SPECIAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003000140007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 11, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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glop SECRET
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. Co
r
COPY NO.
October 11, a95l
MEMORANDUM FOR THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
SUBJECT: Current US-ROK Relations
REFERENCE : Special Report of Working Group
The attached special report is submitted to the Board-in response
to a suggestion from General Cutler of September 30, 1954. Because em=
of the rapid exchange of telegrams regarding this continuing p u ,
this report may not fully reflect the status of the matter at the
time of the meeting. Therefore, the chairman of the working group
which prepared the report, Mr. Robert McClurkin, has been asked to
meet with the Board for this item in order that the latest developments
may be reviewed.
-liner B. Staaus
Executive Officer
Attachment:
Special Report on Status
of US?ROK Relations.
NSC review(s) completed.
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Interim Report on Status of U.S.' ROK R?lationshi
Current Situation
between the U.S. and the RJK have worsened sub-
i
l
ons
at
Re
stantially since President Rhee's return to Seoul from the U.S.
in August. Basically, this situation is a consequence of the
frustration of the ROK leadership, especially of Rhee, with
respect to:
(a) the objective of unification;
(b) fear of renewed. Comunist aggression and in the
longer range Japanese political economic domination; arc
hat appears to them. to-be-'the sl'a;
(c) :impatience with what-appears-
progress of the economic rehabilitation program'.
The deterioration in U.S.-ROK relationshiNs has been re-
flected over the past few weeks in ROK propaganda. Through its
official spokesmen and its semi-official press organs, the ROK has
staged a propaganda attack on the U.S. equaled in its misrepresen
tation of the facts and of U.S. motives only by attacks from the
Communist countries. Speeches and editorials have been accoatpani~3
by a series of mass demonstrations, petitions, and resolutions in
the National Assembly. The general lines developed in these attar?s}
are:
(a) Redeployment
The U.S. is redeploying its forces without having giver
the ROK notice in advance and such redeployment constitutes aban-
donment of the ROK and exposes that country to another attack sue-1
as that of June 1950;
(b) Military Aid
U.S. military aid is entirely inadequate in the face of
U. S. redeployment and of the large Communist buildup in north Kn:='sa;
(c) RO aapanese Relationships
uided in its attitude toward Japan,
mis
i
S
g
s
.
The U.
officials are pro-Japanese aid its policy is directed toward making
Korea again subservient to Japan; and
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(d) Economic Aid
The U.Sv'economic aid program for Korea is too small? it,
has accomplished nothing thus far, U.S. officials are opposed to
building up Korea's basic industries, and the U.S. insists on at-
taching humiliating conditions to its aid which the ROK find com-
pletely unacceptable.
While there has been some abatement of the propaganda oampair,
in the past week, the current ROK actions with respect to the UNC's
request for hwan to meet local currency requirements continue to re-
flect the deteriorated situation. Despite its commitment to do so,
the RO K has refused to make bwan available except at 180 to 1, a
price which grossly overvalues the hwan, and the Command has taus
been unable to meet its hwan obligations.
The draft agreed minute' resulting from discussions held witnn
President Rhee last August and subsequently with Defense Minister
Sohn and Economic Coordinator Paek in Washington, has been deliverac.
by Ambassador Briggs, General Hull, and C. Tyler Wood to President
Rhee for his concurrence. President Rhee has not yet agreed to the
minute but has indicated he will give it further consideration.
2. Viers Inherent in the Current Situation
Prolongation of the current situation may result in a deeper-
ing of the present rift in U.S,-ROK relations which will have adve r~e
effects over the longer range. In addition, the Communists, who have
already found it possible to turn ROK public statements into sharF
propaganda weapons, will be able to capitalize even more effectively
on this situation if it is prolonged.
Aside from the above factors, however, there are two more
imminent dangers inherent in the situation:
(a) ROK frustration, particularly with respect to the issue
of unification, may lead to action against the Communist members
on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) teams. Genera
Taylor has made clear to the ROK his responsibility for, and intern
to protect, the members of the NNSC with all the force at his oom--
mand. A desperate effort by the ROK to eject the Communists could
lead to a situation which would require U.S. troops to use their
weapons against the ROK; and
(b) These frustrations may lead to unilateral action bry the
ROK. There is sane evidence to indicate that plans have been made
to take such action in a manner which the ROK hopes would involve
U.S. forces.
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3. U.S. Counter Action
(a) Diplomatic Representations
strong representations have been made with respect to
ROK false and misleading propaganda attacks,, and, as each new at-
tack of this sort appears;, Ambassador Briggs: is being instructed
to present to the RDK strong protests from the U.S. Government.
These representations may, have accounted in part for the recent
moderation in ROK propaganda.
(b) public Statements and Press Briefings
Only one statement by a U?SiBriggsrelated
afterot~ed ~?.
propaganda campaigns, that made by Ambassador
monstrations of the wounded veterans, has been released. Bo'h
however have strongly recomr-f sided
Ambassador Drigg9 and General Hulls
statements by high public officials designed to make clear the caf?i3
for the U.S. in the current controversies. 'The principal reason -`lase
reocanmendations have not yet been followed is a reluctance to r .ge ~~
in public debate of issues which are still in the process of pr
gotiation, fear that the statements by U. S. public officials wo1 ran
merely bring forth more and harsher statements from the ROKs and -lope
that the ROK campaign would soon abate.
several press stories have appeared
In the last few days,
on the subject of U.S.-ROK relationships which have emanated from
.~
have the
correspondents stationed in Seoul and t kyhe These These stories
controversies with
fended the U.S. position with respect
E)K and have. provoked press requests in Washington for confirmata rn.
Several members of the press have been given background
briefings. Theses however, have neither been designed to yield, aiw nor have they yielded, strong and widespread statements e p L a fs~ r g
the controversy to the American people. Press background
have not been fully utilized for much the as reasons that sta ,~.-
ments by public officials have been avoideds
(c } USIA Media
Use of the USIA media in Korea as a direct means of we=unter-
ing ROK misstatements and misinterpretations of U.S. motives has not
yet been made. It is believed that U.S. media, including the FGA,
must carry only moderate and restrained reports in view of the danger
that the ROK, if it felt USIA was taking a hostile stand or was
with Korean affairs, might ban USIA operations comp-
USIA operations, therefore, have concentrated on explanations cz the
achievements of the economic reconstruction program.
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(d) Hwan D awii
with respect to hwan drawings, General Hull has been in-
atructedt
(1) not to buy hwan at a rate of 180 to 1;
(2) to notify the ROK that, on resumption of 'Wan ad-
vances, payment on account for the months June through SepterfJer aym ants on account
of 8 million dollars w:lll be made and is reached onuthep~ problem;
continued until agreement
to use dollars, treasury checks, payment in kind,
(3)
or sale of axm y supplies BS a means of obtaining hwan on a stop-
gap basis.
(4) to reduce hwan requirements to most extent pcssit=-";
(r) to purchase hwan from other sources .:than Bank of-
Korea *t the best rate available; and
(6) Application at this time of possible sanctions
and/or release of press :statements on this issue are regarded as
premature.
(e) Draft Minute
With respect to the Minute, current instructions are to
avoid appearing overanxious and, therefore, to leave the next mckuu
up to the Koreans. Until this Minute forces initial dew the U.S. wil:k- ":ot not undertake to augment or modernize
economic aid as contemplated in the item under discussion.
(f) Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (N1dS0
On the problem of the NNSC, a meeting w:dll be held Soon
with the Sixteen nations who fought in Korea at which time the U.S.
gyn. 11:
n in approaching the gwiss.'Ic:
ti
o
(1) ask their coopera
Swedes and requesting these neutrals to announce to the 1? outtar:v r
Armistice Commission that, because Of it wing all pe~,so i
responsibilities in the north, they
from the NNSC inspection teams in both north and south Korea to the
Demilitarized Zone until convinced of Communist wiUingne*s to
cooperate; and
(2) state that if this c proach to the Swiss and Te=aes
the U.S. must then consider taidng ac''ion -dl through the 1W leading to the termination of the activiti-ee cr the
fails to produce results,
NNSC.
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