MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN DIRECTOR'S CONFERENCE ROOM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2 JULY 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 2, 1951
• Content Type: MIN

NSC.revievy(s) completed.
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PSB-M-1
2 July 1951
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Minutes
of
Meeting held in Director's Conference Room,
Central Intelligence Agency, 2 July 1951
Lieut. General W. Bedell Smith, Director of Central.
Intelligence
Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Edward Barrett, for the Under Secretary of State
Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Mr. Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
1. Initial discussion was based on the agenda proposed in
the memorandum of 1 June 1951 from Mr. Dulles to the Director of
Central Intelligence. In view of Mr. Gray's appointment:, discus-
sion of the proposed interim procedure (TAB A of that memorandum)
was not necessary. The proposed functions and organization of the
Staff (TAB B) was passed over as it was considered a non-contro-
versial paper. The basic difference of view brought out in General
Magruder's and Mr. Sargeant's papers was discussed briefly but no
decision or recommendation was made. It was agreed that Mr. Gray
should have an opportunity to discuss the matter with various
interested people before forming an opin:Lon.
2. General Smith stated his view that the principal factor
missing in our psychological set-up at the present time is a
"master plan" similar to the plan of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
in the last war when it was decided to concentrate first; on Germany
and then turn on Japan. He pointed out that everything else would
logically flow from such a plan and that economic programs, covert
missions, and VOA policies should be related to it.
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2 July 1951
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2 July 1951
3. General Smith felt that the PSB and its Staff should work
on the preparation of this master plan and act as a high-levelpro-
jectereview board to allocate missions to the various agencies and
to survey the effectiveness of operations in progress.
FUNDS, SPACE, AND PERSONNEL
4. The Board agreed that Mr. Gray and his Staff should be
physically located on "neutral ground" apart from any one of the
participating agencies.
5. It was understood that of CIA would assist Mr.
Gray in working out with Mr. Finan oz e Bureau of the Budget and
representatives of State and Defense the necessary arrangements
regarding funds and office space for the Board and Staff. General
Smith agreed to try to make certain slots available for the immediate
hiring of some high-level consultants to be assigned to the PSB.
RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS
6. The relation of the Board to the NSC was discussed briefly,
and it was understood that the Board would occupy a position some-
what similar to that of the Senior Staff, reporting directly to the
NSC. Coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be effected
through their representative with the Board, Admiral Stevens.
7. The supporting role of the O/PC Consultants and Mr. Barrett's
Psychological Operations Coordinating Board was mentioned and the
possibility was raised of combining these two groups while preserving
separate overt and covert staffs. It was agreed, however, that no
change should be made at the present time inasmuch as both groups
were operating satisfactorily
SCOPE OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS"
8. The point was made that the scope of the Board's responsi-
bility is very broad and covers every kind of activity in support
of U S. policies except overt shooting and overt economic warfare.
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2 July 1951
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SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)
1. Attached are papers which have been prepared interdepart-
mentally and approved for presentation to the Psychological Strategy
Board (PSB) by the principal advisers tc the members of that Board,
2. It is our recommendation that you authorize the distribution
of these papers to the members of the PSB with a view to calling a
first meeting of the Board in the near future.
3. It is suggested that the ar,ende for the first meeting of
the Board might be as follows:
a. To consider the proposed interim procedure (TAB A).
b. To approve the proposed functions and organization of
the Director and his Staff as an aid to the new Director in
setting up his organization (TAB B).
c. To note the paper (TAB C) prepared by General Magruder
regarding his concept of the Board and the organization chart
which has been developed to implement this concept. They are
put forward to suggest the eventual. nature of the Board and its
Staff. It is not endorsed by all the participants and if, as,
and when it is discussed representatives of the departments
and agencis should have an opportunity to present their views.
There is also attached under TAB C a paper submitted by
Mr. Howland Sargcant of the Department of State commenting on
General Magruder's paper,
d. To consider the relationship of the Psychological
Strategy Board to the National Security Council.
c. To consider future:: business of the Board (TAB D).
ALLTEN W. DIJLIES
Deputy Director (Plans)
Central Intelligence Agency
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S-E-C-R-E-T TAB A
INTERIM PROCEDURE
In order to move ahead with the organization of the PSB the
chairman, General Walter Bedell Smith, suggested that informal
me tinge be held among the representatives of the participating;
agencies in order to outline the field of work of the Board. Three
such meetings have been held. The first under the chairmanship of
General Walter Bedell Smith and the second and third under that of
Mr. Allen Dulles. This group was composed as follows:
Mr. Dulles, CIA (presiding)
Mr. Barrett, State (or his representative)
General Magruder, Defense
Admiral Stevens, JCS
This group with the help of staff assistants in each agency has
developed the set of papers of which this is a part.
This group is prepared to continue to sit, if desired by the
Board, to deal with any further preparatory measures that may be
necessary pending the appointment of a Director and his assumption
of his duties.
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S-E-C-R-E-T TAB B
FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR AND STAFF
In order to give effect to the terms of the President's
Directive of April fit, 1951, the responsibilities of the Director
and the functions of the Staff, subject to the Board, should be:
a. to encourage the responsible agencies to produce
ideas in support of psychological operations which include
those matters envisaged under the NSC 59 and NSC 10 series;
b, as necessary, to coordinate, expedite, and ensure the
expansion of the planning and implementing of psychological
policies and programs;
c, to initiate and formulate proposals, including pro-
posals for national psychological strategy, which would be
referred as appropriate to the Board or directly to the
respon ible operating departments or agencies for develop-
ment and execution;
d. to ensure that the psychological policies, objectives
and programs promulgated by the Board are within the capa-
bilities of execution of the operating agencies or, if not, to
roe-amend to th e Bawd +lzob -ucl1 s3)ecis.1 ndm3.ai~trstivc p.3i o inol
and logistical support as may be required from appropriate
departments and agencies be made available;
e. to make a broad and continuing evaluation of current
and proposed operations in the light of national plans and to
recommend improvements to the operating agencies based on this
review;
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f. to assure that in the determination, pronouncement
and implementation of political, economic and military policies,
adequate attention is given to their psychological effects
and to existing psychological programs;
g. to assure that the programs of psychological operatin?;
agencies will be furthered by U. S. Government official pronounce-
ments;
h. to encourage, receive, and review proposals and research
bearing on psychological operations from private and official
sources outside the operating departments and agencies and to
make these available as appropriate to such agencies;
i. to provide secretariat services, including:
(1) preparation of reports as directed by the Board;
(2) organization of the business of the Board and
expedition of decisions;
(3) promulgation of the decisions of the Board;
j. to assemble such intelligence and such policy and
operational information as necessary for the performance of
the above functions;
k. to examine continually the functions of the Board and
Staff in order to ensure that the facilities and resources of
the participating departments and agencies are utilized to the
maximum extent.
(A proposed chart of organization for fulfillment of
these functions is attached hereto.)
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NOTE; (3.) It is expected tb t each .:a"..rbez of t car ffaa:;. lick>d
aw c ty cze responsibilities
ic ttde all tte ^savez ?ich the Board itse f .e Pcc '? ce, I a the bsei ce o -,,he three p ca pal B:o ,.
members at a mectingp the Director will p. t aG c irmaa The Dcax'd =y Z,011cit the ?= roe ice:-
mental co sh,. ztte as reeu re , G
fisted ,~ the . tte rt has been e to s ti r ~c
h iz it cr uxzit; ;; cM1 ;J` a.e aff me cq}
preceding p' ee .max pie,a of t 7a.1 i} u' vie _ rpcze k.r ^ ~. ~ti? y ' + .., .~'?
,i.a~R. act "rY, .vtl1 c v x`.?.` TT,,,A 'Rr'!~ 'C 4~n.r. ?R ns,
f, Perform such other duties necessary to carry out
his responsibilities as the Board may direct,
f%;, n iT
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THE
39. The Staff o? ould have rereponu bility iiWer the Director for
the performance of the following specific functions trhich cannot e
delegated to operating agencies:
as U ithin the frametrorkc of approved national policies,and
as authorized by the Board, the forialation ;and pr:mulgation in
practical operating terms (not abstractions) of coordinated uo:rld4
wide and regional
(2.) psychological policies?
(2) psychological objectives,
(3) psychological progrems?
bo Giving impetuu to the detai',od pl?mning and er cution
by the operating agencies,
co Continuous evaluation of thaba rea.Its of operations,
witch, a view to makisxg profit adjuetmentLi in the programs when n ces-
aarj,
d0 The preparation of requl d reportsg
e. Its own oecretarlat z th strativs duties.
'2j? The foregoing list inadequatae~~7 reflects activities required
to give vitality to the conduct of the cold wars It does,, ho-uever,
suggest the indispensability of dyyn 4 personalities to give flesh
and blood to the orgax.nat ton6 If the Director and Staff give them-
selvos up to pondering and planning, vA shall have succeeded only in
o. tablishing another Ivory Towor. this they mu.it plan systematieally
to the extent necessary to for ate a hand strategic objectives and
practical programs, the tirector and h:e principal assistants should
sense themselves as being full time "at the front" in the cold var as
literally as coannanders in orthodox vax
2L As principal aids the 1Ylrecto . should have certain regional
and functional chiefs (each with a re -assistants) who should be outs
standing experts in their respective ,uaographia.political and functional
areas. These principal subordinates i-arpresent in a sense the "cosah:laaders"
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of the regional operations, More aecuratoly, as a group they might
apprvp~riately be oaUed tbes
ational C002-dim don and ;&mentation Division
The specific regional Staff Sections suggested are,
a) Soviet Russia and European s atell I to s,
China, South..ast Aria and South Asian
c) I!tddle and Near East and UooLen North Africa,
d)
(a) Latin American
22, ab In intimate porsoasl ldait on ulth the corresponding
regional heads of the operating agencies, the Chiefs of the fbrogoing
staff sections exercise their steering-coordinatd funn,tion
uithin the terms of the or ;proved policies of jecidves and pro.
grams formulated by the Strategy Group and Vie Plana and Programs
Iivisiono Also,, in c,flaboration frith the Tatter otaf"4, they assist
In all steps in the foainulation of policies, ob~jectives,c and pro-
grans applicable to t it respectiv,, regLonso They foU(r the
development of the opt rations, ovaluate the results and Iwep the
Director currently infcrmed of nociifications uhSAh may be required
in the programs.
by The rogirual chiefs should be t iered to fur nigh the
authorized intorpret' tion to operating agencies of approved pcliciec-'
objectives and prorran
c, There should also be provisions for functional spociali?
nation as appropriate.
23,, The other major respor sibilily of the ;--taff s that of p'anwing
on the nati nal lcvola that is: the formulation of policies, oojeetives
and programs as guidance to the operating agencies. These major 3ivi.
lions of the staff might be willed the S SE Group itind the II
and Programs Divit;ionnfl These staff ',iivisbons, should be respoauzdbla9
for the formulation and communication to the operating departwntc and
agencies of all -types of formal guidance Mmired to initiate the
projects and pur)oses of the Doerdm
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Strategy Group
24, This group sits at the call of the Director and is chaired
by him. Its permanent membership should consist of the Director,,
the Board Designees and a tall group of professionally sldlled
full-time consultants, in addition,, Regional and Functional Da-
plementers from the Operational Coordination and Implementation
Division, as trell as consultants from operating departments and
agencies should sit. with this group, when the subject of discussion
requires,
25, In addition to routine business of the Staff,, the Strategy
Group considers policies,, objectives and projects originated
by the Board as bell as those self-originatedL, ,lien approved by
the Board, they are passed to the Plans and n-ograms Division for
formulation into coordinated guidances, plans or programs for
prac-ulgation to the operating agencies,
26. It is from the Strategy Group perhaps that the most Imagi-
native and consecutive thinking should emerge, It in here that
the global psychological aspects of the cold uar are considered as
a whole, The long-range objectives having been formulated, inter-
mediate objectives are adopted and strategic moves to attain thew arc
continuously studied, The initiative in the cold uar is seizod at
each f-vorable opportunity, the broad terms of the action required
are decided. 'Lbe Plans and Programs Division then works out coordi-
nated guidance or programs required by the operating agencies to
initiate plaan:dng or immediate action? depending upon the nature
and urgency of the operation.
Plans and Progress Division
27. Thia is the pla ring unit of the Staff which performs the
mechanics of program planning, Its functions are to incorporate into
coordin--tod guidances, plans or programs the straateegic decisions and
courses of action approved by the Board and to promulgate them to the
operating agencies? In their final form theses guidances, plans and
program;,, pile of broad national scope and in a global framework,
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should constitute basic blueprints for act ion on the pert of
one or more of the operating agencies. They dhould not be pe:r-
mitted to delgeOeZate into abstractions or generalities, but
should be formulated only in terms of practicable tangible ob-
jectives.
28. A key nucleus of the V1 "q and Y+mgrmas a Division should be
recruited from the only area of goverownt where systematic and
coordinated planning is really understood and practiced, Ilya
the armed services. Those key planners o tld e.itab eh a pattern
and instruct specaalists# drawn from ?sycholoClcal operating
agenciee, in the essential mechanics of pr graarningo Plans and
programs should be kept realistic by intimate +.ollaboration on
an ad hoc or task basis of regional and funct..onal specialists
from, the operating departments, and agencies and from the Operational
CoordinLtion and Imp: arsontation D vissiond
SUIT RY O1' C^IrEPT
29. planning and operational coord-1.natUn should be based
on the assssption that the cold uar can be vale. As a secondary
responsibility only, should the Board permit the energies of the
Staff to be diverted to planning uartAme programs as distinct from
current operations. A sma7.l. nucleus of planners might appropriately
be set apart for pr ograx nie national. plans for psycholorLcal varfare
in vartitrae, but major consideration should be given to the currant
opor tionss of the globsa conflict.
30. Rembering the D.Day for the cold war occurred several years
ago, the plans and programs frith which the Doard trill be primarily
concerned are for a campaign being f sight no. Tho 7osrd and its
Staff should conceive itself to function as the eommsnd and staff
of an army in combat rather than as a department of dsfense preparing
for a war to come. _
r
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S E C R E T
PROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION
1. The attached list contains substantive problems
which it is suggested the Board should consider. Although
work is already going forward to some extent on all these
items, the amount of progress varies considerably. It is
recommended that the Board select the most important and
urgent ones and direct their staffs to expedite the pre-
paration of papers for PSB consideration.
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SUGGESTED INITIAL PROJECTS FOR PSB
I. Psychological Strategy in the Cold War
Many individuals working in the field of psychological opera-
tions in the Cold War have felt the absence of a. "grand-strategy" --
a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all efforts can
be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a
strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short
period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes
far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists.
These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operations
planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand
strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board
gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they have had
heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks
of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formu-
late a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the Cold War.
A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:
1. Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's
very best brains from both inside and outside the govern-
ment in the field of psychological operations and making
provision to see that they have facilities for concentrated
work. The group should also include experts in political
and military strategy. It is felt that the prestige of
the Board will be such that it can command the services
of individuals who would not ordinarily be available
to work personally on such a project.
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2. A working place outside Washington should be designated
for meetings. It has been noted in "previous similar cases
that it is much simpler to enable top quality men to work
on problems of this sort personally (rather than delegating
diem to subordinates) if they can be insulated from the
pressure of routine duties. This insulation procedure is
commonly adopted byy such agencies as Brookings and RAND
with a considerable measure of success.
3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad
problems as the following:
a. What psychological and other measures can be taken to
restrain Soviet aggression?
b. What psychological and other measures ca-11 be t ken to
strengthen our allies and potential
c. He a may the best statement of U. S. ideology be
arrived at?
d. How can our Cold. War aims b: defined?
~~. The following measures should be taken in preparation for
this working group:
a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place.,
secretarial help, security, etc.
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b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of
NSC papers and. Presidential statements having a bearing
on psychological operations.)
c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, as
needed.
5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four
day period at the beginning of the summer and f'cr a three or
four day period toward the end of the summer. In between the
two full meetings sub-groups should be asked. to work on
specific phases of the overall problem.
6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be viewed as an
effort to work out a national policy binding on all agencies.
It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:
a. From the point of view of psychological opeerations, what
should our national policy be?
b. How may existing national policy be exploited more
effectively through psychological operations?
II. A Long-Term Campaign to Improve the Personnel Situation in
Psychological Operations
This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to
improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce
superior personnel who already have the available qualifications to
enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A
considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been
accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to the
second part might be as follows:
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(1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside
the government what their principal objections to entering
government service are.
(2) Work outs with all agencies affected, a long-term publicity
program designed to attract first-.rate personnel.
(3) Approach key members of Congress with a view to obtaining
their support in this campaign.
III. Policy Planning and Research Survey
This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary
PSB with outside advice solicited as needed, should attempt to answer
the following questions:
1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the
field of psychological operations is curr~.ntly going on"
2. What basic research fox- xsychological operations in the cold
vuz Ara not war is currently going on?
3. What additional planning and research is needed, and what
agencies should undertake it?
IV. Survey of Evaluation Activities
This survey should be undertaken along the same lines as the
PCB:WPDavison:vth
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1. Substantive Problems
A. Suggestions for Priority Attention
1. The defection of Communist China from the USSR
2. Psychological strategy to be followed on the death
of Stalin
3. A strategic psychological plan for 1and measures
for immediate application
4. Psychological policies on public statements with
regard to the Atomic Bomb
5. Subversion, demoralization and defection of Soviet
troops in Fast Germany
B. Other Items
6. A psychological plan for
0
7. National policy measures designed to increase
desired defections (both in and outside combat
areas)
3. Psychological strategy witi:. regard to the universal
desire for Peace:
a. desirability of a disarmament proposal
b. countering Soviet :L951 Peace Campaign
9. Implementation of Project
II. Long;--Term Protects (See attached)
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1. Psychological strategy in the Cold. War
report
2. Psychological measures to insure that constructive
relationships can be maintained and developed
among the United States and the governments and
peoples of nations, as in NATO, whose cooperation
is essential to the national security,.
3. Campaign to improve the personnel situation in
psychological operatio;ais
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!+. Survey of policy planning and research in the field
of psychological- operations
5. Survey of activities evaluating the effectiveness of
psychological operations
M. Administrative
1. National psychological warfare and special operations
personnel control and allocation
2. Measures to refine operational psychological warfare
techniques
3. Cover and deception in current national psychological
warfare -toward. USSR
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