COMMENT ON PLANNING GROUP PAPER PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 22, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29
CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29
CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
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~C,tjS P
ME11gC~RANDUb~i i'GR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT Comment on Planning Group P~.per ''Problems
of Southern .Africa."
1. dye believe that the general line taken by the paper
is a good one. In particular, we agree with the thrust of
the policy suggestions.
2. ~-e also feel, however, that there are numerous errors
of fact and interpretation, some of which bear directly on the
policy sections. Among the more important of these are the
following:
a. Page 1S: The statement that ''resolution of
Ratanga separa ion should reduce the counterproductive in-
fluence Tshombe has had...on Federation policy" is unclear.
If it means that a detente in the Congo will make the whites
who now control the Federation (and who will still control
Southern Rhodesia in the event of the ~'ederations's breakup)
any easier to deal with, we would disagree. Rather, we feel
that any sign of a weakening in Tshombe's "independence" will
make the whites even less willing to liberalize their racial
attitudes. A period of Elisabethville-Leopoldville amity might
reduce this reluctance, but we would foresee no appreciable
change in the relatively short time-span to which this paper
directs itself .
b. Page 22; We doubt that the British role is
completely passiv'e.- It is indirect and limited in its ef-
fectiveness, but we are fairly sure, for instance, that Londnn
has influenced Whitehead's apparent decision to reschedule elec-
tions for December.
Decl ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7 ,
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
c. Page 29: Our impression is that the Carpio-
Martinez De A va visit and its aftermath made it less likely
than ever that the South African Government will cooperate
with any UN initiative on South-hest Africa.
d. Page
30:
We
would suggest that Swaziland's
economic poten~ia
is
an
even more cogent reason for
giving
more attention to
it.
On
the other hand, we suspect
that
Basutoland for numerous reasons--its location, the presence
of an entrenched nationalist party with wide overseas con-
tacts, and its basic poverty--rather than Swaziland will
turn out to be the "test case" among the High Commission
Territories.
3. ~e would also make the following relatively minor
comments:
a. Page 1: We would suggest that here or in the
body of the paper, mention be made of the fact that extensive
violence in southern Africa would also jeopardize the only
important industrial economy south of the Sahara, thereby
adding to the economic difficulties of neighboring territories.
b. Page 6; We would suggest substituting "Afrikaner"
for "Boer" in-?'ine~, and "English-speaking South Africans"
for "British" in line 6. In the second and third lines of
the second paragraph, we would suggest the following wording:
*' ..is offering the Africans at least 15 out of 65 seats in
the colony's legislature, which is as far as Prime Minister
~Qhitehead feels he can push..."
c. Page 7; Here and elsewhere in the paper we
believe that no ~'s~iould be taken of '~Phitehead's apparent
decision to hold the elections in December. Concerning the
second line of the first complete paragraph, Northern Rhodesia
is now controlled by the Central African office rather than
the Commonwealth and Colonial Office; and concerning the last
line of that paragraph, the Anglo-American Corporation (not
the British Rand Corporation) is the second company which is
supporting Kaunda. ~fe would also question whether the British
South Africa Company would "favor a strong white stand in a
showdown." '~Te feel it might well give up its mineral concession
rights and try to fall back on its extensive agricultural and
trading activity, rather than run the risks of all-out opposi-
tion to African nationalism.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7
d. Page 8; In the second paragraph, we feel note
should be takes-the fact that nearly 20,000 of the "Portu-
guese troops" are Africans. We also feel that the first
sentence of the last paragraph takes too little account of
factors in Katanga (and in the Congo in general) which op-
erated independently of r;uropean interest. The latter merely
Gave Tshombe the means to do ?,~ha% he anti numerous o Sher local
Congolese leaders wanted to do; and removal of the mining com-
panies' influence would merely remove an aggravating factor,
not the problem itself.
e. Page 12; ewe feel that the wording in the first
three lines give' s rather short shrift to the desires of the
radical Africans to operate on their own and the possibility
that they might resist bloc participation on the scale en-
visaged in the passage.
f. Page 20; i4fe agree that Kaunda's supporters will
have the largest s ni gle bloc of seats in the legislature, but
we are not completely confident that they will have even a
"slight majority." ?~Ve believe that the complexities of the
Northern Rhodesian constitution are so great that no flat pre-
diction is possible.
g. Page 31; This is the first indication we have
seen that the So-`u?~i African Government is backpedalling on
the franchise question.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/29: CIA-RDP80S00003A000100020001-7