PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD (PSB)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300130030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 1, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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1 June 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)
1. Attached are papers which have been prepared interdepart-
mentally and approved for presentation to the Psychological Strategy
Board (PSB) by the principal advisers to the members of that Board.
2. It is our recommendation that you authorize the distribution
of these papers to the members of the PSB with a view to calling a
first meeting of the Board in the near future.
3. It is suggested that the agenda :for the first meeting of
the Board might be as follows:
a. To consider the proposed interim procedure (TAB A).
b. To approve the proposed functions and organization of
the Director and his Staff as an aid to the new Director in
setting up his organization (TAB B).
c. To note the paper (TAB C) prepared by General Magruder
regarding his concept of the Board and the organization chart
which has been developed to implement this concept. They are
put forward to suggest the eventual nature of the Board and its
Staff. It is not endorsed by all the participants and if, as,
and when it is discussed representatives of the departments
and agencies should have an opportunity to present their views..
There is also attached under TAB C a paper submitted by
Mr. Howland Sargeant of the Department of State commenting on
General Magruder's paper.
a. To consider the relationship of the Psychological
Strategy Board to the National Security Council.
c. To consider future business of the Board (TAB D).
ALTEN W. DULTES
Deputy Director (Plans)
Central Intelligence Agency
NSC review(s) completed.
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S-E-C-R-E-T TAB A
INTERIM PROCEDURE
In order to move ahead with the organization of the PSB the
chairman, General Walter Bedell Smith, suggested that informal
meetinge be held among the representatives of the participating
agencies in order to outline the field of work of the Board. Three
such meetings have been held. The first under the chairmanship of
General Walter Bedell Smith and the second and third under that of
Mr. Allen Dulles. This group was composed as follows:
Mr. Dulles, CIA (presiding)
Mr. Barrett, State (or his representative)
General Magruder, Defense
Admiral Stevens, JCS
This group with the help of staff assistants in each agency has
developed the set of papers of which this is a part.
This group is prepared to continue to sit, if desired by the
Board, to deal with any further preparatory measures that may be
necessary pending the appointment of a Director and his assumption
of his duties.
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FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR AND STAFF
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In order to give effect to the terms of the President's
Directive of April 4, 1951, the responsibilities of the Director
and the functions of the Staff, subject to the Board, should be:
a. to encourage the responsible agencies to produce
ideas in support of psychological operations which include
those matters envisaged under the NSC 59 and NSC 10 series;
b, as necessary, to coordinate, expedite, and ensure the
expansion of the planning and implementing of psychological
policies and programs;
c. to initiate and formulate proposals, including pro-
posals for national psychological strategy, which would be
referred as appropriate to the Board or directly to the
rcap,onsibl.o. operating departments or agencies for develop-
ment and execution;
d. to ensure that the psychological policies, objectives
and programs promulgated by the Board are within the capa-
bilities of execution of the operating agencies or, if not, to
rep...amend to C1i na speciaa aaml4d_ctrtiwe porsonnol
and logistical support as may be required from appropriate
departments and agencies be made available;
e. to make a broad and continuing evaluation of current
and proposed operations in the light of national plans and to
recommend improvements to the operating agencies based on this
review;
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f. to assure that in the determination, pronouncement
and implementation of political, economic and military policies,
adequate attention is given to their psychological effects
and to existing psychological programs;
g. to assure that the programs of psychological operating
agencies will be furthered by U. S. Government official pronounce-
ments;
h. to encourage, receive, and review proposals and research
bearing on psychological operations from private and official
sources outside the operating departments and agencies and to
make these available as appropriate to such agencies;
i. to provide secretariat services, including:
(1) preparation of reports as directed by the Board;
(2) organization of the business of the Board and
expedition of decisions;
(3) promulgation of the decisions of the Board;
J. to assemble such intelligence and such policy and
operational information as necessary for the performance of
the above functions;
k. to examine continually the functions of the Board and
Staff in order to ensure that the facilities and resources of
the participating departments and agencies are utilized to the
maximum extent,
(A proposed chart of organization for fulfillment of
these functions is attached hereto.)
-2-
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PROPOSED ORGANIZATION - PHASE II
BOARD
Learp..??????*
11
aemaring???????????.#
SECRETARIAT
and
IADMINISTRATIVE
0 ONAL
COORDInATION
DIRECTOR
? ????????????????? ???????????
1PROGRAMPAING &I
rVALUATIOr
NOTE: (1) It is expected that each meMber of the Board will designate a deputy whose responsibilities
include all matters over which the Board itself has cognizance. In the absence of the three principal Doard
meMbers at any meeting, the Director vill act as cbairnma. The 'Mord may solicit the advice of non-govern-
mental consultants as required.
(2) No attempt has been made to specify uthich unit or units would perform each et the Stuff runctiona
listed on the preceding page. in view of the small size of the proposed Staff this choald he left to the
Director who iU allocate them in accordance vrith the ,;=142.fIcatic=of711c anT4strt, It
forming these fuactiorsp hmever,.tbe Stafr 71111 te4ille to tile y=4:Irran ent;e:d,. M4111.tes
of the participating de;Parlmentai ana azen=e0.0
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S-E-C-R-E-T TAB C
CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE
DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
IN THE COLD WAR
The attached paper and organization chart has been prepared
by General Magruder and presents a concept toward which the Board
and its Staff might evolve. No new functions as such are envisaged
but it is based on a much broader interpretation of the agreed
functions. While agreeing that "the Board shall utilize to the
maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating
departments and agencies," the group disagreed on what constituted
the "maximum extent." Under the view expressed in TAB B the PSB
and its Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among
existing agencies. Under the concept in the attached the PSB
and its Staff would itself systematically program and control the
psychological strategy of the Cold War. This involves a much
larger independent planning role and much more contact with the
detailed operations of the agencies than could be unanimously
endorsed by the representatives.
Also included under this TAB are comments on General Magruder's
paper submitted by Mr. Howland Sargeant of the State Department.
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REVISED* 21 Nazi 1951
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
CONCEPT OF THE ORGAITIZATION TO PROVIDE
mum PSYCHOTAGICAL OPERATIONS
IN Tu. 0. LB WAR
THE FOBLEI:
2, To analyze the scope and mission of the Psychological Strategy
Board and the tasks of the Director and the Staff; .and to derive there.
from the qUelificatione and Approximate composition of the staff,
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBL1R
2, The pur2ode Of the Executive Directive of 4 April 1951, is
the
'Ito authorize and provide forbore effective planning,
coordination and donoUct, within the frymework of
approved national policies, of psychological opera-
'done')
3. The Psychological Strategy Board is respmasible for the
',formulation and pramulgationsas gaidrace to the.
departments and agencies responsible for paycho.
logical operationi, of over-all national ptYchio.
logical objectives? :olicies and prtgrams, and for
the coordination anaevaluation of the national
psychological effort!'
4. There is provided a Director, decimated by the President, rem
seoneible under the Board for directing its. activities. He is assisted
by. 4 staffs the organization, qua1ifications and size of which, Within
limits set by the Board, are established by him,
DISCUSION?
5. The Directive creates no new operaitng agency. It reedits from a
general sense of need for harnessing the dispart e resources of existiag
departments and agencies responsible for executing various psychological
operations and intensifying the national effort. It includes under the
term "psychological operations'? a uide spectrum t3f overt and covert
activities - from -propagation of truthful foreign information to sub.
versive operations of both a moral and a phytIca2 character.'
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6. In face of the peculiar challenge of Bolshevict Russia, the primary
objective of intensifying these unconventional national efforts is to tin
the cold war and prevent declared global war. Failing this, the second-
ary objective is to create vinc'd.tionr: favorable to our orthodox forces
In the event of uar. If all our resources available for psychological
operations wore bro...ight to bear consistently, progresrively and cumula-
tively, the chances of kee Inc the peace or speedily winning the war
would be immeasurably increased. If that is true, the establishment of
an organisation for exploiting these resources should be consider d a
major national pmject. It should not be undertaken with half measures.
7. Psychological operations are in no manmer a substitute for sound
political...diplomatic actions, strong and forces or alert intelligence.
Psychological operations reflect the strength of all these but trill al..
lays be subsidiary or supplementary to orthodox governmental operations.
Therefore, the functions of the Psychological Strategy Board are not in
competition or conflict with normal operations of the departments and
agencies. Instead, the Board coordinates and steers the resources of
their psychological units Into profitable channels toward national goals.
8. Soviet Russia and the satellites employ every instrumentality of
government, orthodox and unorthodox, in aghting the cold war. Foreign.
offices back up their propaganda; ground, sea and air forces shift and
=newer in support of the psychological var. It is a ficult to say
whether orthodox forces supplement psychological operations or the con.
trary which is dog and which is tail. An Soviet reteurces are de..
ployed actively or potentially in support of war that is now being waged.
As long as they have the initiative, our conventional planning for a
future declared war is constantly thrown off balance and tends to be con-
fused or unrealistic,
AEI
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9. Conventional concepts and plans based upon a L-Day which no man
can predict had us into the dilemma of We dangerous extremes.
Either our state of pzeparedness win be inadequate on the critical
day or over...mobilization long.-drawn-out will be economically destruc-
tive. Particularly is this true because war plans aro based upon
the assumption that ,the cold war cannot be decisive. Planning would
be more realistic if it were assumed that the cold war could be wen
and, if Ten, cculd be decisive, This assumption mould occasion a
modification of conventional war plans but not in such rammer or de..
gree as to alter signiiicantly the state of our prepazedness at any
particular future date, The assumption 'would, however, greatly enhance
the importance to be attached to current cold war operations, enlarge
the concept of such operations and ensure the availability of both
active and potential national facilities (orthodox as well as unortho-
dox) in its concbacte
100 This conceptual background of tie Psychological Strategy Board,
the importance of the rtakes involved, atd the scope and variety of
operations to be coordinated - these all zre indicators of the requi..
site qualifications of the director and his staff,
110 Although tho Board does not perform psychological operations, its
reEpoasibility to give isspotua to an intensified psychological effort
implies considerable power of decision in the initiation and control of
major projects, Likewise, while the psychological operating units vithin
the depart:mats and agencies cannIt be directed by the Board to carry out
its programs, the individual meoabqrs of the Board exp.officio are of such
prestige as to create the presumption that the executing agencies will
oencider guidance approved by the embers as being in effect mandatory.
ZHU,
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(atim4,
011CLUSIONS
12, Kceping in mind this implied authority, the Board, Director and
Staff should exorcice functions canparable to both command and staff
even though their explicit authority limits the nature of 'Iceman&
to guidance, Otherwise expreseeds.the Director and Staff are respon.
Bible for the emagement of the Psychological aspects of the national
cold war effort. Since no single individual could have the (=mete=
or time to manage the global campaign, it seems evident that under the
supervision of the Directors this management must be in part delegated
to staff assistants. A workable arrangenentwouldbe to employ for
this purpose regional and functional specialists, each of whom would
be responsible for assisting in the formulation of and directly
abargvivith steering his part of a coordinated global program,
13. Nero precision can noW be given to the role of the Board,
to the qualifications of the lirector and to the composition and
functions of the Staff.
Tnr BOARD
14, In the specific field of psychological operations the Board
functions begimuhere the functions of the National Security Council
leave off. The Council promulgates broad national policies and prin-
ciples but its reports are too general to constitute blue-prints for
implementation, The Board an the other hand adopts specific and practise
cable objectives and initiates action to attain them, The Board ap.
proves lines of action and programs which assign workable and coordi.
mated tasks to the operating agencies,
150 The members of the Board will be able to give only limited
pers.nal time to the details ofmanagement of national psychological
operations., However, their decisions, %dm translated into dynamic
action programs by the Director and his staff and promulgated to the
repartmonts and Agencies, can give national purpose, consistency and
continuity hitherto impossible in this
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16 'Within the Powers of the Board, the Director should bo.aV,
/wad a high degree of, initiative to act promptly andfisod.lholy in. those
.gael",A7101".111g situations inherent in psychological warfare. He should ?
?
be Supported against bureaucratic inertia or obstruction in bringing
to bear, at favorable opportunities, all national psychological re
sources in order to meintairi the offensive in the cold war.
THE DIRECTOR
%t
17. The Director should be a nationally known figure and have a
broad backgTound in international affairs. Preferably ho should have
experience in more than one aspect of the broad spectrum of activities
comprised in psychological operations as defined in the Presidentvs
Directive. He should be more a man of action than an intellectual
analyst. He should be capable of quick and bold decisions within his
authority, but methodical in directing long.range planning by his staff.
By judgmont and tact he should be able to inspire boamuork in operating
deparbAcnts and agencies.
10. His task is of such national importance as to deserve unhesitating
support from the Board and the Procidaat himself.
As prescribed by the Prosidentes Dtroctive? he shall:
Be responsible for having prepared the programs,
Policies, reports, and recornendations for the
Board's consideration,
Sit uith the Board and be responsible to it for
organizing its business and for expediting the
reaching of decisions,
c. Promulgate the decisions of the Board,
d. Ascertain the manner in which agreed upon objec.,
tives, policies, and programs of the Board are
being implemented and coordinated among the
departments and agencies concerned,
c. Report thereon and on his evaluation of the
national psychological operations to the Board
together uith his recommendations,
f. Perform such other duties necessary to carry out
his responsibilities as the Board may directo
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THE sTATTs
19. The Staff sllould have responsibility ander the Director for
the performance of the following specific factions which cannottipe
delegated to operating agencies:
a. Within the framework of approved national policies0and
as authorized by the Board, the foreulation and premulgation in
practical operating terms (not abstractions) of coordinated world.
wide and regional.
(2) paythological policies,
(2) psychological objectives,
(3) psychological programs.
be Giving impetue to the detailed planning and execution
by the operating agencies,
c. Continuous evaluation of tie reeJlts of operations)
with a view to making prompt adjustmente in the programs whenneces.
sary9
d. The preparation of required reports, .
e. Its own escretariat.adminIstrative duties.
20. The 2oregoing list inadequateyreflects activities required
to give vitality to the conduct of the cold war. It does, however,
suggest the indispensability of dynamde personalities to give flesh
and, blood to the organization a Tr the Director and.6taff giveetham.
selves up to pondering and planning, et shall have suceeedeci. Only in
ectablishing another Ivory Tower. Ibile they must plan systematically
to the extent necessary to formulate mind strategic objectives and
practical programs, the Director and his prindipal assistants should
sense themselves as being fell time 'at the front" In the cold War as
literally as comnanders in orthodox war.
21. As principal aids the Dirac-tee should have certain regional
and functional ehiefs (each with a rem: assistants) sho should be oat'
standing experts in their respective 4eographic.poIitical and functional
areas. These principal subordinates .pre sent in a senne?the- =meanders"
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of the regional operations. Ebre accurately as a group they might
appropriately be called tins
wational Coo an r.......tationtivisionrdinatior
The specific regional 'Staff Sectimes suggested are.
(a) Soviet Russia and European satellites,
? (b) China, South East Asia and Email Asia,
(c) !addle and Near East and Moslem North Africa,
(d)
(e) Latin America.
226 a, In intimate personal liaison with the corresponding
regional heads of the operating agencies, the Chiefs of the fbragoing
staff sections emarcise their steerirg...coordinating fanctiOn
within the terms of the aepraved policies objectives and pro-
gram formulated by the Strategy Group and the Plane and Programa
Division. Also, in collaboration with the latter staff, they assist
in all steps in the formulation of policies, objectives, and pro-
grams applicable to their respective regions. They follow the
development of the operations, evaluate the results and keep the
Director currently informed of modilications which may be required
in the programs,
b. The regional chiefs should be empowered to furnish the
authorized interpretation to operating agencies of approved policies:,
objectives and programs.
c. There should also be provisions for functional specialio
zation as appropriate.
236 The other najor responsibility of the etaff is that of planning
on the nati nal level, that is, the formulation of policies, objectives
and programs as guidance to the operating agencies. These major divi-
sions of the staff might be called the ........z....._11214.2.StrateGrotthelans
and PromeaDivi.s.191.14, These staff divisions, should be reeponaible
for the formulation and communication to the operating departments and
agencies of all types of formal guidance required to initiate the
projects and purposes of the Board.
waTm
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fikatta-91C22.
26 This gr,up sits at the call of the Director and is chaired
by him. Its permanent membership should consist of the Director,
the Board Deeignees and a email group of profeaninnaily skilled
fulI.time consultants. In addition, Regional'andrunctional In.
plementers fran the Operational Coordination and Implementation
Division, as well as consultants from operating departments and
agencies should sit with this group, Ithen the subject of discussion
requires.
250 In addition to routinp business of the Staff, the ftrategy
Group considers policies, objectives and projects originated
by the Board as wen as those self-originated. then approved by.
the Board, they are passed to the Plans and Proems Divieien'for
formulation into coordinated guidances, plans or programs for
promulgation to the operating agencies.
26. It is from the Strategy Group perhaps that the most imagi-
native and consecutive thinking should emerge. It is here that
the global psychological aspects of the cold uar are considered as
whole.. The long-range objectives having been formulated, inters.
mediate objectives are adopted and strategic moves to attain than are
continuously otudiod. The initiative in the col4var is seized at
each f-vorable opportunity. Tho broad terms of the action required
are decided. The Plans and Programs Division then works out coordi-
nated guidance or programs required by the operating agencies to
initiate planning or immediate action, depending upon the nature
and urgency of the operation.
Plans zrnd Pramc Division
27. This is the pla nine unit of the Staff which performs the
mechanics of program planning. Its functions are to incorporate into
coordiatted guidances, plans or programs the strategic decisions and
courses of action app rovod by the Board and to promulgate them to the
operating agenmies. In their final form these guidances, plans and
programs, utile of broad national scope and in a global framework,
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should constitute basic blueprints for action on the part of
one or more of the operating agencies, They should not be per6
mitted to degenerates into abstractions or generalities, but
should be forMulated only in terms of practicable tangible ob-
jectives.
28. A key nucleus of the Plans and Programs Division should be
recruited from the only area of government Ithere Systematic and
coordinated planning is really understood and practiced, namely,
the armed services. Thew key planners salad establieh a pattern
and instinct specialists, diem from ?syehological operating
agenciec, In the essential mechanics of programing, Plans and
programs should be kept realistic by intimate collaboration on
an ad hoc or task basis of regional and functi.onal specialists
frau the operating departments and agencies and from the Operational
Coordin,Ltion and Implementation Dd.Vivi.=
SMEARY OF 0^.CCEPT
29. Planning and operational coorcknaticm should be based
on the assumption that the cold war can be ucu. As a secondary
responsibility only, should the Board permit the energies of the
Staff to be diverted to planning wartime precious as distinct from
current operations. A mall nucleus of planners might appropriataly
be set apart for progrmwaing national. 'plans for psycholoc;ical warfare
in wartime, but major consideration should be given to the currant
operations of the global conflict*
30. Rembering the D-Day for the cold war occvrred several years
ago, the plans and programs Irith which the Board will be primarily
concerned are for a campaign being fought naa, The Board and its
Staff should conceive itself to function as the ?wand and staff
of an army in combat rather than as a department of &fence preparing
for a war to come*
SECRET
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POSSIBLE ORGANIZATION -124ALEKI
Secrztariat
and
Administrative
DIRECTOR
trate Grog.
Director
'Board Designees
Fall and/or part time consultants *
Division Cblefs and Operational
Coordinators
Operational
I
ICoordinatorst Speech Co-
Regional & .ordinator
1
Functional 1
Plans & Programs **
Management
Current
War
iNat onal
Regior.al
Ideology Is Doctrine
* From the Government or private lift?
** Maximum use to be made of regional and functional specialists available in the operating
departments and agencies.
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COMMENTS OF MR. HOWLAND SARGEANT ON
"CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYNAMIC
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR"
The subject paper is a personal expression of General Magruder
designed to be helpful in the establishment of the new Psychological
Strategy Board. While most of the concepts in the paper are ones
with which I would heartily agree, there are a few points to which
I would take exception. These differences are mainly matters of
degree rather than of kind, but it may be useful to try and express
them.
The following principles seem to me to be basic to the success-
ful operation of the Board:
1. Our psychological program will succeed only as personnel
and offices responsible for detailed planning and implementation
perform their functions with greater and greater efficiency. To
impose a large super-structure on top of them and to remove many
of their functions in whole or in part would, I believe, introduce
new requirements for coordination and liaison activities, deal a
serious blow to the morale of persons now engaged in psychological
operations, and in the end result in diminishing rather than
increasing the efficiency of their work. Activities of the new
PSB staff can result either in stifling the initiative of lower
echelons or in inspiring them to greater efficiency. Every effort
should be made to see that the latter result is achieved.
2. With respect to psychological programming, the principal
need which the new Board and its staff can fill is that of formu-
lating very broad government-wide policies, especially such policies
as are presently beyond the competence of any single department or
agency. The application of these policies to concrete operating
situations should be entrusted to the individual agencies. It
should be noted that the tendency in many administrative structures
is to secure the services of competent experts and then to overload
them with details to such a degree that they are unable to devote
more than a very few minutes of their time to the larger picture.
This is especially true in the field of psychological operations.
To over-simplify the matter, it might be said that more exhaustive
attention is often given comparatively minor matters of detail than
to broad questions of major importance. Consequently, it is of
utmost importance that the staff of the now Board and the Director
himself should not be overloaded with detailed matters of administra-
tion or implementation. This is one of the principal reasons for
keeping the staff small and whenever possible arranging for the
delegation of functions to existing agencies.
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3. The number of individuals in the United States who 4
are competent to serve on the staff of the new Board is very small
indeed. A few might be obtained from outside the government, but
the majority of them are already occupied in existing agencies. If
we strip these agencies of their most highly-qualified policy personnel,
we will have lost more than we have gained since, as noted in one
above, the ultimate success or failure of our psychological opera-
tions will depend most of all upon the efficiency of the individual
agencies.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
There are several points at which General Magruder's paper may
conflict with these principles, although it is possible that the
apparent conflict rests in the manner in which certain passages
are interpreted. The following comments are offered by way of
example:
In paragraph 19 on page 6 it is stated that the staff should
be responsible under the Director for the formulation and promulga-
tion in practical operating terms of coordinated world-wide and
regional psychological policies, Objectives and programs. It is
further stated that this function cannot be delegated to operating
agencies. It is my feeling that the staff should in fact delegate
most of the preliminary work in this connection to operating agencies
and should itself be responsible only for the final formulation and
promulgation. Furthermore, this formulation should not, attempt to
be in "operating" terms if this means that the needs of each medium
must be spelled out, nor should it be in "regional" terms if this
means that detailed consideration should be given to the differing
requirements of each country. The implementation of policy by
various communications media and the requirements of specific
regions could more efficiently be spelled out in detail by experts
in the existing agencies.
In paragraph 19c, also on page 6, it is said that the staff
should make a continuous evaluation of the results of operations
with a view to making prompt adjustments in the programs when
necessary. My Objection may be merely a matter of wording, but I
feel that the words "make a prompt adjustment" implies a degree of
involvement in operations which was not contemplated by the
Presidential directive. Perhaps it would be adequate to say merely
that the staff should recommend such adjustments to the operating
agencies.
Paragraph 20 on page 6 expresses the fear that if the Director
and staff give themselves up to pondering and planning, we would
have succeeded only in establishing another Ivory Tower. Herein,
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I believe, there is a difference only in emphasis, but I believe
that this wording might obscure the fact that at the present time
our detailed planning is often far in advance of our long-term
planning. Would it not be bettar to encourage the Director and
staff to "pona.Qr and plaa" as long as this cerebration is harnessed
to the realities of operations. As stated above, we have not given
our most qualified thinkers an opportunity to think. Let us insure
that some of them at least have an opportunity to do so in the staff
of PSB.
Paragraph 21 on page 6 suggests that the staff should include
certain regional and functional chiefs who are outstanding experts
in their respective geographical and functional areas. Certainly
lb is to be hoped that personnel can be found for PSB who will have
certain regional or functional qualifications, but PSB should not
try to compete with the operating agencies when it comes to regional
or functional experts. Instead, PSB policy experts should plan to
rely principally on the regional and functional specialists in the
various agencies.
Paragraphs 23 and 24 suggest the creation of a "strategy
group." It is my feeling that the entire senior staff of the
PSB should be considered such a strategy group and that to create
a special organization so entitled within the PSB staff would imply
that the rest of the PSB staff would be concerned with details which
might more appropriately be left to the operating agencies.
In general, my feeling is that the PSB should strive to
conduct its business with as small a staff as possible and should
attempt to perform only such substantive tasks as are in addition
to those now being performed in the operating departments and
agencies. It may be that this conception is not far removed from
that expressed in General Magruder's paper, but that paper may also
be interpreted as advocating a large staff which would to a large
extent duplicate or supplant certain functions of existing agencies.
These comments, therefore, are intended only to highlight the dif-
fering interpretations which are possible and to assist in their
resolution.
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SECRET
PROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION.
1. The attached list contains substantive problems
which it is suggested the Board should consider. Although
work is already going forward to some extent on all these
items, the amount of progress varies considerably. It is
recommended that the Board select the most important and
urgent ones and direct their staffs to expedite the pre-
paration of papers for PSB consideration.
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I. Substantive Problems
11. 1,212E:Taralja21,saLp_ (See attached)
1. Psychological strategy in the Cold War
2. Psychological measures to insure that constructive
relationships can be maintained and developed
among the United States and the governments and
peoples of nations, as in NATO, whose cooperation
is essential to the national security.
3. Campaign to improve the personnel situation in
psychological operations
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5.
Survey of policy planning and research in the field
of psychological operations
Survey of activities evaluating the effectiveness of
psychological operations
III. Administrative
1. National psychological warfare and special operations
personnel control and allocation
2. Measures to refine operational psychological warfare
techniques
3. Cover and deception in current national usvcholop:ical
warfare toward USSR
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SUGGESTED INITIAL PROJECTS FOR PSB
I. Psychological Strategy in the Cold War
Many individuals working in the field of psychological opera-
tions in the Cold War have felt the absence of a "grand-strategy" --
a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all efforts can
be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a
strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short
period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes
far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists.
These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operations
planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand
strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board
gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they have had
heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks
of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formu-
late a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the Cold War.
A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:
1. Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's
very best brains from both inside and outside the govern-
ment in the field of psychological operations and making
provision to see that they have facilities for concentrated
work. The group should also include experts in political
and military strategy. It is felt that the prestige of
the Board will be such that it can command the services
of individuals who would not ordinarily be available
to work personally on such a project.
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2. A working place outside Washington should be designated
for meetings. It has been noted in previous similar cases
that it is much simpler to enable top quality men to work
on problems of this sort personally (rather than delegating
them to subordinates) if they can be insulated from the
pressure of routine duties. This insulation procedure is
commonly adopted by such agencies as Brookings and RAND
with a considerable measure of success.
3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad
problems as the following:
a. What psychological and other measures can be taken to
restrain Soviet aggression?
b. What psychological and other measures Can be taken to
strengthen our allies and potential allies?
c. How may the best statement of U. S. ideology be
arrived at?
d. How can our Cold War aims be defined?
4. The following measures should be taken in preparation for
this working group:
a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place,
secretarial help, security, etc.
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b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of
NSC papers and Presidential statements having a bearing
on psychological operations,)
c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, as
needed.
5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four
day period at the beginning of the summer and for a three or
four day period toward the end of the summer. In between the
two full meetings sub-groups should be asked to work on
spLcific phases of the overall problem.
6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be viewed as an
effort to work out a national policy binding on all agencies.
It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:
a. From the point of view of psychological operations, what
should our national policy be?
b. How may existing national policy be exploited more
effectively through psychological operations?
II. A Long-Term Campaign to Improve the Personnel Situation in
Psychological Operations
This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to
improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce
superior personnel who already have the available qualifications to
enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A
considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been
accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to the
second part might be as follows:
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(1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside
the government what their principal objections to entering
government service are.
(2) Work out:, with all agencies affected, a long-term publicity
program designed to attract first-rate personnel.
(3) Approach key members of Congress with a view to obtaining
their support in this campaign.
III. Policy Planning and Research Survey
This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary
PSB with outside advice solicited as needed, should attempt to answer
the following questions:
1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the
field of psychological operations is currently going on?
2. What basic research .P1- psychological operations in the cold
ukAl cula hut war is currently going on?
3. What additional planning and research is needed, and what
agencies should undertake it?
IV. Survey of Evaluation Activities
This survey should be undertaken along the same lines as the
pb0Ve.
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