(Classified) ESTIMATE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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A
ONitaff
25X1X7
/05294/6--.-
Estimate of Chinese Communist
Capabilities for Attacking India
Through Burmese Territory
14 AUGUST 1963
7
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14 August 1963
SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA
THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY
THE PROBLEM
To assess the maximum military force tho Chinese Communists
could employ and logistically support in sustained attacks into
northeast India through. Burma. The attacks considered in this paper
are those the Chinese Communists have the theoretical capability
to mount in addition to those described in-11111 Estimate of the 25X1X7
Chinese Communist Ground Throat Aglinst India from Tibet and Sinkiang,
dated 14 August 1963, and ' Estimate of the Communist Chinese 25X1X7
Air Threat Against India," dated 17 January 1963.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. Although this study does not estimate the reactions of the
Burmese government to a Chinese Communist incursion, it is assumed that
the Chinese would, as a normal military precaution, deploy security forces
along their lines of communication.
GROUP 1
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2. The Chinese would not augment ground and air forces along
China's borders with countries in southeast Asia.
3. The Chinese would use port and rail facilities in North
Vi(Aaam.
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CONCLUSIONS
A. In an attack on India through Burma jr' 1-)71.eve that the Chinese
Communists would establish stockpiles on the Sino-Burmese frontier in the
Hsin-chieh/Teng-cnung area using Kunming as their base of supply. Kunming
is served by a rail line from Hanoi in North Vietnam and by road from .0-1r.
Chinese railhead at Anshun, and these facilities could support limited op-
erations in the China-Burma-India theater. The Chinese could use two
principal routes to move sulTlies throllp:h Burma: (a) the Ledo Road via
Myitkyina and (b) the Lashio-;mandalay-Imphal road. (Paras. 1-2)
B. After essential row improvements the Chinese could move a total
of 940 tons per day to support ground operations in India. We estimate that
the maximum ground force the Chinese could deploy in an attack into India
through Burma would be about 132,500 men, equivalent to approximately nine
infantry divisions under the command of an army headquarters. The most
favorable period for operations in thr nrea occurs after the beginning of
the dry season in NoveMber. (Pares. 3-8)
C. We estimate the force advancing over the Ledo Road would consist
of one standard infantry division, four light infantry divisions, and one
artillery regiment. The attack, we believe, would have the objective of
destroying Indian forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields and the
eventual link-up with Chinese forces advancing from Tibet into the eastern
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pert of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA). We estimate the force advancing
through Imphal would consist of the major elements of two light infantry
divisions and one standard infantry division. This attack, we believe, would
have the objective of destroying Indian forces and, together with the attac17r
from Tibet, the occupation of important areas of northeast India. (Pares. 7-10)
D. We estimate the Chinese could also support four independent infantry
regiments, two north of Homalin and two through the Dipu pass. These units
would be supplied by pack animals and porters, and could be supported up to
50 miles into India. If air supply were available, they could penetrate
deeper. (Pares. 11-12)
E. We believe the Chinese would employ about 395 combat aircraft in
operations against northeast Indip. This force would probably consist of
300 MIG-15/17 jet fighters, 75 IL-28 light jet bombers, and 20 TU-2 light
piston bombers. We estimate that these aircraft would provide a daily sortie
rate of about 360. Approximately 120 transport aircraft would be available
to support operations from Burma. (Pares. 14-18)
F. We believe that the Chinese have the purely military resources
personnel, equipment, weapons, and ammunition -- to conduct operations
through Burma and simultaneously attack along the himalayan front. If such
operations were undertaken, logistic support would require approximately 25
percent (50,000) of the nation's truck park and, on an annual basis, more
than 50 percent (750,000 tons) of the motor gasoline available in all of
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China in 1962. It mould necessitate a drastic reallocation of the nation's
transportation and POL resources, and the Chinese mould be confronted with
extremely formidable maintenance and replacement problems. (Paras. 19-21)
G. We believe that the Chinese could launch attacks from Tibet and
Sinkiang with little or no warning. We believe the attack through Burma,
on the other hand, would give Indian defenses several weeks of warning.
Even if the Chinese could do the road rebuilding surreptitiously or under
the guise of some peaceful purpose, the attacking columns would require
approximately two weeks to close in their attack positions at the Indo-
Burma border, and probably would be quickly detected. (Para. 22)
H. The foregoing conclusions represent an estimate of the maximum
feasible scale of attack across Burma against India, entailing maximum
logistic difficulties and warning time. The Chinese could attack in less
force with less difficulty and less warning.
DISCUSSION
I. GROUND OP11., TIDE'S
Logistics
1. The theater of operations for a Chinese Communist offensive against
India through Burma encompasses Yunnan Province in China, northern Burma,
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and the states of Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur in northeast India. The
Chinese would probably locate their base depot at Kunming which is served
by road from the railhead at Anshun and by tail via Hanoi and Haiphong in
North Vietnam. Forward stockpiles most likely would be established in the
Hsin-ehieh and Teng-chung areas,
2. Supplies for Chinese ground forces engaged in operations in India
would have to be moved over distances ranging from 800 to 1,700 miles from
Kunming. The initial transportation leg would cover the route by rail
between Kunming and Ipinglang, and then by road to Hsin-chieh, which is near
the Sino-Burmese border some 330 miles vest of Kunming. From Hsin-chieh the
Chinese could move supplies across Burma to the Indo=Burmese border via the
following main supply routes: (a) over the Ledo Road via Myitkyina, and
(b) over the Burma Road to Mandalay and thence by way of the Mandalay-
Imphal road. Some supplies could also be delivered to Mandalay via the
route through Talo and Keng Tung. Available intelligence indicates that
extensive road repairs and bridging to the Shingbwiyang-Pangsau Pass section
of the Ledo Road and on parts of the Mandalay-imphal road would be required
before these logistic rontes could support the scale of military operations
envisaged. (See map at Annex.)
3. The limiting factor governing Chinese attacks on India from Burma
would be the amount of supplies which could be moved across the Indo-Burmese
frontier. We estimate that the Chinese could move a daily maximum of about
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1,710 tons forward from the stockpiles at Hsin-chieh and Teng-chung. This
tonnage, we believe, would be used as follows: 240 tons for engineer units,
security units and forward dumping; 330 tons for motor transport; 940 tons
to support grouLd operations in India; and 200 tons for air units in Burma.
Composition of the Attacking Forces
4. We estimate that the composition of the Chinese Communist force
could include an army headquarters to provide operational control along the
axes of advance, lightly equipped infantry divisions for the initial phase
across the mountainous jungle terrain along the Indo-Burmese border, and an
operational reserve consisting of standard infantry divisions, with their
organic medium artillery and some tanks, to be employed on the Assam plain.
These ground units could readily be provided from the two armies located in
the Kunming Military Region, supplemented as necessary from China's strategic
ground reserve.
Operational Considerations
5. Prior to the initiation of the attack) these troops probably would be
staged in Chinese territory near the Sino-Burmese border. Forward movement
from the staging areas would have to await necessary road repairs. We believe
that essential improvement of the Ledo Road would require the employment of
six engineer regiments and take up to one month. Three engineer regiments
would probably be sufficient to make the necessary improvements to and maintain
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the Mandalay-Imphal road. After essential road repair, it is estimated that
the attack forces could close in their attack positions at the Indo-Burma
border in approximately two weeks.
6. An offensive during the southwest monsoon (May-September) would be
extremely difficult, but not impossible, to support logistically. The most
favorable period for military operations in the area occurs after the
beginning of the dry season in November. Refer to Annex D for a detailed
discussion of the climatic effects on ground and air operations.
Avenues of Attack
7. We estimate that the Chinese would utilize two major and two cross
country avenues of advance into northeast India. One major avenue leads
from Pangsau Pass through Ledo and across the Digboi oil fields to Dibrugarh;
the other is via Imphal, Kohima? and into Gauhati. Cross country trails
lead from Bhamo via Indaw and Homalin to the Indo-Burmese frontier and from
Kun-shan in Chamdo district through the Diphu PIss to Walong in Eastern
Assam.
8. In simultaneous advances over the two principal avenues of attack
into India, the Chinese could employ and logistically support a force
estimated at 118,500 troops, organized into approximately eight infantry
divisions under the command of an army headquarters.* Tables of personnel
* the daily through-put capacities of the Ledo Road and the Mandalay-
Imphal route required to support this force are 520 tons and 320 tons,
respectively.
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and equipment for the-army'keadqnerters and for the Standeird'infantry division
are sliown in Annexes B and Co respectively. Over the two cross country trails,
the Chinese could support four independent infantry regiments (14,000 troops).
9. Along the northern axis leading to Dibrugarh (via the Ledo Road)
the Chinese force could consist of one standard infantry division and four
light infantry divisions with one additional artillery regiment (74,000
troops). Chinese objectives in this attack, we believe, would be the
destruction of Indian Army forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields,
and the eventual link-up with Chinese operations from Tibet into the eastern
pert of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEPA).*
10. In the advance toward western Assam (via the Mandalay-Imphal route)
the Chinese could employ the major elements of two light infantry divisions
and one standard infantry division (44.500 troops). This attack and the
attacks from Tibet would probably have the objective of destroying Indian
forces and the occupation of important areas of northeast India.
11. To assist forces attacking on the Imphal route and from Tibet in
the Rime area, the Chinese could support pack animal and porter supplied
units from roadheads at Homalin in Burma and KUn-shan in China. Approximately
50 tons would be available at each place to support two infantry regiments
25X1 X7
IF?MMTSWiate of the Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against India from
Tibet and Sinkiang," dated 14 August 1963
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30-50 miles north of Homalin, and an additional two regiments from Hun-shan
through the Diphu Pass to the Walong area. These units could penetrate deeper
if air supply was available.
12. In addition, by using surplus tonnage available on the Ledo Road
at Shingbwiyang and at Myitkyina, the Chinese could support small parties
of lightly equipped infantry operating on the Indian frontier north of Putao
and west of Shingbwiyang. We have no intelligence on the tracks and trails
in these areas but from World War II experience we believe this is possible.
It is considered that the employment of these additional troops, the number
of which cannot be accurately estimated, would not materially affect the
Chinese capability to achieve their overall objectives in Assam.
II. AIR OPERATIONS
25X1 X7
13. In the " Estimate of the Communist Chinese Air Threat Against
India," dated 17 January 1963, 290 tactical aircraft were estimated as
constituting the air threat. Of this number, we believe 100 aircraft would
be based in Sinkiang for operations against the Ladakh-Jammu-Kashmir area,
and 190 would be based in Tibet and southwest China for operations against
northeast India. In support of operations through Burma we believe an
additional 205 tactical aircraft could be employed against northeastern
India, The 395 aircraft which could operate against India's eastern front
would probably consist of 300 MIG-15/17s (including 40 N2G-17D
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all-weather aircraft), 75 IL-28s, and 20 TU-2s. Locations of all aircraft are
identified in Annexes E and Fl and logistic requirements for this force are
noted at Annex G.
14. There are 19 airfields within Chinaand 12 within northern Burma
which could be used for the employment of Chinese Communist air forces in
support of attacks against northeast India. Because of operational and
logistic factors we believe only six of the former and two of the latter
would be used for combat support of these attacks. We believe that logistic
capabilities are sufficient to support two fighter regiments at Myitkyina
South and one fighter regiment at Namponmao. A, program of improving existing
forward airfields in Burma and the use of airfields that may be captured in
India would permit continuing forward deployment of fighter/ground attack
aircraft to the immediate vicinity of the active battle area.
15. Jets based at Myitkyina South and Namponmao would be the only
fighters that could be employed in a ground attack role. From these two
bases in Burma, the fighters could provide close support to ground forces
generally within anareaembracing Imphal, Dibrugarh, and Sadiya in India
(see map at Annex). The TU-2 aircraft, in attacks from Nagchhu Dzong airfield
in Tibet, could also provide support to ground forces as far south as Imphal.
The IL-28s would have the range to conduct bombing attacks and reconnaissance
over northeast India and jet fighters on combat air patrol could cover all of
India east of East Pakistan and Nepal.
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16. It is estimated that these Chinese Communist aircraft would provide
a daily sortie rate of about 360. A likely mixture for this number of sorties
would be 65 ground support and 225 air defense/combat air patrol sorties by
jet fighters, with the jet light bombers conducting 55 sorties per day, and
the piston light bombers conducting 15 sorties per day.
17. We believe that approximately 120 light and mall transport aircraft
could be utilized in supporting operations through Burma. The 30 IL-12s,
16 IL-1481 and 28 C-46s of the Thirteenth Air Division could deliver about
132 tons of material daily from the Chengtu area to the airfields at Myitkyina
South and Namponmao as long as airborne operations were not conducted else-
where. In addition, T LI-2s and 3 0-475 of the Thirteenth Air Division could
operate from Kunming or Mandalay and 35 AN-28 could be located in Burma as
follows: 10 at Singkaling Hkamti South, 10 at Kolemya, and 15 at Katha.
The AN-2s would have the primary mission of supporting the ground forces.
III. THE EILIJECT OF BURMA 0 TIONS ON CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY
CAPABILITIES FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG
25X1 X7
18. In the 1111111Estimate of the Chinese Communist Ground Threat
Against India from Tibet and Sinkiang," dated 14 August 1963, we estimated
that to sustain the operations described in that study for one year would
require about 40,000 trucks, and approximately 600,000 tons of motor
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gasoline. We then made the following judgment: "An effort of this size
probably could not be supported if China were involved in significant military
activity elsewhere."
19. We believe that the Chinese have the purely military resources --
personnel, equipment, weapons, and ammunition -- to conduct operations
through Burma and simultaneously attack along the Himalayan front. However,
the attack through Burma would require approximately 10,000 trucks and, on
an annual basis, nearly 150,000 tons of motor gasoline. Thus, if the Chinese
were to launch attacks simultaneously into India from Tibet, Sinkiang and
Burma, approximately 25 percent (50,000) of the nation's truck park would
have to be used, and, on an annual basis, more than 50 percent (750,000
tons) of the motor gasoline available in all of China in 1962 would be
consumed.
20, Although the Chinese could, if they wished, make available the
motor transport and gasoline required to support these offensives, to do
so would necessitate a drastic reallocation of the nation's transportation
and POL resources. Motor and air transport would have to be redistributed
from other military regions and the civilian economy wuold be stripped of
all but a minimal level of these modes of transportation. Neny organizational
and managerial problems would arise, and it is questionable whether the
military or civilian transportation agencies could cope with these prOblems.
Furthermore, if this transportation effort, which would be taking place over
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extremely long and difficult roads and in areas far remote from industrial
bases, were to continue for long, the Chinese would_ be confronted by extremely
fornddible maintenance and replacement problems.
21. We believe that the Chinese could launch attacks from Tibet and
Sinkiang with little or no warning. We believe the attack through Burma,
on the other hand, would give Indian defenses several weeks of warning. Even
if the Chinese could rebuild the roads surreptitiously or under the guise of
some peaceful purpose, the attacking columns would require two weeks to close
in their attack positions on the Indo-Burma border and would probably be
quickly detected.
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Annex A
DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY UNITS
(Short Tons Based on "Light Combat Rates" At 85% TOE)
Unit
Class I
(Rations)
Class II and IV
(General Supplies)
Class III
(POL)
Class V
(Ammunition)
TOTAL
(All Classes)
Army Hq (Including
5.2
4.7
9.9
0.6
20.3
Command & Staff and
Combat Support
elements)
Inf Div ( Standard)
24.6
22.3
28.0
54.0
128.9
Inf Div (Light)
23.6
21.5
3.1
28.0
76.2
I
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ANNEX B
0
H
-I-)
TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, ARMY HSADQUARTERS AND COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS (AT 100% TOE) d
0
4-3
m
o rd o
H m H
O a+)
2 w g
O-4 0 H
174 ,-I q-I
CD d 0
to w
H H
o o
x o w
w et:3 rt:i
Personnel:
Total
Cmd
Grp &
Staff
Arty
Regt
Sig
Bn
Gd
Bn
Rcn
Bn
Eng
Bn
Officers
783
403
207
38
54
42
39
Enlisted
4355
1581
1290
257
356
428
443
Total
5138
1984
1497
295
410
470
482
Equipment:
Gun }lbw, 152 mm
12
12
Gun, 130/122 mm
12
12
Mortar, 160 mm
12
12
LM, 7.62 mm
72
27
27
18
SMG, 7.62 mm
785
71
203
64
66
339
42
Carbine, 7.62 mm
2144
298
1075
158
212
37
364
Pistol, 7.62 mm
562
257
146
33
64
31
31
Truck, Cargo, 6x6
105
90
15
Truck, Cargo, 4x2
173
157
15
1
Truck, 1/4T, 6x4
12
7
5
Truck, Ambulance
Truck, Radio Van
1
1
Motorcycle
30
24
2
2
2
Bicycle
24
24
Cart
Horse
96
24
12
12
48
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Annex C
TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, INFANTRY DIVISION (STANDARD) (AT 100% TOE)
Total
Cmd
Grp
&
Staff
Chem
Co
Sig
Bn
Rcn
Co
Engr
Bn
AT
Bn
AA
AW
Bn
B
A
N
D
Ord
Plat
Arty
Regt
Tk-
A/G
Regt
Inf
Regts
(each)
Personnel:
Officers 1819
210
9
41
10
39
54
57
1
1
207
134
352
Enlisted 15,766
710
134
283
129
443
364
376
37
37
1290
590
3791
Total 17,585
920
143
324
139
482
418
433
38
38
1497
724
4143
Equipment:
How, 122-mm 12
12
Gun, 76-mm 12
12
Gun,AT,57/76-mm 39
12
9
Gun,AAAW,37/57-mm 12
12
Mort,120-mm 39
12
9
Mort,82-mm 81
27
Rd l Rf1,57-mm 27
9
Rd l Rf1,75-mm 27
9
AA,90-mm 54
18
AAMG, 12.7-mm 39
12
9
HMG, 7.62-mm 135
45
LM, 7.62-mm 378
9
18
117
SMG, 7.62-mm 3499
112
18
18
112
42
77
4
203
156
919
Cbn, 7.62-mm 8717
225
116
213
364
297
33
1075
280
2038
Pistol, 7.62-mm 1867
169
7
36
7
31
45
2
1
146
181
414
Flamethrower link
Unk
Tank, med 32
32
Armd Recon Veh 3
3
Aslt Gun, SU 76/ 12
12
100
Trk, Cargo,6x6 382t
6
Unk
15
25
90
12
78
Trk, Cargo,4x2 107
70
10
15
12
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Cmd
Grp
Total Staff
Equipment Cont'd:
Trk, 1/4T 36 8
Trk, Ambulance 4 4
Motorcycle 25
Bicycle 12
Cart 396t 45
Horse 780t 135
Annex C
AA A Tk- Inf
Chem Sig Rcn Engr AT AW N Ord Arty A/G Regts
Co Bn Co Bn Bn Bn D Plat Regt Regt
1 5 4 6
5 6 2 12
15
117t
33 45t 189t
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ANNEX D
THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE ON GROUND AND AIR
OPKRATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA AREA
I. GROUND OPERATIONS
1. Southwest Monsoon. Mid-May through September is quite warm
and humid. Day temperatures are in the 80's (0F.) and 90's, lowering
to the 60's and 70's at night, except cooler temperatures are common
at higher elevations. Relative humidity averages 80 percent or more
much of the time. Cloudiness ranges 8/10 or more during the morning at
most places, with convective clouds in the afternoon and evening covering
7/10 or more of the sky. Precipitation generally averages from 10 to 20
inches per month, with some exposed slopes receiving more than 25 inches.
Thunderstorms are common in the spring and the southwest monsoon seasons.
Their frequency is determined by local conditions; at some locations
thunderstorms occur on 50 percent of the days in some months. This season
would clearly be the most unfavorable one for most military operations.
2. Autumn. Mostly during the month of October, is the transition
season from the wet southwest monsoon to the dry northeast monsoon.
3.
winter
inches
broken
The Northeast Monsoon.
season.
Precipitation is
per month at most places.
November to about mid-March is the dry
at a minimum, averaging less than two
Cloudiness is usually scattered to
with little diurnal variation. Temperatures are mostly in the 60's
and 70's during the day, dropping to 40's or 50's at night; freezing
temperatures may occur at higher elevations. Relative humidities are
generally high in the morning, averaging 70 percent or more at most
locations and lowering to a minimum during the afternoon and evening. This
would be the most favorable season for most military operations.
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ANNEX D
4. Spring. Generally from mid-March through mid-May is the
transition from the dry winter to the wet summer. Over much of this
sector, temperatures reach a maximum just before the onset of the
southwest monsoon, averaging a few degrees warmer than in the summer.
Thunderstorms are common with the advance of the southwest monsoon.
II. AIR OPERATIONS
1. Weather conditions are least favorable for air operations
during the southwest monsoon season, when cloudiness and precipitation
are at a maximum. Convective-type clouds are predominant with frequent
layers of middle and high clouds. Cloudiness is generally most pre-
dominant over the southwest slopes and peaks of the mountains.
Thunderstorms and showers are frequent in this season. Aircraft icing
is most hazardous near 15,000 to 18,000 feet. Flying conditions are
generally worse during the one or two expected tropical storms per
season in this region. Winds aloft are mostly southerly, shifting to
southeasterly at about 10,000 feet.
2. Weather conditions are generally favorable for air operations
during the northeast monsoon season. However, strong westerly winds
above 20,000 feet are sometimes present. Aircraft icing may occur at
times above 10,000 to 13,000 feet, but is usually not a major problem
since cloudiness is at a minimum.
- 2 -
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Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
Annex E
AIRFIELDS AND AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN TIBET AND SOUTHWEST CHINA
Distance to
Airfield Name Border (NM)
Coords
Elevation
ft.
Length
ft.
Surface
Estimate of Participating Aircraft
Tactical Ftrs Bombers Trspts
1.
Lhasa
180
30o30'N
14,000
13,000
Asphalt
60 Mig 15/17s
910051E
(AMSL)
2.
Nagchhu
220
31?33'N
15,000
12,000
Crushed
(20 Tu-2s
Dzong
91?43'E
(AMSL)
Rock
(25 I1-28s
3.
Yushu
220
32?53'N
12,500
8,000
Crushed
30 Mig 15/17s
96?47'E
(AMSL)
Rock
4.
Kantzu
270
3137'N
11,500
14,000
Crushed
100 12'E
(AMSL)
Rock
5.
Chengtu/
360
30?44N
1,640
4,600
Macadam
Feng-Huang-Shan
104?00E
(AMSL)
6.
Kuanghan
370
30o57,N
1,640
8,300
Macadam
104?20'E
(AMSL)
(30 I1-12s
7.
Chengtu/Wenchiang
315
30o43,N
1,700
7,500
Concrete
30 Mig 15/17s2/
25 11-28s
(28 C-46s
103?57E
(AMSL)
(16 I1-14s
8.
Chengtu/
310
30?035'N
1,640
7,200
Concrete
Shuangliu
103 57'E
(AMSL)
9.
Chengtu/
350
30?16N
1,640
5,000
Macadam
Taiping SSU
104?01'E
(AMSL)
10.
Hsinching
340
325'N
1,500
7,000
Macadam
103?51'E
(AMSL)
11.
Hsichang
195
27?55'N
5,000
4,900
Macadam
102?13E
(AMSL)
12.
Peitun
130
25?27'N
6,420
6,600
Macadam
100?44E
(AMSL)
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Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
Distance to
Airfield Name(Cont1d)Border (NM)
Elevation
Coords ft.
Length
ft.
Surface
Annex E
Estimate of Participating Aircraft
Tactical Ftrs Bombers Trspts
13.
Paoshan 65
25(?)04'N 5,490
4,900
Macadam
99 09E (AMSL)
14.
Mangshih 25
24?24'N 3,020
5,600
Sod
98?31'E (ASL)
15.
Kunming 230
25?00'N 6,240
9,500
Concrete
60 Mig 15/17s27
25 I1-28s
102?45E (AMSL)
16.
Mengsa 40
23?43N 4,500
8,000
Sod
99?37'E (ASL)
17.
Ssumao North 85
7'N
2247'N4,120
6,800
Macadam
100 57'E (SL)
18.
Menghsi 10
N
22o00 480o
' ,
4,300
Sod
100?16'E (AMBL)
19.
Mengtzu West 215
2354'N 4,720
8,200
Concrete
30 Mig 15/17s2/
103 19'E (SL)
a/
Includes 10 Mig 171) aircraft.
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Airfield Name
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
AIRFIELDS AND CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN NORTHERN BURMA
Distance to
Indian Elevation
Border (NM) Coords ft.
1. Putao 15 27?20'N 1,490
97?26E
2. Singkaling 30 250281N 600
Ekamti South 95?41'E
3. Namponmao 125 25?21'N 470
)
I 6. Bhamo
4. yitkyina 135 2522'N 472
M
5. Katha
South
140
100
96 19'E
97 21'E
24?16'N
(0
24(?)09'N
320
360
97?15'E
0
7.
Kalemyo
4o
23011N
loo
94 04'E
8.
Mongmit
150
23?006'N
600
96 39'E
9.
Lashio
210
22?58'N
2,450
97?45E
o
10.
Gangaw
50
22,11'N
700
94-08'E
11.
Mbnywa
115
o
22013'N
260
95 05,E
12.
Mandalay
160
21?56'N
250
96005E
Annex F
Length
ft.
97?17'EGood
Surface
and run-
way con-
dition
Estimate of Participating Aircraft
Tactical Ftrs Bombers Trspts
6,000
4,200
clay,
Fair
Gravel,
Good
10 AN-2s 0
%
0
6,600
Asphalt,
30 Mfg 15/17s
(Includes 10 Mig 17-Ds)
6,000
Asphalt,
Good
60 Mig 15/17s
5,280
Laterite,
Good
15 AN-2s
6,060
Asphalt,
Poor
4,2oo
Laterite,
Good
10 AN-2s
5,280
Gravel,
Fair
4,500
Bitumen,
Good
3,600
Gravel,
Fair
4,900
Gravel,
Fair
(7 Li-2s
4,000
Bitumen,
Fair
(3 C-47s
(These aircraft would
also operate from Kunming)
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-,-1
+3
cd
11
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
AIR LOGISTICS-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
Airfields & Aircraft Mission
A. CHINESE AIRFIELDS
1. LHASA
60 Nig 15/17s
with Air Tech-
nical Battalion
(ATB) & Maint
Personnel
2. NAGCBEU DZONG
Air Defense/
Combat Air
Patrol (CAP)
POL & LUB
A/C and
Rolling Stock
Annex G
Common
Use Items Total
Includes Snort 0
Ammo & Bombs Tech Supplies Personnel Tons +,
0
0
+)
O ? rd 0
H
? d +)
O d
F-1 W 0
84 8 2 10 104 .H
ri CH
W d w
rd F-1
? W d
H OH
O C.)
X 0 0
M
25 I1-28s with Bomb/Rec 137
Air Technical
Battalion (ATB)
& Maint Personnel
20 Tu-2s with
Air Technical
Battalion (ATE)
& Maint Personnel
3. YUSHU
Ground Support
18
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Defense/CAP 42
Air Technical Bat-
talion (ATB) &
Maint Personnel
40 3 6 186
1
20 2
3
1 5
TOTAL
3338-j
1
TOTAL 52'
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
I
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
Airfields & Aircraft
Mission
POL & LUB
A/C and
Rolling Stock
Ammo & Bombs
Tech Supplies
Common
Use Items
Includes
Personnel
Total
Short
Tons
Annex G
4.
CHENGTU/WENCHIANG
30 Mig 15/17s
with Air Techni-
cal Battalion
Air Defense/
CAP
42
4
1
5
52
(ATB) & Maint
Personnel
25 IL-28s with
Bomb/Rec
137
4o
3
6
186
Air Technical
Battalion (ATB)
g, Maint Personnel
TOTAL
2382/
5.
KUNMING
60 Nig 15/17s
with Air Techni-
cal Battalion
Air Defense/
CAP
84
8
2
10
104
1
cu
1
(ATB) & Maint
Personnel
25 I1-28s with
Bomb/Rec
137
4o
3
6
186
Air Technical
Battalion (ATB)
TOTAL
29o1/
& Maint Personnel
6.
MENGTZU WEST
30 Nig 15/17s
with Air Tech-
Air Defense/
CAP
42
4
1
5
52
nical Battalion
TOTAL
522/
(ATB) & Maint
Personnel
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Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
Airfields & Aircraft
B. BURMESE AIRFIELDS
1. MYITKYINA
Common
POL & LUB Use Items Total
A/C and Includes Short
Mission Rolling Stock Ammo & Bombs Tech Supplies Personnel Tons
60 Mig 15/17s Ground At-
with Air Tech- tack, Air
nical Battalion Defense,
(ATB) & Maint CAP
Personnel
64 20 2 10 96
Annex G
2. NAMFONMAO
30 Mig 15/17s Ground At- 36(14)2/ 7(2)/ 1(.5)2/ 5(3)/ 49(19.5)2/
with Air Tech- tack, Air
nical Battalion Defense TOTAL 145f/ cn
(ATB) & Maint
Personnel
25X1 X7
a/ This 333 tons is provided from the 500 tons referred to in para 25 of the Estimate, dated 17 January 1963.
bi This tonnage provided by truck from Hsining-Lanchou railhead. It is not a restrictive factor in this problem.
s/ This tonnage is not a restrictive factor due to proximity of major railhead.
Approximatedly 350 short tons per day are required and available to support these air operations out of the
total tonnage deliverable daily to Kunming.
Figures in parentheses indicate Mig-17D requirements. They are parts of rather than additions to the totals.
This breakout included here to distinguish Mig-17D air defense mission from ground attack mission of remaining
20 jet fighters.
f/ With the exception of the first 6-8 days of operations or during the rainy season when certain road systems may
be temporarily inoperable, this tonnage will be provided overland by truck. During periods when air supply
is necessary, it will be accomplished largely by Thirteenth Air Division aircraft operating from the Chengtu
airfield complex. Approximately 132 tons could be delivered daily from this railhead location using 30 I1-12s,
16 I1-14s and 28 C-46s on a 50% serviceability basis. In addition, 7 Li-2s and 3 C-47s, operating from either
Kunming or Mandalay, could easily supply the remaining 13 tons. Another factor favoring adequate tonnage at
these two fields is that transports probably would be able to operate about 25% more flying days than the
fighter aircraft they were supporting.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020001-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/ZteslikIpP80S01499R000100020001-7
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JET LIGHT BOMBER RADIUS
(Bomb load 4400 lbs. except at
Nagchhu Dzong, where it is
2200 lbs.)
JET FIGHTER INTERCEPT MISSION
(Two external fuel tanks)
PISTON LIGHT BOMBER RADIUS
(Bomb load 3300 lbs.)
JET FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK
(Allowing 5 minutes for low level
combat, but carrying only one
550 lb. bomb)
50 100 200
300
Nautical Miles
50 100 200 300
Statute Miles
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