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Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 17, 2003
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March 11, 1946
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Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ON VE DAY --- VJ DAY Prepared by Secretariat Strategic Services Unit War Department 11 March 1946 25X1 Approved For Release Y, OT : QIA-RDP80R01731 R Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003600080001-8 CONTENT S I Functions of the Individual Branches............... 1 II VE Day: Europe, Afric a, the Near Ea st ............. 7 III VE Day: The Far East. ......... ..... ............... 10 IV VJ Day: Europe, Afric a, the Near Ea st ............. 12 V VJ Day: The Far East . .............. ............... 14 25X1 Approved For ReleSE 01 08 : I'lA RDP80R01731F003600080001-8 Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 logical and scientific fields was collected through espionage and other means not usually open to normal Government pro- cedure, then evaluated and disseminated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to authorized American military and civilian agencies. Direct liaison for information and training pur- poses was maintained with Allied secret intelligence services. 2. Counter-Espionage (X-2) Information concerning the activities of foreign in- telligence services and clandestine organizations was collected, lists of subversive personalities abroad were prepared, and this information disseminated to authorized American military, counter-intelligence, and Government agencies. Advice and assistance on the institution of measures necessary to protect U. S. interests from enemy espionage and counter-espionage activities were supplied to executive agencies of the U. S. Government. Direct liaison was maintained with other Allied and neutral nations' counter-intelligence services. FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BRANCHES INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES 1. Secret Intelligence (SI) Intelligence in military, political, economic, socio- 25X1 3. Research and Analysis (R&A) Detailed intelligence studies were prepared embracing political, psychological, sociological, economic, topographic and military information required for strategic services opera- tions or requested by the JCS, the Armed Services and authorized Government agencies. In addition sections of the Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were compiled, as well as special map or cartographic studies. 25X1 Approved For Re~~~~5/0>~ Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 25X1 B, PARA-MI LI TARY BRANCHES 1. Special Operations (SO) Sabotage of enemy communications and special targets, support of underground resistance groups and special clandestine para-military operations were planned and conducted. Indi- viduals, teams or underground organizations behind enemy lines were organized, equipped, and trained. 2, Operational Group Command (OG) The OG was a separate military unit within OSS of or- ganized, uniformed commandos or guerrilla troops who were ex- perienced in and spoke the language of their target territory. Fifteen-man and thirty-man operational nuclei were trained to aid and direct resistance groups in carrying out guerrilla opera- tions and to attack selected targets behind enemy lines. The OG was active in MedTO (as 2671st Special Reconnaissance Bat- talion), ETO, and FETO. 3. Maritime Unit (MU) Maritime operations were carried out, including the conduct of clandestine landings of agents and operatives and maritime sabotage. Special equipment and supplies necessary were developed in conjunction with the Research and Development Branch. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rel 5/08 Approved For Release 2003/05/68 3CrA-RDP80R01731 R003600080001-8 25X1 5. Special Projects Special operational assignments and missions special weapons were carried out as approved by the with Director. 25X1 6. Field Experimental Unit New special weapons and techniques were demonstrated to OSS field missions. Later this unit prepared a plan for penetration of Korea from the Pacific which was under considera- tion of the Theater Commanders at the and of the Pacific war. C. AUXILIARY BRANCHES 1. Communications Communications required for operations were maintained and personnel trained and special equipment developed for this purpose e 25X1 3. Schools and Training Personnel were trained for strategic services opera- tions including SI, SO, MO, and MU. 4. Security Responsible for maintenance of security and security procedures in OSS personnel and installations in Washington and overseas. 5. Research and Development Secret devices and equipment required for special operations were invented, developed, tested, and camouflaged Approved For Re " 116$5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/08 'CIA-RDP80R01731 R003600080001-8 where necessary. Clothing and accessories used for travel and residence in enemy-occupied or neutral territory were collected and provided to CSS operations branches. Liaison with CSRD and other agencies on technical matters was main- tained. 6. Chief Surgeon Medical officers not only provided medical care and supplies, but also cooperated in the field with intelligence procurement branches collecting and analyzing medical intelli- gence and data on enemy medical supplies and techniques. 7. Presentation Charts, graphs, maps, and other presentations were pre- pared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Commanders, Army and Navy and other agencies. 8. Field Photographic Motion and still pictures were produced for Army, Navy and Government Departments including training, documentary and historical movies as well as recording 085 operations and techniques. D. PERSONNEL BRANCHES 1. Headquarters and Headquarters Det. 2. Naval Command 3. Civilian Personnel 4. Personnel Procurement E. SERVICES BRANCHES 1. Budget and Procedures 2. Reproduction 3. Office Services 4. Procurement and Supply 5. Transportation 6. Finance 25X1 Approved For Release?90/08 -5- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 F. ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCHES 1. Director 2. Assistant Directors 3. Planning Group and Planning Staff Responsible for formulation of over-all strategic plans on which OSS operations were based. 4.. Executive Office 5. Secretariat 6. General Counsel 7. Board of Review A quasi-judicial body to pass on matters of funds and expenditures. 25X1 Approved For Rele EOM0f 08 : CIA-RDP80R0l731 003600080001-8 Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 Pepro- duction Special funds Deputy Director Services cter?.. - nsent Su Tronspor-I Motion I vio?r?~y L~ra~jo 6xeeullve c Secre aria Communr c0trons Chief Surgeon schools ? 7roininy Deputy Director /n/el/,pence Secrirt Reseorc4 rvrregn rw/ysis iorw/7he1 ,enero/ Counsel Deputy Director Personnel ~rsonne/I urrnren Commondin,Offic oerottona/ Groulo Command Boord of 12evieu. h1f Ike hmen Op,ro ' ora,' Groups Office Services ?SECQFT? Morale Ooerohons Special pro7erts rie/d rperinen Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 r ,eeiol s4s5 iatanto Representetw Nova/ Command Deputy Director Operations Security Special perofions Maritime Unit Field -7- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 II VE DAY: EUROPE, AFRICA. THE NEAR EAST 25X1 25X1 A. EUROPE ( ETO and MedTO) 1. Reporting on Surrendering German Army Units Intelligence units which had been deep behind German lines in Berlin, in Central Germany and in the Redoubt con- tinued to supply military information and order of battle of the disintegrating and surrendering German armies. Some of the teams were over-run by advancing Allied units and re- ported in person; others maintained contact by wireless or by direct ground-to-plane ultra-high-frequency radio telephone. New directives were issued these units to report also on civilian morale, resistance nuclei or "Werewolves", and conditions of installations, supplies, roads and railroads, at the request of Military Government. 2. Occupation Period Intelligence Network Developing OSS headquarters in Paris and London prepared to implement detailed plans for intelligence coverage of Germany. Two operational units, at Maastricht and Luxemburg and such advance units as the OSS 7th Army Detachment, had already established operations in occupied parts of Western and Southern Germany and Austria and made certain key political, industrial and labor contacts. These were to supply both. local elements, Military Government, and the occupation forces, and also SHAEF and Washington customers. 3. Redeployment to Far East Begun Redeployment of personnel to the Far East was already well under way for such OSS activities as had completed their mission in Europe.. The Parachute School and many of the Operational Groups and Special Operations personnel that had been active in France and the Balkans were on their way to new assignments in the China Theater. Approved For Rele R r lJ08 : f0080001-8 t 0 -g- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 25X1 5, Joint Document-Collection Teams City or "T-Force" Teams composed of X-2, SI, and R&A personnel working with the 6th and 12th Army Groups were collecting and evaluating all documents which might show the capacities or plans of the Japanese or which might have any connection with Germany either politically or industrially for particular use in the collection of evidence for Reparations Commissions, for War Crimes and for the "Safe- haven" work seeking hidden enemy assets.. 6. X-2 Liquidating German Intelligence Service Counter-intelligence units were maintained in all the major neutral and allied-occupied capitals of Europe to assist in the liquidation of the German Intelligence Service by the use of mobile special counter-intelligence teams and by participation in the CI War Room. In addition, inform- ation was gathered on foreign intelligence activities and techniques and liaison was maintained with the Allied counter- intelligence services. Captured German intelligence personnel and agents were interrogated, plans were discovered for stay-behind networks, the German Intelligence Service itself was penetrated and plans for its complete liquidation developed. 7. Morale Operations 25X1 8. The Photographic Project Continued Strategic harbors, ports, railroad yards, factories, dams, and power installations as well as the coast line of Western Europe were being photographed in a joint R&A-Field Photographic intelligence photographic documentation project. 25X1 Approved For Releas~/ l~' : C -9- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 25X1 25X1 B. AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST 1. Covert Intelligence Coverage Virtual peace-time conditions prevailed in these territories permitting SI personnel to be established fl 2. X-2 Making Security Checks 25X1 X-2 agents were oDeratinel 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For ReleaSE2 UtU_ 5j58 -to- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 V-E DAY: THE FAR EAST 25X1 1. CHINA Intelligence coverage extended. Directives called for the r her development of intelligence from China, French Indo-China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. At this time coverage of South China was relatively complete, including a coast- watching network from HongKong to Shanghai maintained for the U. S. Navy. Coverage of North China Central Government areas and of northern French Indo-China through'Conununist areas and of Manchuria and Korea were awaiting Theater approval. Mean- while, agents were being trained for Korea and an independent Chinese network had been contacted in Manchuria. Intelligence data supplied to Theater Command, the 14th Air Force, and Navy included tactical targets, weather data, information on shipping and aircraft activity, order of battle `/ information, operational and situation intelligence. In addition, R&A prepared special strategic studies for the 14th and 20th Air Forces, and SI obtained specific strategic intelligence at Theater request. At this time SI and Field Photographic per- sonnel sent to Kwangtung Province to make for Theater a survey of HongKong to Hainan Strait were setting up a coast-watching system in this previously uncovered area. 25X1 Para-military teams cut enemy lines. SO teams were operating under a Theater directive to interdict the enemy's strategic routes of communication in north and south China and northern French Indo-China, by training, supplying and leading guerrilla forces in sabotage behind enemy lines. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Re bfL_3fj05/0> : CIA-RDP80R01731IR003600080001-8 -1'l- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 25X1 Personnel being reinforced. Personnel redeployed from Europe and others shifted northward from Burma were reinforcing the China staff to permit further expansion of intelligence and para-military operations. 2. SOUTHEAST ASIA 25X1 Det. 101 at climax of operations, Nearing the completion of the urma campaign, OSS guerrilla forces in Detachment 101, the only combat forces in this area, were engaged in heavy fighting endeavoring to clear the enemy from the Shan States in southern `n+ Burma. Twelve OSS field groups furnished the only intelligence from this area, maintaining coverage of enemy withdrawals into Thailand. This was the beginning of the phase of Detachment 101 operations which won the Distinguished Unit Citation. Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia. Intelligence teams were providing information on Jap s pp ng and defenses as well as weather data from peninsular Burma, central Malaya, the Andaman Islands and Sumatra. The infiltration and exfiltration of agents from enemy-occupied territory had become a regular procedure, 25X1 carried out by MU 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relea~L.. i fift"8I: CIA-RDP80R01731IR003600080001-8 --1z- Approved For Release 2003/011108 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 VJ DAY: EUROPE, AFRICA, THE-NEAR EAST 25X1 25X1 EUROPE Aid to AMG, Occupation Forces, and Washington Intelligence directives were revised in emphasis from the tactical and military situation to strategic political data for Washington consumption, and a priority objective became the collection of information on Russian activities and on events in the other Allied occupation zones. Intelligence bases continued to supply political, economic, sociological and industrial information to Military Government, the occupation forces, and the Political Advisor with particular concentration on the exploitation of intelligence opportunities in Germany and Austria. War Crimes Data Collection A concentrated effort to obtain War Crimes data was aimed both in the collection of documentation and in the interrogation of key Nazi military and political figures. X-2 Adapting to Lon er-Range Basis 25X1 25X1 Liquidation of the German Intelligence Service con- tinued and new plans were developed Emphasis was shifted to long-range strategic coup er-esp onage rather than strictly military activity. AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST Activities being Curtailed Activities of all Africa stations were being surveyed and evaluated in order to tighten the organization to meet budget requirements even at the risk of reducing intelligence coverage already considered thin in some areas* Approved For Re t ff f05/08 : W"Ll INV Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 The Near East coverage situation changed little. Intelligence emphasis focusses on Russian activities and on political developments. 25X1 Approved For Rele 1 3f t/T5/08 : ~IA-RDP80R01731 ROp3600080001-8 -14- Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 V-J DAY: FAR EAST 25X1 Reorientation of objectives upon surrender. Theater placed primal -responsibility on SS to furnish it basic necessary intelligence during the re-occupation period. All teams in the field, both intelligence and pars-military, were placed under the direction of the chief OSS Intelligence Officer and assigned to seize enemy documents and to report military, economic and political intelligence pertinent to re-occupation operations in their areas. Mercy teams ordered by Theater to rescue prisoners of war permitted the expansion of intelligence col- lection into hitherto inaccessible regions. Counter-espionage activity was re-directed toward the apprehension of enemy agents in the major Chinese coastal cities. Retrieval of prisoners of war. Teams composed of SI, SO, Medical and Communications personnel and interpreters parachuted into Mukden, Peiping, Weihsien, Keijo in Korea, and in conjunction with AGAS into Shanghai, Hainan Island and Hanoi. All were suc- cessful except the Korea mission, which was sent back by the Japanese and later cancelled. In addition to valuable reports and intelligence procured, over 250 prisoners and internees, including General Wainwright, were immediately flown out, and many other received badly needed supplies and care. For example, on Hainan Island the team located 400 prisoners of war, most of them dying from malnutrition and disease, and after radioing for supplies set up a 200-bed hospital. An additional intelligence team in Formosa made an intensive survey of the Japanese defenses of the island even before the official surrender of the large Japanese garrison there, OSS the major producer of intelligence in China. By V-J Day OSS was providing over two-thirds of G-2 and AAF intelli- gence, at least 40 percent of intelligence on Asiatic shipping and the bulk of weather information in China. X-2 had compiled a list of over 15,000 individuals suspected of cooperation with the enemy. An increasingly large number of requests for specific information were being directed to OSS by other American agencies in the Theater. Coverage of the China Theater extended from Peking and the Shantung Peninsula in northern China to the Tonkin Gulf area in French Indo-China. Operations planned for areas further north were awaiting Theater approval. 25X1 Approved For Re eas 43/05/48 : CIA-RDP80R017*31 R003600080001-8 Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8 Para-military operations harassing the enem until V-J Day. Guerrillas e by SO men continue attacks against the enemyfs troop concentrations and lines of communication. Since January 1945 SO teams were responsible for killing over 12,000 Japanese. Five Chinese Commando units were operating against the enemy, having made the first combat parachute jumps ever taken by members of the Chinese Army. Three of these units working together ac- complished the capture of the Tanchuk Airfield. Morale operations effective. The distribution of thousands of subversive items in both north and south China was bringing about the surrender of hundreds of puppets and the intensification of Jap counter-measures. 2:. SOUTHEAST ASIA Intelligence coverage. OSS was supplying the major part of American G-2 intelligence in the India-Burma Theater. Progress was being made toward the objective of obtaining both overt and covert intelligence coverage in Thailand, Malaya, Java and southern French Indo-China. Teams were sent into key cities in occupied areas even before surrender terms had been settled. With the surrender, emphasis of reporting changed to definition of the w+ Japanese attitudes in Southeast Asia, the ambiguous position of the Thais, and political and economic information. Support to Thai resistance. Delivery of supplies and dis- semination of subversive pub cations had continued until the surrender. Over 480 prisoners of war were brought out of Thailand and supplies of food and medicine taken to others. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/q