CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01499R000100010003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 28, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT
AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG
USIB MEMORANDUM
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
17 April 1963 Memorandum, as revised 28 May 1963
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
the following intelligence organizations participated in the
separation of this estimate: The Central h~telligence Agency
and the" intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.
Concurred in by the
:UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 28 May 196,3. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
~r, Defense Intelligence Ayency; the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, .Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of 1Vaval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the,A~sistant Chief of staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
~r Intelligence, .loint Staff,? and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal
$ureau of Investigcrtior~, abstained, the subject being outside
of 'their jurisdiction.
~LASSIFICATIC~N ~F TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE GN~LY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
'GROUP 1
E%CLUDED AND DECLASSIFICA DON NGRAOING
WARNING
This matelrial contains information affecting the Nationol Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
missipn or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
28 May 1~3
SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT ACZATNST INDIA FROM TIBET
AND SINKIANG
The object of this study is to examine the offensive capabilities
during 1~3 of Communist China's ground forces against India and the
Himalayan border states. This study does not consider attacks that might
be laun~ehed by Chinese forces through Burma. It does not estimate Chinese
Communist intentions.
A. Chinese Communist forces presently in the Sino-Indian border
area consist of ~+ divisions, 11 separate combat regiments, ~ border
defense regiments, and administrative and support troops totaling about
120,000 men. A mayor offensive effort against India, as specified in E,
would require the redeployment of additional divisions from elsewhere,
which the Chinese could do without seriously jeopardizing their overall
military posture< (Para. 2)
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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B. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road from rail-served base depots
at Chengtu in Szechwan; Lanchou, and Hsiatung in Kansu; and in the
vicinity of Urumchi in Sinkiang. From these railheads supplies are
moved into the frontier area by motor transport over long and difficult
routes, ranging from 500 to l,BDO miles, thus limiting the quantities
of supplies which can be delivered. (Pares. 3-~+)
C. We estimate that the Chinese could deliver an average of 1,600
tons per day to Tibet and southwest Sinkiang; this operation would require
about ~-O,OaO trucks. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment
of substantial reserves in the forward areas, would be sufficient on a
continuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of about
225,000 combat and service troops. Of these a maximum of approximately
175,000 could be supported logistically in simultaneous attacks. The
tonnage of 1,600 tons per day also could support air operations consum-
ing approximately x+50 tons daily. This maximum support effort would
tax China?s motor transport capabilities and would result in a heavy
drain on POL supplies. (Pares. 5-6)
D. We believe that the maximum threat to India and the Himalayan
border states would be limited to simultaneous attacks in Ladakh,
through the border passes between Ladakh and Nepal, into Nepal, either
into northern Assam across Bhutan or into the Siliguri area across
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Sikkim, and into the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA}. We believe the
maximum Chinese force could be as large as 175,000 men, consisting of
7 light infantry divisions, 2 standard infantry divisions, and 15
independent in#a~xtry regiments.
E. We estimate that the Chinese, should they launch the attacks
described above, would have the following military objectives:
a. Ix: Ladakh, to extend Chinese control to include the
capture of the importe:nt center of Leh.
b, In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal, to seize
the Chinese territorial claim north of Joshimath.
c. Ih Nepal, to seize the mayor valley approaches and the
c~:ty of Katmandu.
d. In the east, to occupy NEFA and to interdict Indian
communications and control of Assam. (Pares, 1~+-32)
F. The next favorable periods for offensive operations begin in
May for the avenues of approach on the frontier west of Katmandu and in
September for the avenues east of Katmandu. (Fares. 7-9)
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T. GENERAL
1. With 2.F million men the Chinese Communist Army is the largest
in the world, and has been able, under certain circumstances, to field
an effective fighting force. There are several factors, however, which
we believe are causing the Chinese Communist leaders concern as to the
ability of their armed forces adequately to support China's foreign
policies. Now virtually without supply and support from the USSR,
obsolescence and wear and tear have caused a decline in the effectiveness
of the armed farces' equipment and weapons. 47e believe that China's
industry cannt~t produce enough of the heavier and more complex equip-
went -- notably aircraft and naval ships and possibly armored fighting
vehicles -- to maintain present equipment levels. Peiping also probably
sees several situations, in addition to the border dispute with India,
which may require the commitment of military forces: the situations in
Laos, Vietnam, the Taiwan Strait, and North Korea. Even the Sing-Soviet
dispute will pro'ba'bly place additional limitations on Chinese military
capabilities through further restriction of supply of essential materials
and the passible need to watch over the long Sina-Soviet border more
closely than to date.
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2. China's troop dispositions are directed toward coastal and border
defense. ~ secondary mission for all units is internal security, and, in
some areas such as Tibet, this function has been the main occupation of the
units stationed there. The Chinese now have a force of 120,000 men in Tibet
and southwest Sinkiang including 4 infantry divisions, 11 separate combat
regiments, and 5 border defense regiments. A major offensive effort
against India would require the employment of additional divisions. These
l~
could, under present circumstances, be drawn from the estimated 11 armies
in reserve in north, east, and central China to reinforce the frontier area
without seriously ,jeopardizing China's overall defense po.}tore.
3. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road aver distances ranging from
500 to 1,800 miles from rail-served base depots at Chengtu in Szechwan;
Lanchau, and Hsiatung in Kansu; and in the vicinity of Urumchi in
Sinkiang. The facilities at these railheads are capable of handling the
supply requirement of the maximum forces deployable in the Sino-Indian
border area.
The Chinese Communist "army"' resembles in size a US corps, its
basic tactical components consisting of three infantry divisions.
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4. From the Cherygtu.t~ransshipment point supplies are delivered to
the Changtu-P?~.4~,~;+a area via the Szechwan-Tibet highway for distribution
to forces located in eastern Tibet and along the frontier from Lima west
to Milin. Frain Lanchou and Hsiatung supplies are moved over the Tsinghai-~
Tibet road to the Nagchhu Dzong and Yangpaching distribution depots serving
west, central, and southern Tibet. From the Urumchi r~:ilhead goods move
by road to a supply base at Kashgar and from there to units in the Yarkand
and Ladakh areas. The Kashgar base probably also gives some support to
troops located in extreme western Tibet.
5. Under optimum conditions a total of 2,000 tons per clay could be
delivered to the military subdistricts in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet.
This tannage, however, is unlikely to be achieved during all periods of
the year because of climatic factors. Therefore, it is estimated that
the maximum sustained tonnage deliverable to supply distribution points
iza Tibet and southwest Sinkiang is an average of 1,600 tons per day. The
attacks described in this study would tax Chinats motor transport capa-
bilities and would result in a heavy, although not insupportable, drain on
POL supplies. The delivery of tonnages to support these opzrations over
the period.of a year would require about ~-0,000 trucks and approximately
600,000 tons of motor gasoline, about ~+0 percent of the total motor
gasoline available in all of China in 1962. An effort of this size prob-
ably could not be supported if China were involved in significant mili-
tary activity elsewhere.
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~`_" _
6. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment of substantial
combat reserves in the forward areas, is sufficient on a continuing basis
to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of about 225,000 combat and
.service troops. Of these a maxl:mum of approximately 175,400 men could be
supported logistically in simultaneous attacks. Tn addition to meeting
the aY~ove ground force needs, the tonnage of 1,600 tons per day also could
support air operations consuming approximately X50 tons daily.
7. Although severe winter weather is an important factor in the
conduct of military operations along the Sino-Tndian border, low tempera-
ture and snow in themselves are unlikely completely to prohibit activity.
More serious problems arise from melting snow and ice and heavier precipita-
tion in spring and summer. Mid-October to mid-December is the most favor-
able period for operations all along the border and road conditions will
be at their maximum capacity during this time of the year, althpugh in the
western segment of the frontier as far east as Nepal, favorable conditions
may begin as early as May, but usually later.
8. In the western half of the frontier, which encompasses Ladakh,
the high central Tibetan plateau and most of Nepal, April and May is a
difficult season because melting snows make streams unfordable and flat-
floored valleys are: often flooded. The summer in this sector is generally
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favorable for operations except in Nepal, where heavy rains from the
southwest monsoon cause landslides and swollen streams particularly aloe;
the access routes from India. From December to March temperatures are
severely low and winds, occasionally reaching gale force, not only make
the cold difficult to endure but also fill the air with fine penetrating
dust. Snowstorms and blizzards are frequent, especially in the mountains.
9? Tn the eastern segment of the frontier, extending from eastern
Nepal through Sikkim, Bhutan, and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA)
sand including Lhasa to the north and a narrow belt of the $z'aht~aputra
River Valley to the south, road conditions during the spring months of
April and May will be only fair. Flooding, unfordable streams, and land-
slides may obstruct routes for short periods. June to September are the
worst months for operations in the eastern segment of the frontier; roads
in the Brahmaputra River Valley and in the Lhasa area may be flooded. In
~IEFA, particularly in the eastern part, road capacities are reduced to a
minimum during the southwest monsoon season.
IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS
10. In the Himalayan region the physiographic effects on military
operations are enormous, and the harsh environment requires modifications
in organization, equipment, and tactics. The use of trucks, armor, and
artillery is limited by the inadequate road network. Maintenance problems
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~~.?e also increased. Troops fire easily, combat loads must be reduced,. and
daily march. times and distances must be shortened. Animal transport and
porters are relied upon heavily.
11. Tactical movements require more detailed preparations than those
at lower altitudes. Reconnaissance and security on the march require
special attention. Tactical operations wi11 rarely take place at an echelon
above that of the regiment. The regiment and the battalion are the units
usually employed along a single axis against a single tactical objective.
Operations are characterized by infiltration, ambushes, and envelopmetats.
12. We believe the standard organization of the Chinese Communist
infantry division has been modified to conform to the decentralized opera-
tional requirements of mountain operations. During the recent fighting on
the border the Chinese used 120-mm mortars, 76.2-mm mountain guns, and
recoilless rifles. The largest artillery piece likely to be employed
south of the Himalayas is the 122-trim howitzer. Although tanks have been
reported in Ladakh and in the Chumbi Valley, there is na evidence that
the Chinese have large numbers of tanks in Tibet.. We believe that only in
southern Sikkim could tanks be employed in other than an assault gun and
artillery role. It would be extremely difficult for the Chinese to trove
more than a few tanks on to the Indian plain.
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13. The Chinese have a limited capability to employ airborne forces.
Wa estimate that not more than two battalions could be dropped in support
of the actions described below at a given time. Airborne troops could be
staged at airfields at I{ashgar, Hotien (Khatan), Soche, Kaerhmu, Chengtu,
and I{unming.
V. AVEN~7ES QF' ATl'ACK
l~. We believe that in the feasible avenues of attack a maximum
force of 175,a0o men, consisting of 7 light infantry divisions, 2 standard
infantry divisions, 15 independent infantry regiments, and 2 airborne
battalions could be employed. Difficulties of logistics and restrictions
of terrain, we 'believe, would limit the Chinese to the following mayor
military objectives:
a. In Ladakh, an extension of Chinese control to include the
capture of the important communications center and airbase at-Leh.
b. Sn the border area between Ladakh and Nepal, to seiz? the
Chinese territorial claim north of Joshimath which would be a psyehalogi-
cal threat to New Delhi.
c. In Nepal, to facilitate the eventual occupation of the coun-
try by seizure of the ma,jar valley approaches and the capture of the city
of Katmandu in order to forestall Indian intervention.
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!.. In the East, to occupy NEFA and to interdict Dian
communications and control of Assam.
Ladakh
1~. Tn Ls.dakh the: Chinese Communists completed a road from Sinkiang
in 157. From this road, they have constructed a number of feeder roads,
including one in the west that roughly parallels the main road, which per-
raft the movement of troops and supplies to outposts. Generally the: valleys
provide natural roadbeds that rewire: little construction or ma,inte;nance:
to be? made usable: far motor transport. Them approach routes froze Ladakh
converge on Leh across the Karakoram and Lads,kh ~angems; through t~~ ~~:~ser
Pass (17,~~? feet) to Panaznik from the north ?~nd via Chushul and Shyak
from the sauthe:ast. C?f those, the latter, a motarsble route, is by fa.r
the: more favorable avenue: of approach. From Leh the road twists arras
two grezt mountain ranges to Srinagar, the ma.,~or Indian mi3.ita.ry base in
Kashmir.
16. The road network leading from Sinkiang and western Tibet ~.nto
Ladakh will support an estimated seven light infantry divisions. This
capability exists for operations within northern and eastern L~~da.kh and
north of the frontier; for apemra.tions further south, hawev~;r, this support
capability drops as matarable roads give wa,y to peck trails.
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17. The Chinese coL~l~~. launch the following attacks in the Ladakh area:
a. One infantry regiment could move from Baulat Beg Oldi through
the Saser Pass to Panamik (12C miles), but since the pass is closed from
December to May, the resupply of this regiment during the winter months
would have to be accomplished by airdrop or by road from Chushul.
b. Given sufficient engineer support for road improvement, 1 light
infantry division could be supported from the Chushul area, with 2 regiments
advancing to Leh (1C0 miles) and 1 regiment supporting the thrust from the
north on Panamik by advancing up the Shyok River Valley to the area of
Tirit (10~ miles).
c. Because of logistic limitations and the need to improve road
systems a,s they advance, Chinese military ob~ectivea would probably be
limited to an extension of their control of the Lado.kh area to include the
capture of the key communications center of Leh.
The Border Passes Between Ladakh and Nepal
18. Along the 'border b~:tween the Chushul area in southern Ladakh and
Nepal there are several passes through which. Chinese forces could attack.
Qf these, the 'best avenues of approach, although they are narrow defiles
subject to blockage by snow during the winter months, are through Shipki
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Fass (15,~Fp0 fact), Mans. Fass (17,890 feet),, Niti Fass (16,604 feet),
and Lipulek Fass (16,754 feet).
19. After May, two infa~.try regiments could be supported in an
advance; through Shipki Fass to the vicinity of Chins (~+5 miles). Not
more than three regiments could be moved through Mania and Niti Pas~.~E.~:~ to
Joshimath (approximately 45 miles); and two regiments through Lipulek Fass
to the general area of Dharehula (2Q miles). Advances beyond Chins,
Joshimath, and I7harchula could not be logistically supported until the
Chinese had improved the existing trails to accommodate one-quarter-ton
vehicles. Further, we believe that the Chinese would be unable to re-
supply by air during the winter months, and the regiments would be forced
to withdraw north of the passes.
Nepal
2n. 'The Chinese have good lateral communications along the entire
frontier on the Shigatse (Zhikatse}-Gartok road., They have built feeder
roads toward the ma,~or passes and trails lead from these roads through
all the passes, many of which rare open for much of the w~.nter.
21. Tf the Chinese could seize the Katmandu airfield' they could
then airlancl. up to 1 lightly-equix,ped infantry division within 5 to 7
days. We estimate that by extensive utilization of pack animals and
porters the Chinese could support attacks by one infantry regiment through
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each of the following passes: througl3.Tluralaon,a Pais to Bajang; through
Kore Pass to Dana.; through Kyiran~; Pass to T~Tawakot; tl~.rougli I~odari Pass
to Dhulikhel; and through Rakha Pass to Dingla.
22. The tenure of even limited Chinese forces in northern Nepal
would be largely dependent an stoek~pilii~~; anal. tx~eir ability to sustain
porterage operations through the northern ~;~~asses x.n winter. vJe estimate
that they could not attack India through Idey4:1.
The Sikkim Area
23. There are two converging avenues of appraach from the Chur~bi
Valley through Sikkim to Sili,guri. One, a motorable road, leads through
Natu Pass (1+,500 feet) via Gangtok; the other, an unimy.~raved road)
crosses the frontier through Jelep Pass joining the former road near
Kalimpong.
24. We estimate that the Chinese could attack through the Natu and
Jelep Passes with two 1igYL?t infantry divisions and ~~tdvance to Gangtok
(34 miles) without improving the roads. If the road capacities between
the frontier and Gangtok were increased, ?cahich would require