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October 30, 1952
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r A rove d For Release 20 2 0004001.0-6 - pp (t/f1tF : I~QNLY Trip SECI:ET PSB D-34 DOC . NO. 8)!.? ONI;Y DATE October 30, 1952 1,01 SN `I'I2I C COPY NO. r t} i_s INCLUL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD Washington PROGRBSS REPORT ON TIE NATIOI~%.9.L PSYCHOLOGICAL ETF RT FOR THE l'IRIOD JULY 1, 1952, TI-3.OUGH S PTa1BER 30, 1952 Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board WARN ING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,Sec- tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. NSC review(s) completed. SECURI'TY INFORMATION "P + Approved For Release 2006/03/1P (80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For ReleaEh(/ 1-BA- 1R 00040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 3 November 1952 Piro James Lay? Jr. Executive Secretary The National Security Council Washington 25) D. C. Dear ihhro Layt I have the honor to transmit herewith to the President and the National Security Council a Progress Report on the National Psychological Effort for the period July 1 1952 through September 30, 1952: This is submitted in accordance with your "Memorandum to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board - Status of United States Programs for National Security," dated May 29, 1952* This Report, was approved at the Sixteenth heeting of the Psychological. Strategy Board held October 30, 1952. Sincerely yours, Alan Ga Kirk Director Enclosures; PSB D-314, Copies`6 and 7 SECUttITY IdFORNATION TOP SECh;ET EYES ONLY 84109// Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORNIA4'ION COPt No 5 TOP SECRET PSD D-34 October 30 f 1952 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE PERIOD JU],Y 1, 19520 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30y' 1952 Submitted to the Presl.dent and the National Security Council by 4he 1sychological Strategy Board TABLE OF CONTENTS EEje I. Evaluative Sirimary of Significant Psychological Activities..'. 2 .'....:.. s ..' 6 II: The Work of PSB, .:.... q s,. III. Summaries of Reportst Department of State... .................'...:..,.,..~,.:.; 15 Department of Defense...... +.I...I??? ..::::,F:..i:i:. 19 *Central Intelligence Agency*.-:....:.. .`.:;:.....:: :.:..` 24 Field Representatives of ritual Security Agency.:38 Text of Report of Department of States,',,,...:.`.?::.:::...t:.:ANNEX A Text of Report of Department of Defense ..:.......::...:.'.."..ANNEX B The Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is specially classified. SECURITY INF O MA.TION TOP SECRET Page 1 of hl Approved For Release 2006/03/17 CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB D-31. October 30, 1952 I. SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW 1, The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psycho- logical activities during the reporting period on the part of.the de- partments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, Capabilities by Area 2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capa- bilities for making an immediately effective psychological c itribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence, These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the,European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in building capabilities for future development, 3v Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian "jamming" continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the whole field of communications. Insofar as Con unist China is concerned, the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses. Anti-American Attitudes u, In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propa- ganda and pressure. During the reporting period a. substantial increase was made SECURITY INFORATION TOP SECRET 84109 Page 2 of 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB D-3L October 30, 1952 was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect and non-attributable propaganda, However, the above trend makes clear the importance of still farther increasing our efforts to develop in- direct and non-attributable information activities. 1 extern Euro e 5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues to cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes favorable to the position-of-strength strategy, European enthusiasm continues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military, i.e., NATO and EDC. However, U. S, phyohological action has contributed to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries, notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration atti- tudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth. of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread of neutralist sentiments. Middle East 6. The political crisis ire. Iran has materially reduced U. S. capabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country, The danger of further deterioration in Iran,emphasizes the importance of rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries; where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt, the political crisis similarly reduced current oapabil.ties; but the present SECURITY INF CREATION 8TOP SECRET a 9 Page 3 of 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB D-313 October 30, 1952 present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements that make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, how- ever, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda, 7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was in- creased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological impact of TCA and XSA agricultural, puhlio+ health, and other aid programs. Psychological capabilitiei in Southeast Asia have been expanded, but little in- crease in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the United States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolu. tionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological obstacle, 8 Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained widespread acceptance in the non--communist world. "Hate America" Propaganda SECUFcITY INFOEMATION 841H l TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80RCPPM M40 -r- Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURI'T'Y INFuR,MATION '[OP SWRET PSD D-34 October 30, 1952 "Date America" :Propaganda 9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been con- cerned with combatting the Soviet-Com aunist "Hate America" propa- ganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on this subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propa- panda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose,.of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by the Department of Defense and its components of in- formation on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United States operations. I~Iili.tary Assets for the "Cold War" 10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribu- tion these services can make to the national psychological effort. However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of ap- proved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and missions upon. which military psychological activities in peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study. SECULI TY INF CRMTION TOP SECH T rj + Page 5 of Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80R01731 R0040 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Security Information TOP SECRET PSB D-34 October 30) 1952 II. TI=C WORK OF PS13 General Aott7ities 17.. A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with special. reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed and submitted to the Board. Pending development of capabilities and situations which any make it possible to envisage a final solution of the cold warp it proposed continued effort in the direction of building capabilities and effecting cunnxlatiVe.retraction of Soviet power; 12. A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with the understanding that it might be "worked into an early speech" in order, to provide current psychological operations inLastern Europe with needed support without implying any more ambitious programs there. 13. The Board decided that intea-agency and inter-departmental coordination for social science research in support of psychological operations should be further, developed and agreed to continued PSB association with this study, P1aa irk 114. During the period under review, the first comprehensive area plan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for approvf-l This paper, entitled "A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany", lays down basic guidance for U. S psychological operations aimed at furthering; the integration of the German Federal Republic into the Western European Commodity, and other national objectives: 15. A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area Japan - was completed in draft form during the Quarter and circulated to the departments and agencies concerned for final comments before submission to the Board in the coming rter. 16 Apar#q,#? lna3 Security Information pp Approved For Release 20061 9 ? fJ -RDP80RO1731 R00? 1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Security Information TOE' SEXiRE`1' PSB D-34 October 30, 1952 16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance for national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two plans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept of national psychological strategy planning. On the basis of the lessons derived from them, the Director 'a staff began a study aimed at improving the PSB planning process as a whole. Coor in ion 1?. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with respect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and Italy was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries took advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems in connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their experiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans was initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to deter- mining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future. 18. In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating panel for implementation of the plan in the field. Evaluati,.on 19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's responsibility for "evaluation of the national psychological effort". At the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of the national psychological effort directed at Italy.. The staff has also undertaken, as part of a larger government-aide economic policy study, an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic policies in the United Kingdom,. These projects should contribute additionally Security Infornwition ~41oq/, TOP SECRET Page 7 of 1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Setnzitty Information TOP SECRET PSB D-34 October 3(}, 1952 additionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable approaches for future evaluation activity. 20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for the Quarter t 21. Plans Cam plated and Be (a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction 6f Communist Power to France (PSi3 D-1/4/o) I and (b) Psychological Fperations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSJ3 D-15/b ) (1) During the Quarter under review, the Washington inter- departmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome con- tinued to coordinate U. S. activities under these plans. (2) According to :Eknlbassies Paris and Rome, the French and Italian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to take vigorous action to reduce communist power in their respective countries. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United 3tates should continue to remain in the background, while making known to both governments our concorn that vigorous anti-communist action be pursued. They are also agreed that principal liaison should remain at the prune ministerial level, (3) The Quarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in com- munist tactics, reflected in both '1rance and Italy, i.e. p away from a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist groups and toward a policy of "respectability" and cooperation with non-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and ability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti- communist action might be impaired. In turn, the U. S. would find it more difficult to influence these governments and their people in taking Approved For Release ODDSWS 71rM R01731 R00320004001 4261.18 9 TOP SEC 1T Page 8 of 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003200040010-6 Security Information TOP SECRIt"T PSB D-34 October 30, 1952 in taking a strong anti-communist position. (c) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "A" (PS:B D-i.8/a ) (1) ( - ani7aa_ tion under this plan, which is administered by the Department of State, was completed during the period under review. Figures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now total 20,995 in the countries of reception,. plus estimated arrivals of 429 per month. D:aects authorized or underway include language and vocational training courses,.a visa opportunity search, and registration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care for their urgent immediate needs.. (2) Reset ;igment is now in progress.. Voluttary agencies have requested transportation for 860 escapees under the program. Actual departures number 295,, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas. Propaganda utilization has been made of individual cases of re- settled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news media..: The Department of State has under development a propaganda plan for exploiting the escapee program as such,. (3) _ncs obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953 now total c6,291,760. This includes an initial authorization of $4f300,000 in dollars and $1,991,760 in counterpart funds. (4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been slight,. The Departme it of Defense reports inplementation of the Lodge Amendment as follows: applications for, 6008; rejections, 4847; acceptances, 395; scheduled for processing, 108; under review by CIC, 655.. The Department of the Army does not con- template any further liberalization of the conditions under which excapees may be recruited, (d) Staff ~Z8 3 A roved For Release flrPSUR01731 ROO32 0040 10- pp Cg S LR:;+'T- age o 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Security Information TOP SECRET PSB D-34 October 30, 1952 (d) Staff Study--Preliminary Analysis of the C of szni 3t BW Propaganda Campaign with Recommendations (PS]3 D-25/b) This study, which is connected with the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign, was a;:proved by the Board on August 7. Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating opera- tional planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was assigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Oo ittee. At PCC direction, a Working Group on Bate Ameri.ea Propaganda has been assigned to the problem, 22. Plan Com ted B,i}t ` ot~ Yet ?eing Exec,,e uted-.~Stand..By Plans (a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSl3 D-7/c), and (b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean Arm;Lstiee Negotiations (PSB J-19.4) The first of these plans is dfsigned to establish special psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to our adversaries, to be imple:uented in the event of successful cease- fire negotiations. The second plan endeavors to establish for government departments and agencies engaged in psychological opera- tions courses of action in preparation for, and in the event oft a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations, (o) Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities and (d) Nsti.onal Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War (PS5 D-11/`b) Both the plan axed the guidance have been distributed to the vari 4 -L , 9// Security Information Approved For Release 2006/Q 'f 7S 1 DP80R01731 R003 0,91 Q 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Security Information TOP SECRET PSB D`34 October 30, 1952 various departments and agencies foir their use, and have been integrated by the military services with their war planning, Planning on interrovided the eomrmanists with additional effective propaganda material,, despite i1,`;., attempts to present a contrary interp'.etation. Other Activities 1, Psychological exploitation of military powers Certain atomic weapons tests, have been, exploited psychologically in conjunction with the Derartrnent of State and the Atomic i ner .y CowrrLiss1on. The Department of Defense ha,-promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public. information regarding atomic weapons, guided misailea, and new weapons, Shows of military force have continued, priruarily in Europe. (as noted above). 2. In addition to various activities indirectly countering the -Hate Awerica" cwapai ;n, the Department of l)efonse has cooperated closely with the Departmunt of State and other agencies concerned to coordinate the release of information on biological avid chemical warfare by the Dermrtment and its components; and has joined in the interdepartmental planning tack concerned with countering the Br,' charges and other "Hate Eancri ca" propaganda. ;forward Planning and besearch 1, The De?xartrtent of : efense continues to conduct a broad pro(,ram of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations. ?. To further the wartime national paycholoL; effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to support S'1CuitITY IJFO4itd10iV 4 1. () .J F TO? SECRIT Page 22 of 41 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY IFFORi.iATION TOP b : CHLT PS3 D-34 October 30, 1952 sunnort the "Joint Emergency %Jar Plan," using as guidance for this purpose the 'r i ati oval. Overt Propaganda policy Guidance for General 1d r$t approved by the Psychological E trategy Board, The military services and major silbordinate cowk ends are currently developinu or modifying existing plans accordingly, Planning is progressing on a. "Transfer Plan" to facilitate the ifiartine transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and lers annel to miljtery control, A psychology ical clan to ;iupnort the U .S, forges in Japan is beini.; developed, Ii. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a pal*r setting forth the views of the Supreme Allied Comrnaitder, is arope$ on his wartiiae psychological warfare responsibilities. 5. Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological ooernttions in Alaska, de.velgped by the Commander in Chief., Alaskan Force-so have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of "tiff, SI CUitITY Ii,70hi?ATIJ$ T0'"~ SE;CitiT 841 J 31 Page 23 of l- Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECU11MY INFORMATION TOP SECRET, P5B D-3h October 30, 1952 D. Swrwlary of Re orts 'Field Staff Representatives of the Mutual Security Agency* The defense build-up and. its attendant problems continued to dominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period under review. Although the period closed with a short-term upswing in optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the major obstacles to the attainment of U. S. policy objectives in the area. Following are the significant psychological factors noted; 1, Renewal of the Mutual Assoatance Program by the U. S, Congress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and con- tinuity of U, S. policy. However, the relationship of rich bene- factor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the +tforeign aidrt concept, remained the most important single obstacle to favorable psycholog- ical exploitation of U. S. programs in Europe. A new concept, geared to the partnership approach, would provide a much healthier climate for psychological operations, 2. The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in the pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-suzrzaer the noticeable lift in European confidence and morale which had followed the Lisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there were signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement contracts, change in political leadership in Germany,, and the Pinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed to some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of war, a~ This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by. the Information Division of SECURITY IN1( ?MATION A F' yj TOP SEChET Page 38 of .l Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INF CRMkTI ON TOP S HET PSB D-34 October 30, 1952 war, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense con- tinued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort. 34 Progress toward ratification and realization of the European Defense Community, particularly in France# ran afoul of diminished public enthusiasm. ... NATO, while maintaining general support as a defensive alliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination. It is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The NATO Information Service has remained ineffective, 5, The impression is spreading in Europe that the economie situation is not getting any better, As the quarter ended, em- ployment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in some places, On the other hand, pressures on living standards and general economic development, growing out of the defense pro- gram, were causing visible restlessness, Some progress was achieved by MSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field of productivity and technical assistance. But U. S. tariff and trade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to our general efforts abroad. 6, Neutralism, in its "third forced context, continued to give ground in the face of Europe-Is growing military strength, the developing-fsense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace offensive. At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up from the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very serious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented rebuttal needs to be made. 7.. Anti-Americanism remained on the increase, Contributing factors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number SECURITY INFOhMATION Page 29 of -41 of u' s 841A/ 1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET PSB D-34 October 30, 1952 of U. S. troops abroad, the current U. S. election campaign; Congressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad that American officials tended to be more blunt and insistent in their relations with European governments. Economic pressures of the defense program;, the generalized European unhappiness with the state of the world,, and the feeling in some cuarters abroad that America is taking too :strong a line against Rusaia have also been contributory causes of anti-,,Vmericanism In assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in dealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points to further progress during the quarter in the integration . of` MSA and State information operations,, and to increasing acceptance of the idea within the U. S. government that our information operations th ould be somewhat decentralized, At the same times the report draws attention to serious shortcomings in, organization, procedure and directions 1, MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act for guidance as to "national objectives." 2 There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy and operations coordination between military and civilian informa- tion elements. This is evident in such programs as offshore pro- curement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe: 36 The NATO information services have not developed an effective positive programs said remain weak. !. Recent exp rieno e has underlined the effectiveness of in- direct propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further development in this field, In view SECURITY INFOiiMATION 8 11 F, ~~ TOP SECRET Page 4 of Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFcMATION TOP SECRET PSB D-31. October 30, 1952 5. In view of the great size and psychological impact of the annual influx of American tourists in Europe, more should be done to study and influence this particular movemeh t * ,southeast Asia (Philippines.. Thailand, indo-China, Formosa, Malaya) Favorable psychological, result a accrued during the quarter from NSA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use of DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating trachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid, Distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a noticeable impact in the area. Installation of conuriunity radio re- ceivers widened the audience available for information programs. At the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the maximum psychological impact from U* S. programs in the area were impeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. Si position, in the belief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an identification with U'estern colonial interests and indigenous ruling groups, in the face of a risibig tide of revolutionary nationalism. The report concluded with the following suggestions t 1, Local personnel, should be trained to take over from American personnel as quickly as possible in our various in,. formation, economic and social programs, 20 A special effort should be made to influence and support intellectuals, professional people and upper incane groups; since their influence is disproportionately large throughout the area. Possibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to es- tablish close liaison with these Individuals. 3.. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest caliber of U.S, personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia SECURITY INFOWTION 8'4 7_ ``? 9// TOP SECRET Pagel. of ii].. Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFOItNATION PSB D-3L SECRET Annex A October 30, 1952 THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM (Prepared by the Department of State) (Quarterly Status Report, June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952) I. The tasks of the foreign information and educational exchange program of the Department of State, carried on by the International Information Administration, continued to be those set forth in Annex V to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows: (i) "The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism*" (ii) "The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability successfully to deter aggression of Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to insoire concrete international, national and individual action accordingly." (iii) "The third task is to combat,, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of govern- ments and peoples into neutralism.,< (iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without provoking pre- mature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power." (v) "The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and govern- ments traditionally linked with the United States, parti- cularly in Latin Americas a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and individual action accordingly." 2. During the period June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952, the following actions were taken, in accordance with plans for every country and with special plans as noted,, to intensify psychological deterrents to aggres- sion and subversion by Soviet Comrnuniamt (a) The growing strength and unity of the free world continued to be projected to the peoples and the governments of nations dominated by Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2006/03/1P - i -RDP80R01731 R0032& 0Qi.6_ of 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-34 SECRET Annex A October 30, 1952 soberly to exploit particularly (i) The development and the maintenance of defensive military strength on the part of the -ree world, as demonstrated by Operation Mainbrace, maneuvers on the continent of Europe, the ANZUS Conference} and the continuing successful resistance to aggression and subversion in Korea, Indochina and Malaya. (IA-P0-2-ANZUS) (ii) The development of new weapons by the United States and other free nations, particularly tactical atomic weapons by the United States and the explosion of an atomic bomb by the United Kingdom. (iii) The diplomatic, economic, cultural and other supporting actions given to the people of rest Berlin in order that they might the more strongly resist the harassing tactics of Soviet Communists. (iv) The conclusion of the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic and its planned inclusion in the European Defense Community. (v) The exposure in the joint replies of the United States, the United Kingdom and France of the deceitful nature of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany. (b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of the United States were concurrently projected. This involved sub- stantive action to exploit particularly (i) The continuing efforts of the United States to promote the balanced reduction and limitation of armed forces in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. (ii) The patient efforts of the United Nations Command to reach an armistice in Korea and the justice of its refusal to repatri ate prisoners of w.r. (iii) The manifest absurdity and the malign purpose of pro- paganda designed to arouse hatred of the United States, particularly charges that its forces engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea. (c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism continued to be sought? This involved substantive action to exploit particularly (i) The strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the people of the USSR. implied in the plans for the Communist Party Congress. (IA-i,o-53-2O, Interim Guidance re Nineteenth Communist Party Congress) S CCIRITY INFORMATION SECRET 841189 Page 2 of /10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-314 SECRi-T Annex A October 30, 1952 (ii) The renewed purges of party leaders both in the satellites and in France and Italy. (IA-PO-53-17,. Italy, 1953) (iii) The implication of the refusal of large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea voluntarily to return to China. (IA-PO-7, Use of Prisoners of War in Propaganda) (iv) The continuing support by the United States of the United Nations as an instrumentality for the adjustment of differences and the rel.axatioi of tensions among nations and the rehabilitation of victims of aggression, (IA-PO-53-16,, Rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea) (v) The unsoundness of the fundamental communist economic thesis that the capitalist world is now entering a period of economic crisis which will ultimately and inevitably lead to its collap"o. (d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the Kremlin, efforts continued to expose the myths surrounding and inspired by Soviet Communism and minimizing fears of fifth coluarrris acting on its behalf, This involved substantive action to exploit particularly (i) The schisms within local communist parties, especially the plight of Marty and Tillon in France. (ii) Through indiggenqus channels the fellow-travelling tendencies of the authors of the report of the Inter- national Scientific Commission on bacteriological warfare. (TA-PO-L, International Red Cross Conference in Toronto) (iii) Through calculated silence, the insignificance of the impending peace conferences in Peiping and Vienna. (TA-PO-Asia Peace Conference, September, 1952) (iv) The proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forded Labor of the Economic and Soci-il Council of the UN in a "Red Bookf+ on forced labor, (LA-.PO-53-20-Forced Labor: UN Hearings, October 114, 195?) (v) The refusal of the USSR to join in further efforts to negotiate a treaty concerning Austria. (vi) Among Chinese overseas, the nature of the regime now in power in China and its threat to freedom in Asia, 3. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of confi- dence of the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur, (a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world of the need and the possibility of building rear military capa- bilities as a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achiev- ing them. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly SECURITY' INFORMATION 89/~ Approved For Release 2006/03ii"EA-RDP80R01731 R003-f4QQt- of 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-34 S#XRET Annex A October 30, 1952 (i) The developing military strength of the free world as revealed in Operation Mainbrace and other maneuvers in Europe, with emphasis an the contribution and participation of the Europeans, in the continuing successful resistance to aggression and ;subversion in the Far East, in the develop- ment of new weapons and new techniques by nations of the free world* (ii) A balanced u.nderstandin of the problems created regarding the pace of rearmament by the domestic economic pressures and the reduction of economic and military assistance on the part of the United States. (iii) The interest of nations in the Near and Middle East, particularly the Arab States, in mutual defense arrangements. (iv) The interest of the Philippines and Japan in developing Indigenous defense capabilities. (b) Encouraging the peoples and the governments of Europe in the development of common institutions for mutual welfare and defense, This involved substantive action to exploit particularly, largely through indigenous means (i) The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Authority. (ii) Developments within the Council of Europa,. (iii) The need to proceed rapidly with the ratification of the contractual agreements with German] and the protocols establishing the European Defense Conmlunity. (IA-FO-53-14, iDC and European Integration) (:c) The maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions, the consistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly (1) A balanced understanding of developments, especially affecting foreign policy, grog Lng out of the presidential election, with a view particularly to encouraging confi- dence in the continuity of basic policy regardless of the outcome. (IA_FO-l, The Presidential Campaign) (ii) The patience and the reasonableness of the United States in its role of agent of the United Nations with regard to negotiating an armistice and limiting hostil- ities in Korea. (iii) The motives animating the United States when, as with the United Kingdom concerning Iran and with France concerning North Africa, the United States has undertaken to follow policies differing from.theirs. (IAMrO.5, Self-Determination) F 11_41'~l el 9 // SECURITY ITT DRMATION r' SECRET Page Is of 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-34 SECRET Annex A October 30, 1952 (iv) The cultural maturity of the United States as an indication of the depth of its perceptions and the sophistication of its people, for example, the tour of "Porgy and Bess," the participation of artists repre- senting the United States in the conference of Venice sponsored by UNESCO and the presentation of typical musical compositions, ballets and performances at the Congress for Cultural i'reedon:s in Paris. (v) The development bytlie United States in the Dis- armament Commission of the United Nations of a compre- hensive program for the balar ed reduction and limitation of arms and armed forces. (vi) The readiness of the United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, to discuss the unification of Germany with the USSR on su? table terms. (vii) The dangers of neutralism as a means of safeguarding individual liberty and freedom. (viii) The interests of indi;enous groups understanding of and sympathetic with the objectives of the United States, !t. The following actions were taken to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East, tendencies nationalistic and religious threatening to under- mine the stability and the cohesion of the free world, This involved sub- stantive actions to exploit particularli (a) The respect of the people and the government of the United States for the religion and the culture of the peoples of the Middle East, as demonstrate=d prima sly by the readiness of the United States Air :Force to carry thousands of pilgrims to Mecca who otherwise would have been stranded at Beirut and by the attentions shown to Feisal of Iraq during his visit to the United States. Exploitation of the airlift to Mecca has been left largely to indigenous mechanisms, but it i, the subject of a pictorial pamphlet produced in Beirut, a film and a series of statements by members of the crews of the planes involved. (b) Actions taken by the United States to promote a fair and reasonable settlement of the dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom over the nationalized properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. (c) The efforts of the United States to promote direct negotia- tions between France and the colonial peoples for the achievement of popular aspirations in Tunisia and Morocco, (d) The encouragement given by th& United States to reconcilia- tion between Israel and the Arab States. 5. The following actions were taken to maintain, without provoking pre- mature deeds, hope of ultimate liberation among peoples held captive by SECURITY INFORMATION 4 04ltp9) SECR T Page 5 of 1n Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SEcUP I:TY INJORMATIOPI FSB D-34 SF CRI T Annex A October 30, 1952 Soviet Communism, This involved substantive action, carried on almost entirely by the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin,: to exploit particularly (a) The balanced interpretation of statements made in the course of the presidential campai,,n concerning the policy of the United States toward the satellites of "..astern Europe., (b) Interpretation of the significance of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress. (c) Exposure of the campaign of hatred against the United States. (d) The manifest impracticality of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany, (e) portrayal of the Sino-5oviet meetings in Moscow in a light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese on the mainland as to tI? motives of the Peiping regime in their dealings with the LISS[z. 6. The following actions were taken to maintain among peoples traditionally linked with the United States, p..rticularly in Latin merica, a continued recognition of mutual interests. This involved substantive action (a) To foster Latin 4ieric-an association with. U.S. objectives and policy especially through exploitation of (i) The visit of the Secretary of State to ;Brazil. (ii) The conversion of. Puerto V;ico to Commorrrealth status, (iii) The performance of Puerto Rican and Colombian troops in Korea, (b) To interpret the position of the United States with regard to issues involved in Latin American nat:+..onalism, including nationalization of resources Alleged International Oil Cartel, PO-53-5, Self-Deterrrination, and continuous infor- mation guidance on Ecuadoran., Bolivian and Chilean elections, on U,S, tin and copper purc.asing policy, etc.) To develop attitudes and methods for meeting the anti-U.S. propaganda of the I_rgentine Government (Circular instruction of .August 26, 1952, and FFo--53-13). (c) To demonstrate the dangers to Latin America of Soviet Communism. This involved (i) Successful conclusion o.17 the special project in Panama initiated in fiscal. 1952. (ii) :Preparation of special programming to meet the deteriorated political situation in Chile. 8 Cot 8 9 i ) SECURITY INI'OI A.TI:ON S-,--- CR I. T Page 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SiCURITY INIORihJA.TION PSB D-34 S7CRi.T Annex A October 30, 1952 (iii) Stimulation. of awareness in Latin American countries of the Communist danger in Guatemala. (iv) Encouragement of intellectual movements in defense of 1,J'estern value (Circular airgram, September 30, 1952). (v) Counteraction of the Communist BWW campaign in Latin America (Circular instruction, September 17, 1952). (vi) Counteraction of propaganda in Latin America related to the Peiping -Yeace" Conference (IA Special Instruction, August 18, L952 and Latin American Supplement). 7, The following actions of an operational nature were taken in support of the actions listed above. (a) Administrative. (i) Approval was given to a staff study provVing for the establishment of the ITA ,uropean Regional Service Staff, whose purpose is to provide USIS missions in Europe and elsewhere, especi.a.i~ly Greece and Turkey, with materials originating in Europe, to provide advice as to the effective utilization of media and to cooper- ate with Office of Information of the Special Representa- tive in Europe in sex aicing U`33 information offices in Europe. (ii) Approval was given to a staff study providing for the establishment of the IIA ear Itast Regional Service Center in Beirut. Authorizati.on has been given for the shipment of equipment and the assignment of personnel to the Center. (iii) The Department of State; has under executive order assumed from the hutual Security Agency responsibility for administering the Informa lion Media Guaranties. (b) Policy Formulation., on July 10, 1952, the Current Information Policy Staff, Office of the Assistant Adrrd.nis tra-`:.or for Policies and Plans, inaugurated a new series of i.nformntion policy guidance known as Information Guidance Bulletins, The great majority are trans- mitted by telegram to posts having an interest in the subject matter, As of September 30, 1952, 114 Bulletins had been issued. (c) evaluation, 'valuation studies completed include detailed studies of problems in Turkey and :ran, of the placement of USIS materials in foreign newspapers, of the use of the USIS transcriptions on S.' CURI'.ry ID?FORI' TA TION 8 /q Ii 'q 9 SECK31 Page 7 Of / 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R0032000'40010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003200040010-6 S.EALTRITY INFORMATION PSB D-34 SE CR S Annex A October 30, 1952 foreign broadcasting systems, of non-theatrical film distribution in foreign countries and of key words in propaganda of the United States and the free world. (d) International Press Service. On August 11, 1952, responsibility for the preparation of the four regional editions of the wireless Bulletins was assumed by the Regional Branches of the International Press Service. (e) International Broadcasting Service. (i) The ship borne transmitter, the Courier, on September 7, 1952 began operations at Rhodes, Programs in nine languages --Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, Inglish, Armenian, Georg- ian, Azerbaijani and Tartar--are broadcast in short and medium wave lengths during a per. od of 5-3/4 hours daily. Monitoring reports thus far available indicate excellent reception. (ii) A fifteen minute broadcast in Tartar was inaugurated at the local programming center at Nhinich on September 21, 1952. (iii) A study of the transmitters located in the United States was made by I_?ooz, Allen and Hamilton with a view to providing a stronger short-wave signal to relay bases overseas. (iv) Alfred Hammond Norton assumed charge of the Inter- national Broadcasting Service with the title of Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration, (f) Information Center Service, Franklin Publications, Inc., a private corporation formed by a group of publishers and private interests, was formed in July to undertake, on behalf' of foundations and universities as well as the Government, the publication and distribution of noteworthy American books in translation in '`oreign countries. The first efforts will be made in. the rab States. The sum of 4500,0CO has been made available to it by the Department of State. (g) International Motion Picture Serviced (i) A film showing the participation of the individual voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates has been completed. and distriouted. Another showing his participation in the election of a President is scheduled for completion immediately after the election. (ii) The first conference of film officers, involving representatives from posts in the MTear and Middle Fast, was held on Cyprus from august 11 to August 15, 1952, with the purpose of determining how films could be produced with sharper focus on local problems. SECURITY INFORMATIOU SECRI, T Page 8 of 1.0 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-314 SPCRFT Annex A October 30, 1952 (h) International Educational Exchange Service, A tendency has been noted on the part of certain foreign governments to undertake unilateral control of the selection of their citizens who may 'be offered exchange grants by the United States and other governments,. The trend appears to be motivated by (1) the heightened nationalism Common to Asian states since the war, and (2) a desire tc control closely any exchanges that might occur with the Soviet Union and Communist China and at the same time not to make it appear that these governments are being singled out in any way, The Burmese Government has made formal representation in this matter to the United States Government, exempting only the Fulbright program, since it is founded on a formal agreement between the governments. The Department has taken the position that even at the cost of a temporary cessation of exchanges with Burma, the principle must be maintained that this government has final responsibility for selecting grantees financed through congressional appropriations. t-1hile Burma is the clearest case in point at the moment, similar situations have developed in Indonesia and in Syria and are nascent throughout most of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. (i) Cooperation with Frivate Enterprise. Projects are under way with various private agencies, social, commercial and philanthiropic, to provide foreign groups with books and magazines, to assist Americans travelling abroad, to provide radio facilities to underde"reloper areas, to project a balanced picture of Wall Street, to promote the exchange of persons and to develop bi-national community relationships. (j) Cooperation with Other Governmental Agencies. Integration of Information activities of the International Information Administration and the Mutual Security 'administration in other countries has taken place: in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg,, Italy, Yugoslavia., Greece and Turkey, Integration had already taken place in Iceland, SwitZe rland and Trieste. (k) Cooperation with Other Governments, (i) Bi-national committees to promote the ready accept- ance by local populati:Dns of troops of the United States established on their soil have been formally established in France, the United Fingdor, Germany, Italy and Iceland. Similar committees are functioning on an informal basis in Libya and Morocco. (ii) Negotiations are under way for limited cooperation in foreign information activitirs with the government of Australia. Cooperation would chiefly concern broadcasts to Southeast Asia. SFCURI:TY IN ORrIATION SI CR._0,T Page _ Sof 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-31. SECRi,;T Annex A October 30, 1.952 (1) Electromagnetic 'Warfare. No significant change took peace in the overall level of Soviet jamming, although minor changes took place from time to time in the application of the jar;ming mechanism to the various language broadcasts. Sufficient information has bf:en received through govern- mental intelligence sources to i:'arrant the conclusion that the Soviets have in the procEss of construction, probably in the final states, somewhere between eight and twelve high powered transmitters either designed for or capable of jamming in the medium frequency and low frequency bands! These are generally distributed around the Eliro]pean periphery of the Iron Curtain. An Fast German intelligence sourcf: heretofore found to be reliable, reports the establishment within the government struc- ture of East Germany of an office for radio warfare. A powerful East Zone broadcasting station moved on to the frequency used by the Armed Forces Network in Berlir:. T'hether this was intended. as a deliberate interference measure, or whether it represented a Soviet need for a frequency is not now know,an, SECTIRrr? INFCF MATION SECTET page 10 of 10 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SFCUI?.ITY INFORIi TlON PSB D-3L TOP ST. CRET Annex B October 30, 1952 SIGNIFICATTT FSYC1iC;iOICAL ACTIVITILS OF T'HHE: T- T Ty ~j~ p DT',F t~~t-T 17 1 I}1 U Ur ti7 T D y~U tit kTO TEL 1 i LIOI) J R M 1JULY Mal GFi 30 `TFTt TFn' 9 ' SECTION I What activities has your agency engaged in during the period under r -'F it evi w which arepsycholo i(.ally significant for the attainment o national v ~ECtives Z^'it respecE71 I- bring current psyciolog ca .signif1- cant pr o7lems, situations and objectives,, the Department of Defense activity was as indicated below, 1, The problem. of neu'4ralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the Unitec in?;dom? o ass z n combatting neutralism and anti-.american senta meats in f seer. r Europe, including the United Kingdom,, the Department of Defense through the military Services engaged in the fol- lowing activities; a, Reduction of neutralism: (1) Shows of military force in 'Western Europe have been staged,, The participation of U.S. military forces in national and international maneuvers in this area has expressed UcS, determination to assist in the defense of I'estern Europe from all aggressors. The following major military demonstrations have realistically portrayed U.S. intentions in this area: (a) The U.S. Navy participated in the allied fleet maneuvers in the North Sea and Baltic areas, involving some 160 warships of seven nations, demonstrated the capability of the allied naval forces to defend Western Europe. (b) Significant arrong the activities of the military forces in achieving psychological advantage was the conduct of the combined U,.S,-French maneuvers cast of the nthine River and the alert drills of the tICS. garrison in Berlin, The U.S,-French ~-iianeuvers served to demonstrate military capabilities and the effLeacy of combined operations, Also such maneuvers helped to overcome Western Europeants linger- ing belief that SHAPE defense would be west of the Rhine or further back in the even.; of attack, In Berlin, the U, S, military activities have been most valuable in reaffirming the stated Ut S.. position to the West Berliners, the ''Free World' and the Soviets, that any attack directed at "Test Berlin would be met with force. Also of significance were the U.,So"British and French ground and air maneuvers in Germany, and the Italian--U.S. maneuvers, Both maneuvers occurred in Septemt:>er and tested defenses against the East. (c) During the reporting period, the Skyblazers, a USAF aerobatics team of four jet fighters, on behalf of CIS?CUSAFE gave approximately 30 air demonstrations to foreign military and civilian audiences throughout Mediter- ranean and European countries. In a continuing program to SECURITY INFORMATION / TOP SECRET Page 1 of 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 "" Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP Sx.C!?LE T PSB D-34 Annex B October 30, 1952 rotate combat-ready units of the Strategic Air Command to foreign stations, USAF medium and heavy bombers visited countries in Europe. (2) Statements by General Ridgray and other Senior U.S. commanders have reemphasized the need for collective effort to build a position of strength as the means of deterring Soviet aggression. Significant among the themes stressed by U.S. military leaders were the following: (a) Warnings that critical defense minimums must be met. (b) Warnings that the threat of aggression had not lessened, (c) Praises of great progress made within the NATO military structure toward our corrnon goal. (d) The need for West German contribution to 'Vest European defense; (e) The allies plan to hold their ground in Germany should the Reds attack. (f) Indications of the use of atomic arms for the joint defense of Western Europe, b, Reduction of anti-,American sentiments, Although a certain amountntof progress has -been rr_ade n solving the problem of anti- American sentiments in Western Europe, much remains to be accomp- lished. The Department of Defense feels that we are still on the defensive in combatting; the Tate-America" campaign but attempts are being made to seize the initiative through the following measures: (1) Troop-civilian relations committees organized in Western Europe early this year continue to function. Department of Defense participates on these interdepartmental committees organized by Department of St ite Public Affairs officers, by providing representatives for areas where U.S. military personnel are stationed, A marked degree of closer cooperation and collabora- tion between U.S. commanders .cnd local government officials has contributed to the saccess of the program. While no definitive evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of materials and methods used in Service information programsi continuing effort is made to establish trends and indications with a view to improving subject matter presented and to keep it current, The program continues to have a favorable effect and a. trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe. This trend is presumably due to firmer action by host governments against communist propaganda :Ind obstructionism., more favorable local press and better orientation of U.S. military personnel. At a July meeting called by Ambassador Draper to consider troop- civilian relationships in NATO countries? it was decided that formal committees should be established throughout the NATO area. n-t~1 Sx CURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET Page 2 of 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SICFF:T PSB D-34 Annex B October 303 1952 It is felt that the activities of such interdepartmental com. mittees, as already exist, have had notable effect upon neutral- ism and anti-American sentiments in VV'estern Europe, and have assisted in countering Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda by keep- ing U.S. military personnel better informed and adjusted to local conditions, thereby reducing the number of incidents. Detailed reports as to the effectiveness of the program as it pertains to the indigenous populations are submitted by Public Affairs Officers through Department of State channels. (2) In the continuing effort to establish and maintain U.S. good-will in areas of national interest, U.S, defense forces have promoted friendship and under:,tanding by: (a) Visits to European ports and contacts with local populace by units of the U.S, Navy, Including a four day visit by eleven ships to Yugoslav waters. (b) Scheduled appearances In '?Test European capitals and other principal cities by tJ,S# military bands before foreign military and civilian audiences. (3) By sending special teams to Indoctrinate NATO forces in the use of U.S. equipment, the Defense Department has increased the confidence of the NATO forces in their capabilities to defend Western Europe. (4) Pith the view of promoting defense production, stimulat- ing the economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic Defense forces, the! Department of Defense has continued its policy of off-shore procurement of supplies from European Defense sources. Whenever feasible, this form of economic assistance is so oriented as to benefit the non-communist segments of the countries involved. 2, The problem of securinw ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and tFie Furopea n Defense Community treaty? To assist securing ra f c a-#i anc " im ymentaticin p ie Bonn "contractual agree- ments" and the European Defense Community Treaty, the Department of Defense through the military Services-has supplied military assistance or advice as to military matters involved.. 3. Soviet ['I.Iatetl-America" Propaganda? To assist in combatting the Soviet "Hate-America" pro]5aganda, the Department of Defense through the mil- itary Services has taken the following stepst a. The Department of Defense Office of Public Information cooper- ated closely with the Department of state and other agencies involved in psychological activities In coordinating information released by the Department of Defense and its components on biological and chemical war- fare. As this was a period of intense communist propaganda on biological warfare against the tJnit,ed States, this coordination was significant in assisting the countering of such propaganda. Through the Interdepart- mental Committee to Combat Communist; Propaganda, on which the Department of Defense Office of Pub-Lie Information is represented, progress was made in developing plans and means 'or setting forth United States posi- tion regarding the false charges of using germ warfare in Korea. The SFC;I1RITY INFO14ATION TOP SECRET Page 3 of 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SLCURITY INFORMATION P5B D-313 TOP SFCUET Annex B October 30, 1952 Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda has conducted a constant analysis of the Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda campaign and has sought immediate and long range means of countering such propaganda. The Department of Air Force has undertaken production of a film entitled "Brain- Washing", counteracting Soviet charges against U,S* forces in Korea that United Nations Command is conducting germ warfare% b. The Department of Defense has provided the Department of State with advance notice of troop movements in certain overseas, areas in order to minimize communist propaganda against them and to make most effective psychological use of their presence, In addition, these com- mittees have continued to monitor and direct the activities of coordinat- ing subcommittees set up in each country in which there are American troops. These subcommittees consist of representatives from the Armed Forces, Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. Reports indicate that their work has been effective. G, See references made to paragraphs 1 b and 13 for other examples concerning activities conducted to combat "HaEe-America" propaganda, 4. National Policy Objectives in the Middle East, In support of the national policy r o e~"#o mprove ~ , ; eelaf long Th the Moslem world the Department of Defense has cooperated in establishing good will by; a. The airlift of 31854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda,, be The airlift of 4 tone of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon. As a result of these operations as well as the Major Jabara, USAF, visit, reported in August 1952 annual report, friendly relationships have been established between key Arab leaders and U.S, government representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. It"has beep, suggested that the Jabara visit alone made a more significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in the Middle East than any other single act undertaken in the area up to that time. 5. The Allied Position in West Berlin, in support of national policy objectives -finGemany e a poerori in West Berlin has been strengthened; bya a. The maintaining of U.S. military forces in rest Berlin and demonstrating the determination to support and protect the city by force if necessary. The recent conduct of maneuvers in West Berlin by U.S. military forces was a dynamic expression of our intention to defend the city, be Continued use of the 1J.S. :military approaches to Berlin reaf> firm U.S. policy to keep the approaches to nest Berlin open, By inter departmental action contingency plans for the psychological exploitation of a second Berlin Airlift were developed, 6. The International Role of Japan in the Post-Treaty Era; Department of Defense has rem ere suppoFc rough rou ine m. ,:teary advice and assistance and by providing training and equipment for the Japanese National Police Reserve# Through the Security Treaty the U.S. has again demonstrated its belief in the efficacy of collective security and has attempted to awaken SECURITY INFOR,IATION TOP SECRET Page 4 of Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6' Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SEct1RITY INMMATION PSB B-34 TOF SECR ijT Annex B October 30,E 1952 Japan to the communist threat to its national survival. The utilization of Japan as a military base for the support of the Korean-Campaign has served to demonstrate the need for collective effort against aggression and the closeness of danger to- the Japanese "Home Islands". 7. National policy Objeotives in Latin America, The Department of Defense has contributed the sups "car our national policy in Latin America and to the stability of existing governments by assisting in the training and equipping of military forces of the Latin American countries, This has been accomplished by sending U.S. military teams and personnel to various Latin American countries and by inviting Latin American military forces to partici- pate In specialized training programs being conducted in the U.S. 8. The Korean Campaign and Truce Negotiations. The Department of Defense activities Me area are conducted,, he Commander in the Far last, who is responsible for the conduct of psycholo'ricai operations in Korea in accordance with national policy? In the accomplishment of this mission- the Commander has participated in the following significant activities: a. The conduct of target warning operations in North Korea of impen'ing bombing of 78 North Korean cities expresses the intent of the United Nations Command to save as many lives as possible of non- combatants in target areas. Psychologioally1 these warning operations are also designed to increase the pressure brought to bear by United Nations Command on the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army negotiators at Panmunjom, and to contribute a satisfactory termination of the Korean conflict* b, Provision of military representation to the inter-departmental committee which prepares and transmits the Special Korean Information Guidance. This guidance provides CINCUNC with information not readily available in Tokyo, including digest of U.S. and foreign press comments and reactions, and substantive materials and suggestions to be used in maintaining the propaganda initiatives in Far East Command. There are a number of examples in which the U.S. (UN) delegates to the'truce negoti- ations have used information provided them through this meanso co The U.S, (UN) policy that it U1l1 not use force in the repatri- ationof prisoners of war has had wide psychological repercussions. Although the U,S' adherence to the principle of non-forcible repatriation has gained for it wide "'Free "!'orld" support, the continuing firmness in this position has blocked the achievement of an honorable armistice, d. An attempt has been made to establish the fact that agitation In prisoner of war camps was inspired and provoked by "hard core" com- munists. However, the publicity accorded such incidents has provided the communists with additional material for their propaganda campaign and raised some doubt as to U.S. (UN) intentions. e. The leaflet, radio and loudspeaker operations directed at the North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers continued, A new commentary series exploiting the statements. of Chinese Communist-Forces prisoners who oppose return to communist control was begun in September. Themes stressed are: Soviet exploitation of China and North Korea; communist brutality and oppressions, and subservience ea. SECURITY INF'urn1A7TON TOP SECRki T Page 5 of 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFtJRMATION PSB D-314 TYOP SECRET Annex B October 30, 1952 of the communist puppet regimes to the USSR. In leaflet operations, now nearing three billion disseminated, theme emphasis is on good treatment, non-forcible repatriation, nostalgia and support of opera- tional plans such as DEADLOCK (armistice negotiations), FRAUD (to dis- credit communist regimes of China and North Korea) and ERIS (LUSAK plan to create or aggravate friction between CCF and NKA). 9. Psychological Results of Presence of U.S. Personnel Abroad. The stationing o U5S. m , ary anc `6ivrZa_i9 personne abroad has rased psycho- logical problems,'many of which are still unsolved, but, in spite of these problems, it is believed that the presence of such personnel in areas abroad has been of value in :reaffirming and demonstrating U.S. intentions to assist in the collective security effort, as All U.S. military personnel selected for assignment overseas receive a course'of instruction prior to embarkation. In addition, upon arrival at their destination, all personnel are oriented on their mission; proper standards of conduct; cooperation with our Allies; local history, geography, and customs; and other subjects considered essential by the unit commander. b. To orient and condition psychological warfare personnel of the 580th: and 581st ARC T^*ings, the Department of Defense requested the Department of State to brief unit personnel on the scope of U.S. national psychological programs and the significance of U.S. psychological warfare interests abroad. It is particularly significant that personnel of military psychological units receive such information prior to being deployed to overseas areaso 10o Shows of Military Force. Although the programs and activities of the Departanen of DeT se botlaa~ home and abroad are desi ned primarily to achieve military ends, it is recognized that many if not all of these activ- ities have an inherent psychological impact. In recognition of the natural psychological effect of such Defense activities, both advantageous and adverse, added consideration to the proper exploitation of the following activities is warranted. a. The continuous program of t+1aneuvers by U.S. military forces both at home and abroad engenders a feeling of confidence in the capa- bilities of the U.S, to assist in the defense of free nations from com- rminist aggression. However, the potential psychological impact of such maneuvers is not generally integrated into operational plans, b, In the latter part of Sept mber, at the request of the Depart- Mont of State, action was taken to conduct a flight of USAF 8-29's to Malaya,, a neutral South East Asia country, Flights such as this, as well as the continued appearance of U,.S. aircraft and naval vessels throughout the world, support U.S. position of world leadership by demonstrating military striking potntial, technical excellence of equipment, and military prepa:rednesc~ of U.S. Government* c. Recent expansion of military interests in foreign areas has rfesulfed in the establishment of a strategic air base in Greenland. Such expansions illustrate the scope of U,S0 military planning and free- world cooperation and determination to defend against communism in the event of general hostilities, An ii r" 3l1 SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRI.".T Page 6 of 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-31i TOP SECRET Annex B October 30, 1952 d. In conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, exploitation of certain atomic weapons tests has been made. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles and new weapons, This policy provides that agencies concerned with psychological operations coordinate fully whenever public information is to be released on these weapons. ll. What new evidence has emerged during the quarter concerns th e p chologic al efTe veness of activities conducted before reporting eeriod? a. As a result of U.S. psychological operations in the Arab World, such as the good-will tour of Major Jabara (Jet Ace) (reported in August 1952 annual report) relationships between key Arab loaders and UrS,- government representatives in 1,gypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have been improved. This has contributed to a psychological atmosphere favor- able to U.S. interests in the Addle East and significantly contributed to the U.S* cold war effort in this area# b, The UN psychological warfare effort is providing valuable support for tie Korean campaign. Reports continue to indicate that majority of the people in a leaflet drop area read UN leaflets, including some party members$ and that the leaflets or information contained therein are passed on: The North Korean civilians in general believe the information, Re- ports still indicate that the ;`north Korean civilian is waiting for and apparently expects a UN offensive. Most local authorities in North Korea are continuing efforts to prevent UN propaganda from reaching the soldier and civilians Leaflet drop areas are declared ttOff Limits", inhabitants are confined to their homes until leaflets are disposed of, the people are told that leaflets are poisoned and all people are threatened with "cruel punishment" if they pick up UN leaflets. Most prisoners state that there is a continuous campaign to minimize effectiveness of UN psy- chological warfare operations. Communist officers refute UN propaganda statements, the soldiers are subjected to unannounced inspections, leaf- lets are turned in and burned, men apprehended with leaflets are subject to disciplinary action including confinement. 12i Included in current activities and separate from plans and capabil- ities is the program of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations. Fundamentallyi this program is concerned with rendering maximum assistance to the achievement of national objectives by (1) in times of t-cold warts reducing the mower and influence of potentially hostile nations, (2) in case of hostilities, defeat of the enemy, and (3) at all times countering threats to our national security. Research and develop-, meat support of national objectives is rendered by research programs classified under the following technical fields: a, Strategic Intelligence programs to improve through social science researrch techniques the collection and military utilization of basic, comprehensive data on foreign areas and peoples, including; (1) Potentially hostile groups and peopleso (2) Potential allies. (3) Strategic areas and pc;oples which are subjected in times of t+co .d war" to intense international pt'essures and tenstions. 841 ?9i/ SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2006/ f1',;, fRDP80R01731 R0032 8404 -6 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY Ir?FOFMATION PSB D-34 TOP SECRET Annex B October 30, 1952 b4 Psychological warfare research programs to render maximum assistance to achievement of national objectives by affecting (through means other than destructive weapons) the will and capacity of individ- uals and groups to support their leaders and national policies. at Psychological warfare materiel research programs to develop equipment and devices to facilitate communication with peoples in potentially hostile and inaccessible areasb d. Civil Defense research programs to maintain high morale at home to case of hostilities by such means as increasing efficiency of security measures, adequate defense against enemy psychological warfare, and effective disaster control, e? Military Government and Military Relations (in Foreign Areas) research programs to increase the effectiveness of techniques fort (1) The control and management of enemy areas occupied by our military forceso (2) The indoctrination in democratic principles of enemy nationals in areas occupied by our military forces. (3) The fostering of better relationships between our mili- tary forces abroad and the nationals of host friendly nations. SECTION II What significant progress has been made in developing plans capabili- ties and or an z [ona. me s or c ontri siting furt h er to national psieoog eale for 13. preparation of Psychological Warfare Plane To further the wartime national psychological ware effort, the Join" hiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to support the "Joint Outline Emergency 1Iar Plan." The "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General Wars" approved by the Psychological Strategy Board was used as guidance in the preparation of this plan, which now puts wart:Lme psychological warfare plans and objectives in phase with approved policy guidance, The military Services and major sub- ordinate commands are in the process of developing or modifying existing plans in accordance with current guidance. ll , Specific Planning for Psychological Warfare. i6' In 'the psychological warfare field planning is progressing toward the development of a }"Transfer Plan, which will facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign infirmation equipment and personnel from other agencies to the military controls for the execution of U.S. psycho- logical warfare operations in military theaters of operationsb b. For the Far Eastern area a psychological plan to support the UeS. *forces in Japan is being developed. co An ad hoc committee has been formed to develop a program for promoting the surrender of enemy air crews. 84-1X3/1 SECURITY IT:FORIIATION TOP SECRET Page 8 of 9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-fi''`?" - Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 SECURITY INF'OE1ATION PSB D'.34 TOP SECRET Annex B October 30, 1952 di To meet the communist threat in Europe# two plans for the reduc- tion of communist power in T'rance and Italy are presently under consider- ation: e; The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have under study a SHAPE paper which"`sets forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (3AC.UR), concerning his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities, f4 Initial plans for the, conduct of wartime psychological operations in Alaska? developed by Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and review. 25: Planning for Unconventional F,'arfare, In the field of unconventional warfare, the ' o n Chief o" 7Ta-? reeenUy approved a paper establishing a delineation of responsibilities between the Services and,the Central Intelli- gence Agency in the field of ;scape and evasion, In addition, a SHAPE paper concerning. the delineation of responsibilities of the clandestine services and SACEUR to include organization and definitions is presently under study and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 16; Planning for Guerrilla Warfare and Covert Onerations4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the crlaa covered by the pre ove paper, delineated the responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guerrilla warfare, and covert operations. A study is now being made of the command relationship between CIA/DPC (new titles PMS) organization and the armed forces, In active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged4 17: General planning on Continuous Basis, Tn addition to activities involving current ppyC v 6 ce, pro ems, the "Department of Defenses in accord- ance with national policy, prepares plans and makes preparations for the war-; time conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare; and in these fields participates on a continuing basis ins a. Interdepartmental and international planning bi Orientation and training of peroonnel. Coordination with other agencies and departments: d; Support of other agencies and departments as required. l86 Research and Development Emphasis on Psychological T?farfare, The Research an Development Board has`reac Tate a Pane on Psy too cal Warfare' whose responsibility will be to plan an integrated program of,research and, development for military psychological operations and periodically review the progress of the departments in implementing this goal; As in the case of all DDB panels, associate memberships on the Panel on Psychological.WW-arfare will be available to interested non-military agencies, SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET page 9of9 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200040010-6