SOURCES AND METHODS LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01268A000200020028-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 16, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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OGC 77-1090
16 Febn,a! v 1977 I OLC #77- e4 3 6
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central intelligence
FROM: Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel
SUBJECT: Sources and Methods Legislation
Attached for your signature is a letter to Attorney General Bell
relating to the sources and, methods legislation that was introduced as
H.R. 12006 in the 94th Congress, and urging that prompt consideration
be given to the introduction of similar legislation , with the support of
the Justice Department, in the 95th Congress. The letter is intended
to get a dialogue going on this subject with the new team at Justice.
STAT
Anthony A. Lapham
Attachment
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honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
As you know, the President, in his message of 18 February 1976, proposed
legislation to protect intelligence sources and metho;.c s from unauthorized
disclosure. This proposal was subsequently introduced as H.R. 12006, but
no similar legislation was introduced in the Senate. I feel strongly that there
is a need for such legislation, and I seek your support to the end that an
appropriate bill, endorsed by the Justice Department, might be introduced
early in the 95th Congress.
Over the years, serious damage to our foreign 'inte'lligence effort has
resulted from the unauthorized disclosure of inforrr.at_on related to intel-
ligence sources and methods. In most cases, the sources of these leaks have
been individuals who acquired access to sensitive information by virtue of a
special relationship of trust with the United States Government. Current law,
in our opinion, does not adequately cover situations v. here a deliberate
breach of this relationship of trust occurs. In most instances, the Government
must prove either an affirmative intent to harm the United States or aid a
foreign power, or a tendency of the leaked information to produce such harm
or give such aid. The evidence required to establish these elements commonly
requires the revelation of additional sensitive information in open court or, at
the very least, the further dissemination and confirmation of the information
which is the subject of the prosecution. Given the di _`iculties of proof, and
the understandable reluctance to incur the additior?`_ damage occasioned by
such proof, the existing laws are seldom invoked and th eir deterrent value
is slight.
Presently, Section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, places a responsibility on the Director of antral Intelligence to
prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence urces and methods.
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However, this responsibility is not backed up by statutory penalties for unauthorized
disclosure. Legislation along the lines of 11. R R. 12006 as introduced in the House
in the 94th Congress, would close this gap to the limited degree necessary to
carry out a foreign intelligence program, but at the same time give full recognition
to our American standards of freedom of information and protection of individual
rights.
H. R. 12006 acknowledges the authority of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, and the heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or by the
President to engage in foreign intelligence activities for the United States, to
designate certain information as relating to intelligence sources and methods and
provides a criminal penalty for the disclosure of such information to unauthorized
persons. It also provides for injunctive relief in those instances where unauthorized
disclosure is threatened and serious damage to the intelligence collection effort
would result.
The sanctions set forth in H. R R. 12006 are limited to individuals entrusted
with the sensitive information described in the legislation or who gain access
to it by virtue of their position as officer, employee, contractor, or other special
relationship with the United States Government. It would not permit either
criminal action or injunctive relief against representatives of the press or the
publications they represent, except in a case such as Marchetti where a publisher
is acting as an agent for someone subject to the sanctions of the legislation
Public disclosure of classified intelligence gives foreign powers keen
insight into the capabilities and limitations of our intelligence system. It
also undermines the attitude toward security at all levels of Government.
If disclosures of our most guarded secrets and our most sensitive sources and
methods of collecting intelligence continue to occur, the end result is a loss
of faith in the system designed to protect such matters . It also threatens the
very safety and welfare of those who may be providing us intelligence at a
substantial personal risk.
Another factor that is often not considered is that, in addition to the
risks to national security, such public disclosures can also result in sizeable
monetary costs to the United States Government. These costs are often difficult
to measure, but the fact remains that disclosure of the manner in which certain
information is acquired stimulates and enables the target country to take counter-
actions designed to insure against further U. S. access to data of the type
disclosed.
It is a tragedy to see articles in the news media quoting our intelligence
reports verbatim without regard to possible damage to sensitive collection
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programs. The inevitable result of such disclosures can only mean a sharp
curtailment of the effectiveness, if not the disappearance, of some of our most
important intelligence sources, human as v,.-ell as tecin cal.
Legislative proposals to protect intelligence sources and methods were
initiated several years ago by this Agency and have been extensively reviewed
within the executive branch. We have worked particularly closely with the
Department of Justice to come up with an effective and satisfactory bill. On
31 December 1975, the Deputy Attorney General advise: one Director of Central
Intelligence that, with certain relatively minor amendments, the proposed
statute was basically satisfactory from the standpoint of the Department's concerns.
The legislation proposed by the President and introduced as H. R. 12006
incorporated those amendments.
I sincerely believe that passage of a bill that follo:-:s the general pattern
of H. R. 12006 would be a strong deterrent to exposure cf intelligence sources
and methods by persons who have such information by virtue of their relation-
ship with the U. S. Government. I hope that you will support the introduction
of such protective legislation in the 95th Congress, and I can assure you of my
personal interest in the matter and the readiness of r--:y General Counsel and his
staff to meet with your designated representatives at any time to work out a
mutually satisfactory bill.
Sincerely,
r14. KrroO %
E. H. Knoche
Acting Director
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