LETTER TO THE HONORABLE GORDON GRAY FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300410030-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 1, 1951
• Content Type: LETTER

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1 November 1951
The Honorable Gordon Gray
Director, Psychological Strategy Board
708 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington,, D. C,
I return herewith the material from Eli Ginsberg
which you sent me with your note of 26 October 1951,
I have taken a copy of it in order to have an opportunity
to give it further study. Father Z4orlion, whose memorandum
he encloses, worked with me in New York during the early
days of the war. I have a moat favorable impression of
him.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Distributions
prig - Addressee
1 cc - DDCI Chrono
1 cc - PSB file ./'
1 cc - Exec. Reg.
ARMY review(s) completed.
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 ADDRESS OFFICIAL rove TFor Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003300410030-2
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 23. D. C. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
.
October 26, 1951
Ginzberg about which I spoke to you
last night. I should appreciate your
returning it to me after you have had
a chance to read it, as I have not
yet acknowledged its receipt.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Gordon Gray, Director
Psychological Strategy Board
708 Jackson Place
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Gray:
s'0 October 1951
I appreciate the fact that I had an opportunity to talk with
you yesterday about my recent trip to SHAPE, EUCOM, and England.
"iy only regret is that in so doing I added to your already tight
schedule.
In accordance with our conversation? I am putting down on paper
the major points which I reviewed with you. I am dividing my
comnents into three parts: diagnosis, conclusions, and recom
:aeaId-tions.
-le diagnosis :
to .er mr __ Our desire to ;et on with the defense of
iiestern Europe has made very bad traders of us in the
case of the Germans. We have failed to remember the
extent to which all Germany policy is dictated by the
sheerest type of opportunism. We have likewise under-
timated the extent to which there will always be a
-11 between West Germany and East Germany. (7,ermarIs
recovery on the economic front hias been remarkable
nd we are really confronted with a new "German problem" .
One of the mos t serious shortcomings of American policy
?as been our lack of effective relations with the
Sri list- o position. The TT.S . m?_s t look forward to
increasin 21y difficult problem in Western Europe
bec?i'use of. they improved bargaining position of the
f ermans , who will use their strength to the full.
b, Trance -- The whole of French life, political, economic,
social, is frozen. Despite our post-war assistance,
have f iled to really win the middle third to our
ride. x.11 that one can sav is that we have not lost
^ as yet. We did very little for the working classes
when we 'w'ere pouring money in via ECP,. Now that we are
trying to get the French to accelerate their rearmament
pro-ram, the already unsatisfactory economic conditions
( E? t
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of the masses will probably deteriorate. The political
implications for the U.S. are obvious. Although most
Frenchmen are looking for a "new deal", they have no
reason to expect that they can receive one via American
effort.
C. Italy -- If the situation in France is unsatisfactory,
that of Italy is definitely dangerous. There is a real
chance that the Communists may win a free election. As
in France, the government is uninterested or unable,
probably both, to tackle effectively important areas
where reforms are sorely needed. Even in plants run
completely with ECA funds? the government has not pre-
vented Communist trade unionists from getting a strangle-
hold, The only party that promises the workers anything
is the Communist Party. If the Communists should gain
a 40 odd percent vote, one must assume that some of the
weak politicos will try to join the bandwagon. The
situation remains most precarious.
d. En land -- The political situation is of an entirely
Brent order as far as the U.S. is concerned as
compared with Germany France, and Italy. The British
are substantially united and are basically committed to
the same-values as we are. However, their economy is
very taut. One must not overlook the fact that the
Scottish trade unions supported Aneurin Bevan. U.S.
policy must be careful not to push the British over the
economic brink as far as the internal domestic situation
is concerned. We may have an option of more loans and
more rearmament, or slower rearmament.
Re conclusions :
a. The U.S. has not become identified in Western Europe
with a "new deal" for the masses of the population.
b. Neither the U.S. nor its democratic allies have an
effective personality similar to Stalin. Eisenhower
has potentials but not as long as he is on active
military duty.
c. Our - overanxiousness to get a German contribution for
defense has led to the creation of a new German problem.
d. As far as France and Italy are concerned, we must
be careful that our defense preoccupation does not
set the stage for what might be called a "Chinese
solution', in which we do a little and not enough and
eventually lose the country to our opponents.
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e. We have failed to date to differentiate short- and long-
run objectivds and have paid insufficient attention to
the priority issues under both heads. We should be
pushing the French and the Italians much more than we
are to mess up their local Communists; on the other
hand, we ought to be at work on long-term problems
such as Italian unemployment.
fQ The frozen situation in France can give probably only
via a series of reforms which are supra-national
Likewise, there is probably no chance of keeping the
Germany problem under control except within a broader
context of Western European effort. Although the U.S..
has begun to push along these lines, there is much
more which we can and should do.
g. There is a lack of effective integration of American
effort -- diplomatic, economic, and military. To the
extent that there is formal leadership via the ambassa-
dors, we suffer from the historically passive State
Department approach.
Recommendations:
a. It is important to use every means at our disposal,
the Catholic Church, trade unions, editors, etc., to
correct the picture that most Americans now have that
ECA solved the Western European problem. We must get
the country prepared for the long pull without permitting
it to become too discouraged,
b. There is the utmost need for organizational and leader-
ship changes to intensify the effectiveness of American
effort on the three fronts of diplomatic economic,
and military aid. Care should be taken in such a. reform
to be sure that there is civilian control rather than
military control at the top.
c. Closely related to the foregoing is the need for some
tougher operators in countries where we must seek to
push the Communists back rapidly, as in Italy and
France. The search for proper personnel who combine
diplomatic, military, and psychological strength will
admittedly be very difficult.
do To the extent that we still retain certain important
controls 'aver Germany, we should be careful to hold
on to them and not bargain them away foolishly. The
Germans should be forced to demonstrate over a consid-
erable period of time that they are really with us
before we trust them.
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e, The U,S, should accelerate the support which it has
begun to give to French leadership in working toward
Western European integration,
f. It is most important that in all future aid a conscious
effort be made to identify what the U,S. is doing in
Western Europe with a "new deal" for at least a part
of the population. There is no reason why we should
not establish minimum labor standards, etc. in our
current offshore procurement program. Every action
that the U.S. takes should have something positive
about it for the local population. In the last analysis
we must win this population or we lose everything.
Although I have tried to be as brief as possible, I regret that
the letter grew to four pages. But then Western Europe really
is quite a problems
I am enclosing, as you requested I should, a copy of the
document prepared by the Vatican group on the Italian situa-
tion, which, as I mentioned to you takes anything but an
optimistic point of view, I cannot, however, refrain from
commenting on the fact that despite the quite pessimistic ap-
praisal, the solutions recommended -- food packages -- seem
hardly adequate, This reemphasizes the fact that the groups
that have the most to lose in Western Rurope are still looking
for a very cheap solution,
Is there anything on paper about the scope and responsibili-
ties of the Psychological Strategy Board? I would be much
interested to learn at least a little about the direction of
your present efforts.
With kind regards,
Sincerel,y' yours f
Eli Ginzberg
Consultant
Enclosure
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M iORANDUM OF FATHER MORLION, PRESIDENT OF
THE INTERNitTIONAL UNIVERSITY "'R0 DFO" W11+.
CONCLUSIONS FOR IM DIATL ACTION IN FACT OF THE INC1?
SOCIAL-COM; UNIST THREA1T
Having been called for consult,.Lion by heads of the-Catholic Apostolate
and by responsible Christian Democratic Leaders, I must affirm in the name of
our whole s7.,aff of specialists in tie study of communist psychology, that based
upon the experience of the adminibtrativ,; elections held in May and June 1951,
the situation is definitely more dangerous in Italy today than in 1948. As de-
scribed in the full pu~;e story of Time Magazine of March 28th, 1949, the Citi-
zens Committee (Comitati =ivici) created by the 3,000,000 strong Catholic Ac-
tion Organization of Italy (Prof. dedda), made use of the methods of applied
psychology and public debates taught in the "t'ro Deo" University, in their
decisive battle'a,~ainst communism. This seemed to stop the political advance
of communislt in Italy - strategically the most important country in Europe.
The weekly organ of the "Pro Deo" Ora Dell'Azione (The Hour of Action),
which became the organ of the Comitati Givici, documented 105,000 local lead-
ers of propaganda during the decisive battle of 1948 and seemed to have mobilized
dormant Christian forces to the extent that the co_nnunists themselves admitted
they had been licked by superior Catholic propa-anda methods. Notwithstanding
the clear cases of revolt within the communist party (famous Cucchi-Magiani
incident), and the general political .skepticism v;hich developed s'rintly
amongst communist masses in 1949 and 19 1, the administrative elections of
1951 h:ve,been a surprise showing a definite strengthening of the communist
socialist bloc.
1) . The lon;rams dan3.er in the increase of communist in Its, IV - The elections
of North Italy held 27th May and June 1951 show (according to the definite
figures published by the important independent aaily "Tempo") that in the major
cities alone the socialist communist bloc has gathered 1,y64,667 votes in 1951
against 1,471,808 in the elections of 1948 and 1,245,128 in the administrative
elections of 1946. The elections of the 3rd of Jane 1951 in 6icily are ,von
more iapresuive; the Socialist-Communist bloc gathered 64,641 in 1951 against
454,088 in 1948 and 591,870 in 1947. The indisputable evidence of the rein-
forced power of the con unist party brings us face to farce with a much greater
peril than in 1948 with the follovrinL consequences:
a).. The masses of the left have taken courage aLain and have embarked on in-
creased propaganda which will permit more dangerous political strikes and
pre-revolutionary az,itation. Following; the setback of 1948 the communists
have obeyed the orde_?s from Moscow, creating central, ro,ional and local
schools for leaders which as confirmed by the nest secret sources, have cost
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them in 1950 alone more than 1 1/2 million dollars. They now have many
thousands of extremely efficient propai,andists who are, as a result of long
and careful training, pro:,ably superior to the majority of the Christian Dem-
ocratic propa;;andists - who only et moving in election time - and Catholic
Action men who are not used to methods of infiltration. The communist propa-
gandists are well paid __nd sell the party papers in every house which is open
to their influence, are powerful in every factory, and have spent according to
trusti.orthy estimates lit the last three years over 18 million dollars in prop-
a ,ands. After the strong affirmation of the anti-comunist :.:arty l.hich obtained
absolute majority in 1948, the phenomenon of fear which brought the masses to
follow communist loaders might h::ve disapp(.!ared. As it is not proved that the
socialist-coimauriist biL c has s trenghened while the strongest anti-co-c' ' unist
party has lost at lease 15 of votes, the way is open again to bring many more
of the politically undecided ~:orkers into the orbit of the numerous communist
organizations who have succeeded in impressi~z;, the _masses as being the most
efficient fighters for peace and for social justice.
b). As tho bloc of marxist parties repre ants nearly 40A of the votes, the -
co,,i,nunist 1>aders now only need an alliance with about 10X of the voters to
form amajority for a new government. ambitious political leadex?s of smaller
parties will ..:,e tempted more and more to join with the. Leftist bloc to oust
the ohristian Democratic leaders and it is clear that any government with com-
munist majority would quickly succeed with the well-known so-called democratic
methods in creating a marxist dictatorship.
c). The U.S.S.R. can now act with more force knowing that the Italian fifth
column, strongest communist party in the world after Russia, is more efficient
than ever. The faction in the Polit Buro of Aoscow, which bases its arguments
for speedy a;ression on the assumption that democratic strength in Western
Europe is disintegrating, now occupies a str_nger position. The ;,r-ves peril
to peace is not so much the i,.lea in Russian minds that the U.S.S.R. possesses
the atomic bomb and superior armies, but the idea that ourope can be conquered
without any grave resistance by means of sabotage by the Fifth Columns.
2a). There is a basisibr optimism based on striking facts reaardin the non-
communistic idealoy of Italian mom,-jers of the Communist party.
If it were a fact that during the last three years large masses of the
people had continued to vote for the communist party as the result of a real
Marxist conviction, the realistic conclusion ww-uld be that it is now too late
to try to divert the masses from communist and socialist parties. Our reason
for optimism, however, is based on the true fact that the majority of the work-
ers who follow communist leaders are individualists at heart and are naturally
disposed to prefer the principles and practice of individual freedom to this
totalitarianism. Italian communism is, in fact, a sentimental reaction rather
than a deeply rooted conviction. It is a product of 5 years of very clever
deceptio, of the public opinion and the possibility clearly exists that if we
act now *.th intelligence and decision we shall{ brim; the majority of Italians,
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rho do not really agree with communist doctrines; to get out of the close cir-
cle of the Marxist political organization.
b). 'While the communists have made great efforts to form leaders and propa-
gandists in order to indoctrinate the masses, the religious and democratic
forces have stepped up the classes of training schools for anti-communist pro-
pagandists, political leaders, and trade unionists, etc. The fact that the
"Pro Dec" University accepted during the last 3 years 3,271 subscriptions for
the 4 year courses in Rome and gave in addition short courses in applied
psychology in 82 res;ional centers for many thousands of dynamic intellectuals
and workers, assures that the longrange mobilization of leaders will be possible.
c). The two most deeply rooted doctrines in the Italian people which can be
vitalized by modern means of propaganda to overcome communist pressure are -
repugnance of class hatred and a deep religious sentiment.
Probes and inquiries made by the experts of t re National University "Pro
Deo" in 240 typical groups of workers through Italy have shown that 95% of the
people would endorse the following opinion. "We do not want to suppress the
rich as we cannot do the job of our employer and director ourselves, but we
only want to be paid decently and to see that work be found for all."
During the last year in more than 100 towns and villages about 400,000
communist have listened to our speeches and taken part in debates on the sub-
ject of private enterprise. These Communists have demonstrated genuine admir-
ation for manufacturers who have taken commercial risks to raise output and
bring more security to their workers and new jobs for the unemployed. Class
hatred has not yet found its roots and there is also no hatred for the Ameri-
can people. It would be sufficient to start systematically to broadcast examples
of solidarity and justice on the basis of Christian sentiment to create a very
strong; competition to the superficial communist slogans and anti-Americanism.
Polls made in 1,400 typical circles confirmed that 97% of the wrokers
still believe in God and in the moral rule of the Gospel. 'thenever a religious
approach is made there is a very sincere response and if the communist masses
can be informed patiently and clearly about the athiest nature of communism
they can be brought to choose a Christian affirmation of social justice instead
of the atheist one.
5). The Methods of applied psychology for immediate action in public opinion.
Forseeing the danger, which is now more decisive than in 1948, the "Pro Deo"
specialists have launched in September 1950 a new kind of organ "Unions Popolare"
in.which workers can write about their concrete problems. This non-political
organ has now created deeply rooted sympathies in,all communist circles because
whereas even in the "Unita" and other communist organs the worker finds articles
written about him by journalists (who are practically bourgeois) the Jnione
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Popolare" publishes articles written and signed bar authentic workers together
with their photographs and objective reports of an inquiry continued in each
number on the :genuine misery of the most underpaid families: what they eat,
how they dress, what they think and what they desire. There are in Ttaly
30,000 parishes and approximately 60,000 Paris Priests, and t.,is is a type of
capillary ors-anization pith which even th.: communists cannot compete. On the
basis of this new psychological formula and with the help already provided by
the same Chritian propagandists who in 1948 have worked in each of the 30,000
parishes we can 9~~icceed In crnatin.c a real popular moveciont in competition with
the come+unist, rr, the and propc Ban(la.
a) . The first characteristic of the ca pain must be a rca,lly sens;-:tional ex-
pression of human solidarity, which fires the iira;.,ination of the ne,.oses- Up to
now the comniunintr have won the f' rat round ?.itl-_ tncir storics ar,_:: pictures of
the communist paradise and have succeedred in making even the gifts of kmerican
democracy hateful as beiri: i olitical charity serving to snslave. Italian v:orkers
to American imperialism and capitalisri. Tn the past-, the ,ier.icr:n ;.ifts and
packages have not been ver:,? carefully advertised and the masses d _d not see,
in fact, which clanfses of peoplu were practically saved b?,r this assi_s-i,axace. The
new angle which would reatly impres the ima, .nation of tU,o r:iasses is the fol-
lowin . There are305,000 :families with an income of ']_'Os thaw 1S doll~rs per
month am-' tr.erss are 1,704,000 families v,lth an income of less tnen '70 collars
per month. If international Christian and deiT.acra t c solic.urit e rs to work
in Italy - el exists 40 of all the unemplc? r;J in -urone F,^.d fu3? tshe.s food
packages an.. clothes, ehc. - first to he most i3st.1.tute families - this prac-
tical action will have more psycholo:-ical effect a ,;ainst communism than any
other form of propa;Yana. In fact, communist poll i icians claim they aurm-,at by
strikes the wages of the workers in factories and offic(vs. `ju+ those workers
already earn more than 30 dollars per monta. vorinunisrn ne:;loots the poorest
classes who are not for then the rust )olitically active. A strewn' of assist-
ance very clearly directed to these low well authenticated cases will soon make
social solidarity and does work while communist speeches and strikes have never
brought any help to the poorest in Italy.
b). 'The second characteristic of ti.,_; carnpaL,,n must be the tuildin::; uu of
numerous personolities to Yhich the sympathies can be directed. Up to now,
Stalin and the national communist leaders are for the masses the proc:ical friends
of the working mcn who fic=;ht for their ri hts. This time in e-~ch parish there
must be one or more Italian working men to take the initiative, through the
"Unione Populare", of working- together with non-ideologically convinced commun-
ists and maintaining correspondence with foreign individual workers. This cor-
respondence with fellow workers abroad would unite in a vay more rail than the
communist method the proletariate of the other countries. The packa,-es would
include photographs and letters from the workers who must represent their fellow
workers. Tae difference between anonymous gifts from a government or ,tfts from
family members or friends abroad and the kind of gift which expresses in an or-
ganized way the worker's solidarity is of very trcat-psycholocical importance.
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c). The third characteristic of the campaign must be the permanent contact with,
and infiltration into the communist masses. The inquiries to be made in each
parish with the help of the parish Driest and parisl-, doctor to describe con-
1 the miser of the most underpaid families is a crk which creates con-
-v f itant contact between the Crristia-is and the co imuniet masses. Up to now, the
conwnists thems3lves have always complai.nwd that "the Christians only come to
us when it is election time." In fact, this lack of penetration in popular
circles in a permanent vrarr has been the ryreatest error of democrats in Italy.
It is an illusion to think t',!,t Christians Dan be breu,,ht to cont,3ct re ularly
the communist passes with idealcot_i cal purposes. In he method of the "inione
Popo,lare", `_'.o -aver, systematz'c irquir-r on -d-ye most desperate humaa cases with
a guarantee that concrete help will follow Ii t5 penetration becor-o s attractive
and easy. Instead of giving a few t.c all those who Pfterv,rarrls are angry
because they do not ;et enor14-1:, i_e hetttr t,c find o -M, w}_ich families can be
saved by one package per month, (whi :;: v;clu.ld cte::rly double their income). It
is this permanent help for t''e pocrL +,",Jci) tliiic?~' the reatest impression.
Although nobody i'i.th con on sers'j exjccts this now form?.113 of sollc.arity to
really solve t`ne _,roblers of tnis_:r-.- ir: Ltalr -~ herw is no doubt that by contacts
made in this way a very powers l current of public opinion in favor of t'hristian
democracy and a=;&inst corrnunism can be creator:. -'_e a:o,,' the, other forms
of social justice, in fact, can Lhe presented s,rau.,all. , month by month, after
this first move of practical so7_id rig:: to those w:.c uut, to rrcw have only lis-
tened to co,oplain .3 and calumnies. rr.or-, ~::~ c>rta t still; the -practical
work to be done v:ith these inquiries, t'ese letters rc v:ri.tten, this
organization of help for t',-he poorest of toe ,-.e rr~_c`i_cal scaool
of the future Christian leaders who gust ~--e cc*!uo:_le nr' vcrkin like corn unist
propagandists always on the roar: aru in the houses of the people.
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