CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01499R000100010018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 9, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
9 April 1963
M~lORA?'~~UM FOR: Mr. .A.'.lan Evans, State (INR)
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (DZA)
Colonel. Paul E. Pique, USA (ACSI)
C?~,ptnin G. K. Nicodemus, US1~' (ONI )
Colonel A. E. Stoll. USAF ~A~fi1IEBB~
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Sb'T3JECT: CHIT ENE COT~~~33NIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA
1. The ettached drsf-~ sty;idy of the Chinese Co~nunist
Ground Threat to India, is forwarded for review. This assessment
is based on the initial. DIA cantributian and also reflects sub-
se~Iuent consul?tatio~.s between DIA end CIA staff specialists.
2. It is req.~.~:sted that your representatives meet with
us at 1004, WednPSda;~, 1? April at CIA 33eadc~uarters to discuss
this draft. USIB ta~?get cie;~e is 24 April,
25X1
Executive Officer
National Estimates
DISTRIBUTION B MCLITARY
NSA, DIA reviews completed
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
9 Aprll 1963
Sr,~3~7ECT: CHIZ,:~,SE CCN]NFJNIST GROUI`1D THREAT AGAINST IPTDIA
Z'he obi ect of this s ~,zdy is to examine the maximum offensive
capabii.ities aver the next few months of Communist China's ground
forces ag~einGt India aucl the Himalayan border states? It doQ6 not
assess what the G"kinese could do were they to undertake a long-
term program of roadbuilding and stockpiling nor does this study
estimate Chinese Communist ~.ntPxltj.oxas .
A. Chinese Ca~unis~t forces presently in the Sino-Indian
border axea con3ist of 3 divisions, 13 regiments, 5 border defense
regiments, and administrative and support troops totaling 120,000
men. A ma,~or offensive effort against India would require the
GROtrn 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification
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redeployment of several divisions from elsewhere, which tha Chinese
could do without seriously jeopardizing their overall military
posture.
B. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by roadf~?om rail-served base de-
pots at Chengtu in Szechwan, Lanchou, and. A'sia~~ung in Kansu, and in
the vic:tnity of Urumchi in Sinkiang. From t~~ese railheads supplies
are moved into the frontier area by motor transport over long and
difficult routes, thus limiting the quantities of supplies why?.eh
cn~a be clcjlivered.
C. We estimate that the Chinese could deliver 1,600 tons per
day. This rate of delivery] assuming the establishment of sub-
stantial reserves in the forward areas would be sufficient on a
continuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of
225!000 troops. Of the total supplies deliverable to Tibet and
southwest Sinkiang, enough could be moved to forward areas all
along the frontier to suppor~ an attacking force of approximately
175,000 men. We believe, however, that in the feasible avenues of
attack, due to operational and logistic problems the Chinese would
employ a force of 1239000 men. The tonnage of 1,600 tons per day
also could support air operations consuming approximately 450 tons
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daily. Attacks by 1751000 troops would tax China's motor transport
capabilities and would be a heavy dra3.n on POL supplies. The de-
livery of tonnages to support these operations over the period of a
year would require approximately 6001000 tons of motor gasoline)
about ~+0 percent of the total available in all of Ch2na in 1962.
D. We believe that the main threat to India and the Y'imalayan
border states consists of Ch3,nese capabilities to attack in Ladakh,
through the border passes between Ladakh and Nepal into India,, into
Nepal, and across Bhutan and the Northeast Frontier Agency ( ~~A)
into northern Asss,m. We estimate the forces employed in these
attacks would consist of 5 light infantry divisions) 15 independent
infantry regiments) and 2 airborne battalions totaling 12,3000 troops.
E, We estimate that the Chir~esel should they 1aux~ch the attacks
described above, would have the following military objectives;
a. In Ladakh, to extend Chinese control to include the
capture of the important center of Leh.
b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepali to seize
the Chinese territorial claim north of Jasimath.
c. In Nepali to seize the major valley approaches and
the city of Katmandu.
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d. In the eastt to occupy Ng'A a~:d that part of Assam
north of the Brahmaputra River. To accomplish this the Chinese
could either temporarily occupy the .key communications centers of
Siliguri and Hasimara,, or effect a strong lodgement in the Gauhati
area,. We believe the Chinese would be more likely to choose the
latter.
F. The next favorable periods for offensive operations begin
in May for the avenues of approach west of Katmandu and in September
for the avenues east of Katmandu.
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1. With 2.6 million men the Chinese Communist army is the
second largest after that of the USSR,, in the worlds and has
praven~ under certain circutnstances~ to 'oe ax: efPect:.ve fighting
force. There are sevw.rai factors, however1 which we believe are
causing the Chinese Communist leaders concern as to the abil~.ty of
ths~ir armed forces adequately to support G~,ina's foreign policies.
Now virtually without supply and support from the USSR obsolescence
and wear and tear has caused a decline in tk~e eP.fectivenvss of the
armed forces equipmev~t and weapons. We believe that China's in-
dustry cannot produce enough of the heavier and more complex
equipment -- notably aircraft and naval ships and possibly armored
fighting veh3.cles -- to maintain present equ2pment levels. Peiping
also probably sees aevex?al Fituations~ in addition to the border
dispute with Indian as requiring a high level of effective military
preparedness: i.e.~ the situations in Laos' Vietnam, the Taiwan
Strait and North k~orea. Rven the Sino-Soviet dispute will probably
place additional demands on Chinese military dispositions and capa-
bilities~ since one of the attributes of China's new "independence"
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from the USSR will be the need to watch over the long Sino-Soviet
border more closely than to date.
2. China's troop dispositions are directed toward coastal and
border defense. A secondary mission far all units is internal
security, and, in some areas such as Tibet, Chia function has been
the main occupation of the units stationed there. The Chinese now
have in the Sino-Indian border area 3 divis3.onsi13 regiments, ands,
5 border defense regiments, totaling 12x,000 men.' Eleven artnies=~
are stationed in Worthy east, and central C~zina and could be drawn
upon to reinforce the frontier area. A ma,~ar offensive effort
against India would require the redeployment of several divisions,
but,. under present circutpstances, the Chinese Cammux~ists cou7.d do
this without seriousljr jeopardizing China's overa3.1 defe~tse posture.
~./ These forces are composed of 3 infantry divisions, l1 in-
dependent infantry regime~ats,1 cavalry regiment, 1 artil-
lery regiment, and 6 b order defense regiments.
The Chinese Communist "army' resembles in size a US carps,
its basic tactical components consisting of three iuFantry
divisions<
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II. LOGISTICS
3? Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces ixz south-
west Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road from rail-served
base depots at Chengtu in Szechwan Lanchou~ and Hsiating in Kansu
and in the vicinity of Urumehi in Sinkiang. The facilities at
these railheads are capable of handling the supply requirements of
the maximum forces deployahle in the Sino-Indian border area.
4. From the Chengtu transshipment point supplies are delivered
to the Changtu-Pangta area via the Szechwan-Tibet highway for dis-
tribution to Forces located in eastern Tibet and slang the frontier
Pram Lima west to Mtlin. From Lanchou and Hsiatung supplies are
moved over the Tsinghai -Tibet road to the Nagchhu Dzong and
Yangpaching distribution depots serving west, central., and southern.
Tibet. From the Urumchi railhead goods move by road to a supply
base at Kashgar and from there to units in the Yarkand and Ladakh
areas. The Kashgar base probably also gives some support to
troops lacated in extreme western Tibet.
5. Under optimum conditions a total of 2000 tons per day
could be delivered to the military subdistricts i.n southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet, This tonnage, however, is unlikely to be
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achieved during all. periods cf the year 'Decease of cl'.m~3tic factors.
Therefore, it is estimated that the maximum sustained tonnage deliver-
able to supply distribution points in Tibet and southwest Sinkiang is
1,600 tans per day. The attacks described in this study would tax
China's motor transport capabilities and be a heavyl although not
insugpor'ca,bl..e, drain on POL supplies. The delivery of tannagPs to
support these operations aver the periad of a year would require
approximately 600,000 tons of motor gasoline, about ~+0 percent of
the total available in all of China in 1962, An effort of this
size coulcl not be supported if China, were involved in military
activity elsewhere.
6. This rate of delivery, assuming; the esta~blishmezat of sub-
stantial reserves in the forward areas, is sufficient an a con-
tinuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of 225,000
troops. Of the total supplies deliverable to Tibet and southwest
Sinkiang, enough could be moved to forward areas all along the
frontier to support an attacking force of approximately ?75,000
men. However, we bel~?eve that the operational and logistic prob-
lems encountered in feasible avenues of attack are such that the
Chinese would employ a force of 123,000 men. In addition to
meeting the above ground-farce needs, the tonnage of 1,600 tons
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per day-also could support air operations consuming approximately
x+50 tons daily.
III. CLIMATES TACTICS] AND EQUIPMENT
7. Although severe s~rinter weather is an important factor in
the conduct of military operations along the Sino-Indian border,
low temperature and snow in themselves are unlikely completely to
prohibit activity. More serious prablems arise fry melting snow
and ice and heavier precipitation in spring and summer. Mid-October
to mid-December is the .most favorable period for operations all along
the border and road conditions will be at their maximum capacity
during this time of the years although in the western segment of
the frontier as far east as Nepal,fevorable conditions may tSegiti
as early as Nlay.
8. In the weaterra. half of the frontier,, which encompasses
Iadakhj the high central Tibetan plateau and most of Neprzlr the
spring is a difficult season because melting snows make streams
unfordable and flat-floored valleys are often flooded. The summer
in this sector is generally favorable far operations except in
Nepali where heavy rains from the southwest monsoon cause land-
slides and swollen streams particularly along the access routes
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from Ind3.a. From December to March temperatures are severely low
and windsg occasional]y reaching gale force, not only make the
cold difficu~.t to endure but also fill the air wi~~h fine penetra-
ting dust. Snowstorms and blizzards are frequent, especially in
the mountains.
9. In the eastern segment of the frontier, extending from
eastern Nepal through Sikkim, Phutan, and Northeast Frontier Agency
(NEFA) and, for purposes of this discussion, includi~-g Lhasa to the
north and a narrow belt of the Brahmaputra River valley to the south,
road conditions during the spring months of April and May wi:~l be
only fair. Flooding, unfordable stream,and landslides may obstruct
routes for short periods. June to September are the v,*orst months for
operations in the eastern segment of the frontier; roads in the
Brahmaputra R9.ver valley and in the Lhasa area may be flooded and
in NF~'A, particularly in the eastern party the southwest monsoon
will reduce road capaci~uies to a minimum.
10. In the Himalayan region the physiographic effects on
operations are enormous, and the harsh environment requires modi-
fications in organization,, equipments and tactics. The use of
trucks, armar~ and artillery is limited by the inadequate road
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network. Maintenance problems are also increased, Troops tare
easily, combat loads must be reduced] and daily march times and
distances must be shortened, Animal tranport and porters are re-
lied upon heavily. Logistics, communications, and the control of
large units in coordinated operations are difficu~.t,
11. Tactical movements require mare detailed preparations
than those at lower altitudesa Reconnaissance and security on
the march require special attention. Tactical operations will
rarely take place at an echelon above that of the regiment. The
regiment and the battalion are the units usually employed along
a single axis against a single tactical objective. Operations
are characterized by infiltration, ambushes, wide flanking movements,
and sudden concentrations for specific missions.
12. We believe the s?a;andard organization of the Chinese
Communist infantry division has been modified to cont?orm to the
decentralized operational requirements of mountain operations
During the recent fighting on the border the Chinese used 120 mm
mortars, 76,.2 mountain guns' and recoilless rifles. The largest
artillery piece likely tq be employed south of the Himalayas is
the 122 mm howitzer. Although tanks have been reported in Ladakh
and in theC humh~. Valley: there is no evidence that the Chinese have
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large numbers of tanks in Tibet. We believe that only in southern
Sikkim could tanks be employed in other than an assault gun and
artillery role. It would be extremely difficult for the Chinese
to move more than a few tanks on to the Indian. plain,
13. The Chinese could employ airborne forces to seise an
airfield required far resupply of advancing ground forces, or to
prevent Indian redeployment, or to leap-frog Indian defensive
positionso We estimate that not mare than two battalions could
be dropped in a single lift. Airborne troops could be staged at
airfields a,t Kashgar, Hatien, Soche, Kaerhmu, Chengtua and Kunming.
IV. AVENUES OF ATTACK
l~. Although the maximum number of ground farces that the
Chinese could employ and support logistically in simultaneous
attacks all slang the Sina-Indian border is estimated to be 175,000,
we believe that, in. the areas from which the moire attacks against India
and the Himala.ya~a border states might come, a maximum force of 123,000
men is likely to be put into action. This force would consist of
5 light infantry divisions, 15 infantry regiments' and 2 airborne
battalions. The attacks described in the following paragraphs are
estimated at the greatest strength that logistic limitations and
terrain restrictions ~r111 allow.
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15. These attacksx rare believe, areuid r~vn the following mili-
tary ob,~ectives;
a. In Ladakh ?~u e,~tension of Chia~ese control to include
the cap~~ure of the important com~.f.catians center and airbase at Leh.
b. ZA the border area between I~,dakh and l~e~:l to seize
the Chinese territorial claim north of Joshimath which would be a
psychological threat to New Delhi.
c. In Nepal to facilitate the eventual occupation of the
country by seizure of tale ma;~or valley approaches and the capture of
the city of Katmandu in order to forestall Indian inter~%ention.
d. In the East the effective occupation of t~-~e N~'A aad
that part of Assam north of the Brahmaputra River. To accomalish
this objective the Chinese could either temporarily occupy the key
communics,tians centers of Siligziri and Hasimars;~ or effect a strong
lodgement in the C~ui:~ati area. Of the two, we believe that the
Chinese would choose to establish the Gauhatfi saL~,Ent because it
would not only effectively deny the Indians comm~aicatiox~s with
northern Assam and at the same time greatly assist the Chinese ad-
vances into central and eastern P~'A, but also would be militarily
the easier and less costly venture.
# We estimate that the occupation of Siliguri and I~simara would
require two standard divisions and two light divisions. These
forces would.ba additional to the figure of 123,000 troops and
would bring the total attacking force to approximately 175,400.
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16. Ladakh. In Ladakh the Chinese Communists completed a road
from Sinkiang in 1957, From this roads they have constructed a num-
ber of feeder roads, including one in the Wiest that rosily parallels
the main roads which permit the movement of troops and supplies to
outposts.. In many places the valleys provide natural roadbeds that
require little cona~ruction or maintenance to be made useable far
motor transport. The approach routes from Ladakh converge on Leh
across the Karakoram and Lada'h Ranges; through the Saser Pass
(17,48Q feet) to Panamik from the north and via Chushul and Ssyok
from the southeast. Of these, the lattera a motorable route, is by
far the more favorable avenue of approach. From Leh the road twists
across two great mounta~.n ranges to Srinagar, the major Indian ~-ili-
tars base in Kashmir.
l7. The road network leading from Sink;I:m~ and western Tibet
into Ladakh will support an estimated seven light infantry divisions.
This .capability exists for operations within Ladakh and earth of the
frontier; for operations into Indian territory, howevera this support
capability drops as motorable roads give way to pack trails and less
than 7 divisions could be supported. Therefore the magnitude of the
Chinese threat in this region is limited by the logistic difficulties
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that would be encountered in Indian territory, rather than by the
number of troops that could be concentrated and supported on the
Chinese aide of the frontier.
18. The Chinese could launch the following attacks in the
a. One infantry regiment could move from Daulit beg-oldi
through the Saser Pass to Panamik (120 miles), but since the pass is
closed from December to May, the resupply of this regiment during
the winter months would have to be accomplished. by airdrop ar by
road from Chusul.
b. Given sufficient engineer support for road improvement,
I~ light infantry division could be supported from the Chusul area,
with ~ regiments advancing to Leh {100 miles) and 1 regiment supporting
the northern thrust to Panamik by advancing up the Shyok River valley
to the area of Tirit {100 miles).
c. Because of logistic limitations and the need to improve
road systems as they advance, Chinese military objectives would prob-
ably be limited to an extension of their control of the Ladakh area
to include the capture of the key communications center of Leh. We
do not believe that the Chinese, in their initial attack, could ad-
vance beyond Leh.
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19. The Bardpr Passes. Between T,,e.dakh and Nepal. Along the
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border between t;7e Chun+a:~ area in sca~heru i,adak'c and Nepal there
are several passes through which Chinese farces-could attack. Of
these, the best avenues of approach, although they are r.-czrro~a defiles
sub3ect to blockage by snow during the winter months, are through
Shipki Pass {15,x+00 feet), Mana Pass (17,880 feet}, Niti Pass {16,600
feet), and Lipulek Pass (16,750 feet).
20. After May, two infantry regiments could be supported in
az~.d ~~dvan:,e thro~~?ghh uhipki Pass to the vicinity of Chini (~5 miles) .
could be moved
T3ot ~ror.~ than t~xree re a7ments~through Mana and Nit1. Passes to
3a,.:iznath (appraxi.mate'y ~+5 miles); and two regiments through Lipulek
Pass to t.e ge7~era,~_ area of Dharchula (20 miles} . Advances beyond
Ch:~?ai, Josimath, ar~d Dha?^chula could not be logistically supported
until the Chinese had improved the existing trai]..s to accommodate
one-guarter~ton vehicles. Further, we believe that because the
Chinese probably would be unable to resupply by air during the winter
months, the regiments would, therefore, be forced to withdraw north
of the passes.
21. N~e~al. The Chinese have built roads to within a few m11es
of the Sina Nepalese border apposite the five ma,~or entry routes
and they have good lateral communications along the entire frontier
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from the Shigatse- G~.Ttok road west to Tia~~;ri Dzong. Trails lead
from these roads to all the passes, many of which are Dpen for
much of the winter.
22. It is estimated that the Chinese could airdrop up to
2 battalions to seize the Katmandu airfield, and could then within
5 to 7 days airland up to 1 lightly-equipped infantry division.
They could support this force by air indefinitely, provided they
retained tactical air superiority in the area. We estimate that by
the utilization of pack animals and the mobi~.ization of all avail-
able Tibetan and Nepalese porters the Chinese could support attacks
by one infantry regiment through each of the following passes:
through Naralagna Fass to 13a~an~; through Kore Pass to Dana; through
Kyriong Pass to Nawakot; through Kodari Pass to Dhulikhel; and through
Rakha Pass to Dingla.,
23. We estimate that the Chinese could not occupy Nepal up to
the Indian frontier, and their tenure of northern Nepal would be
entirely dependent on stockpiling, their ability to sustain porterage
operations through the northern passes in winter, and the retention
of air supremacy over the Katmandu area.
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2~+. ThP Sikkim Area. There are two converging avenues of
approach from the Chumbi Valley-through Sikkim to Siliguri. One,
a motorable road, leads t~~.rough Natu Psss (1,500 :Feet) via Gangtok
and Kalimpong; the other, an unimproved road, crosses the frontier
through Jelep Pass ~oia~ing the former at Kalimpong.
25. We estimate that the Chinese could attack through the Natu
anal Jelep Passes with two light infantry divisions and advance to
Gangtok (34 miles) without improving the roads. If the road capac-
ities between the frontier and Gangtok were increased, which would
require an estimated 6 to 10 weeks, a total of 3 light infantry
divisions and 2 standard infantry divisions with armor could be sup-
ported in an advance to Siliguri (100 miles), In the in3.tial attack
not more than two airborne vattalions could be dropped in rear of the
forward Indian defensive positions.
26. If prepared to viGlate Bhutanese neutrality, the Chinese
could turn the establiEhed Indian defensive positions in Sikkim by
making an initial attack down the Torsa River valley which generally
parallels the Bhutan-Sikkim border.
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2j~ Lr;t,:~stic support of the larger f'aLees rec~uir.E:d to hold
the ~:x~~osed Siligu:^i posi~Lion during the wi~.lter moaiths w~~uld be
extremely di:Fficult. U?.~.r ss stocks of supplies were captured or
airfields secured to support a:~_rlift operations a withdrawal to tha
Dar,~eelj.ng area and a reduction in strength to not more than one
division would be necessary.
~8. Western Bhutan.. An uadet~eloped trail goes from Pari
Dzong in Tibet through western B~.utan anal ~a:tns the raid co~ecting
Para Dzong to Hasitnara. We estimate that the Chinese could advance
to Para Dzong with one division wi.tht~ut i~iprnving the trail. If the
trail were improved to permit the movement of vehicles this
division could be supported in an adva~lce to Hasimara. Overland
logistic support of this division in the Fiasimara area during the
winter would be possible provided stockpiling were carried out
promptly. We estimate that the Chinese could employ up to two alr_
borne battalions to seize the airfield at Hasimara at the same time
that the infantry division mated out of the Himalayan foothills.
29. Eastern Bhutan and Western NE'~'A. There are two converging
routes which cross Bhutan and #orm an approach to Assam: one from
Lhakhang Dz~g to Gauhati via Lhuntsi Dzong and Dewangi.ri; the other
from Bum La to Gauhati via Towan~, Tashigang Dzong, and Dewangiri.
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30. Tn an advance through Bhutan the Chinese initially could
support 2 infantry regiments at Tashigang Dzong (50 miles), and 2
infantry regiments at Lhurltsi Dzong (30 miles). After road improve-
ments, the Chinese could maintain 3 light infantry divisions within
Bhutan, or could advance to Gauhati (145 miles) with at least 2
divisions. The Chinese co~zld drop two a~.x~bornc battaliox~ at
the northern end of the Gauhati bridge, to destroy the bridge and
delay Tndian reix~i'or. cement . This attack into the Gauhati area
could be supported by a diversionary attack against Indian defenses
in Sikkim.
3l. Tn northwest NEFA there is a motorable road which connects
Bum La with Tezpur and T~?rich passes through Towar. and Bomdi La.
We estimate that, if the Chinese were to repeat t't~.~;3.r attack from
Bum La to Bo!~1i La (~0 mi~.~PS) they cauld support two lig=:~?~: infantry
divisions at Bomdi La and advance with one of these divisions to
Tezpur.
32. Central and Eastern NE'FA. There are two avenues of approach
across the McMahon Line into 1VEFA: in central NEFA from the border
village to Long~u south through the Subansiri River galley; and in
eastern NEFA from Lima through the Luhit River valley via Walong.
- 18 -
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 Approved For Rise 2003/07/31 :CIA-RDP80S01499F~QQ~0100010018-0
33. A penetration in the cexxtral NEFa sectcir would be restricted
to a distance over; which porter supply lines could be operated. We
estimate that, at a maximum, the Chinese could support two regiments
in the Subansiri River ttalley up to 3C or 40 riles soui:h of the border.
In the eastern part of the NEFA the Chiu.ese could initially support
an al;uack by one light j.nfantr-f division 1n the Luhit P.iver valley
as .far west ao Tepang. SnbsequEnt to t;~e development of a road to
iepang, whieh would require an estimated 8 to 10 weeks, the Chinese
could support up to 3 light infantry divisions i.n this axes and ad-
vance to Balamag:.Z~+ni with l of these divisions.
34. We estimate that the alvjective of a major attack in ~'he
fast would be to disrupt Indian communications with Assam either by
seizing the important communications centers of Siiige.~ri and ~~asimera,
or by establishing s salient in the Gauhati area north of the
Brahmaputra River.. If the Chinese could improve the roads through
Bhutan with sufficient speed to sustain their attack to Gauhati,
they probably could stockpile sufficient supplies in this salient
to support their troops throughout the winter period.
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 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 :CIA-RDP80S01499R000100010018-0
(C7 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A: ESTIMATED PERSONT~EI, AND MATERIEL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
INFA1~2'RY DIVISION (LIGHT) AND THE IIV'DEPEI~TDENT INFANTRY REGIMENT AS FOUND IN TIBET J
~
ITEM
__~
HQ ~
AND ;
STAFF{
,~
CO
i 1 ;
SIG RCN EDIG
BN _ CO _ BN
'~
AT ~
BN
~ _- ~
AA_~1W
BTd BAa
~
OR.D'+
Pi,T
~ ~
ARTY ~ INF
~REGT REGT
O~'~'icers ~
21O
g
~
41 10 39
2
8
X1
5~+ i
64
57 1
6
~ 1
!
207 i
2
1
0 ~
Enlisted
710
13
+
g
2
3 1
+3
3
37
37
37
~
9
,
~
Gun, 76.2mm, Mtn
~
~ '
2~
6
Gun, AT 5T 7 mm
i
j
12,
Mortar, 16O-mm ~
12
Mo~a-r, 120-mm
Mortar, 82-mtn. `
1 I
~
Rc1 Rfl, 57-~
I
Rc1 Rf1, 75-mm
RL, 9o-mm
~
AAMG, 12.7-mm
2~+
HMG, 7..62-mm
M
L~dG, 7-62-mm
g 18
a
SIYIG, 7.62-mm
112
18
1$ 112 ~+2
77 i
! ~+
203
Carbine, 7.62-rmn
225
116
213 36~-
297
~33
11,075
Pistol, 7.62-mm
169
7
36 i 7 31
~ ~+5 2
; 1
` 1~6
Flamethrower
Unl~
T~k, Cargo, 6x6
l2
{
2~- ~
Trk, Cargo, ~+x2
1
~
~
12
Trk, ~-ton, ~x4
~ 2
~
Motorcycle
4 2
~ 5
2
~
Bicycle
Cart
~
j
~
15
Unk
Unk
Ht~rse,M-ule, or Camel
}--135+_
~___~
______ ~
!
~
1
Strengths above are at 144j~o TOE. Units in Tibet are estimated to be at 85 TC strength.
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 Approved For Release 2003/07/31 :CIA-RDP80S01499R000100010018-0
(S) APPENDIX 2 TO :}.NIITEX A: AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS AND LIFT CAPACITIES OF THE 13TH CCF~ AIR
DIVISION=l TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE SINO-INDfiAN FROP3TIER REGION
I1~TI"..3~1L LIFT
SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
~
CARG-0 TONS TROOPS
CARGO (TONS
Ti~flOPS
,,
AIPCRAFI' TYPE=~
RANGE AIR-
AIR-
AIR- ATR-
.AIR- AIR-
AIR- ATR-
R1~D~US LANDED
DROPPED
LANDED
DROi~PED
LANDED
DROPPED
LANDED
DROPPED
IL-12~COACH
I,6O0~
720 57 ~Q
39? ~
50~
X32
35.6
2~+.9
37-5
270
IL-l~+f CRATE
1, 600
H
720 30.E
21.3
26g
230
lg.o
13.3
168
1~+ '
.W
C-~+6~CGMMANDO
1,600
a
N c~
720(est.) 133.9
3.$
1,120
896
8~+.0
58.8
700
X60 ~ w
TarAr~s
21.3
1~~Y5
1:893
1,558
138.6
97.0
1,183
97~+
Only the 13th CCAF Air Division is considered trained and available far operations in the Sino-Indian
border Area.
The above data is based on 8Q~ serviceability for the initial lift and 50~a serviceability for sustained
operations.
For single aircraft operations the following factors may be used: IL-12~COACH and IL-1~~CRATE, x,750 lbs.
of cargo or 2~+ troops a~.rlanded and 3,325 lbs. of cargo or 1$ troops airdropped; C-~+6/COMMANDO, 12,000
lbs. of cargo ar 50 troops airlanded and $,x+00 lbs. of cargo or ~+0 troops airdropped.
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 Approved For Rase 2003/07/31 :CIA-RDP80S01499F~Q~100010018-0
S-ME ; - ~~. ...-i
APPENDIX 1 TO AT3P11,'X B: DAILY RES~'PLY RE~!tT.IrR}~~NI'S Ft7R THE
NESE C0T~7MtlI~TIST INa'1~i?rri'a''i'1r DiV3SIGPJ (S'?'.f?~.~tD