PROCUREMENT FROM FBI OF COUNTERESPIONAGE INFORMATION HAVING POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE VALUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003500040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 14, 1950
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006i0712k'.ADOR01731 R003500040003-1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
MAR14
SUBJECT : Rr oc-arement from FBI of Counterespionage
Information having Positive Intelligence value
1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 27 February
1950 from W. Prescott Childs, Chief, Coordination, Qperations,
and Policy Staff, to the Ikecutive and other officers, eztitle4t
"Failure of JAEIC to teceive Counter Espionage Information havi-T
Positive Intelligence Value". Reference is als6 made to the meio-
randum dated 1 i ,rch 1950 from the Assistant Director, WD, to' he
Chief, CORPS, concurring with the memoranda attached to the fir:;t
reference listed above. Pursuant to Mr. Childs' request, the
comments of OSO are set out below.
2. It has long been realized that there has been at impro!)er
utilization of available counterespionage information as the basis,
or at least partial basis, for positive intelligence estimates.
This has been true particularly in connection with estimates of
capability in the scientific intelligence field. The problem
raised by this lack of utilization has been discussed by 080 - ,h
OS1 on several occasions.- 030 concurs that every effort should be
made to secure from the FBI all pertinent counterespionage inft.^ma-
tion bearing; on these estimates. In connection with any-effort.; tc
secure such information, however, it should be remembered that, t
has been a rigid FBI policy not to release operational details -)f
active pending counterespionage cases where such release can avoided. In view of this, while I do not entirely concur in 1F-s
policy, it must be considered in connection with any approach i-j
the FBI for such information.
3. 060 does not concur in the proposed draft letter to t t3
FBI attached to the first listed reference above. While it is
felt that a strong request should be made for such pertinent
counterespionage information, it is not felt that the draft later
as presently phrased Iias any substantial chance of securing tizk
information that is desired. Citing the FBI's membership on 4-3
!AC and ref erring to the desire of the National Security Councl 1.
will not be considered by the FBI as sufficient reason for varntr
ORI/CDF,
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a
any policy that, they do not desire to vary. In connection with the
use" of the FUCKS case as a specific example., it is felt that th?::s
should be mentioned, but not as proof of any failure of the B to
furnish information to CIA which should have been furnished to sr-
mit this Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in making approtri-
ate intelligence estimates. In the first place, while a co?nplei
summary of the R'UCHS ease has not been received, the informaatior
that has been received clearly reflects that there apparently zs
no real or detailed knowledge of disclosures made by FUCHS until
his questioning by the 9ritish authorities only a few days before
his arrest. Secondly, if the FUCIIS case is used as sole proof b.'
the FBI's failure to furnish necessary counterespionage informat ;_on,
they will be able to state with accuracy that this was priaaril3f a
British case and that they were not at liberty to divulge inforris,-
tion to anyone until they did divulge such information.
4. It is felt also that the approach to the FBI should
definitely be on behalf of CIA as such, and not on behalf of the
JAEIC, since it is probable that the FBI would be more rolizctant
to furnish such information to a committee than to a single agency.
Ac n: Attached for your consideration and for concurrence or
comments is a proposed substitute draft letter to-the
FBI for signature of the DCI.
Attachment:
Draft ltr to FBI
Distribution:
Assistant Director, OR;
Assistant Director, OCD
Assistant Director, OSI
Chief, I&S
Chief, COAPS
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D R A F T
IV-Tr. John Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.
One of the most critical responsibilities of the Central Intel-P
ligence Agency at the present time is the compilation of periodic
estimates of the capabilities and progress of the USSR in desi;ning,,
producing, and stockpiling atomic bombs. In the light of receeit
developments reflecting successful Soviet espionage efforts against
U.S. atomic energy installations, I am deeply concerned over the
validity of such estimates and particularly desirous that all pos-
sible information bearing; upon Soviet capabilities in this field be
carefully considered in connection with future estimates.
I feel that in the past there has been insufficient utilimatior
of available counterespionage information as at least a partial basis:
for estimating Soviet capabilities in the atomic energy field. One
of the primary factors in any such estimate is, of course, the extent
to which the results of U.S. and other research and development have
become available to the Soviet Union through espionage and other me2R s.
Knowledge of substantial compromise of U.S. atonic energy info miatiaL
by the Soviet intelligence services can easily be sufficient to com
pletely change the estimates of Soviet capabilities. For example,
the periodic estimate which was produced in July 1949 would have
been substantially changed had the Central Intelligence Agency been
aware of the extent of the information divulged to the Soviet intel-
ligence services by Dr. Emil Julius Klaus F[JCHS. Subsequent develo -
ments have demonstrated that this estimate was too low and consequerctiy
gave an inaccurate and unrealistic picture of Soviet capabilities.
Capability estimates currently in preparation and to be prepared in
the future should be materially affected by available countereepiona4:3
information indicating the extent of Soviet access to classified J.$.
information in the atomic energy field.
I am particularly concerned over this problem in view of the
fact that the most basic U.S. plans and policies are conditioned by
the intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities. Any failure to
utilize all available information bearing on this problem can, as I
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am sure you will agree, result in the gravest consequences and Ln
serious prejudice to our national :interests. -
This Agency has received very little detailed information reflec-
ing the extent of Soviet intelligence successes against U.S. atomic
energy installations and personnel. In view of the seriousness, of
this situation and the overriding national interests involved, rt is
requested that the Central :Intelligence Agency be furnished tiyi-Ui all
information presently in your possession indicating actual or prob-
able disclosure to the Soviet intelligence services, or to other
intelligence services, of critical or classified information colicerr_-
ing atomic energy. It is also requested that this Agency be wised
at the earliest possible time of any actual or probable disclosures
of such information which may come to your attention in the future.
Of particular value will, of"course, be specific details on the,
exact information compromised and on the technical competence and.
extent of access to critical information of any individual identified
as, or suspected of being, an agent of a Soviet or other intelligence
service.
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