SPECIAL PROGRESS REPORT TO THE NSC RELATING TO INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002900480007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 18, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON ?5r1). C.
January 18, 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
SUBJECT: Special Progress Report to the NSC relating to Indochina
Attached for information and discussion at the OCB meeting of
January 19 in connection with Agenda Item 4 are preliminary working
drafts prepared in the Departments of State and Defense of a special
progress report to the National Security Copncil relating to Indochina.
In order to save time these drafts have been submitted informally
without departmental, or working group. concurrence. The purpose of this
report is. to present 4 concise statement of the major operating problems
or cippisl.ons' With respect to U.S. programa in this area as they relate
to OqrrentNSC policies, particularly NSC 5429/5.
I do" notbelieve that it would be desirable or necessary for the
OCB in this report to make specific recommendation with respect to
policy imaioatione in advance of the presentation of General Collins'
report to the Board. It is believed therefore, that Section C of the
Progress report, "Emerging Problems and Future Actions", should be
restricted to a factual statement of the major operating problems or
decisions requited in the near future which may have significant policy
implications.
I believe that the following points stated in summary form represent
the principal operating problems or decisions which should be covered in.
Section c of the OCB progress report to the National Security Council:
1. Are the proposed programa consistent with- the broad
objectives of U.S. policy in the Far East as expressed in
NSC 5429/5?
a. In particular, do the force levels approved or
recommended reflect. this policy?
b. Are the varying prospects among the three countries
involved reflected in. the emphasis, types. and. amounts of
the 'programs forthese-three states?
2. What operating assumptions can be made with respect to
relationships with the French in training of troops in Free
Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia and 'inthe supervision of military
assistance programs?
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3.. ShoUldU.S..programsipe,baaed on the assumption that
elections will be held as provided for in the Geneva Agreement?
Following OCB discusolOn.,it4s recommended that,thevorking group
prepare a revised draft for concurrence by the Board members and trans-
mittal to the NSC not later than Nbnday, Jaime** 24.
??:7- ?
AttaChments:
4
1. Preltanary Working Draft
PreP4red4n.State Department
for discussion at OCB Nbeting of
January 19.
2. TreliMinary Working Draft ,
prepared in Department of Defotee
for discussion at OCB Nbeting of
January 19.
Elmer B. Staats
Eieduti?ie Officer
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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT PREPARED IN STATE
FOR DISCUSSION AT OCB MEETING OF JANUARY 12
FEST PROGRESS REPORT ON ANNEX A, PARAGRAPH 10, INDOCHINA TO
NSC 5429/5, CURRENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE FAR EAST
(Policy Approved by the President, December 22, 1954).
(This report covers the period August 20, 1954 through January 17,
1955.) (Para. 10 of NSC 5429/5 is identical with Para. 10 of
NSC 5429/2, approved by the President on August 20, 1954 with the
addition of a new para. 10-h.)
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTIONS
1. The U.S. has vigorously supported the government of
Prime Minister Diem in Viet-Nam and the Royal Khmer and Lao Gov-
ernments. In spite of official French agreement to such courses
of action, French support in Viet-Nam has in practice been less
than Wholehearted.
2. U.S. representation has been materially strengthened
in all three States by all agencies concerned; U.S. capacity for
direct dealing with the three governments has been increased ac-
cordingly.
3. Force levels for Cambodia and Laos have been drawn up
and submitted to the U.S. Government on the basic premise of
maintenance of internal security, arrangements with the French
have been initiated but not completed for the assumption by the
U.S. of training Vietnamese forces; final agreement remains to be
reached with the Vietnamese Government on force levels and structure.
General Collins hopes to have such agreement by the January 27th
meeting of the NSC, but is handicapped by lack of U.S. decision
regarding the amounts of U.S. aid which can be allocated. Such a
decision is an urgent need.
4. Arrangements have not been completed with the Khmer and
Lao Governments on force levels, structure and training and control
arrangements; complications arise in each country from French de-
sires to retain preeminence in the former and from thei?Rrovisions
of the Geneva Accords in the latter.
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5. The programs developed by Generals Collins and Ely
including:
14 Reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces
and the establishment of sound relations between
military and civil authorities,
2: Strengthening of the Diem Government by the
inclusion of capable administrators,
3; Resettlement of refugees and displaced persons,.
4: Land reformi
5. Establishment of a National Assembly,
: 6, Financial and economic matters relating.to
direct aid, and
7: Psychological warfare
have not been fully implemented because of the shortness of time
but appreciable progress has been made except in the field of
strengthening the Diem Government. This IS a continuing require?
ment and our ability to influence Diem is limited.
6: Economic aid has been programmed and its initial ele?
ments agreed for the three states; provisional arrangements have
been completed for the extension of direct defense support aid to
all three states as of January 12 19552 and initial payments have
been made to Viet?Nam and Laos. It is expected that the first
payment in direct support of Cambodian fOrCes will be made by
February 1, 1955.
74 The U.S. Navy sealift evacuated approximately 400,000
Vietnamese from Haiphong to the South; their resettlement has been
materially assisted by direct aid programs and indirectly by
projects of land reform and technical assistance.
8.. The American Consulate remains in Hanoi thigh without
any "consular relations" with the Viet Ninh regime.
9. The U.S. has imposed trade and financial controls on
North Viet?Nam similar to those applied to Communist China.
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10. Propaganda and information activities have been
materially expanded, notably in Viet-Nam in connection with
support of the Diem Government and in publicizing the refugee
movement from Communist territory.
11. UpS.. good offices and representations have assisted
in the general though not unanimous recognition of Cambodia and
Laos and to a lesser extent Viet-Nam.
12. The Manila Pact, in its Protocol, includes the areas
of Laos, Cambodia and Free Viet-Nam in the area against which
aggression from outside would call for action by the signatory
powers.
B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON POLICY
13, Intelligence estimates made during this period (NIE
63-7-54) as well as continuing reports and assessments, stress the
relatively, greater military and political capabilities of the Viet
Minh regime, though there is no evidence of Communist intentions
to take avert military action. Toward the end of the reporting
period, there was some indication of an improvement in the political
stature of Diem and in the authority and efficiency of his govern-
ment.
14. Government level agreements with the French have not
been effective in securing complete French cooperation; lower
level "sabotage" and the pressure of French commercial interests
continue to the detriment of U,S. objectives. French desires to
save their economic and aultural interests in North Viet-Nam have
also complicated French policy toward Free Viet-Nam.
15. The virtually complete autonomy of the Associated States
has resulted in an impetus to the natural affinity of Laos, and
Cambodia with Thailand which is expected to develop further in
the future.
16. The activities of the International Control Commission
have tended on balance to favor the Communists, largely due to the
insistence of the Indian Chairmen in preserving unanimity, Which
has prevented effective positive action. The usual delaying
tactics by the Communists have hampered the Commissions.
17. The working group recommends revision of NSC 5429/5,
Annex A, para. 10, in the following respects:
(a) A quantitative element, whether in time or funds,
based on a full assessment of the chances of reaching the.
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objectives set set forth in para. 4 (page 3), especially as, bop
and e., to replace the "every possible effort" of para. 10.a.
and the unqualified "assist" of pare. IO..
..(b) liaos and Cambodia should be separated from Viet-
Nam in policy considerations', and separate courses of action
set forth Where disparate circumstance's warrant.
(c) Appropriate changes should be mode to reflect
actions completed,: as in para. 10.b, and c.
(d). Ftrthet policy guidance ,on para. 10.g. is de-
sirablevinasmuch as there are no U.S. "Consular relations" and
virtually no U.S. non-strategic trade, though French, UK, Indian
Ancf,c4her,countries, as well as Soviet bloc countries have varying
elements of both (as well as strategic trade of course, for bloc
countries).
(e) Clarification of policy and strategy in respect to
the elections scheduled for July 1956 is desirable.
C. EMERGING pRoBLENs ppymuu ACT19N$
(For the.purpoSes of this report, emerging problems must
be treated on a short-term basis. The attention of the Executive
Branch of the U.S. Government .has been fOcUsSed to such an extent
on this area that it is necessary to give only a summary of the
problems in the following paragraphs.)
AM
M, The Dion government is making, slow .b.it steady progress
toward establishing itself is a potent anti-communist regime.
In this task it is faced with a mtltitude of problems including
inexperience, pdwerftl communist opposition within Free Vit-Nam,
lack. of unity between Various anti-communist or at least non-
communist groups in Free Viet-Nam and by lack of wholehearted
French support. The latter element may prove to be the most
powerful handicap and the French Government continues to attempt
to establish a deadline by Which Diem will be replaced by a French
sponsored candidate'. Those personalities they have put forward
for our consideration all have serious flaws in their Characters
and political philosophies And all seem inclined to adopt soft
policies via-a-Vis the communists, leading to coalition with the
Viet Minh. We continte to Oppose these French proposals, but the
problem will remain.
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19. We are negotiating with the Vietnamese regarding the
force levels and structure we consider called for. Although
close cooperation is evidenced an the part of the Government of
Viet-Nam, it is faced with internal problems which affect its
ability to adopt our concept of a small well-trained force.
Rapid demobilization of existing forces down to the level pro-
posed by the U.S. would create economic and political difficulties.
We will be faced with the need to compromise these differences
as they arise.
20. When General Collins completes his negotiations with
both the French and Vietnamese, we will be undertaking full res-
ponsibility for training of the Viet-Nam National Army. This will
entail a delicate problem of utilizing French military training
personnel under U.S. command. Details of this operation will
necessarily await the formation of our training command, under
General O'Daniel,
21. Evacuation from Indochina of MDAP materiel above the
needs of the armies of the three States has not yet been instituted
but will entail logistical and financial problems. The separate
problem of insuring the removal from the Haiphong enclave of
commercially used equipment previously financed by FOA entails
specifically the bulky and expensive machinery at the Hongay coal
mines. Present indications are that despite French assurances that
it will be removed, such may not be accomplished and it may be
continued in use by the communists for their benefit and to the
detriment of the Free World. We continue to use every effort to
accomplish removal.
22. The French continue to attempt to maintain, to the max-
imum degree possible, their cultural and economic position in the
Viet Minh area. The Sainteny Mission enjoys almost full diplomatic
status and is engaged in activities which can only be inconsistent
with French assurances of that Government's desire to strengthen
a strong anti-communist government in Free Viet-Nam. We will be
faced with an intensification of the problem When the French evacuate
the Haiphong enclave in May 1955.
23. The growing strength of the Viet Minh regime in North
Viet-Nam clearly indicates world communist intent to create a strong
foothold in the area. The establishment of diplomatic missions
by the Soviet bloc, the completion of a rail link with Moscow,
permitting an even greater flow of strategic and military goods,
the imminence of communist control of the major North Viet-Nam port
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of Hdldhong (in May 1955) combined With the reorganization and
augmentation of the regular Viet Minh Threes, equipped with
Soviet bloc atma, trade agreements with Red China and the
presence of Red Chinese technicians and air planes are 611 illus-
trative of future communist intentions. Up to now, there has
been reported no Overt move to resume hostilities, but the fact
is inescapable that communist Capabilities far exceed anti-
communist strength in the area.
24. The basic problem posed by elections in July 1956 is
open.
CAMBODIA
25. Although Cambodia enjoys a greater degree of sovereignty
and autonomy than Viet-Nam or Laos and its geographic position
affords it some protection from Viet Ninh encursions, it faces
lesser internal problems which will take American aid and time
to solve. The only Strong political opposition to the King's
position and authority is SON GNOC THANH, with wham negotiations
are now proceeding. If he and his comparatively small band of
followers rally to the side of the Government, the elections which
are scheduled for April 1955 should result in a victory for the
King and Government. We are now engaged in working out ways and
means by which we can respond to the Cambodian's request for a
military training mission. The negotiations of such will be
complicated by the announced French intention to maintain its
military presence in Cambodia. We consider the present and future
problems faced in the country to be solytble and anticipate steady
progress toward internal security will be accomplished.
LAOS
26. The strategically important provinces of Phong Saly
(bordering Red China) and Sam Neua (bordering Viet Minh held
North Viet Nam) were designated by the terms of the Geneva Accords
as regroupment areas for the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces. The
Viet Minh forces were requested to return to Viet-Nam by November
1954, with the future integration of the Pathet Lao forces into
the community to be as worked out by a political settlement be-
tween the Communists and the Royal Lao Government. Although ne-
gotiations between the two sides has been carried on intermittently,
no progress has been made. The Pathet Lao forces still control
the two provinces and the Royal Government has been prevented from
assuming control over the area. Pathet Lao forces have recently
attacked Royal Army posts in Sam Neua province. The combination
of a weak government in Laos, faced with a determined communist
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enemy presents a situation of danger. Due to the terms of the
Geneva Accords the U.S. cannot have a military training mission
(this is reserved to the French). We have undertaken direct
financial support of the Royal Lao military forces, and the Royal
Governmentts contribution to the cost of its defense is zero.
The International Control Commission is handicapped by a lack of
helicopters and light planes to observe alleged communist viola-
tions of the cease fire. We are concerned over the possibilities
of a worsened situation in Laos, while at the same time our ability
to effect corrective action is limited.
27. General Comments
Despite the dangers outlined in this appraisal our Chiefs
of Mission in Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia have assessed that the
U.S. has a fair chance of achieving its objective of preventing
further communist success in Indochina, if we follow the courses
of action outlined and adopt and implement the aid programs which
have been recommended by the Chiefs of Mission.
COB Mao Donald/FE :PSA :REHoey : t as
January 18, 1955
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Preliminary Working Draft Prepared in Department of Defense for Discussion
4tOCB Meeting, January 19, 1955,
SPECIAL WORKING GROUP (INDOCHINA)
PROGRESS REPORT BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTIONS
(1) The policy of the U.S. Government established in reference to Free
Viet-Nam was expressed as being in support of that government, under the
Premiership of pga,mpia Diem, and to assist initially in (a) promoting internal
security,andpolitiCal.atability; (b) establishing and maintaining control
through the territory of Free Viet-Nam; and (c) effectively counteracting
infiltration and para-military activities south of the 17th Parallel.
(2) General C011ina was ordered to Viet-Nam as a special Ambassador by
the President, early, in November 1954, with the miseion of coordinating and
directing proper implementation of the U.S. policy outlined above.
(3) On 29 November 19511- General Collins cutlined the major fields
on which he intended to concentrate with a view to achieving progress in
each field. They are:
(a) Agreements with the French on the Size, composition and
mission of the Vietnamese armed forces.
Comment: The joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense and other appropriate
U.S. government agencies have approved General Collins' recommendations re
size, composition, and mission. Department of State and General Collins are
currently negotiating for French and Vietnamese acceptance of the size,
composition, and mission of these forces.
(b) Assumption by the Chief, U.S. MAAG; of responsibility for
the training of Vietnamese armed forces.
Comment: The Vietnamese have asked for this and General Ely, the
French Commander in Chief in Indochina, has signed a minute of understanding
with General Coll-tns on this matter which has been accepted by the U.S. and
is now under discussion by the French Government.
(c
French.
) Granting of full autonomy to the Vietnamese forces by the
Comment: This was included in the Collins-Ely minute of under-
standing but has ,not been categorically accepted by the French.
(d) Reorientation of the Army in support of the Vietnamese
Government and vice versa.
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Comment: The removal of Gcueral Hirth, as Army Chief of Staff,
was a major step in this direction.
(e) Employment of the Vietnamese armed forces in pacification
roles and for rehabilitation of the country.
Comment: Only minor progress has been made in this field.
(f) Strengthening Diem's Government.
. Comment: Certain of General Collins.' recommendations to Diem have
not been accepted. However, General Collins' discussions with Diem and the
acceptance of some of his recommendations are showing signs of strengthening
the personal character of Diem who is beginning to emerge as a popular leader
Free Viet-Nam.
(g) Land reform.
Comment: FOA has taken action to obtain an expert in the land
reform field in order to accelerate such a program in Free Viet-Nam.
(h) National Assembly.
Comment: General Collins has been striving for the establishment
of a National Assembly in order to give the Diem Government a measure of
democratic backing and to provide a training ground for political leaders.
(i) Financial and Economic
Comment: General Collins and the country team have recommended
specific programs for Viet-Nam all of which have not been implemented to
date due to a requirement for a decision on the availability of funds.
(j) Recovery of MDAP equipment.
Comment: General3Coilins and Ely have signed a minute of under-
standing providing for the return to U.S. control of U.S. MDAP equipment
excess to the needs of the French in Indochina.
Cambodia. An approved force basis has been developed for Cambodia
which will, when Cambodian forces become proficient, provide that country
with the means for insuring internal security. Direct forces and economic
support are now being furnished directly to the Cambodian Government.
(5) Laos. Direct forces support, through FOA channels, has been
provided directly to the Laotians in addition to economic support.
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B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON POLICY
(1) Viet-Nam
(a) Elections. The success of any U.S. program for Viet-Nam must
be considered in the light of the proposed elections scheduled for July 1956,
in accordance with the Geneva Agreements.
(b) The French have not completely accepted the idea of backing
Diem as the most suitable figure in the development of a stable, Vietnamese
Government.
(c) The French Government has not expressed complete agreement
on the Collins-Ely minute of understanding re U.S. assumptions of respon-
sibility for training.
(d) The Vietnamese have not completely accepted General Collins'
recommendations on the phase-down of Vietnamese forces.
(e) The question of availability of U.S. funds for the support
of Vietnamese armed forces has not been established.
(f) Evacuation of U.S. equipment excess to the needs of the French
and Associated States forces is still dependent upon the completeness of an
inventory and a final determination of Associated States force bases.
(2) Cambodia.
(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense have
approved a force basis for the Cambodian forces.
(b) The Cambodians have indicated that they will agree to the
gradual phase-out of French instructors and techniciRns as a prerequisite
to the establishment of a U.S. MAAGI Cambodia.
(c) State has not agreed to the negotiations of a bilateral
agreement with the Cambodian Government on the gradual phase-out of French
instructors and technicians.
(3) Laos.
(a) The U.S. has agreed to support the Laotian forces.
(b) The terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreements prohibit the
introduction of U.S. military personnel into Laos for the supervision of
any U.S. military aid provided to the Laotians.
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(c) The joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated a reluctance to
recommend a force basis for Laos due to the prohibition against U.S.
supervision outlined above. However, the JCS are currently considering
a force basis recommendation made by Minister Yost.
C. EMERGING PROBLEMS AND FUTURE ACTIONS
(1) Viet-Nam
(a) Elections. It is considered that the elections in Viet-Nam
must be postponed indefinitely or voided entirely if a strong, stable Viet-
namese Government is to be developed. It is quite probable that France would
oppose this concept as there appears to be strong French support towards
negotiating an agreement with the Viet Minh in an effort to salvage French
economic interests in the area. It is estimated that the population of
North Viet-Nam, even after the loss of a half a million refugees, will still
exceed that of the South. This, coupled with the fact that the Viet Minh will
control the elections in many areas of Free Viet-Nam by sUbversive and para-
military activities appears to make a Viet Minh victory a certainty if elec-
tions are held.
(b) Mendes-France, during his visit to the U.S. in November of
1954., agreed, in discussions with the Secretary of State, to let Generals
Collins and Ely work out the details of the U.S. control of organization
and training of the Vietnamese forces. Generals Collins and Ely have signed
a minute of understanding on this problem which has been accepted by the U.S.
but not completely by the French. It would appear that the French are
currently procrastinating and will continue to do so on this problem, the
settlement of which is a requirement for the establishment of a military ai4
program for Viet-Nam.
. (c) General Collins has requested and has been granted authority
to negotiate with the Vietnamese on the organization and strength of the
Vietnamese Armed Forces. However, he was not given a dollar figure, as
requested, to use for planning purposes. Such a figure cannot be given until
a breakdown of Section 121 funds based on FOA and Defense requirements has
been determined. Therefore, General Collins cannot complete negotiations
with the Vietnamese until a planning figure is made available to him.
(d) Although Generals Collins and Ely have signed a minute of
understanding on the return to U.S. control of U.S. MDAP equipment excess
to the needs of the French in Indochina, a complete inventory of such equip-
ment is not yet available. All appropriate agencies are cognizant of the
need for a rapid evacuation of materiel and equipment excess to the needs
of the French and Associated States, and plans have been prepared for this
eventuality. However, a sudden collapse of the Government of Free Viet-Nam
or an overwhelming attack by the Viet Minh or Chi Corns would preclude the
possibility of evacuating a large percentage of this equipment.
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(e) The French have requested U.S. helicopters for support of
the ICC and these requests have been concurred in by State representatives
in the field. However, the U.S. is not a signatory to the Geneva Pact and
is not committed in any way to support the ICC. Further, past experience
with the French pertaining to requests for aircraft have demonstrated that
they have not exhausted their own resources prior to requesting support
from the U.S.; they do not have the ability to adequately operate and main-
tain such equipment; and that a request for U.S. maintenance personnel and
spare parts support will follow closely the granting of such assistance. It
is visualized that pressure on this problem will be maintained on the U.S.,
the approach being in light of the ultimate benefits (doubtful) to the U.S.
(2) Cambodia
(a) The Cambodians have requested and the U.S. has agreed to
support of the Cambodian military forces. However, as a prerequisite to
such support, the JCS recommended, concurred in by Defense, the ultimate
withdrawal from Cambodia of French instructors and technicians. Although
Ambassador McClintock and the Cambodians have agreed to a written agreement
on this JCS prerequisite, State for reasons of political expediency, will not
accept this proposition. Defense considers that the assistance of the French
during the initial phase of a U.S. military assistance program, although not
mecessary, would be desirable. However, Defense further considers that the
French, in an effort to maintain their sphere of influence in this area,
will impede U.S. aid programs at every opportunity. The result would almost
certainly be an inefficient military aid program for which Defense would be
blamed and which would cause a further loss of U.S. prestige in the area.
State-Defense agreement on this problem is not foreseen at this time.
(3) Laos. A solution to the amount of U.S. military support for this
country and the method of U.S. supervision is not forthcoming at this time.
It is considered that supervision will of necessity, have to be by civilians
and that these civilians, although desirable that they have military back-
grounds, will have to be contracted for and administered by FOA-State.
D. EXTENT OF AGENCY INTERESTS
State, FOA, CIA, USIS, and the Treasury Department have an interest in
the problems outlined in this paper. However, due to time limitations,
this paper has not been coordinated with these agencies. This paper
should be submitted to the Board Assistants in conjunction with papers pre-
pared on this problem by any of the other appropriate agencies listed above.
TOP SECRET Lo 6 715
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R0029004800u/-6
TOP SECRET
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Approved i-or elease 20051u4125 lM-ruruurw, ..,
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