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April 11, 1951
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Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 r. 59 r 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS Attached hereto are the following papers in a plan for a new propaganda .appro;:l; to the Soviet Union: SECRET - - - -"Emergency plan for Psychological Offensive (USSR)" CONFIDENTIAL -"Psychological Offensive vis-a-vis The USSR - Objective, Tasks sand Themes" RESTRICTED - -"An Analysis of the Principal Psychological Vulnerabilities in'ihe M-21 and of the Principal Assets Available to the U.S. for Their E floita. tion" Recipients should note the difference in classification of these papers tnd tie.. tribution must be strictly in accordance with the classifications. The Confidential paper is intended primarily for operators of propaganda media- Officers of the government who are in a position to guide speakers or writers to prc?-. duce material which fulfills these objectives and tasks should be encouraged ;o base their guidance on this paper. This, however, should be done on an oral and 4:,Yorrai basis without revealing either the existence of such a document or the integr.ted nature of a series of tasks established to attack the USSR by propaganda. We do no- want to telegraph our punches to the enemy. (N.B. Themes in this paper are :oly suggestions and operators should not be limited to them in carrying out the Cttjectiev and Tasks.) The Restricted paper is one of several existing studies on Soviet psychQJogica;. vulnerabilities and is given this classification to permit wider use by writetc:3 and speakers. Again, to avoid telegraphing our punches, this paper should not be quoted from. Writers and speakers should be encouraged to attack these vulnerable pCtnts but not to describe them. CAUTION: Objective II (To establish a reservoir of good will between the peop- s of the USSR and those of the free world.) requires the most careful handling. Thi:a objective was considered necessary to counteract the effect on the Soviet people Wthe current efforts of the Soviet regime to create an attitude of especial hostili-y to the U.S. within the USSR. Within this context the end result sought is cot fusio>r.. and ambivalence in the minds of the Soviet people; actual circumstances do not peril{; the achievement of ends beyond this. Accordingly, every effort has been made Lo keep the tasks and themes under this objective as realistic as possible. The word "`goof:-. will" has been used instead of "friend.ship" as more nearly corresponding to th- rea.l. istic possibilities. This plan is directed specifically at the Soviet Union. Some of the Obje-~tivwa, Tasks and Themes may be useful to operators dealing with other areas, but thei:? use should be guided by local attitudes. They should serve as guidance to other w-eas$ however, in that output should not contradict or confuse the approach described in these papers. State Dept. review completed MORI/CDF-502670 11 April 1951 1-v/SD Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 *..~ SECRET lor EMERGENCY PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE (USSR) Attached are the basic papers for a planned psychological offensive age ." pi- 7 the Soviet regime which have been prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group formes the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs as Director of IFIO. Ttl? plan is founded on two assumptions: 1. That the reluctance of the peoples of the USSR to suffer another war is a deterrent on the aggressive ambitions of the Bolshevik dictatorship. 2. That it is within the capabilities of the United States at the_presenL time, and in spite of severe limitations on means of approach to these peoples, to increase the force of this deterrent. The plan is within the framework of existing U. S. policy vie-a-vir the USSR. Without waiting for possible future changes in policy, the intention cis this plan is to extract the maximum benefit from the existing situation. The plan is intended to sharpen and systematize the entire psychological. approach to the USSR. Planning has been done in close consultation with the Voice of America, the principal agency capable of putting it into overt execi..ica. It is intended that hence forth the Voice of America shall program Its otttl ttt to the USSR generally within the framework of the objectives and tasks set fc~r?tl, herein. Lists of suggested themes are appended to the appropriate tasks. TLt, lists are not exhaustive, and the suggested themes are not designed as text fci quotation in output; they are designed only as hints for profitable lines of thought to be followed in output, on the basis of adequate research and jn Ql propriate context. Occasions will arise when, in its reportorial role, the Voice of A ericS. will have to carry program material which does not contribute to the objects i and themes specified in the plans. In such cases these extraneous themes s=ctcic be subordinated to the main effort. It is understood that this will require serious revision in the current working procedure of the Vocie of America. Such a plan as this cannot depend on the efforts of the Voice of Anearice: alone. Extensive organization of research will be required. In addition, thvxe- should be wide distribution within the government of the basic papers-its the plan so that this approach to the USSR gets into the stream of official and et x i - official public statements and thus facilitates the work of the Voice of Amer~.~a. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 W RESTRICTED AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES III THE USSR AND OF THE PRINCIPAL ASSETS AVAILABLE TO THE US FOR THEL. EXPLOITATION This analysis is intended to point out areas in which further research may find profitable material for a psychological offensive on the USSR and does not claim that the methods suggested herein will inevitably be of appeal to the Soviet population. Wt:?le Americans must make the final decisions as to which lines of research to pursue and w`rhRch themes to stress in a psychological offensive on the USSR, for Americans to debase arn(oig themselves whether certain themes would be comprehensible to Soviets without refererict= to the many ex-Soviets available would appear to be a senseless intellectual exercise. Much of the wording of this paper is intended to show the reasons why certain top) s may be among those which may be profitably exploited and no effort has been made to restrlr? it to phraseology which would itself be of value in propaganda. This paper is in no wat- an attempt to belittle the undoubtedly great obstacles which face the United States in its attempt to communicate effectively with the Soviet population; it is rather an attempt tc: indicate ways in which the United States may be able to communicate effectively with it. It is, in addition, suggested that analyses of emigre propaganda and of the propaganda F other governments, in particular the Yugoslav Government, directed toward the USSR might suggest other effective means of approach. Such analyses would in any event warn the United States when it and other governments and groups were working at cross purpose. in their propaganda to the USSR. When asked when Communism would be achieved in the USSR, a recent defer for replied "on the day when the people fail to see the discrepance between Soviet pro~aagand,a and their daily life". Since the aim of Soviet internal propaganda is to make all Soviet citizens into the willing and enthusiastic tools of the state' s policy and since there is evidence of widespread, although almost wholly passive discontent, it is apparent that that day has not yet arrived. That many Soviet citizens do see the discrepancy between Soviet propaganda and reality implies that they are capable of judging what they see, hear and read by st:a-,41 -`d;3 other than those which the state wishes the "Soviet man" to apply, whether this be in t7~ case of an intellectual who concludes that party control is stultifying to science or in the case of a disgruntled kolkhoznik who thinks that his life isn't fit for a pig. In anal zing Soviet vulnerabilities the sources of these standards have some relevence since they offer avenues of approach by which these vulnerabilities may be reached. Since the ruling culture of the USSR is basically Russian, Russian culture, having made itself the general culture of the country to an extent almost comparable to that with which Anglo-Saxon culture has formed the basis for U. S. culture, most of this page i is devoted to reactions which obtain within Russian culture. RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 J* Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 a. Sources of Non-Soviet Standards While many Russians do not appear to have the same reaction to injustice done to others which an American would have, almost all seem to have a point when injustice is being done to them which makes them say the equivalent of "It ain't right". This implies that despite the teachings of Soviet propaganda most Russians have in their minds at least the remnants of an ethic other than the Bolshevik ethic. The principal source of this seems to be the standards which were observed in family life in pre-revoluntionary Russia. De- spite the fact that only a minority of the inhabitants of the USSR have any personal know- ledge of life in pre-revolutionary Russia, the traditional standards which governed re- iat=. i hips in the Russian family have been handed onto the young by their parents and by t:?r "grandmothers" (responsible, even now, for a large part of child care). These standards still provide competition for the strong influence of Soviet propaganda to which children are subjected in the Soviet schools. That some of the younger generation fairly soon become disgruntled with the regime and cease to work hard for it and that many others make their careers within the system but,do so in a cynical way because it is the sole way to advancement and privilege indicates that not even this group is Koestler's "generation without an umbilical cord. " A second source of non-Soviet standards is the knowledge of conditions in pre- revolutionary Russia which is also passed on by parents and grandparents to the young. Remembered in times of hardship, tales of an easier and better life in Tsarist Russia undoubtedly lose nothing in the telling. A further source seems to be Soviet education itself, particularly secondary and higher education, which, while it aims at giving most Soviet citizens only enough education to do their jobs well, can hardly fail to impart enough perspective to make the recipient conscious of the falsity of much Soviet internal propaganda. Not even Pravda can convince him that a hole in the ground is in reality the Palace of the Soviets. An additional source of education and also of non-Soviet standards is pre-revoluntionary Russian literature, which is widely read by the literate, perhaps partly because reading is a form of escapism and because contemporary Soviet literature is so dull. Since the Soviet leaders wish to appropriate to themselves the literature of the revolutionary move- ment against Tsarism, they have left in circulation the great bulk of nineteenth century Russian literature, which, although censored, contains many appeals to values entirely contrary to Soviet values as well as many denunciations of Tsarist tyranny wholly appli- cable to the present regime. Another source seems to be Soviet law, which, while it is essentially merely another arm with which the state executes its policy, in judging cases involving the civil relation- ships between individuals frequently applies the same standards of right and wrong as western civil law, standards which if applied to the actions of the Politburo would show them to be wholly immoral. Still another source of non-Soviet standards is knowledge of the world outside the USSR. Such knowledge, while it is often extremely blurred and fragmentary, exists -2- REST RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 W fairly widely. Perhaps among the many sources from which it has come the most important are the experience of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and Germany durirg World War U and the foreign language broadcasts of VOA and the BBC. b. Other Basic Factors Contributing to the Partial Failure of Soviet Propaganda Through their use of the vocabulary of western liberalism Soviet propagandist s themselves have been responsible for popularizing many non-Soviet concepts, such as humanism, free speech, etc. , perhaps the best collection of these being in the Sov:- ?t Constitution. " (It may be of more than academic interest to note that Soviet dictionaries give the western definitions for many of the terms used.) While it is probably true that by their use of this vocabulary Soviet propagandists have partially blocked the effer ive . ness of western propaganda based on these concepts, it seems clear that they have also incorporated elements of inconsistency which lower the overall effectiveness of their propaganda. In the light of Nazi frankness in their propaganda in which they could :lay "Come on you German Herrenvolk let' s conquer the world, " it is apparent that prc - paganda intended to justify and promote Soviet agressiveness in the name of "peace in the whole world".is not without elements of weakness. Soviet propaganda with its continued emphasis on material progress and its promi Y >- of "pie in the sky" seems also to have increased the dissatisfaction of many Soviet .:itizer, at the continuing poor conditions of life in the USSR (See 2 a. (1) ). Another important source of discontent in the Soviet Union is the tough resistance which some basic cultural patterns have to violent change. This is illustrated by the fat t that initial Soviet efforts in the fields of marriage, divorce and the family proved disma_ failures and had to be completely reversed. That Soviet defectors condemn the Sovet system as "against human nature" indicates that the Soviet leaders are still trying to put a good many square pegs into round holes. (See 2 a. (4) ). c. Dangers in Piecemeal Psychological Attack Despite the many sources of tension and disaffection in the USSR, many Sovi -: citizens probably remain ultimately loyal to the regime since it claims to have the .nly road to social justice and material progress, and to be the guardian of Russia and the Russian peoples from the hostile and aggressive capitalist powers. Although the social structure of the USSR provides many tempting targets for psychological attack, piecemeal attack involves grave dangers. As long as the regime can appeal to Marxism-Lenir_sim Stalinispi as the only road to social and material progress and as an infallible system of interpreting history, it can answer any propaganda attack relatively successfully. While it can successfully portray itself as the guardian of Russia from aggressive capitalist encirclement, attacking individual sore spots in the Soviet social structure without putting the blame squarely on the regime in each case would be likely to seem to prove the regime's point about its aggressive enemies and thus solidify the population behind the regime. It seems that prerequisite to the successful exploitation of the various sources of dissatisfaction in the USSR are the discrediting of Soviet ideology, and the destrue.tion of the myth that the regime is the only protector of Great Russian and other Soviet nationalistic interests. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 d. Attacking Soviet Ideology While it is true that for many people in the USSR Soviet ideology has become a ritual which is observed in a mechanical way as a necessary sign of conformity and sub- mission, in addition it constitutes an important Soviet source of strength since it serves as the base for much Soviet propaganda. To any extent that it may be possible, forcing people to think about the real nature and function of Soviet ideology would be valuable since it would strip the regime of its self-justification and thus help to direct toward the regime the Soviet population's resentment over the hardships and injustices to which it has been subjected. While in Soviet propaganda the real nature of Soviet policy is usually masked by references to capitalist aggressiveness, Stalin has at times been relatively frank as to its true implications. It is possible that repetition of some of Stalin's remarks might be a good way to expose the profoundly aggressive nature of Soviet ideology and Soviet policy. The following quotations from Stalin are a tentative suggestion of the way in which this might be done: "The revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to main- tain its victory, and to push forward to the final victory of Socialism unless... it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat... The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic machine, the bourgeois police... After consolidating its power and taking the peasantry in tow, the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build up a Socialist society. But does this mean that it will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of Socialism? ... No it does not. For this the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore the development and support of the revolution in other countries is an essential task of the victorious revolution... In England and America, too, the preliminary condition for 'every real people's revolution' is the smashing, the destruction of the 'ready made state machine' ...In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution, the law of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine as a preliminary condition for such a revolution, is an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the world... For, says Lenin, the free union of nations in Socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged struggle by the Socialist republics against the backward states... After the October victory, we entered on the third strategic period, the third stage of the revolution, the objective of which is the overthrow of the bourgeoisie throughout the world... The victorious proletariat of one country having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own Socialist production, (should) stand up against the rest of the world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. " An effort should, of course, be made to take from this aggressive program its last shred of self-justification by showing that the peoples of the free world, and their Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 governments which depend on the people's consent. are making progress in raisins their conditions of life while "the revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it a~ an aid in combining legal work with illegal work, to intensify, under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeois It would probably be understandable, even to Soviets, that the disruptive efforts of ;the USSR the base of the so-called world revolution in the lives of the free nations are "e- sented by those nations, which are quite competent to manage their own affairs. Ar, eariv example of this process, which is responsible for any coolness of relations betweet the governments of the free world and the government of the USSR, is furnished by the i eply of the Congress of Soviets on March 15, 1918 to President Wilson's message saying hat the U.S. would "avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more couple sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great rKae in the life of Europe and the modern world. " The tactful Congress in reply expressed its "Firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialistic state of society which alone is capable of securing just and lasting peace, as well as the cult--ire and well-being of all laboring people... " It might also be possible to point out what the so-called World Peace Campaigt' s call for "peace in the whole world" means in the light of Lenin's statement that theta would always be wars as long as capitalist governments existed. One of the regime's important methods of self-justification is based on its claims to having "a scientific method of interpreting history. " Since each Stalinist policy t: hearalded as an act of unparalleled wisdom, it is possible that the many flip-Clops in Soviet policy can be exploited to discredit Stalin' s "wisdom" and his " scientific rnet-led" Why, it could be asked, did the Soviet leaders start out with the extreme "war comrn6inisirt. then have to reverse their position completely in the NEP, and only then start in five - year plans. Why, incidentally, hasn't anyone been able to write a book on the basic principles governing the Soviet economy during the period of transition to Comirnunista? Why, if Lenin scorned gold and wanted to build toilets out of it, has Stalin sacrificed millions of lives to mine it? Why was it right to try to do away with the family as the basis of Soviet society, if this policy had to be completely reversed? Why was it right first to put the army on a fraternal basis and then reintroduce traditional military discipline? Why was it right to have political commissars in the army one minute an-I wrong the next? What was so "scientific" about the mammoth purge of the officer corps on the eve of the war with Nazi Germany, when most of the officers still alive had to be taken of of the concentration camps and sent to the front anyway. What was so wise about the NaCa i- .Soviet Pact which left Hitler free to destroy the second front for which (as Churchill said) "The Russian people were to cry so loud and wait in agony so long. " (In connection with the Pact it might, incidentally be worth noting Stalin's 1927 rernarh "and if it is necessary that somebody be stained with blood, we shall exert all our efforts to make it some bourgeois country rather than the USSR. ") -5- RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 It is possible that Soviet ideology can also be attacked on the basis of the trans- formations that it has undergone since the original formulation of Marxism. If the ideology is to be attacked at all, however, it would seem advisable to avoid implying that it was basically good but had been distorted by Soviet leaders since this would tend to confuse the issue and to weaken the impact of our attack. The following is a highly tentative suggestion as to one area of change in Soviet ideology which might be exploitable: Lying at the center of other transformations which Communist ideology has under- gone is the reversal under Lenin and Stalin of the Marxian emphasis on materialism. The Marxian 'view was that " social -existence" (ie. environment) determined a people' s consciousness. Although Marx granted the possibility of acts of will on the part of people, he apparently thought that these acts would somehow be brought about by material conditions. Marx' s application of these principles to the question of revolution was that capitalist society contained within it the seeds of its own destruction and the course of development of capitalist society would inevitably lead to revolution and the establish- ment of a new social system. Lenin on the other hand, insisted that the downfall of capitalism depended on the existence of a revolutionary party capable of seizing power at a time of crisis in the capitalist system and of establishing its dictatorship. He thus introduced into Soviet ideology the idea of the crucial importance of the will, and, in effect, reversed the Marxian emphasis on materialism, although the latter continues to be advanced as one of the foundations of the ideology. A recent formulation of the "reconciliation" of these mutually contradictory concepts is found in an article "The Unity of the Dialectic Method and the Materialist Theory of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy", appearing in the central Soviet press on September 12, 1947, which states: "For dia- lectical materialism it is not enough to recognize the presence of the objective factors which are prerequisite to the success of practical work. One must also have a correct understanding of the :objective factors in the historical process. Subjective factors play a decisive role t.e turning possibility into reality. " As to whose will it is that plays such a decisive role in determining the course of events even Soviet theory has stated quite frankly. The position of the Communist Party as the initiator and controller of all organizations in the USSR is stated in the Soviet Constitution as is the principle of "democratic centralism" within the party prescribing that all authority flows from the top. That this concentration of authority goes far beyong the usurpation of all political power is made clear by some of the manifestations of Soviet propaganda and ideology which seem astonishing to most westerners. Nor only are all the inhabitants of the USSR made to conform to the will of the Soviet leaders,, this will is presented by Soviet pro- paganda as the people' s dearest wish. It is even projected beyond the borders of the USSR and is attributed to the overwhelming majority of people in the outside world are said to regard Stalin as "the leader of all progressive humanity. " In no field, however minor, can anything be permitted to challenge this will as the only basis for thought and action. Since Soviet ideology has repudiated God and claims to be able to control the forces of nature, even natural laws which restrict the unfettered exercise of the leader' s will must be "attacked" and "destroyed. " Thus Soviet science was forced to repudiate the Mendelian-Morgan theory of genetics since it dared to suggest that the development of plant and animal forms was possible only within certain boundaries set by natural law. -6- RESTRRC-TED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 J RESTRICTED It is thus apparent that Soviet ideology' a debt to materialism is exceeded by its debt to Fichte, Hegel, and others who asserted the complete supremacy of the will. On,- of thr Soviet system's more direct ancestors in this line, .however, seems to have been the nihilist Nechayev, whose "Revolutionary Catechism" (1869) is an amazing prescription for the practice of revolution. In this short: statement Nechayev outlines the attitudAs azr methods which are the very foundations of the modern police state. While the nihilist strives to impose his will on world society through destroying it and the totalitarian dic- tator attempts to impose this will on it through dominating it completely, it is apparent that nihilism and totalitarianism both involve the complete destruction of all other fr-rms, organizations, societies, moralities, etc. , and are dangerously close relatives. (see "Zero" by Robert Payne.) That Nechayev had direct influence in Lenin was acknou tedg by the latter. It is of interest to note that his "Revolutionary Catechism" was also a ma .,~ influence on the Nazi system since it was the basis for the Tcheka-forged "Protoco' of tlle Wise Men of Zion" which was one of Hitler's principal points of departure. While it would probably be tactless to point out to Russians the Russian influe' ce on Nazism, US propaganda aimed at more literate target groups might be able to get a:-rosf. the dangerous irrationality of the Soviet Leader's attempt to impose their will on th-' world in disregard of reality. That this concept may not be wholly foreign to some `,ovIt t s: is indicated by Soviet' s propaganda continued emphasis on Hitler' s insanity and its a- sistence that U. S. leaders are mad (eg. "The Mad Haberdasher", "Forestalism", etc. e. Winning Russian Nationalism A second and probably even more important source of Soviet strength is the stipport of Russian nationalism, which was gained by Stalin during the war, largely through the stupidities of the Nazis. When in the thirties revolutionary enthusiasm and hopes to a better future had begun to wane seriously, Stalin began to rule almost wholly by force. This force was applied largely through the fiction of alleged internal enemies, which pro- cess created real internal enemies, who in turn had to be suppressed. This .pelf-de structive technique came dangerously close to getting completely out of control during the purges and had only been brought under control when the war broke out. Russia's ir.t:erna disruption was amply demonstrated by mass desertions to the Germans during the fit at year of the war. After that, however, German brutality and hostility toward the Russian people began to solidify the people behind the regime and by the end of the war had given Stalin and the. Politburo a graphic demonstration of the strange cohesive character acrd amazing force which the amorphous mass which is the Russian people can display in he face of Russia's enemies. The advantages of ruling by virtue of this force rat-her th=?n primarily through the exercise of straight coercion and violence against large parts s their own population were at once obvious to the Soviet rulers. Stalin's 1946 speech : a which he so soon after the conclusion of World War II raised the question of further world conflicts and called on the USSR to devote much of her effort to building up her military strength was the signal that the Soviet leaders had resolved to rule in this W y. Whether this was done primarily for reasons of internal control or primarily for reasons of external advantage, its effectiveness is apparent since despite the dissatisfaction v'hich was widespread in the USSR after the end of the war, purges and internal repressive measures of the same catastrophic scale employed before the war have not been nece sary. Stalin clearly indicated that the Great Russian people were the key to Russia' a Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 victory over the Nazis in his toast to them at the end of the war. Continued references to them as "the elder brother" show that Soviet leaders have not changed their evaluation of them as the strongest force in the USSR. It is clear that every effort should be made to show that the rule of Stalin and the Politburo is against and not in the best interests of Russia and the Russian people. That while the free world will resist aggression, it has no animosity toward the Russian people and is, in fact, more sympathetic toward their interests than are the Soviet leaders. The exploitation of Russian and the Russian people for purposes of international Communist propaganda, intrigue, and aggression can be emphasized to gain the first of these ob- jectives. (In doing this, however, care should be taken not to build up a picture of a genuinely revolutionary international proletariat.) To gain the second, concepts common to Russia and to the free world, in particular the U.S., can be established and it can then be shown that they are what lead the free world to resist Communist aggression and are also what make it understand and sympathize with the plight of the Russian people. The inordinate sensitivity of the Russians to criticism of Russia's backwardness coming from foreigners and their suspiciousness of foreigners in general make Russian nationalism an extremely difficult force for Americans to handle. In view of this it might be advisable for U.S. propaganda to mix points demonstrating our understanding and respect for the Russians with points that might be construed as critical of them in a proportion of at least one to one. In addition, in touching on the sorest spots, it might be wise to imply the final point, so clearly that the Russian cannot fail to draw the de- sired conclusion, and to refrain from stating it explicitly. Since the less educated Russian likes to regard himself as khitri (clever-sly-hard to dupe), it might be a useful technique in exposing Soviet proT,a.ganda lies to imply that we understand that the listener was too smart to have been tat, ,an in by the trick. f. Interdicting Other Soviet Strengths While U. S. propaganda has made an effort to show that conditions are improving in the free world, thus implying that there is no need for revolution and that there is no world proletariat waiting for Soviet "liberation", there is a further self-justification of which Soviet leaders should be stripped. The Nazi attack on the USSR is taken to prove their point about the aggressiveness of the capitalist world and to justify all their draconian measures to build up the military strength of the USSR. Since the war Soviet propagandists have, of course, been assiduous in attributing all the evils of the Nazis to the United States.. The striking similarity between the Nazi and Soviet systems could be pointed out or at least implied. It could be emphasized that Nazi Germany was aggressive because she was totalitarian and not because she was capitalistic. (See Section I (d) "At- tacking Soviet ideology"). A further and also important source of Soviet strength is the slight but undeniable rise in the standard of living in the USSR during the past two years. One way of neutralizing the psychological effects of this Soviet asset might be to say that the relatively slight proportion of the total Soviet economy that was involved had been devoted to this purpose not out of solicitude for the welfare of the people but so that if the Soviet leaders decide to embark on general war, the blame for the subsequent drop in the Soviet standard of living will seemingly fall on the U. S. , the alledged aggressors, and not on the regime, the actual aggressors. - g - RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 NW VAO RESTRIC TED Questions Regarding Russian Psychology The old Russian village "mir", which was supposed to have some mystical uali- ties and to be greater than the sum total of the individuals making it up, and the R-. ssia_r orthodox congregation, where the truth was supposed to reside in the congregation as a whole rather than in any individual member, are evidence that in the basic pattern of Russian thought the group is credited with being greater than the sum of its rnemb=rs. This may go part of the way toward explaining the Soviet passion for unanimity, i, -. ir_. demonstrating their strength they have seized on a familiar Russian concept. It is re- flected in a good deal of political writing by recent Russian emigres, who rebuke t_?e West for an excess of individualism which, they claim, degenerates into selfishne~ s. There is thus reason to doubt that U. S. propaganda based on appeals to the conceT is o western individualism would be of as much effect as appeals based on concepts mo -e firmly rooted in Russian thought. For example, U.S. propaganda might stress the dif- ference between the old "mir" where unanimity was achieved through custom and ?espe - for the village elders, and the new collectives, where unanimity is achieved through dip- fear of the police. It may, however, be the concept of the superiority of the group ove- the individual which leads the two principal Russian emigre parties in Germany in -heir programs to repudiate the concept of class warfare in the bitterest of terms and to stre k the values of national unity. (As with much that is Russian, where one tendency st-e:ns be accompanied by its opposite, it should be remembered that in addition to placing qre value on unity, the Russians have what may easily be the world' s greatest talent fc. E. bitter factionalism.) Despite these comments on Russian collectivism, it should b,. re- membered that the Soviet collective farms are almost universally hated and that re.-ent Soviet defectors indicate many, if not most, Soviet citizens realize clearly .Soviet : tec- tions are a farce. Nor should it be doubted that western concepts have made e;;o'ig a. headway in Russia for the concept of "freedom" to be a touchstone of great importance and the concept of tyranny to be wholly understandable. It cannot be doubted that the Soviet regime's rule by force and its emphasis r.n ,materialism,' in addition to denying a decent life to the great majority of its citizer hi- done much to break down Russian moral standards and to promote lying, selfishneF+;, graft and theft. Nevertheless, it may be true that the injustices and hardships imposed the regime have at the same time led many Russians in their inner lives to place great importance on spiritual values by way of compensation. It might thus be wise to se,- ap- peals to the Russians-based on purely material considerations, while of undoubted basic appeal in themselves, in an acceptable framework of ideas and ideals to avoid offering Russian sensibilities. Three additional questions regarding the psychology of the Great Russians art raised here in the conviction that they are germaine to the problems of a psychological offensive on the USSR and in the hopes that someone else will answer them. Do the Russians think in visual symbols more than Americans ? If so, appeal; base' on the contradictions between conflicting verbal concepts may be less effective than they would be with Americans. EI R'rTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 How does the Russian feeling of guilt differ from the American? Does a Russian feel guilty for thoughts as well as for actions? Does he feel guilty for things done by his group and over which he had no control as well as for things done by him individually? If the hypotheses posed by these latter questions are correct, an additional avenue of approach for propaganda exists, but the danger of offending the individual by censuring the actions of his group is also increased. On whom or what does the Russian focus hatred? Does he hold the individual re- presc:ntative of an institution which is repressing him. responsible for the acts of the im;`.:;':ion as a whole or does he feel that someone he knows as a person can never be rea; e.y guilty and thus focus his hatred'on some unknown person or group some degree re*ai)vtd from him? If it is true that in 1917 many Russian peasants went over to the next visage to burn down the landlord' s house and barns, there may be support for the latter view. Perhaps it is mainly when a Russian has already been galvanized into action against the unknown group that he hurts the person he knows and then hurts him only as a representative of the group he hates. If so, less effect can be gained by trying to focus the hatred of the propaganda recipient on a nearby person than by creating a symbol of the institution or group that is repressing him. h. Dangerous Associations In conducting a psychological offensive against the USSR care should be taken to avoid or nullify the effects of~ association with certain things which have been standard and apparently successful elements in Soviet propaganda, since such association might vitiate the effectiveness of the U. S. psychological attack. Such dangerous associations obviously include: Tsarist injustice, former landowners, capitalist exploitation, former foreign economic concessions, Nazi theories of racial supremacy, and, of course, anti- Russianism of all sorts and Austrian-Polish-German efforts to dismember Russia. It is suggested that it might be wise to handle the following additional subjects with care for the reasons indicated: Chiang Kai Shek, since Soviet propaganda has apparently success- fully made him a symbol of the. evils of imperialist and capitalist exploitation; Kerenski and the Provisional Government, since recent defectors indicate that many anti-Soviet Russians accuse them of spinelessly giving way to the Bolsheviks; Marxist Russian emigres emigres since defectors indicate that the desire for private property is making headway in the USSR and that another brand of Marxism would have little appeal; the Russian Orthodox Church, as distinct from spiritual values and ethics in general, since Soviet anti-religious propaganda has apparently had some effect and since defectors indicate that the present church is intensely disliked by som+:r on the grounds that it is thoroughly interpenetrated by the MGB (everything else is too, but this somehow seems revolting); the Vatican and the Catholic Church since these have been used apparently successfully by Soviet propaganda as a sinister "bete noir'"; Churchill for the same reason and because he has been portrayed as anti-Russian; British imperialism since apparently some traditions.: anti-British sentiment has successfully been kept alive by Soviet propaganda. on the grounds of their alleged imperialism and Tito, since disaffected Soviets apparently feel he is as bad as Stalin, only t"e;;dangerous becayese %ess powerful. - 10 - RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 i. Effects of a Psychological Offensive The point has been raised whether a psychological offensive at the present time would not have the effect of putting a large part of the Soviet population in an untenable psychological position by demonstrating the evilness of the regime for which they work and the complete futility of their daily lives without offering them any alternative. It has been suggested that putting or attempting to put them in such a position would earn us their hostility rather than their friendship and possible future support. At present when Soviet citizens are wholly immersed in the all-pervading atmosphere of the police state and when the United States is not in a position to offer them a real, simple and acceptable alternative of the type that could conceivably be offered in war time, it seems highly doubtful that a U. S. psychological offensive can produce ma; r visible results in the USSR. It does not seem valid, however, to argue. that it will do more harm than good from our point of view. The section of the Soviet population whici is already fully disaffected is now faced with two difficult situations, one in the present where he is forced to live a life he hates, and one in the future where'he fears he will find himself under attack by un-understanding and unsympathetic enemies who will have the mass destruction of the Russian peoples as their objective and thus be forced to figst to defend a regime which he despises. Relieving him now of this fear, which is probably his number one horror, would seem to be likely to gain his sympathy more than to mak , his present life less bearable is, in any event, probably very hard to do since he has learned to live in the Soviet atmosphere and is protected by the "triple bronze" which' protects us all from the full implications of our daily lives. In addition, the fully disaffected probably constitute only one of three major seg- ments of the Soviet population and the effetts of a psychological offensive on the other tvo must be considered. It seems reasonable to suppose that the fully disaffected are one end of the Soviet spectrum, the other end being formed by the group which because of their duties or their privileges consider themselves fully committed to the regime, anu the middle, probably the largest group, being undecided. It would certainly seem wort_~- while to sow doubt and confusion among the group which considers itself fully committed to the regime. It might be possible to make some of its members mentally disassocia e themselves from the regime by keeping the target group of our offensive as small as possible, and, in any event, to increase the tension in the daily lives of the group woutr be to lower the efficiency of the Soviet Government and thus would represent a net gain from our point of view. It is the middle and still undecided group which represents the most serious pro em in considering a psychological offensive. With them, as with the disaffected group, the problems of the future are probably even more important than the problems of the moment. To relieve them of their fears of attack by deadly enemies who wish to destroy all the peoples of Russia would certainly be a big step toward winning their sympathy and poss ale future support. Because of their distrust of propaganda in general and their uncertaint about the truth about the outside world, it?seems improbt#ble that they can be convinced that the outside world is not aggressive without first showing them that the Soviet regime is aggressive. This means increasing their tensions about their daily lives, although Vie - 11 - RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 "aes triplex" principle probably operates here t.oo, and replacing their fear of attack by all destroying enemies by the fears of the only slightly less horrible prospect of inevitable bloodshed caused the outside world' s retaliation to Soviet aggression. While it would be helpful to suggest that they will have an acceptable and better alternative than cooperating with the regime in war time, it seems doubtful that associating their fears of war with their aggressive leaders would result in increased hostility toward the United States. On the contrary, it seems likely that while it would produce no visible results now, in war time it would help to direct at least part of their hostility toward their own regime and to make them more prone to accept an alternative to cooperating with it if one were offered to them. 2. Soviet Psychological Vulnerabilities (1) Soviet reliance on "pie in the sky" thirty-three years after promising The Soviet regime's continued failure to produce the good life that it has promised and its continued reliance on promises of "pie in the sky" are things of which most Soviet citizens are probably already acutely aware and can be capitalized on to the regime' s discomfiture. The Soviet population could be reminded of the promises which the regime has made regarding the standard of living and of the contrast between these promises an,.reality. In doing this, U. S. propaganda operators should make maximum use of concreu examples and hard facts. The effects of the slight rise in the standard of living during the past two years must be neutralized, however, before full profit can be obtained in this field. If it can be shown that the regime has itself created most all (i. e. except Al i Germany) of the enemies on which it has always placed the blame for not delivering the "pie", and must create such enemies in order to govern, it can be shown that reality will always remain grim and the "pie" will remain in the sky. (2) Demonstrable falsity of much Soviet internal propaganda re the USSR The relative degree of objectivity which nearly all Soviet Citizens possess is suf- ficient to make them see the obvious falsity of much Soviet internal propaganda regarding conditions in the USSR. It may be possible to use this fact to discredit Soviet propaganda regarding the free world by continually coupling obvious Soviet lies concerning the USSR with Soviet lies about the outside world. (3) Reversible Soviet propaganda regarding the free world Since much of the Soviet regime' s propaganda concerning the free world is not a picture of the free world but only a mirror held up to its own horrible face, it may be possible to discredit it by pointing out its obvious similarity to conditions within the USSR with which the Soviet citizen-is familiar. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 _W ko; (4) Resistance of some cultural patterns to violent change Soviet attempts to displace the family as the basis of Russian society, to place he army on a fraternal basis, to institute the continuous work week, etc.. failed dismall:r and had to be completely reversed. Such reversals could be capitalized on by emphas.Lziny that they show that the Marxist-Leninist system is foreign to the fundamental basis o Russian society. In addition a study of the basic Russian culture would probably reve-tl other areas in which the regime is trying to go counter to the cultural pattern and is -,ere - by creating tensions which could be successfully exploited in propaganda. The unive-s sality sality with which Soviet defectors condemn what the regime is trying to do as being "against human nature" reveals that this is one of its principal points of weakness. kSee 2 b. (4). A study of the cultures of the national minorities in the USSR might reveal similar material for exploitation in splinter language propaganda. (5) Rewritten Soviet history The Soviet citizen' s memory can be made to work toward discrediting the regin e' s present propaganda if the U.S. makes use of the various rewritings of Soviet history. It has been suggested that a careful review of the changes made in the various editions n the large Soviet encyclopedia alone would furnish a wealth of material for this purpose (6) Soviet refusal to let the ordinary citizen travel abroad In attacking Soviet propaganda the regime's refusal to let the ordinary citizen travel abroad can be tied onto many lies we wish to discredit. Samples: Why should a Sovie citizen believe that life is better in the USSR than in the free world if his government .yon' let him see the free world? If life was worse there than in the USSR, he would come back. Why should he believe that the USSR is helping the "peoples democracies" to improve their standards of living if his government keeps him from seeing these coup. tries. That it won't let him see them shows that the standard of living in most of them areas is still higher than in the USSR. Why should the workers and peasants, in these countries willingly adopt a system which produces a standard of living lower than the one they had before Soviet "liberation" ? b. Specific (1) The fear of war The fear of war is at present one of the strongest emotions among the Soviet popx;_ lation but can only be safely exploited by U.S. propaganda if it is successfully demon strated that the entire danger of war has been created by the Soviet leaders. If this ha.; not been done, raising the intensity of the already existing fear of war on the part of thl Soviet population may backfire and contribute to the Soviet propaganda picture of an ag gressive U.S. - 13 RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 (2) The forced labor -system While all labor in the Soviet Union is in effect forced since "the happy workers" cannot leave the country and must work, the concentration camp system as such probably constitutes the Soviet Unior;' s principal psychological vulnerability since it runs entirely counter to Russian ideals of solidarity and fraternity and since it is the living proof of the evils inherent in trying to force an unworkable system to work. The regime's justification of their concentration camps on the grounds that those detained at " corrective labor" have committed crimes against the state can be attacked by showing what most of these crimes really were: i. e. , "anti-Soviet conversation" means speaking the truth, "anti-Soviet sentiments" means thinking the truth, "kulakism." means wanting the land for which the Russians fought the revolution, etc. , even stealing is largely the regime' a fault since it spends so much of Russia' s natural and human resources supporting the upper Party and its efforts to conquer the world that the ordinary man cannot obtain the necessities of life without cheating. That the forced labor system has grown to such proportions that it cannot now be dispensed with by the Soviet economy can be shown by the fact that the "National Labor Reserves" are in fact an addition to the slave labor system, the regime having been forced to feed the machine it has created with wholly innocent, underprivileged youth under the guise of "education. " All Russians, with the possible exception of the young, are so acutely aware of the injustices of the forced labor system, and at the present it is such an integral part of Russia that it is possible that some restraint should be used by U.S. propaganda in treating the subject. Full treatment might seem to the Russians like rebuking them for their character. (3) The Police State The whole gigantic mechanism of coercion which the Soviet State has created and which has as its function cowing or breaking the will of all Soviet citizens who do not blindly follow the state's instructions constitute' s another Soviet vulnerability of the first importance. To make its system even partially work the regime has been forced to set a large part of its population against the rest. This runs entirely counter to Russian ideas of unity and is clear disproof of the Soviet leaders' claim that they are acting in the direction of the aspirations of the mrisses. Since fear of the secret police forces most Soviet citizens to live a daily lie and to lie daily, the police state system comes in conflict with the Russian concepts of truth and conscience as does the regime' s continual demands for indications of submission (ovations, telegrams to Stalin, confessions, renunciations, etc.). The fantastic plots hatched up by the police as charges can hardly be credible to the more intelligent, and the cynicism and.brutality displayed by the secret police must run counter to Russian ideas of humanity. - 14 - RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 (4) The Collective Farm System There seems little reason to doubt that the Russian peasant's traditional desir== to own his own land is one of the most tenacious parts of the basic Russian culture of which the efforts of the regime are running afoul and that there is almost universal dislike or and disgust with the collective farm system on the part of ordinary collective farm w rke - That the concessions to individualism on the kolkhozes which were necessary to raise the productivity of agriculture on the eve of the war with Germany have recently been re- versed by the regime and that Party control is being strengthened seem to indicate that discontent on the collective farms is due for .a sharp upswing in the immediate future Since many collective farms workers do not feel that they are provided with a sufficient return on their labor by the state and are convinced that kolkhoz chairmen =~nd warehouse superintendents are profiteering in grain, etc. , at their expense, they babe become almost completely indifferent toward their work and a significant number hav taken to theft of collective farm property which they resell through middlemen- To illustrate the latter process: A collective farm worker, who wants to buy a pair of sx.oes for his son, steals the distributor off the tractor which the kolkhoz needs to plow its fields and sells it to someone who resells it to the manager of a Machine Tractor Station, who knows where it came from but has to fulfill his plan for the repairing of tractors, and who puts it on a tractor from another collective farm the distributor of which has been stolen by someone who wants to buy a pair of shoes for his daughter. Other sources of collective farm discontent are: Party men in key positions wh. have little real understanding of agriculture, the scant consumers goods which reach collective farms and which make the kolkhozniki realize that they are being exploited or the benefit of the communist bureaucracy in the cities, slipshod plowing done by Macbne Tractor Station operators who are pushed by the Stakhanovite system and continually rising norms, the fact that collective farm workers face real hardships in times of cr -p failure when they will get no help from the state, etc. , etc. (5) Minorities Nationalism While discontent among the national minorities in the USSR is probably stronger than among the Great Russian people and arises, at least in part, from feelings of nationalism (especially in the Baltic States and among the peoples of the Caucasus) which lead them to resent both the regime and the Great Russian people, care must be exerc _sed in exploiting this force if the Great Russians, always extremely sensitive about foreigc. attempts to dismember Russia, are not to be driven into the arms of the regime. The strength of separatist feeling on the part of the Ukrainians ds`a highly controversial subject, but all Russian defector and emigre sources indicate that because of the fact that Russia' s enemies have traditionally-tried to sever the Ukraine from Russia indica- tions that the U.S. had arbitrarily decided to try to set up the Ukraine as an independent state would be a fatal blow to U.S. attempts to win Great Russian sympathies. in this connection, however, it may be noted that both SBONR's and NTS' a programs (orgavir,_ tions which are almost as Great Russian as you can get) propose some form of plebisci?e as a solution for -the nationalities question in the event that the regime is overthrown, -15 .- RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 (6) The low standard of living in urban communities Since the revolution was in large part fought to raise the standard of living of the proletariat and since the regime has continually justified its actions in those terms, the facts that the standard of living in Soviet cities remains approximately at pre-revolutionary level and housing continues to be grossly overcrowded, this is a fruitful field for psychological exploitation. (See 2 a (1), "Pie in the Sky".) Perhaps one of the best ways to avoid offending Russian sensitiveness to criticiry;m of Russian backwardness in exploiting this field and to associate blame for the situation with the regime would be to emphasize that most of the country's economy is being used by the Politburo to support international Communist aggressive war (i.e. Korea), Soviet propaganda and intrigue, preparations for Soviet aggressive war, etc. The low standard of living of the proletariat certainly also provides grounds for resentment of the dachas, good clothes, good food and other luxuries enjoyed by the Party -Burocracy, which rules in the name of the proletariat. (7) The exploitation of "free Labor" Wages are so low that many workers have to work two shifts to make enough to live on, piece work, the Stkhanovite speed-up, continually rising production norms, the forced "voluntary buying of government bonds, draconian labor legislation, etc. make many of the workers in Soviet industry dissatisfied with their lot in "The Worker' s Paradise". (See (6) above.) (8) The position of women Low wages and high prices have forced the tremendous majority of women in the USSR to work. Most of them simultaneously try to raise a family (which defectors indicate they still consider as their primary inter?est in life). In fact this group is exploited in a way which makes a farce out of the so-called "equality of women". In addition, unskilled and semi-skilled female labor is used on back-breaking jobs extremely injurious to health. If without suggesting that the women's place is in the home, the present exploitation of Soviet women can be associated with the regime, much capital can be made out of this field. It could, for example, be implied that wages are deliberately kept low in proportion to prices so that most women will have to work. Since the majority of women are primarily interested in family relationships and since men are already scarce in Soviet Russ ha, Soviet women might easily provide a good target for anti-aggressive-war propaganda. (9) Popular resentment of the Party-Bureaucracy There is certainly popular resentment of the privileges enjoyed by the new upper classes in "The Classless Society" and of the nepotispractised by connection, cCare, beaurocratic disregard for the individual, etc. Y the ty'Buroc however, should be used in exploiting this field wince it might result in unnecessarily solidifying all the privileged classes behind the regime. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 (10) Friction within the Party-Bureaucracy There is every indication that within the Soviet Party-Burocracy there is ,jeali usy of the position and privileges of superiors, resentment of toadies and bootlickers w.o gain undeserved advancement, resentment of others for their unwillingness to take -es- ponsibility, a sense of insecurity owing to the necessity of finding a scapegoat for everything that goes wrong, frustration at the continual lying that one is forced to di-, a sense of shame at the hypocracy necessary to disassociate oneself from a person or the way out, and continual fear of intra-office spying, compromising oneself, making a mistake, and of the "slow way down" courtesy of the party or the fast way out courtesy the MGB. It would appear, however, that attacks against the group as a whole should be avoided and individual members encouraged to disassociate themselves from the regime so that the entire group will not feel that its only salvation lies with the regime. `le question of the size of the target group for US propaganda is a vital one and it is here suggested that it might prove best to make it no bigger than the Politburo, attributing all evils to it or to the system, so that the door would seem open to all others. In insurrection, the Russian people might choose to shut in on many of the groups but they would be in a better position to select the guilty ones than we. (U) Discontent on the Part of the factory manager group This group probably contains many of the ablest and most energetic people in the USSR and must certainly compare its situation unfavorably to its counterpart in US-in- dustry where opportunities are almost unlimited for able executives. Since it seems to be one of the most logical places in which to look for future anti-Soviet leadership, care should be taken to avoid driving the group into the arms of the regime. (12) Discontent on the part of the Intelligentsia Strict party control and the severe post-war purges probably indicate that there is widespread discontent among the Intelligentsia. The group probably feels its isolation from the west more acutely than any other Soviet group. (13) Frustration and confusion on the part of Soviet engineers Soviet engineers must feel the control, and not the always understanding control, of the Party in much the same way as does the group of factory managers. In addit -In, since many of them spend their time pouring over western technical journals, largt'y American, they are probably particularly susceptible to doubts about the true value -if the Soviet system. (14) Resentment of the Politburo by Soviet Marshals Zhukov and several of the other great Soviet Army leaders during the last war must resent the way that they have been put in the shade by the Politburo, especially sinc: they read of the great post-war roles that Marshall, Eisenhower, Montgomery, are play og. -17 - RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 3. Possible Methods of Approach to Other Major Target Groups Special slanting of propaganda directed toward the Soviet Army could take into account the troops' practical confinement to barracks and the higher standard of living in Eastern Germany, etc, than in the USSR. Emphasis could also be placed on the fact that the Russian Army has traditionally been an instrument of Russian national policy and has almost exclusively been used for the defense of Russia. while it is now being readied for offensive use in aggression against the west in the interests of international communist expansion and not in the interests of the Russian people. The great respect which Soviet wartime leaders such as Zhukov enjoyed, and still enjoy, among Soviet troops could be exploited by showing how they have largely been relegated to minor jobs by the Politburo which feared their prestige. Zhukov' s role in the Soviet film, "The Fall of Berlin" provides a handy example of this process. b. Soviet Youth Soviet youth, which is too young to know at first hand what collectivization and the purges meant or to have seen Eastern Europe or Germany during the war, undoubtedly constitutes one of the regime's principal sources of strength and at the same time probably the most difficult group for US propaganda to appeal to. Exposing the real meaning of Marxism-Stalinism and giving some pointed lessons on the real history of the USSR might be among the best ways of neutralizing the effects of this Soviet source of strength. The fact that the regime is able to offer good jobs to only part of the group while others have to be drained off into the forced labor system under the guise of the "National Labor Reserves" might be a point illustrating the nature of the Soviet system and close enough to home to be understandable. 4. Exploitable US Assets a. Conceptions and Interests Common to the US and Russia Every effort should be made to ascertain the basic Russian concepts which can be used to build up a picture of what the United States is trying to do in terms which are understandable to the Russians and to establish, insofar as possible, a community of interest between the US and the Russian people. b. Exploitable Quotations from Russian Classical and Marxist Literature Research groups and the US universities could be allotted the task of collecting useful quotations which could be prepared for use on IBM machines available to US pro- paganda operators. c. Strength of the free world Stressing the strength of the free world is undoubtedly of great importance and is already one of the major themes on VOA broadcasts beamed to the USSR. - 18 - RESTRICTED Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 VMW RESTRICTED ape d. Non-aggressive character of free world See "Interdicting other Soviet strengths" and "Effects of a psychological offens 19 - Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 ,me PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE VIS-A-VIS THE USSR OBJECTIVE, TASKS AND THEMES U.S. psychological approaches to the USSR should be directed, in general, toward th? crea tion of future beneficial relations between the two nations. The present situation, however, calls for emergency efforts to stimulate all psychological factors within the USSR which nay act as a deterrent upon the aggressive policies of its rulers. For this purpose, therefore, all appropriate psychological pressure shall be exerted to deter further aggression on the p rt of the Soviet Union by: I. Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the reckless nature of Soviet policy as its consequences. R. Establishing a reservoir of good will between the peoples of the USSR and those (f the free world. M. Widening the schism which exists between the Soviet peoples and their rulers. IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVE I: Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the reckless nature of Soviet policy and its consequences. Tasks 1. and 2. 1. To establish the vast potential strength of the free world, moral as well as material, in the minds of the people of the USSR. 2. To make clear free world strength is based on the determination and association of free men to defend their homes and way of life against aggressors. Suggested Themes: (a) The peoples of the free world regard Soviet aggression as an attempt to enslave them and will resist such aggression by force of arms. (b) The attempts of all tyrants to conquer the world have always failed; future attem ats will also inevitably fail. (c) The free world has spiritual, human and industrial, natural, economic, and techn i- logical resources as well as the military potential necessary to defeat any attempt at world conquest and experience. and skills in their use. Necessarily implicit throughout these objectives, tasks and themes is the suggestion to thr Soviet peoples that an alternative to the present regime can exist. It is not the policy of the U. S. to advocate specific alternatives. Consequently no such suggestion should be made o 1 any specific issue (collectivization, democratic elections, etc.) without special policy guid: nce. In all our output however, it should be implicit that the eventual solution lies in a reassert on of the human values which are the heritage of the Russian people, and which Stalinism has repudiated. (d) The tremendr is -1- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 (d) The tremendous potential of the United States which supplied weapons to all nations, expecially the USSR, who fought against aggression in World War U is again being marshaled to prevent further aggression. (e) The myth that the USSR won World War U without significant military, economic and industrial help from the West should be destroyed. Task 3. 3. To make clear that such strength is not being created for aggression. Suggested Themes. (a) There were no annexations of territory by the free world as a result of World War H. On the contrary, many nations have won their independence (India, Philippines, etc.) through peaceful development and political negotiations. (Caution: Do not confuse annexation with the trusteeships and temporary occupations which have followed World War II.) (b) The U. S. has no desire to possess nor control any Russian (or Soviet) lands whatever. (c) In contrast to the Soviet Union, armies were disbanded in the free world at the end of World War U. The free world has started to rearm only as a result of the repeated demon- strations of hostile intent and aggressive design on the part of the Soviet government. (d) The free world desires only peaceful and friendly relations with all nations and will go to war only to protect its people, territory, and way of life from aggression. Task 4. 4. To establish the reckless and aggressive nature of Soviet policy and to establish the inevitable dis=ester for the people of the USSR inherent in their rulers' quest for world domination. Suggested Themes: (a) Soviet ideology as taught by Stalin calls for an aggressive struggle by the USSR against the so-called bourgeois states using armed force if necessary. (b) Any quest for world dominion leads to war. (c) Stalin's speech of 1946 and "The History of CPSU(b)" and Stalin's "Problems of Leninism" all portray a philosophy which permits of no compromise and calls for the destruc- tion of all other systems of government, even though they may have been created by and are defended by the people governed. (d) Statements of possibility of peaceful co-existence have been made only for the purpose of deceiving Srwiet and other peoples and for tactical advantage as taught by basic communist doctrine. Emphasize that they have never appeared as a basic communist tenet. (e) The free world recognizes the communist 'peace" campaign as a travesty when sponsored by a regime which aids and abets aggression openly. It is intended to exploit the people's desire for peace in the selfish interests of the Stalin clique. (f) This "peace" -2- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 AMw (f) This wpeacel campaign is specifically designed to distort the motives of natio resisting communist aggression; it is a device to immobilize the free world's resistant. to Soviet aggression, direct or indirect. IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVE II: Establishing a reservoir of good will between the peg-ples of the USSR and those of the free world. Task 1. 1. To uncover and develop the spiritual values and the moral and ethical conceits of the Soviet peoples especially of Russia and to establish the identity of these vale s with those of the free world. Suggested Themes: (a) Truth, mercy, pity, charity, love of family, hospitality, are some of the basic , clue. which have always been dear to the Soviet peoples and which are derived from their spix itual life. They are held in common with the people of the free world, but in contempt by the: oviet rulers. (b) Historically the contribution of the Russian people to the free world in the vari =us fields of creative thought - i.e., ethics, arts and the sciences - has always been recogni; ad and respected. (c) A review of classical Russian literature and political and ethical philosophy sh ms that Russia shared and was influenced by the creative social and cultural forces that hav shaped the West. The political and ethical ideals of the Russian peoples are at bottom similar to those of the West,,, since they spring from common spiritual roots; they are thwarteda thx communist state, but they are not dead.* (d) The Russian family is founded on love, trust, mutual assistance, and respect for the rights of others. These values are held in common with the free world. (e) The things for which the Soviet peoples believed the revolution was fought: pea _e, freedom, and a decent life for all, are basic concepts held in common with the free woricc. These concepts motivate and are being advanced in the progressive daily and political life of the free world. (f) To assure the Russian people that the free world has no designs against them rv r their country and that it seeks only their freedom and prosperity in a friendly, cooperative world. Task 2. 2. To establish specifically the good-will of the government and people of the United States toward Soviet peoples. * Treatment note: We should avoid talking of Western influence overmuch, and avoid any sug gestion of being patronizing. Suggested Tl roes: -3- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 AM, - AM Suggested Themes: (a) The U. S. is peace-loving and honors the sovereignty and integrity of peoples and nations. (b) Americans distinguish between the Soviet peoples and their government. (c) The United States never has been at war with Russia. (d) The U. S. helped the Soviet peoples in World War II even before the U. S. was at war with Germany. (e) The U. S. continued to help the peoples of the USSR even after the end of hostilities of World War H. (Helped also after the Revolution: Hoover Commission) (f) Americans have contributed their knowledge and experience to the building of industry there. (g) The love of technology and gadgetry, science and mechanics applied to daily life, is shared by the peoples of the USSR and the U. S. (h) Our countries are big and we share a tendency to plan big. (1) We share the spirit of pioneers. (j) There are many thousands of persons of Russian or Ukranian descent in the United States who have had an important influence on the development of American life. (k) Russian and Ukranian folk music and the music of their composers (including the Soviet) are very frequ. qtly performed in the U. S.* Many of our outstanding performing artists are of Russian extraction. (1) The novels and stories of Russian authors are very popular in the United States (the free world). Courses in Russian literature figure in the curricula of all our major univer- sities.* (m) The people of the U. S. and the free world are well aware of the courage, energy and aspirations of the Soviet peoples; many Americans have publicly praised these qualities. (n) The U. S. helps all peoples when it can, whether or not they agree with American foreign policy. (Witness the case of India, Yugoslavia, and other neutrals.) It does not seek to punish peoples for the acts of their governments. (Witness the contributions from the U. S. to UNRRA and UNICEF, which have helped the peoples of America's former allies and enemies alike.) * The tours of the Don Cossack Chorus and of the Ballet Russe should be reported from time to time. * New biographies of Russian writers and studies of Russian literature should be reviewed, even if they appear to have no political content. -4- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 CONFIDENTIAL 10.11 (o) .Theatrical aspirants in America still study the Stanislawsky method and no at?uxnpt is made to disguise its Russian origin. (p) The U. S. government and many private institutions and individuals have sought to establish cultural, scientific, and technical exchange with the Soviet Union. (The U. S. e?.ren sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to have the Red Army chorus tour the United Stater.) (q) Evidence of nature of America (the free world) and of the basic drives and ideas we hold in common with the peoples of the USSR is provided in the American and ot}ler Wegtcrn literature still available in the Soviet Union: Steinbeck, Upton Sinclair, Mark Twain, Jae ; London, Dickens, etc. Although some of the works are "social protest" literature, they c.em- onstrate the operation of the democratic faith in social process; the very fact that they are protests and critical of the social system and government indicates that the society as a wholt is strong and progressive. Task 3. 3. To reduce the credibility of Soviet internal propaganda by: a. Exposing false statements made by Soviet propaganda on internal matters to persons inside the USSR. b. Discrediting false statements made by Soviet internal propaganda regardiaw the free world, e.g., by: i. Associating them with past statements by the Soviet Government regai d- ing the internal situation which has proven false; ii. Proving that the Soviet internal propaganda with respect to the free world is but a reflection of the Soviet system - not a picture of the free world. Suggested Theme (to support 3a): (1) The demonstrable falsity of Soviet internal propaganda is proof of the especial disdair= of the leaders for the people. (2) Years of massive propaganda effort has not killed the instinctive ability of the people to distinguish between true and false; by attempting to debase truth, the regime has really enhanced its value. Suggested Themes (to support 3b): (1) "A small clique of scheming rulers who oppress and exploit the majority of the p< ouia tion." The United States, where people can and do change governments through free Plections, or the USSR? (2) "Inhuman exploitation of the working class." The United States, where workers live well - are free to strike for higher wages, have free labor unions to represent their intere,ts.- can change jobs at will - or the USSR? Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 (3) "Suppression of the truth and monopoly control of the press." The United States, where all are free to criticize the government and anybody can print anything, or the USSR? (4) The classical counter-argument of Wall Street control of the U. S. Press should be answered by emphasizing the multiplicity and vanity of opinions of U. S. newspapers, mag- azines, etc. Task 4. 4. To break down the feelings of isolation and abandonment on the part of persons non-sympathetic to the regime. /NOTE: All tasks under Objective II are directed at breaking down the feeling of isolation of the Soviet peoples. Task 4. has a special application to those who may be af- fected by news from defectors, news of the organization of "Free Russia"emigre groups, and reports from the emigre press. Defectors should be handled strictly in accordance with special guidances on the subject. Other emigre subjects also must be handled with care by USIS operators owing to intricate policy questions involved. When in doubt about the validity or invalidity of news of this kind, ask for guidance. Do not go beyond news treatment without special guidance.] IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVE III: Widening the schism which exists between the Soviet peoples and their rulers. Task 1. 1. To stimulate conscious thought regarding the basis of Soviet rule in arbitrary police power and intimidation, and to stimulate a realization that by the values of self- respecting men the physical, spiritual and moral conditions under which Soviet citizens are forced to live are unjust and unnecessary. CAUTION: This is the task most easily implemented. Do not overdo it. The purpose is to-stimulate a consciousness of tyranny among those who might become inured to it or not know what goes on beyond their own personal horizon. Suggested Themes: (a) One of the oldest crimes against the people of the Soviet Union has been the slave labor system, but it never before operated with such vast inhumanity. Stress should be placed on the wide range of offenses for which people are sent to prison camps, rather than on the mere fact that they exist. Without including such offenses, USSR would not have the necessary prison manpower nor would it be an effective tool of terrorism. (N.B, Because of American legal aspects involved, make extra effort to keep abreast of special guidances on this subject.) (b) Allegedly an idealistic blueprint of reeducating the wrongdoer, the Soviet penal system is, in fact, a cruel instrument for economic exploitation of the populace and of dis- position of embarrassing elements. (c) Every family in Russia has felt the burden of this instrument, which is as brutally designed to keep the population in a state of terror as it is to inflict physical enslavement. -6- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 %r ~ CONFIDENTIAL (d) The resentment created by Soviet rule makes necessary for its own protection and the exploitation of its subject people the largest oppressive police mechanism in history, many times larger and more complex than the largest police force of the Tsars. (e) Labor camps are only the final stage in a system, the whole purpose of which 1 to enslave the peoples of the Soviet Union in the interests of their masters. (f) First freedom of speech was lost, now freedom of silence: I. The MVD blackout of the mind is so complete that the Russian is not perm: tted to see, hear, learn, or even think anything which is not approved by the Kremlin. ii. In an MVD-operated world, not even silence is golden nor safe - unless a tzusslar, voices his approval of the regime he is likely to run afoul of the police. (The citizen is condemned to a lifetime of enthusiasms.) iii. The MVD blinders seek to prevent the Russians from even seeing what actually goes on in their awn country as well as in the free world. iv. The Soviet citizen has no right of arriving at conclusions through objective discussion. v. All thought is cast in dictated channels and no deviation may be made for fear of arrest and retaliation. vi. Intellectual integrity is impossible for anyone who wants to get along in th# USSR. vii. Brute force has replaced intellectual persuasion in establishing conviction:.. viii. The Politburo is insisting on dragging the cultural level of the Soviet peopi as down to its own level; i.e., Stalin's influence on music, Zhdanov on the "Leningrad writers._ ix. The Kremlin is attempting to prevent the Soviet peoples from reaching that stage of educational and intellectual development which would enable them to understand, intellectually oppose, and defend themselves against the Kremlin's tactics. Tasks 2. and 3. 2. To destroy the Soviet-fostered myth of Stalin as an all-wise semi-deity and point up the fact that he, in conjunction with the Politburo, is responsible for the intolerable conditions under which the population of the USSR live. 3. Avoiding any pointless character attacks, to establish Stalin's responsibility for the unprincipled exploitation of the Russian peoples; to establish his use of a false philosophy alie31 to those peoples to mislead them. CAUTION: These tasks must be used with restraint. (a) Lenin's testament is a shrewd and accurate appraisal of Stalin as a ruthless pourer seeker. -7- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 (b) Stalin has used his position as means to build his arbitrary and selfish power. (c) Stalin has ruthlessly eliminated all rivals. (d) Stalin's purge of officer corps on eve of war eliminated thousands of patriotic Russians whose absence cost the Soviet people dearly in untold, unnecessary casualties in World War II. (e) Stalin's pact with Hitler was a costly blunder for the Soviet peoples, giving Nazis signal to open war, concentrate against and destroy the original allied front on the continent - a front for whose re-creation Stalin later pleaded. (f) Military leaders and the people - not Stalin - organized victorious Russian offensives against Nazis. In both war and peace Stalin is unscrupulously prodigal with the lives of the Soviet people. (g) just as Stalin's propaganda organs claim credit for all alleged improvements in standard of living of Russian people since 1917, so must actual hardships and sufferings of the people be laid at his door. (h) After World War II, Stalin and his clique deliberately threw away the respect and friendship in the free world for the USSR, which the peoples had earned for the Kremlin by their sacrifices and heroism in the war. (i) If Marxism-Leninism is a scientific theory, why hasn't anyone been able to describe the d1basic principles" governing the Soviet economy? Why did the USSR start out the extreme "militant communism," reverse its field com- pletely in the NEP, and only then start five-year plans? Why did Soviet leaders first try to replace the family as the basis of Soviet society and then have to reinstate it? Why did they first try to put the army on a fraternal basis, and then have to reintroduce traditional military discipline? Why was it right to have political commissars in the army at one moment, and wrong the next? 4. To demonstrate the consistently illusory nature of Soviet promises of improved material conditions of life in Russia and the falsity of claims to having created living conditions better than those in the free world. CAUTION: Handle with care. Living standards have improved relatively at certain periods, but only at the whim of the regime. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 CONFIDENTIAL Suggested Themes: (a) Are conditions in the USSR better now - food, clothing, homes, freedom - really a fulfillment of the promises that have been held out ever since the Revolution? Ask the par,nts who sacrificed because they believed their children would be better off.* (b) Do the working classes and peasants of the USSR live better than did the working classes of Eastern Europe and Germany? Ask the soldiers who saw those areas during World War U. (c) What is the real value of a day's work in the Soviet Union in terms of what a w,ori:er can buy with his pay compared to the worker in the free nations? (d) if the working classes and peasants of the USSR live better than their counterpar s in Germany and Austria, why are Soviet occupation troops confined to barracks? Why are ordinary Soviet citizens not allowed to visit those areas? (e) If the working classes and peasants of the USSR live better than their counterparts in the free world, why are they not permitted to visit those areas freely? (f) How many more generations will be sacrificed on the false altar of a better life n the future? When will the individual be permitted to work toward a better life for himself and his family right now? Task 5. 5. To demonstrate that the Soviet people, the Soviet army, and the natural we.dth of the USSR are being ruthlessly exploited by Stalin and the Politburo in the interest of increasing and extending their power in the name of World Communism and against =.he interest of the country and the people. Suggested Themes: (a) The workers and peasants of the USSR are deprived of the fruit of their tabor and their productivity is reduced in a rich land because: i. Their leaders are unscrupulous and too thirsty for power to delegate auth a ity, they have efimeshed the nation in a blundering bureaucracy. ii. The wealth of their factories goes into armaments for extension of the pov; r of the regime. iii. ` The produce of their fields is sold to support this aggression. iv. Millions of their young men are held in military service, not to defend Rutssia, but to serve as unwilling tools of the aggressors. * Such social improvements as they have are less than those obtained by peoples of the Jess and are bumbling, bureaucratic and unworkable in real practice. -9- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R0l731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 CONFWENTUL v. Inefficient and corrupt administration of the national economy and the hostility of workers and peasants prevents development of countries' potentialities. (b) "One with the plough - seven with the spoon." Weapons for aggression in Korea, money for the comintern, thousands of bureaucrats - millions of police all on the backs of the Russian people. (c) The patriotism and devotion of the Russian and his countrymen of other races are prostituted for purposes of aggression in ways and Places foreign to those peoples and not in their interest. (d) The Army, traditionally a weapon of defense of the Russian peoples, has been and will be, ruthlessly sacrificed by Stalin and his cohorts in the name of international communist aggression. Task 6. 6. To exploit the widespread dislike of rural populations for the obligatory col- lective farm system and focus rural resentment on the Soviet regime which imposes collectivization as an instrument of political control. Suggested Themes: (a) Lenin's promises to the peasant of land and freedom - peace, land, and bread - have not been kept. (b) The peasant has always been a special object of Stalin's cruelty and exploitation. (c) The onerous state taxes in kind and other levies deprive the peasant of the fruit of his labor. (d) The bureaucracy deprives the peasant of proper medical care, education, and consumer goods. (More to come) Task 7. 7. To exploit among Soviet women woman's traditional fear and dislike of war, their resentment at their special exploitation by the regime and the failure to give them the promised equality with men; to associate their fears and resentment with regime's aggressive intentions. Suggested Themes: (a) There is a shortage of marriageable men in the USSR now; aggressive war will needlessly cost the lives of millions more. (b) Marriage and home life, already difficult, will become impossible. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 CONFIDENTIAL (c) The dual. burden on women will be intensified - child bearer, with no time to rai? children factory or field worker without time for proper rest, much less to get real en, y- ment out of. one's life on this earth. (d) Woman's equality under the Soviet regime means being forced to work for deliberately low wages and high prices. * The systematized attack on Stalinism - Leninism - Marxism is omitted from this paper as it is a task which has been assigned to a special unit. Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R003500180030-6 RM No. S P 1946 38-8 TRANSMITTAL SL,_ ATE TO:~~ c^ , BUILDING M No. REMARKS: `~J I AA a.r ~~~ A A FROM: BUILDING ROOM NQ ESCT NSI ,~ t r Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP80R01731 R003500180030-6