A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR COLD WAR OPERATIONS UNDER NSC 10/5

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300080011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 30, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2Y5/16OR01731R003300080011-0
DRAFT WFORt"Ara
25X16/30/52
A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR COLD VAR OPERATIONS
UNDER NSC 1015
I. NSC 10/5, paragraph 1, approved "the intensification
of covert operations designed in general order of emphasis to:
10
.20
Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure
of power, including the relationships between
the USSR, its satellites and Communist China;
and when and where appropriate in the light of
U.S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk of
war contribute to the retraction and reduction
of oviet power and influence to limits which
no longer constitute a threat to U.S.. security.
Strengthen the orientation toward the United
States of the peoples and nations of the free
world and increase their capacity and will to
resist Soviet domination,
Develop underground resistance and facilitate
covert and guerrilla operations in strategic
areas to the maximum practicable extent con-
sistent with 1-a above...,,,,,''
2. NSC 10/5, paragraph 2, directed "the Psychological
Strategy Board to assure that its strategic concept for a
national psychological program includes provision for covert
operations designed to achieve the objectives stated in
paragraph I above."
It is the object of this paper to outline a strategic
concept for the operations called for by NSC 10/5.
4. The general objective of such operations can be
subsumed under the general heading of contributing to the
"retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence"
whether by operations designed to weaken Soviet power and
influence in the Communist orbit or by operations designed to
weaken Soviet power and influence by strengthening the free
world.
Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4,
paragraph 20, is to "endeavor to achieve our general objectives
NSC review(s) completed.
by methods
Approved For Rele MP05#WRRDP80R01731R003300080011-0
. EWJ I Y INFORMATION
 TOP SECRET
Approved For Releas%jWQR%DP80R01731 R003300080011-0
by methods short of war." This national strategy calls for
efforts to "encourage and promote the gradual retraction of
undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter
areas around traditional Russian boundaries....; to eradicate
the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence
are held in a position of subservience to oscow....; (and)
create situations which will compel the Soviet government to
recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis
of its present concepts....."
b. This strategy, however, as is most explicitly stated
in NSC 20/1,. does not include efforts "to bring about the
overthrow of the Soviet Government" and excludes the raising
of issues "directly involving the dignity and the vital
interests of the Soviet state as such" on the grounds that
It is idle to imagine" that the achievement of objectives
involving such issues" could be brought about by means short
of war."
7. The general strategy for cold war operations under
1015 must therefore be designed to contribute to the retraction
and reduction of Soviet power and influence by methods short
of war and without the overthrow of the Soviet Government.
8.. The limitations inherent in this strategy pose rea
obstacles to the development of a definitive strategic concept
it is well within the realm of possibility that Soviet power
and influence will not in fact be reduced to "limits which no
longer constitute a threat to U.S. security" without either
war or revolution. Since both war and revolution are excluded
as objectives by the terms of national strategy it is possible
that a definitive strategy for operations under 10/5 may from
the outset be impossible of construction.
Further
TOP SECRLA
Approved For Relea MJ0 $ DP80R01731R003300080011-0
 Approved For Release 21005/1 AK8OR01731 R003300080011-0
the present level of our capabilities for covert operations.
A covert mechanism can not be developed overnight and our
relative national immaturity in this field of activity means
a definitive strategic concept for operations under 10/5 b
9. Further difficulties are posed to the development of
hat we must accept the necessity of the passage of a con-
sider?ble period of time before we can hope to achieve impres.
sive covert capabilities. In this period of time there may
well, be such variation in the international situation or in
exploitable opportunities as to make the present construction
nything approaching a definitive strategic concept for
ations in the covert field an unproductive effort.
10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our
national strategy and the present level of our covert capabilities
possible, however, to advance certain general criteria
for operations under 1015, to test certain general categories
of possible covert action against these criteria, and from a
combination of the two to approach what might be called an
1015 should meet are those of effectiveness, feasibili
acceptable risk$ flexibility, and phasing.
nterim strategic concept for covert operations.
11. The general criteria which present operations under
Effectiveness: The importance of the effects
which successful operations may be calculated to have in
reducing Soviet influence and power or in strengthening the
world against the exertion of Soviet influence and power
must warrant the cost or risk of the operation.
b. Feasibility: Our capabilities in terms of
ned manpower or material, and local or international
support, must be adequate to give reasonable promise of success
to the operation
TOP SECR
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RD 80R01731R003300080011-0
SECURITY INFORMATION
 TOP sEcRtr
Approved For Release ,_, Wff% CIA-RDP80R01 731 R00330008001 1 -0
ORMAT$O
to the operation in the face of such capabilities as the
Communists may have to frustrate it.
e. AcceDtpbi risk: The degree to which the
undertaking or successful conclusion of the operations may
be calculated to provoke military reaction from the Com-
munists must be sufficiently limited as to be an acceptable
risk in terms of our national strategy.
d. xib bility: Operations should be of a type
which lend themselves within reasonable limits to adaptation
or modification to exploit such opportunities or undertake
such objectives as may become possible or advisable subse-
quent to actual initiation of the operation.
MAging: The operation should promise appreciable
results within the next three years, or at least the establish-
ment of a firm basis for expectation of results.
12. In the light of these criteria the following general
categories of covert operations have been selected as being
particularly worthy of study and effort at the present time.
Exclusion from the following discussion of any existing
project does not imply that it is not believed to be of utility.
But it is believed the following general categories of operations
merit special emphasis.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/051/6 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003300080011-0
INFORMA
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA- RDP80R01731 R0033
f
P0080011-0
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 CIA-RDP80R01731 R003300080011-0
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300080011-0
Next 21 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300080011-0
 Approved For Relea /05/ 731 R003300080011-0
IONS
1. It is recommended that the cumulative retraction of Soviet
power and influence in accordance with our capabilities and subject to
the limitations of NSC 20A and 20A be accepted as the interim strategic
concept for a national psychological program, with emphasis on such of the
foregoing categories as detailed atudy indicates to be practicable and desirable.
2. It is recommended that the responsible agencies give priority
and desirability
to determining the detailed practicability/of proceeding along the lines
indicated under each category above,, as those which are apt to be most
effective in bringing about a retraction of Soviet power and influence
with our present and immediately prospective capabilities. It is further
recommended that where such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria
will be met, the indicated actions be given priority in both national
and agency programs proportionate to their probable effectiveness.
3. It is also recommended that our covert capabilities continue to
be developed along all lines whose eventual employment may be expected
to bring about more drastic reductions in Soviet power and influence,
reappraisals of this interim strategic concept be made in the
light of the existing situation annually and also as additional categories
of action appear to meet the specified criteria.
Approved For Release
1R003300c W WOMWfiO
 25X1
SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
PSB
CIA CONTROL NO.
63783
DOC. NO. Draft
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE un-dtd
7/1
COPY NO. 2&- 3
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
mas
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret
within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of
CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assist-
ant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of
custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of han-
dling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
7/1
1130
Mr
1
/~-3a
r
~
y
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and
transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:
BY (Signature)
DOWNGRADED ^
DESTROYED ^
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO
OFFICE
DATE
TOP SECRET
FMAR ORM 195 N01 . 38-13 r'r r. ., .... .,. ............. ~.,.,.,TOF SECRETr .. ..... ... ...... ..................... . . .. 16--87130-2 GPO