PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300400008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 13, 1953
• Content Type: MF

iApprobed For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003300400008-8
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SE~ CET
March 13, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD:
SUBJECT: Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's
Death.
Transmitted herewith is a revised text of a draft plan on
Stalin's death for consideration at the Boardts_meeting on
March 19th As instructed, I have consolidated written and oral
comments in this revision, Since no editing was authorized, the
paper still shows the diffuseness and some of the imperfect
coherence which were due to its hasty preparation.
I would like to stress particularly the importance of
assumption 3 do on page 2, It was the thought of the drafting
group that the main value of the contemplated speech would hinge
upon its embodying a new policy initiative as distinguished from
a novel appeal based on e:isting policies. Only the most careful
precautions in this regard seem likely to prevent the new offen-
sive from being discounted as "psychological warfare".
25X1
c n ne-e or.
Draft Outline, Plan for Psychological
Exploitation of Stalin Ys Deaths,
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SECURITY INFORMATION
March 13, 1953
DRAFT OUTLINE
PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH
PART I INTRODUCTION
1. Problem
a, The problem is to de+rloa a plan of psychological operations as
one part of a comprehensive and decisive program for the exploitation of
Stalints death and the transfer of power to new hands in order to make
real progress toward our national objectives,,
be No once.-fcr-all psychological plan is possible in the present
situationE, Psychological operations,, like other actions must be capable
of rapid and flexible adjustment to changes in the situation. Therefore,
a strong,, high-level, continuing interdepartmental working group should
be especially constituted to keep psychological, plans and operations under
continuous review and in harmony with national policy,,
2. Basic Consider ticna
a. Psychological operations by themselves cannot have sufficient
impact on the Soviet system to produce those changes which we would regard
as real. progress toward our national objoctives4 They can only contribute
to the success of diplomatic, political,, military, and economic actions
taken by the United States Government, or aggravate stresses which emerge
within the Soviet system itself. They should be fully geared into a compre-
hensive and decisive pr6gram for the exploitation of Stalin's death..
be It is beyond the scope of this paper to say what the elements of
such a program should be. However, it has been essential in drawing up this
plan of psychological operations to make certain assumptions about national
policy. The assumptions adopted for the purposes of this paper are set
forth in paragraph 3 below. If these assumptions are in error, the plan
for psychological operations will have to be adjusted accordingly,,
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SECURITY IN-FORMATION DRAFT
3/13/53
3. Assumptions
a. It is assumed that the fundamental objectives of the United
States with respect to the Soviet system remain as stated in the relevant
National Security Council papers, namely, NSC 20/4, NSC 68, NSC 114, and
NSC 135. In essence, these fundamental objectives are:
(1) To bring about a retraction of Soviet power and influence
from the satellites and Communist China and thus a reduction of Soviet
power and influence in world affairs;
(2) to bring about a fundamental change in the nature of the
Soviet system--which would be reflected above all in the conduct of inter-
national relations by the Soviet regime in a manner consistent with the
spirit and purpose of the United Nations Charter.
b. It is assumed that the United States Government intends to exploit
to the full the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties
inherent in the transfer of power to make progress toward these ends,
c. It is assumed that the United States Government will undertake a
comprehensive and decisive program of action-involving whatever diplomatic,
political, military, and economic measures are appropriate and are within
our capabilities--to make real progress toward our national objectives and
that this plan for psychological operations, as revised from time to time
is part of this massive and integrated campaign,
d. Finally, it is assumed that the initial major move in this national
campaign will be a Presidential speech outlining a United States program for
peace End possibly.-propos:i,tag-axe eartly k igh