CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CIA DAILY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003600030006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 7, 1950
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/07/28 :
7 April 1950
' .0:f.ANDUI FOR THE CHIEF, COA:PS
SUBJECT: Content and Distribution of the CIA Daily Summary
1. During the past eighteen months the Department of State has
given signs of an increasing uneasiness over the content and distri-
bution of the CIA Daily Summary. This uneasiness was reflected in
the Dulles .eport, in comments on CIA's "political summaries", and it
has found fre,a ent expression in the day-to-day liaison between the
Publications Division of ORE and the Policy reports Staff of the
Office of the Secretary, the unit which makes "S/S" cables available
to CIA. :r. Robert G. Barnes, Chief of the Policy Reports staff, re-
quested on 1 .=arch 1950 that he be provided with a current list of the
Daily Summary distribution, a request which was immediately -granted.
In subsequent conversations with him, it has been learned that the
Department of State is still seriously concerned over the content and
distribution of the Daily Summary.
2. Content of the CIA Daily Summary. The Daily Summary was estab-
lished at the direct request of the President who wanted to read brief
digests of the most significant telegrams and cables received daily by
CIA. It was made specifically clear that operational cables were to be
included, so long as they bore some significant relationship to national
security and needed therefore to be brought to the ]President's attention.
This concept has remained a guiding one for those responsible for dub-
lishing the Daily Summary, the sole modification being that the National
Security Council is now regarded as also t.:eing a prime target for the
publication. Hotivever, it has been true from the beginning that the
Daily Summary has consisted almost entirely of digests of Sta;,e Depart-
ment telegra mis, the percentage of State materials usually running well
over 90 percent. Although it is clear that in peacetime the most sig-
nificant problems will usually c o:,e within the purview of the J)epa,rt "ent
of State, the extraordinarily high percentage of State items in the
Daily Summary is also owing to the withholding of high-level r.,-lterials
by the various agencies of the National Defense establishment - parti-
cularly operational cables -- on the one hand, and the consi:Rent dis-
tribution of such materials by State on the other. The combination of
these two factors has caused the content of the CTA Daily Susa.i yr to
consist almost exclusively of high level State Department operational
and intelligence cables.
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3. Distribution of the CIA Daily Summary. .Analysis of the dis-
tribution of tt--c Daily Summary discloses that 26 of the 31 copies
distributed externally go to some part of the National I)eense estab-
lishment. This imbalance is caused by: (a) the four-to-one ratio
between the Defense agencies and the Department of State; (b) the
interest of the Defense agencies in learning, through the Daily Summary,
about the Plans and operations of the State Department; and (c) the
disinterest of State in reading a publication which consists 90 percent
of its own materials. Nhatever its causes, however, this imbalance means
that the Daily Summary has become a one-way channel by which State De-
partmLlent' s most sensitive i2foiation and operational planning is made
available to the Defense agencies, without reciprocation by those
agencies. From State's point of view, CIA's profession that the Daily
Summary is designed primarily for the President and the MSC is over-
shadowed by the fact that the distribution of the publication is
predominantly to the military.
4. The present concern of the Department of State would be con-
siderably relieved, if not entirely dispelled, if Army, T?;avy, and Air ,~rere
to make available for the CIA Daily Summz-a.ry, cables and telegrar._s of a
sensitivity equal to those provided by State. tinder such circumstances
the content of the Daily Summary would more accurately reflect daily
cable traffic which relates significantly to the security of the US.
voreover, under such circumstances the Departn:ert of State would undoubtedly
ask for more copies of the Daily Summary, thus adjusting the imbalance of
the present distribution.
R;C OTrIx l' I UIIS
It is recommended that COAPS
1. Acquaint the military agencies with the intelligence needs of
G -1k in connection with the Daily Summary.
2. Inform the military agencies of the degree and kind of State
Department contributions to the Daily Summary.
3. Advise the military agencies of the possibility that CIA may
be forced to curtail distribution of the Daily Summary to those
agencies in order to protect its position with the Department
of State unless they are able to provide CIA with equally
Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates
Approved For Release 2006/07728 ' CIA1RlR01731 R003600030006-8