.
All the parts comprising the estimate would be assembled, discussed
and, if necessary, revised and redrafted by the estimates section or staff
of the Central Agency. It should be recalled that this staff should include
competent air, ground and naval officers who would doubtless be in close
touch with the original drafting of the portions of the estimate prepared
by their respective services. The entire estimate as revised and re-
drafted by the staff of the Central Agency would be submitted to the
Directorate. After full discussion in the Directorate the estimate,
signed by each member of the Directorate, would be submitted to the
State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other appropriate recipient.
A member of the Directorate who disagreed with the estimate in whole or
in part should be required to append his dissent setting forth the grouns
on which it was based.
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In this connection, the British sytem for achieving coordination
of intelligence functions might be studied. A report on this subject has
been submitted to Mr. Robert Lovett.
In conclusion, some obvious facts should be emphasized. The
system herein outlined will not work, nor will any other sytem wvork,
unless there is adequte training of intelligence officers, a willingness
on the part of all the military services to put their most capable
officers in intelligence positions, and a general and sincere recognition
that coordination of intelligence functions is a vital necessity of
national security.
(signed) William H. Jackson