PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200040010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 30, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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DOC . NO.
8)!.? ONI;Y DATE October 30, 1952
1,01 SN `I'I2I C COPY NO. r t}
i_s INCLUL
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
PROGRBSS REPORT ON TIE NATIOI~%.9.L PSYCHOLOGICAL ETF RT
FOR THE l'IRIOD JULY 1, 1952, TI-3.OUGH S PTa1BER 30, 1952
Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board
WARN ING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
NSC review(s) completed. SECURI'TY INFORMATION "P +
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3 November 1952
Piro James Lay? Jr.
Executive Secretary
The National Security Council
Washington 25) D. C.
Dear ihhro Layt
I have the honor to transmit herewith to the
President and the National Security Council a Progress
Report on the National Psychological Effort for the
period July 1 1952 through September 30, 1952:
This is submitted in accordance with your
"Memorandum to the Director of the Psychological Strategy
Board - Status of United States Programs for National
Security," dated May 29, 1952*
This Report, was approved at the Sixteenth heeting
of the Psychological. Strategy Board held October 30, 1952.
Sincerely yours,
Alan Ga Kirk
Director
Enclosures;
PSB D-314, Copies`6 and 7
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PSD D-34
October 30 f 1952
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JU],Y 1, 19520 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30y' 1952
Submitted to the Presl.dent and the National Security Council
by 4he 1sychological Strategy Board
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EEje
I. Evaluative Sirimary of Significant Psychological Activities..'. 2
.'....:.. s ..' 6
II: The Work of PSB, ....::..se ...so ..so .:.... q s,.
III. Summaries of Reportst
Department of State... .................'...:..,.,..~,.:.; 15
Department of Defense...... +.I...I??? ..::::,F:..i:i:. 19
*Central Intelligence Agency*.-:....:.. .`.:;:.....:: :.:..` 24
Field Representatives of ritual Security Agency.:38
Text of Report of Department of States,',,,...:.`.?::.:::...t:.:ANNEX A
Text of Report of Department of Defense ..:.......::...:.'.."..ANNEX B
The Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is
specially classified.
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PSB D-31.
October 30, 1952
I. SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW
1, The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psycho-
logical activities during the reporting period on the part of.the de-
partments and agencies responsible for psychological operations,
Capabilities by Area
2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved
in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capa-
bilities for making an immediately effective psychological c itribution
to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence, These
gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the,European
satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in
building capabilities for future development,
3v Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being
employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian
"jamming" continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the
whole field of communications. Insofar as Con unist China is concerned,
the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due
to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses.
Anti-American Attitudes
u, In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific
grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in
anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propa-
ganda and pressure. During the reporting period a. substantial increase
was made
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was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect
and non-attributable propaganda, However, the above trend makes clear
the importance of still farther increasing our efforts to develop in-
direct and non-attributable information activities.
1 extern Euro e
5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues
to cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes
favorable to the position-of-strength strategy, European enthusiasm
continues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military,
i.e., NATO and EDC. However, U. S, phyohological action has contributed
to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries,
notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration atti-
tudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional
and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth.
of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread
of neutralist sentiments.
Middle East
6. The political crisis ire. Iran has materially reduced U. S.
capabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country,
The danger of further deterioration in Iran,emphasizes the importance of
rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries;
where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt,
the political crisis similarly reduced current oapabil.ties; but the
present
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present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements
that make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little
progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter
toward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable
contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, how-
ever, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800
Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda,
7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was in-
creased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological
impact of TCA and XSA agricultural, puhlio+ health, and other aid
programs. Psychological capabilitiei in Southeast Asia have been
expanded,
but little in-
crease in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the
area to identify the United States with European colonial powers,
and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolu.
tionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological
obstacle,
8 Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of
hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure
on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of
voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained
widespread acceptance in the non--communist world.
"Hate America" Propaganda
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"Date America" :Propaganda
9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been con-
cerned with combatting the Soviet-Com aunist "Hate America" propa-
ganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on
this subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propa-
panda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil
purpose,.of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate
the release by the Department of Defense and its components of in-
formation on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of
these activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United
States operations.
I~Iili.tary Assets for the "Cold War"
10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense
and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in
Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribu-
tion these services can make to the national psychological effort.
However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for
the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of ap-
proved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty
is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific
authority and missions upon. which military psychological activities in
peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation
is under study.
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II. TI=C WORK OF PS13
General Aott7ities
17.. A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with
special. reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed
and submitted to the Board. Pending development of capabilities and
situations which any make it possible to envisage a final solution of
the cold warp it proposed continued effort in the direction of building
capabilities and effecting cunnxlatiVe.retraction of Soviet power;
12. A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with
the understanding that it might be "worked into an early speech" in
order, to provide current psychological operations inLastern Europe with
needed support without implying any more ambitious programs there.
13. The Board decided that intea-agency and inter-departmental
coordination for social science research in support of psychological
operations should be further, developed and agreed to continued PSB
association with this study,
P1aa irk
114. During the period under review, the first comprehensive area
plan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for
approvf-l This paper, entitled "A National Psychological Strategy with
Respect to Germany", lays down basic guidance for U. S psychological
operations aimed at furthering; the integration of the German Federal
Republic into the Western European Commodity, and other national objectives:
15. A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area
Japan - was completed in draft form during the Quarter and circulated
to the departments and agencies concerned for final comments before
submission to the Board in the coming rter.
16 Apar#q,#? lna3
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16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance
for national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two
plans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept
of national psychological strategy planning. On the basis of the lessons
derived from them, the Director 'a staff began a study aimed at improving
the PSB planning process as a whole.
Coor in ion
1?. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with
respect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and
Italy was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries
took advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems
in connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their
experiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans
was initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to deter-
mining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future.
18. In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the
Office of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating
panel for implementation of the plan in the field.
Evaluati,.on
19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's
responsibility for "evaluation of the national psychological effort".
At the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with
the departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of
the national psychological effort directed at Italy.. The staff has also
undertaken, as part of a larger government-aide economic policy study,
an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic
policies in the United Kingdom,. These projects should contribute
additionally
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October 3(}, 1952
additionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable
approaches for future evaluation activity.
20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for
the Quarter t
21. Plans Cam plated and Be
(a) Psychological Operations Plan for the
Reduction 6f Communist Power to France
(PSi3 D-1/4/o) I and
(b) Psychological Fperations Plan for the
Reduction of Communist Power in Italy
(PSJ3 D-15/b )
(1) During the Quarter under review, the Washington inter-
departmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome con-
tinued to coordinate U. S. activities under these plans.
(2) According to :Eknlbassies Paris and Rome, the French and
Italian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to
take vigorous action to reduce communist power in their respective
countries. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United
3tates should continue to remain in the background, while making
known to both governments our concorn that vigorous anti-communist
action be pursued. They are also agreed that principal liaison
should remain at the prune ministerial level,
(3) The Quarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in com-
munist tactics, reflected in both '1rance and Italy, i.e. p away
from a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist
groups and toward a policy of "respectability" and cooperation with
non-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and
ability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti-
communist action might be impaired. In turn, the U. S. would find
it more difficult to influence these governments and their people
in taking
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in taking a strong anti-communist position.
(c) Psychological Operations Plan for
Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "A"
(PS:B D-i.8/a )
(1) ( - ani7aa_ tion under this plan, which is administered by the
Department of State, was completed during the period under review.
Figures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now
total 20,995 in the countries of reception,. plus estimated arrivals
of 429 per month. D:aects authorized or underway include language
and vocational training courses,.a visa opportunity search, and
registration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care
for their urgent immediate needs..
(2) Reset ;igment is now in progress.. Voluttary agencies have
requested transportation for 860 escapees under the program. Actual
departures number 295,, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas.
Propaganda utilization has been made of individual cases of re-
settled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news
media..: The Department of State has under development a propaganda
plan for exploiting the escapee program as such,.
(3) _ncs obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953
now total c6,291,760. This includes an initial authorization of
$4f300,000 in dollars and $1,991,760 in counterpart funds.
(4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been
slight,. The Departme it of Defense reports inplementation of the
Lodge Amendment as follows: applications for reevuitmet.it, 6008;
rejections, 4847; acceptances, 395; scheduled for processing, 108;
under review by CIC, 655.. The Department of the Army does not con-
template any further liberalization of the conditions under which
excapees may be recruited,
(d) Staff ~Z8 3
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(d) Staff Study--Preliminary Analysis
of the C of szni 3t BW Propaganda
Campaign with Recommendations
(PS]3 D-25/b)
This study, which is connected with the current "Hate America"
communist propaganda campaign, was a;:proved by the Board on
August 7. Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating opera-
tional planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was
assigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Oo ittee.
At PCC direction, a Working Group on Bate Ameri.ea Propaganda has
been assigned to the problem,
22. Plan Com ted B,i}t ` ot~ Yet ?eing Exec,,e uted-.~Stand..By Plans
(a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident
to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations
(PSl3 D-7/c), and
(b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean
Arm;Lstiee Negotiations (PSB J-19.4)
The first of these plans is dfsigned to establish special
psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to
our adversaries, to be imple:uented in the event of successful cease-
fire negotiations. The second plan endeavors to establish for
government departments and agencies engaged in psychological opera-
tions courses of action in preparation for, and in the event oft a
breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations,
(o) Plan for Conducting Psychological
Operations During General Hostilities
and
(d) Nsti.onal Overt Propaganda Policy
Guidance for General War (PS5 D-11/`b)
Both the plan axed the guidance have been distributed to the
vari
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various departments and agencies foir their use, and have been
integrated by the military services with their war planning,
Planning on interrovided the eomrmanists with additional
effective propaganda material,, despite i1,`;., attempts to present a
contrary interp'.etation.
Other Activities
1, Psychological exploitation of military powers Certain
atomic weapons tests, have been, exploited psychologically in conjunction
with the Derartrnent of State and the Atomic i ner .y CowrrLiss1on. The
Department of Defense ha,-promulgated a comprehensive policy on the
release of public. information regarding atomic weapons, guided misailea,
and new weapons, Shows of military force have continued, priruarily in
Europe. (as noted above).
2. In addition to various activities indirectly countering
the cominuni.st -Hate Awerica" cwapai ;n, the Department of l)efonse has
cooperated closely with the Departmunt of State and other agencies
concerned to coordinate the release of information on biological avid
chemical warfare by the Dermrtment and its components; and has joined
in the interdepartmental planning tack concerned with countering the
Br,' charges and other "Hate Eancri ca" propaganda.
;forward Planning and besearch
1, The De?xartrtent of : efense continues to conduct a broad
pro(,ram of research and development in strategic intelligence and
psychological warfare operations.
?. To further the wartime national paycholoL;i.cal effort, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to
support
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sunnort the "Joint Emergency %Jar Plan," using as guidance for this
purpose the 'r i ati oval. Overt Propaganda policy Guidance for General
1d r$t approved by the Psychological E trategy Board, The military
services and major silbordinate cowk ends are currently developinu or
modifying existing plans accordingly, Planning is progressing on a.
"Transfer Plan" to facilitate the ifiartine transfer of U.S. foreign
information equipment and lers annel to miljtery control,
A psychology ical clan to ;iupnort the U .S, forges in Japan
is beini.; developed,
Ii. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a pal*r setting
forth the views of the Supreme Allied Comrnaitder, is arope$ on his
wartiiae psychological warfare responsibilities.
5. Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological
ooernttions in Alaska, de.velgped by the Commander in Chief., Alaskan
Force-so have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of "tiff,
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D. Swrwlary of Re orts 'Field Staff Representatives of the
Mutual Security Agency*
The defense build-up and. its attendant problems continued to
dominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period
under review. Although the period closed with a short-term upswing
in optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the
major obstacles to the attainment of U. S. policy objectives in the
area.
Following are the significant psychological factors noted;
1, Renewal of the Mutual Assoatance Program by the U. S,
Congress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and con-
tinuity of U, S. policy. However, the relationship of rich bene-
factor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the +tforeign aidrt concept,
remained the most important single obstacle to favorable psycholog-
ical exploitation of U. S. programs in Europe. A new concept,
geared to the partnership approach, would provide a much healthier
climate for psychological operations,
2. The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in
the pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-suzrzaer the noticeable
lift in European confidence and morale which had followed the
Lisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there
were signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement
contracts, change in political leadership in Germany,, and the
Pinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed
to some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of
war,
a~ This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by.
the Information Division of
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war, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense con-
tinued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort.
34 Progress toward ratification and realization of the
European Defense Community, particularly in France# ran afoul of
diminished public enthusiasm.
... NATO, while maintaining general support as a defensive
alliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination.
It is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The
NATO Information Service has remained ineffective,
5, The impression is spreading in Europe that the economie
situation is not getting any better, As the quarter ended, em-
ployment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in
some places, On the other hand, pressures on living standards
and general economic development, growing out of the defense pro-
gram, were causing visible restlessness, Some progress was achieved
by MSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field
of productivity and technical assistance. But U. S. tariff and
trade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to
our general efforts abroad.
6, Neutralism, in its "third forced context, continued to
give ground in the face of Europe-Is growing military strength,
the developing-fsense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace
offensive. At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up
from the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very
serious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented
rebuttal needs to be made.
7.. Anti-Americanism remained on the increase, Contributing
factors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number
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of U. S. troops abroad, the current U. S. election campaign;
Congressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad
that American officials tended to be more blunt and insistent
in their relations with European governments. Economic pressures
of the defense program;, the generalized European unhappiness with
the state of the world,, and the feeling in some cuarters abroad
that America is taking too :strong a line against Rusaia have also
been contributory causes of anti-,,Vmericanism
In assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in
dealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points
to further progress during the quarter in the integration . of` MSA and
State information operations,, and to increasing acceptance of the idea
within the U. S. government that our information operations th ould be
somewhat decentralized, At the same times the report draws attention
to serious shortcomings in, organization, procedure and directions
1, MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act
for guidance as to "national objectives."
2 There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy
and operations coordination between military and civilian informa-
tion elements. This is evident in such programs as offshore pro-
curement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe:
36 The NATO information services have not developed an effective
positive programs said remain weak.
!. Recent exp rieno e has underlined the effectiveness of in-
direct propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further
development in this field,
In view
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5. In view of the great size and psychological impact of the
annual influx of American tourists in Europe, more should be
done to study and influence this particular movemeh t *
,southeast Asia (Philippines.. Thailand, indo-China, Formosa, Malaya)
Favorable psychological, result a accrued during the quarter from
NSA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use
of DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating
trachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid,
Distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a
noticeable impact in the area. Installation of conuriunity radio re-
ceivers widened the audience available for information programs.
At the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the
maximum psychological impact from U* S. programs in the area were
impeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. Si position, in the
belief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an
identification with U'estern colonial interests and indigenous ruling
groups, in the face of a risibig tide of revolutionary nationalism.
The report concluded with the following suggestions t
1, Local personnel, should be trained to take over from
American personnel as quickly as possible in our various in,.
formation, economic and social programs,
20 A special effort should be made to influence and support
intellectuals, professional people and upper incane groups; since
their influence is disproportionately large throughout the area.
Possibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to es-
tablish close liaison with these Individuals.
3.. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest
caliber of U.S, personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia
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SECURITY INFOItNATION PSB D-3L
SECRET Annex A
October 30, 1952
THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of State)
(Quarterly Status Report, June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952)
I. The tasks of the foreign information and educational exchange
program of the Department of State, carried on by the International
Information Administration, continued to be those set forth in
Annex V to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows:
(i) "The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological
deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the
form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union,
of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or
in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by
civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism*"
(ii) "The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the
growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments
of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including
Western Germany, in their capability successfully to deter
aggression of Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it
nonetheless occur and to insoire concrete international,
national and individual action accordingly."
(iii) "The third task is to combat,, particularly in the Near
and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist
tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and
the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of govern-
ments and peoples into neutralism.,<
(iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held
captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the
Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification
with the free world and to nourish, without provoking pre-
mature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance
to regimes now in power."
(v) "The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and govern-
ments traditionally linked with the United States, parti-
cularly in Latin Americas a continued recognition of mutual
interdependence and to promote national and individual
action accordingly."
2. During the period June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952, the following
actions were taken, in accordance with plans for every country and with
special plans as noted,, to intensify psychological deterrents to aggres-
sion and subversion by Soviet Comrnuniamt
(a) The growing strength and unity of the free world continued
to be projected to the peoples and the governments of nations
dominated by Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action
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October 30, 1952
soberly to exploit particularly
(i) The development and the maintenance of defensive military
strength on the part of the -ree world, as demonstrated by
Operation Mainbrace, maneuvers on the continent of Europe,
the ANZUS Conference} and the continuing successful resistance
to aggression and subversion in Korea, Indochina and Malaya.
(IA-P0-2-ANZUS)
(ii) The development of new weapons by the United States
and other free nations, particularly tactical atomic weapons
by the United States and the explosion of an atomic bomb by
the United Kingdom.
(iii) The diplomatic, economic, cultural and other supporting
actions given to the people of rest Berlin in order that they
might the more strongly resist the harassing tactics of Soviet
Communists.
(iv) The conclusion of the contractual agreements with the
German Federal Republic and its planned inclusion in the
European Defense Community.
(v) The exposure in the joint replies of the United States,
the United Kingdom and France of the deceitful nature of
the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of
Germany.
(b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of the
United States were concurrently projected. This involved sub-
stantive action to exploit particularly
(i) The continuing efforts of the United States to promote
the balanced reduction and limitation of armed forces in
the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.
(ii) The patient efforts of the United Nations Command to
reach an armistice in Korea and the justice of its refusal
to repatri ate prisoners of w.r.
(iii) The manifest absurdity and the malign purpose of pro-
paganda designed to arouse hatred of the United States,
particularly charges that its forces engaged in bacteriological
warfare in Korea.
(c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism
continued to be sought? This involved substantive action to
exploit particularly
(i) The strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the
people of the USSR. implied in the plans for the Communist
Party Congress. (IA-i,o-53-2O, Interim Guidance re Nineteenth
Communist Party Congress)
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October 30, 1952
(ii) The renewed purges of party leaders both in the
satellites and in France and Italy. (IA-PO-53-17,. Italy,
1953)
(iii) The implication of the refusal of large numbers of
Chinese captured in Korea voluntarily to return to China.
(IA-PO-7, Use of Prisoners of War in Propaganda)
(iv) The continuing support by the United States of the
United Nations as an instrumentality for the adjustment of
differences and the rel.axatioi of tensions among nations and
the rehabilitation of victims of aggression, (IA-PO-53-16,,
Rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea)
(v) The unsoundness of the fundamental communist economic
thesis that the capitalist world is now entering a period
of economic crisis which will ultimately and inevitably
lead to its collap"o.
(d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the Kremlin,
efforts continued to expose the myths surrounding and inspired by
Soviet Communism and minimizing fears of fifth coluarrris acting on
its behalf, This involved substantive action to exploit particularly
(i) The schisms within local communist parties, especially
the plight of Marty and Tillon in France.
(ii) Through indiggenqus channels the fellow-travelling
tendencies of the authors of the report of the Inter-
national Scientific Commission on bacteriological warfare.
(TA-PO-L, International Red Cross Conference in Toronto)
(iii) Through calculated silence, the insignificance of
the impending peace conferences in Peiping and Vienna.
(TA-PO-Asia Peace Conference, September, 1952)
(iv) The proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forded
Labor of the Economic and Soci-il Council of the UN in a
"Red Bookf+ on forced labor, (LA-.PO-53-20-Forced Labor:
UN Hearings, October 114, 195?)
(v) The refusal of the USSR to join in further efforts
to negotiate a treaty concerning Austria.
(vi) Among Chinese overseas, the nature of the regime now
in power in China and its threat to freedom in Asia,
3. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of confi-
dence of the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat
it should it nonetheless occur,
(a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world
of the need and the possibility of building rear military capa-
bilities as a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achiev-
ing them. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly
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October 30, 1952
(i) The developing military strength of the free world
as revealed in Operation Mainbrace and other maneuvers in
Europe, with emphasis an the contribution and participation
of the Europeans, in the continuing successful resistance
to aggression and ;subversion in the Far East, in the develop-
ment of new weapons and new techniques by nations of the
free world*
(ii) A balanced u.nderstandin of the problems created
regarding the pace of rearmament by the domestic economic
pressures and the reduction of economic and military
assistance on the part of the United States.
(iii) The interest of nations in the Near and Middle East,
particularly the Arab States, in mutual defense arrangements.
(iv) The interest of the Philippines and Japan in developing
Indigenous defense capabilities.
(b) Encouraging the peoples and the governments of Europe in the
development of common institutions for mutual welfare and defense,
This involved substantive action to exploit particularly, largely
through indigenous means
(i) The establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Authority.
(ii) Developments within the Council of Europa,.
(iii) The need to proceed rapidly with the ratification
of the contractual agreements with German] and the protocols
establishing the European Defense Conmlunity. (IA-FO-53-14,
iDC and European Integration)
(:c) The maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions, the
consistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States.
This involved substantive action to exploit particularly
(1) A balanced understanding of developments, especially
affecting foreign policy, grog Lng out of the presidential
election, with a view particularly to encouraging confi-
dence in the continuity of basic policy regardless of the
outcome. (IA_FO-l, The Presidential Campaign)
(ii) The patience and the reasonableness of the United
States in its role of agent of the United Nations with
regard to negotiating an armistice and limiting hostil-
ities in Korea.
(iii) The motives animating the United States when, as
with the United Kingdom concerning Iran and with France
concerning North Africa, the United States has undertaken
to follow policies differing from.theirs. (IAMrO.5,
Self-Determination)
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October 30, 1952
(iv) The cultural maturity of the United States as
an indication of the depth of its perceptions and the
sophistication of its people, for example, the tour of
"Porgy and Bess," the participation of artists repre-
senting the United States in the conference of Venice
sponsored by UNESCO and the presentation of typical
musical compositions, ballets and performances at the
Congress for Cultural i'reedon:s in Paris.
(v) The development bytlie United States in the Dis-
armament Commission of the United Nations of a compre-
hensive program for the balar ed reduction and limitation
of arms and armed forces.
(vi) The readiness of the United States, together with
the United Kingdom and France, to discuss the unification
of Germany with the USSR on su? table terms.
(vii) The dangers of neutralism as a means of safeguarding
individual liberty and freedom.
(viii) The interests of indi;enous groups understanding of
and sympathetic with the objectives of the United States,
!t. The following actions were taken to combat, particularly in the Near and
Middle East, tendencies nationalistic and religious threatening to under-
mine the stability and the cohesion of the free world, This involved sub-
stantive actions to exploit particularli
(a) The respect of the people and the government of the United
States for the religion and the culture of the peoples of the
Middle East, as demonstrate=d prima sly by the readiness of the
United States Air :Force to carry thousands of pilgrims to Mecca
who otherwise would have been stranded at Beirut and by the
attentions shown to Feisal of Iraq during his visit to the United
States. Exploitation of the airlift to Mecca has been left largely
to indigenous mechanisms, but it i, the subject of a pictorial
pamphlet produced in Beirut, a film and a series of statements by
members of the crews of the planes involved.
(b) Actions taken by the United States to promote a fair and
reasonable settlement of the dispute between Iran and the United
Kingdom over the nationalized properties of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company.
(c) The efforts of the United States to promote direct negotia-
tions between France and the colonial peoples for the achievement
of popular aspirations in Tunisia and Morocco,
(d) The encouragement given by th& United States to reconcilia-
tion between Israel and the Arab States.
5. The following actions were taken to maintain, without provoking pre-
mature deeds, hope of ultimate liberation among peoples held captive by
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SF CRI T Annex A
October 30, 1952
Soviet Communism, This involved substantive action, carried on almost
entirely by the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin,: to exploit
particularly
(a) The balanced interpretation of statements made in the
course of the presidential campai,,n concerning the policy
of the United States toward the satellites of "..astern Europe.,
(b) Interpretation of the significance of the Nineteenth
Communist Party Congress.
(c) Exposure of the campaign of hatred against the United
States.
(d) The manifest impracticality of the proposals of the USSR
concerning the unification of Germany,
(e) portrayal of the Sino-5oviet meetings in Moscow in a
light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese
on the mainland as to tI? motives of the Peiping regime in
their dealings with the LISS[z.
6. The following actions were taken to maintain among peoples traditionally
linked with the United States, p..rticularly in Latin merica, a continued
recognition of mutual interests. This involved substantive action
(a) To foster Latin 4ieric-an association with. U.S. objectives
and policy especially through exploitation of
(i) The visit of the Secretary of State to ;Brazil.
(ii) The conversion of. Puerto V;ico to Commorrrealth
status,
(iii) The performance of Puerto Rican and Colombian
troops in Korea,
(b) To interpret the position of the United States with regard
to issues involved in Latin American nat:+..onalism, including
nationalization of resources Alleged International
Oil Cartel, PO-53-5, Self-Deterrrination, and continuous infor-
mation guidance on Ecuadoran., Bolivian and Chilean elections,
on U,S, tin and copper purc.asing policy, etc.)
To develop attitudes and methods for meeting the anti-U.S.
propaganda of the I_rgentine Government (Circular instruction
of .August 26, 1952, and FFo--53-13).
(c) To demonstrate the dangers to Latin America of Soviet
Communism. This involved
(i) Successful conclusion o.17 the special project
in Panama initiated in fiscal. 1952.
(ii) :Preparation of special programming to meet
the deteriorated political situation in Chile.
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October 30, 1952
(iii) Stimulation. of awareness in Latin American
countries of the Communist danger in Guatemala.
(iv) Encouragement of intellectual movements in
defense of 1,J'estern value (Circular airgram,
September 30, 1952).
(v) Counteraction of the Communist BWW campaign in
Latin America (Circular instruction, September 17,
1952).
(vi) Counteraction of propaganda in Latin America
related to the Peiping -Yeace" Conference (IA Special
Instruction, August 18, L952 and Latin American
Supplement).
7, The following actions of an operational nature were taken in support of
the actions listed above.
(a) Administrative.
(i) Approval was given to a staff study provVing for
the establishment of the ITA ,uropean Regional Service
Staff, whose purpose is to provide USIS missions in
Europe and elsewhere, especi.a.i~ly Greece and Turkey,
with materials originating in Europe, to provide advice
as to the effective utilization of media and to cooper-
ate with Office of Information of the Special Representa-
tive in Europe in sex aicing U`33 information offices in
Europe.
(ii) Approval was given to a staff study providing for
the establishment of the IIA ear Itast Regional Service
Center in Beirut. Authorizati.on has been given for the
shipment of equipment and the assignment of personnel to
the Center.
(iii) The Department of State; has under executive order
assumed from the hutual Security Agency responsibility
for administering the Informa lion Media Guaranties.
(b) Policy Formulation.,
on July 10, 1952, the Current Information Policy Staff,
Office of the Assistant Adrrd.nis tra-`:.or for Policies and Plans,
inaugurated a new series of i.nformntion policy guidance known as
Information Guidance Bulletins, The great majority are trans-
mitted by telegram to posts having an interest in the subject
matter, As of September 30, 1952, 114 Bulletins had been issued.
(c) evaluation,
'valuation studies completed include detailed studies of
problems in Turkey and :ran, of the placement of USIS materials
in foreign newspapers, of the use of the USIS transcriptions on
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SE CR S Annex A
October 30, 1952
foreign broadcasting systems, of non-theatrical film distribution
in foreign countries and of key words in propaganda of the United
States and the free world.
(d) International Press Service.
On August 11, 1952, responsibility for the preparation of the
four regional editions of the wireless Bulletins was assumed by
the Regional Branches of the International Press Service.
(e) International Broadcasting Service.
(i) The ship borne transmitter, the Courier, on September 7,
1952 began operations at Rhodes, Programs in nine languages
--Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, Inglish, Armenian, Georg-
ian, Azerbaijani and Tartar--are broadcast in short and medium
wave lengths during a per. od of 5-3/4 hours daily. Monitoring
reports thus far available indicate excellent reception.
(ii) A fifteen minute broadcast in Tartar was inaugurated
at the local programming center at Nhinich on September 21,
1952.
(iii) A study of the transmitters located in the United
States was made by I_?ooz, Allen and Hamilton with a view
to providing a stronger short-wave signal to relay bases
overseas.
(iv) Alfred Hammond Norton assumed charge of the Inter-
national Broadcasting Service with the title of Deputy
Administrator of the International Information Administration,
(f) Information Center Service,
Franklin Publications, Inc., a private corporation formed by
a group of publishers and private interests, was formed in July
to undertake, on behalf' of foundations and universities as well as
the Government, the publication and distribution of noteworthy
American books in translation in '`oreign countries. The first
efforts will be made in. the rab States. The sum of 4500,0CO
has been made available to it by the Department of State.
(g) International Motion Picture Serviced
(i) A film showing the participation of the individual
voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates
has been completed. and distriouted. Another showing his
participation in the election of a President is scheduled
for completion immediately after the election.
(ii) The first conference of film officers, involving
representatives from posts in the MTear and Middle Fast,
was held on Cyprus from august 11 to August 15, 1952,
with the purpose of determining how films could be
produced with sharper focus on local problems.
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October 30, 1952
(h) International Educational Exchange Service,
A tendency has been noted on the part of certain foreign
governments to undertake unilateral control of the selection of
their citizens who may 'be offered exchange grants by the United
States and other governments,. The trend appears to be motivated
by (1) the heightened nationalism Common to Asian states since
the war, and (2) a desire tc control closely any exchanges that
might occur with the Soviet Union and Communist China and at the
same time not to make it appear that these governments are being
singled out in any way, The Burmese Government has made formal
representation in this matter to the United States Government,
exempting only the Fulbright program, since it is founded on a
formal agreement between the governments. The Department has
taken the position that even at the cost of a temporary cessation
of exchanges with Burma, the principle must be maintained that
this government has final responsibility for selecting grantees
financed through congressional appropriations. t-1hile Burma is
the clearest case in point at the moment, similar situations have
developed in Indonesia and in Syria and are nascent throughout
most of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
(i) Cooperation with Frivate Enterprise.
Projects are under way with various private agencies, social,
commercial and philanthiropic, to provide foreign groups with books
and magazines, to assist Americans travelling abroad, to provide
radio facilities to underde"reloper areas, to project a balanced
picture of Wall Street, to promote the exchange of persons and to
develop bi-national community relationships.
(j) Cooperation with Other Governmental Agencies.
Integration of Information activities of the International
Information Administration and the Mutual Security 'administration
in other countries has taken place: in the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg,, Italy,
Yugoslavia., Greece and Turkey, Integration had already taken
place in Iceland, SwitZe rland and Trieste.
(k) Cooperation with Other Governments,
(i) Bi-national committees to promote the ready accept-
ance by local populati:Dns of troops of the United States
established on their soil have been formally established
in France, the United Fingdor, Germany, Italy and Iceland.
Similar committees are functioning on an informal basis in
Libya and Morocco.
(ii) Negotiations are under way for limited cooperation in
foreign information activitirs with the government of Australia.
Cooperation would chiefly concern broadcasts to Southeast Asia.
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SECRi,;T Annex A
October 30, 1.952
(1) Electromagnetic 'Warfare.
No significant change took peace in the overall level of
Soviet jamming, although minor changes took place from time to
time in the application of the jar;ming mechanism to the various
language broadcasts.
Sufficient information has bf:en received through govern-
mental intelligence sources to i:'arrant the conclusion that the
Soviets have in the procEss of construction, probably in the
final states, somewhere between eight and twelve high powered
transmitters either designed for or capable of jamming in the
medium frequency and low frequency bands! These are generally
distributed around the Eliro]pean periphery of the Iron Curtain.
An Fast German intelligence sourcf: heretofore found to be
reliable, reports the establishment within the government struc-
ture of East Germany of an office for radio warfare. A powerful
East Zone broadcasting station moved on to the frequency used by
the Armed Forces Network in Berlir:. T'hether this was intended. as
a deliberate interference measure, or whether it represented a
Soviet need for a frequency is not now know,an,
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TOP ST. CRET Annex B
October 30, 1952
SIGNIFICATTT FSYC1iC;iOICAL ACTIVITILS OF T'HHE:
T- T Ty ~j~ p
DT',F t~~t-T 17 1 I}1 U Ur ti7 T D y~U tit kTO TEL 1 i LIOI) J R M
1JULY Mal GFi 30 `TFTt TFn' 9 '
SECTION I
What activities has your agency engaged in during the period under
r
-'F it evi w which arepsycholo i(.ally significant for the attainment o national
v ~ECtives Z^'it respecE71 I- bring current psyciolog ca .signif1-
cant pr o7lems, situations and objectives,, the Department of Defense activity
was as indicated below,
1, The problem. of neu'4ralism and anti-American sentiments in Western
Europe, including the Unitec in?;dom? o ass z n combatting neutralism
and anti-.american senta meats in
f seer. r Europe, including the United Kingdom,,
the Department of Defense through the military Services engaged in the fol-
lowing activities;
a, Reduction of neutralism:
(1) Shows of military force in 'Western Europe have been
staged,, The participation of U.S. military forces in national
and international maneuvers in this area has expressed UcS,
determination to assist in the defense of I'estern Europe from
all aggressors. The following major military demonstrations
have realistically portrayed U.S. intentions in this area:
(a) The U.S. Navy participated in the allied fleet
maneuvers in the North Sea and Baltic areas, involving
some 160 warships of seven nations, demonstrated the
capability of the allied naval forces to defend Western
Europe.
(b) Significant arrong the activities of the military
forces in achieving psychological advantage was the conduct
of the combined U,.S,-French maneuvers cast of the nthine
River and the alert drills of the tICS. garrison in Berlin,
The U.S,-French ~-iianeuvers served to demonstrate military
capabilities and the effLeacy of combined operations, Also
such maneuvers helped to overcome Western Europeants linger-
ing belief that SHAPE defense would be west of the Rhine or
further back in the even.; of attack, In Berlin, the U, S,
military activities have been most valuable in reaffirming
the stated Ut S.. position to the West Berliners, the ''Free
World' and the Soviets, that any attack directed at "Test
Berlin would be met with force. Also of significance were
the U.,So"British and French ground and air maneuvers in
Germany, and the Italian--U.S. maneuvers, Both maneuvers
occurred in Septemt:>er and tested defenses against the East.
(c) During the reporting period, the Skyblazers, a
USAF aerobatics team of four jet fighters, on behalf of
CIS?CUSAFE gave approximately 30 air demonstrations to
foreign military and civilian audiences throughout Mediter-
ranean and European countries. In a continuing program to
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PSB D-34
Annex B
October 30,
1952
rotate combat-ready units of the Strategic Air Command to
foreign stations, USAF medium and heavy bombers visited
countries in Europe.
(2) Statements by General Ridgray and other Senior U.S.
commanders have reemphasized the need for collective effort to
build a position of strength as the means of deterring Soviet
aggression. Significant among the themes stressed by U.S.
military leaders were the following:
(a) Warnings that critical defense minimums must be met.
(b) Warnings that the threat of aggression had not
lessened,
(c) Praises of great progress made within the NATO
military structure toward our corrnon goal.
(d) The need for West German contribution to 'Vest
European defense;
(e) The allies plan to hold their ground in Germany
should the Reds attack.
(f) Indications of the use of atomic arms for the
joint defense of Western Europe,
b, Reduction of anti-,American sentiments, Although a certain
amountntof progress has -been rr_ade n solving the problem of anti-
American sentiments in Western Europe, much remains to be accomp-
lished. The Department of Defense feels that we are still on the
defensive in combatting; the Tate-America" campaign but attempts
are being made to seize the initiative through the following
measures:
(1) Troop-civilian relations committees organized in
Western Europe early this year continue to function. Department
of Defense participates on these interdepartmental committees
organized by Department of St ite Public Affairs officers, by
providing representatives for areas where U.S. military personnel
are stationed, A marked degree of closer cooperation and collabora-
tion between U.S. commanders .cnd local government officials has
contributed to the saccess of the program. While no definitive
evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of materials and methods
used in Service information programsi continuing effort is made to
establish trends and indications with a view to improving subject
matter presented and to keep it current, The program continues to
have a favorable effect and a. trend toward greater acceptance of
U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe.
This trend is presumably due to firmer action by host governments
against communist propaganda :Ind obstructionism., more favorable
local press and better orientation of U.S. military personnel.
At a July meeting called by Ambassador Draper to consider troop-
civilian relationships in NATO countries? it was decided that
formal committees should be established throughout the NATO area.
n-t~1
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SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SICFF:T
PSB D-34
Annex B
October 303
1952
It is felt that the activities of such interdepartmental com.
mittees, as already exist, have had notable effect upon neutral-
ism and anti-American sentiments in VV'estern Europe, and have
assisted in countering Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda by keep-
ing U.S. military personnel better informed and adjusted to local
conditions, thereby reducing the number of incidents. Detailed
reports as to the effectiveness of the program as it pertains to
the indigenous populations are submitted by Public Affairs Officers
through Department of State channels.
(2) In the continuing effort to establish and maintain U.S.
good-will in areas of national interest, U.S, defense forces have
promoted friendship and under:,tanding by:
(a) Visits to European ports and contacts with local
populace by units of the U.S, Navy, Including a four day
visit by eleven ships to Yugoslav waters.
(b) Scheduled appearances In '?Test European capitals
and other principal cities by tJ,S# military bands before
foreign military and civilian audiences.
(3) By sending special teams to Indoctrinate NATO forces
in the use of U.S. equipment, the Defense Department has increased
the confidence of the NATO forces in their capabilities to defend
Western Europe.
(4) Pith the view of promoting defense production, stimulat-
ing the economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic
Defense forces, the! Department of Defense has continued its policy
of off-shore procurement of supplies from European Defense sources.
Whenever feasible, this form of economic assistance is so oriented
as to benefit the non-communist segments of the countries involved.
2, The problem of securinw ratification and implementation of the Bonn
"contractual agreements" and tFie Furopea n Defense Community treaty? To assist
securing ra f c a-#i anc " im ymentaticin p ie Bonn "contractual agree-
ments" and the European Defense Community Treaty, the Department of Defense
through the military Services-has supplied military assistance or advice as
to military matters involved..
3. Soviet ['I.Iatetl-America" Propaganda? To assist in combatting the
Soviet "Hate-America" pro]5aganda, the Department of Defense through the mil-
itary Services has taken the following stepst
a. The Department of Defense Office of Public Information cooper-
ated closely with the Department of state and other agencies involved
in psychological activities In coordinating information released by the
Department of Defense and its components on biological and chemical war-
fare. As this was a period of intense communist propaganda on biological
warfare against the tJnit,ed States, this coordination was significant in
assisting the countering of such propaganda. Through the Interdepart-
mental Committee to Combat Communist; Propaganda, on which the Department
of Defense Office of Pub-Lie Information is represented, progress was
made in developing plans and means 'or setting forth United States posi-
tion regarding the false charges of using germ warfare in Korea. The
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SLCURITY INFORMATION P5B D-313
TOP SFCUET Annex B
October 30, 1952
Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda has conducted
a constant analysis of the Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda campaign and
has sought immediate and long range means of countering such propaganda.
The Department of Air Force has undertaken production of a film entitled
"Brain- Washing", counteracting Soviet charges against U,S* forces in
Korea that United Nations Command is conducting germ warfare%
b. The Department of Defense has provided the Department of State
with advance notice of troop movements in certain overseas, areas in
order to minimize communist propaganda against them and to make most
effective psychological use of their presence, In addition, these com-
mittees have continued to monitor and direct the activities of coordinat-
ing subcommittees set up in each country in which there are American
troops. These subcommittees consist of representatives from the Armed
Forces, Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Department of State. Reports indicate that their work has been effective.
G, See references made to paragraphs 1 b and 13 for other examples
concerning activities conducted to combat "HaEe-America" propaganda,
4. National Policy Objectives in the Middle East, In support of the
national policy r o e~"#o mprove ~ , ; eelaf long Th the Moslem world the
Department of Defense has cooperated in establishing good will by;
a. The airlift of 31854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda,,
be The airlift of 4 tone of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon.
As a result of these operations as well as the Major Jabara, USAF, visit,
reported in August 1952 annual report, friendly relationships have been
established between key Arab leaders and U.S, government representatives in
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. It"has beep, suggested that the Jabara
visit alone made a more significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in
the Middle East than any other single act undertaken in the area up to that
time.
5. The Allied Position in West Berlin, in support of national policy
objectives -finGemany e a poerori in West Berlin has been strengthened;
bya
a. The maintaining of U.S. military forces in rest Berlin and
demonstrating the determination to support and protect the city by force
if necessary. The recent conduct of maneuvers in West Berlin by U.S.
military forces was a dynamic expression of our intention to defend the
city,
be Continued use of the 1J.S. :military approaches to Berlin reaf>
firm U.S. policy to keep the approaches to nest Berlin open, By inter
departmental action contingency plans for the psychological exploitation
of a second Berlin Airlift were developed,
6. The International Role of Japan in the Post-Treaty Era; Department
of Defense has rem ere suppoFc rough rou ine m. ,:teary advice and assistance
and by providing training and equipment for the Japanese National Police
Reserve# Through the Security Treaty the U.S. has again demonstrated its
belief in the efficacy of collective security and has attempted to awaken
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SEct1RITY INMMATION PSB B-34
TOF SECR ijT Annex B
October 30,E 1952
Japan to the communist threat to its national survival. The utilization of
Japan as a military base for the support of the Korean-Campaign has served
to demonstrate the need for collective effort against aggression and the
closeness of danger to- the Japanese "Home Islands".
7. National policy Objeotives in Latin America, The Department of
Defense has contributed the sups "car our national policy in Latin America
and to the stability of existing governments by assisting in the training and
equipping of military forces of the Latin American countries, This has been
accomplished by sending U.S. military teams and personnel to various Latin
American countries and by inviting Latin American military forces to partici-
pate In specialized training programs being conducted in the U.S.
8. The Korean Campaign and Truce Negotiations. The Department of Defense
activities Me area are conducted,, he Commander in the Far last, who is
responsible for the conduct of psycholo'ricai operations in Korea in accordance
with national policy? In the accomplishment of this mission- the Commander
has participated in the following significant activities:
a. The conduct of target warning operations in North Korea of
impen'ing bombing of 78 North Korean cities expresses the intent of
the United Nations Command to save as many lives as possible of non-
combatants in target areas. Psychologioally1 these warning operations
are also designed to increase the pressure brought to bear by United
Nations Command on the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army
negotiators at Panmunjom, and to contribute a satisfactory termination
of the Korean conflict*
b, Provision of military representation to the inter-departmental
committee which prepares and transmits the Special Korean Information
Guidance. This guidance provides CINCUNC with information not readily
available in Tokyo, including digest of U.S. and foreign press comments
and reactions, and substantive materials and suggestions to be used in
maintaining the propaganda initiatives in Far East Command. There are a
number of examples in which the U.S. (UN) delegates to the'truce negoti-
ations have used information provided them through this meanso
co The U.S, (UN) policy that it U1l1 not use force in the repatri-
ationof prisoners of war has had wide psychological repercussions.
Although the U,S' adherence to the principle of non-forcible repatriation
has gained for it wide "'Free "!'orld" support, the continuing firmness in
this position has blocked the achievement of an honorable armistice,
d. An attempt has been made to establish the fact that agitation
In prisoner of war camps was inspired and provoked by "hard core" com-
munists. However, the publicity accorded such incidents has provided
the communists with additional material for their propaganda campaign
and raised some doubt as to U.S. (UN) intentions.
e. The leaflet, radio and loudspeaker operations directed at the
North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers
continued, A new commentary series exploiting the statements. of Chinese
Communist-Forces prisoners who oppose return to communist control was
begun in September. Themes stressed are: Soviet exploitation of China
and North Korea; communist brutality and oppressions, and subservience
ea.
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SECURITY INFtJRMATION PSB D-314
TYOP SECRET Annex B
October 30, 1952
of the communist puppet regimes to the USSR. In leaflet operations,
now nearing three billion disseminated, theme emphasis is on good
treatment, non-forcible repatriation, nostalgia and support of opera-
tional plans such as DEADLOCK (armistice negotiations), FRAUD (to dis-
credit communist regimes of China and North Korea) and ERIS (LUSAK plan
to create or aggravate friction between CCF and NKA).
9. Psychological Results of Presence of U.S. Personnel Abroad. The
stationing o U5S. m , ary anc `6ivrZa_i9 personne abroad has rased psycho-
logical problems,'many of which are still unsolved, but, in spite of these
problems, it is believed that the presence of such personnel in areas abroad
has been of value in :reaffirming and demonstrating U.S. intentions to assist
in the collective security effort,
as All U.S. military personnel selected for assignment overseas
receive a course'of instruction prior to embarkation. In addition, upon
arrival at their destination, all personnel are oriented on their mission;
proper standards of conduct; cooperation with our Allies; local history,
geography, and customs; and other subjects considered essential by the
unit commander.
b. To orient and condition psychological warfare personnel of the
580th: and 581st ARC T^*ings, the Department of Defense requested the
Department of State to brief unit personnel on the scope of U.S. national
psychological programs and the significance of U.S. psychological warfare
interests abroad. It is particularly significant that personnel of
military psychological units receive such information prior to being
deployed to overseas areaso
10o Shows of Military Force. Although the programs and activities of
the Departanen of DeT se botlaa~ home and abroad are desi ned primarily to
achieve military ends, it is recognized that many if not all of these activ-
ities have an inherent psychological impact. In recognition of the natural
psychological effect of such Defense activities, both advantageous and adverse,
added consideration to the proper exploitation of the following activities is
warranted.
a. The continuous program of t+1aneuvers by U.S. military forces
both at home and abroad engenders a feeling of confidence in the capa-
bilities of the U.S, to assist in the defense of free nations from com-
rminist aggression. However, the potential psychological impact of such
maneuvers is not generally integrated into operational plans,
b, In the latter part of Sept mber, at the request of the Depart-
Mont of State, action was taken to conduct a flight of USAF 8-29's to
Malaya,, a neutral South East Asia country, Flights such as this, as
well as the continued appearance of U,.S. aircraft and naval vessels
throughout the world, support U.S. position of world leadership by
demonstrating military striking potntial, technical excellence of
equipment, and military prepa:rednesc~ of U.S. Government*
c. Recent expansion of military interests in foreign areas has
rfesulfed in the establishment of a strategic air base in Greenland.
Such expansions illustrate the scope of U,S0 military planning and free-
world cooperation and determination to defend against communism in the
event of general hostilities,
An ii r" 3l1
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SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-31i
TOP SECRET Annex B
October 30, 1952
d. In conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic
Energy Commission, exploitation of certain atomic weapons tests has
been made. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive
policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons,
guided missiles and new weapons, This policy provides that agencies
concerned with psychological operations coordinate fully whenever public
information is to be released on these weapons.
ll. What new evidence has emerged during the quarter concerns th e p
chologic al efTe veness of activities conducted before reporting eeriod?
a. As a result of U.S. psychological operations in the Arab World,
such as the good-will tour of Major Jabara (Jet Ace) (reported in August
1952 annual report) relationships between key Arab loaders and UrS,-
government representatives in 1,gypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have
been improved. This has contributed to a psychological atmosphere favor-
able to U.S. interests in the Addle East and significantly contributed
to the U.S* cold war effort in this area#
b, The UN psychological warfare effort is providing valuable support
for tie Korean campaign. Reports continue to indicate that majority of
the people in a leaflet drop area read UN leaflets, including some party
members$ and that the leaflets or information contained therein are passed
on: The North Korean civilians in general believe the information, Re-
ports still indicate that the ;`north Korean civilian is waiting for and
apparently expects a UN offensive. Most local authorities in North Korea
are continuing efforts to prevent UN propaganda from reaching the soldier
and civilians Leaflet drop areas are declared ttOff Limits", inhabitants
are confined to their homes until leaflets are disposed of, the people
are told that leaflets are poisoned and all people are threatened with
"cruel punishment" if they pick up UN leaflets. Most prisoners state
that there is a continuous campaign to minimize effectiveness of UN psy-
chological warfare operations. Communist officers refute UN propaganda
statements, the soldiers are subjected to unannounced inspections, leaf-
lets are turned in and burned, men apprehended with leaflets are subject
to disciplinary action including confinement.
12i Included in current activities and separate from plans and capabil-
ities is the program of research and development in strategic intelligence
and psychological warfare operations. Fundamentallyi this program is concerned
with rendering maximum assistance to the achievement of national objectives by
(1) in times of t-cold warts reducing the mower and influence of potentially
hostile nations, (2) in case of hostilities, defeat of the enemy, and (3) at
all times countering threats to our national security. Research and develop-,
meat support of national objectives is rendered by research programs classified
under the following technical fields:
a, Strategic Intelligence programs to improve through social science
researrch techniques the collection and military utilization of basic,
comprehensive data on foreign areas and peoples, including;
(1) Potentially hostile groups and peopleso
(2) Potential allies.
(3) Strategic areas and pc;oples which are subjected in times
of t+co .d war" to intense international pt'essures and tenstions.
841 ?9i/
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TOP SECRET Annex B
October 30, 1952
b4 Psychological warfare research programs to render maximum
assistance to achievement of national objectives by affecting (through
means other than destructive weapons) the will and capacity of individ-
uals and groups to support their leaders and national policies.
at Psychological warfare materiel research programs to develop
equipment and devices to facilitate communication with peoples in
potentially hostile and inaccessible areasb
d. Civil Defense research programs to maintain high morale at
home to case of hostilities by such means as increasing efficiency
of security measures, adequate defense against enemy psychological
warfare, and effective disaster control,
e? Military Government and Military Relations (in Foreign Areas)
research programs to increase the effectiveness of techniques fort
(1) The control and management of enemy areas occupied by
our military forceso
(2) The indoctrination in democratic principles of enemy
nationals in areas occupied by our military forces.
(3) The fostering of better relationships between our mili-
tary forces abroad and the nationals of host friendly nations.
SECTION II
What significant progress has been made in developing plans capabili-
ties and or an z [ona. me s or c ontri siting furt h er to national
psieoog eale for
13. preparation of Psychological Warfare Plane To further the wartime
national psychological ware effort, the Join" hiefs of Staff approved a
psychological warfare plan to support the "Joint Outline Emergency 1Iar Plan."
The "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General Wars" approved by
the Psychological Strategy Board was used as guidance in the preparation of
this plan, which now puts wart:Lme psychological warfare plans and objectives
in phase with approved policy guidance, The military Services and major sub-
ordinate commands are in the process of developing or modifying existing
plans in accordance with current guidance.
ll , Specific Planning for Psychological Warfare.
i6' In 'the psychological warfare field planning is progressing
toward the development of a }"Transfer Plan, which will facilitate the
wartime transfer of U.S. foreign infirmation equipment and personnel from
other agencies to the military controls for the execution of U.S. psycho-
logical warfare operations in military theaters of operationsb
b. For the Far Eastern area a psychological plan to support the
UeS. *forces in Japan is being developed.
co An ad hoc committee has been formed to develop a program for
promoting the surrender of enemy air crews.
84-1X3/1
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TOP SECRET Annex B
October 30, 1952
di To meet the communist threat in Europe# two plans for the reduc-
tion of communist power in T'rance and Italy are presently under consider-
ation:
e; The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have under study a SHAPE paper
which"`sets forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(3AC.UR), concerning his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities,
f4 Initial plans for the, conduct of wartime psychological operations
in Alaska? developed by Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been
submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and review.
25: Planning for Unconventional F,'arfare, In the field of unconventional
warfare, the ' o n Chief o" 7Ta-? reeenUy approved a paper establishing a
delineation of responsibilities between the Services and,the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the field of ;scape and evasion, In addition, a SHAPE paper
concerning. the delineation of responsibilities of the clandestine services and
SACEUR to include organization and definitions is presently under study and
review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
16; Planning for Guerrilla Warfare and Covert Onerations4 The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, during the crlaa covered by the pre ove paper, delineated
the responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guerrilla
warfare, and covert operations. A study is now being made of the command
relationship between CIA/DPC (new titles PMS) organization and the armed
forces, In active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged4
17: General planning on Continuous Basis, Tn addition to activities
involving current ppyC v 6 ce, pro ems, the "Department of Defenses in accord-
ance with national policy, prepares plans and makes preparations for the war-;
time conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare; and in these fields
participates on a continuing basis ins
a. Interdepartmental and international planning
bi Orientation and training of peroonnel.
Coordination with other agencies and departments:
d; Support of other agencies and departments as required.
l86 Research and Development Emphasis on Psychological T?farfare, The
Research an Development Board has`reac Tate a Pane on Psy too cal Warfare'
whose responsibility will be to plan an integrated program of,research and,
development for military psychological operations and periodically review the
progress of the departments in implementing this goal; As in the case of all
DDB panels, associate memberships on the Panel on Psychological.WW-arfare will
be available to interested non-military agencies,
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