CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01499R000100020010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 5, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5 August 1963
SU&TECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR AZTACI~NG .L'~'v:CA
THROUGH EUpMF'SE TERRITORY
THE PROBLEM
To assess the ~ military force the Chinese Communists
could employ and logistically support in sustained attacks into
aortheast India through Burma. The attacks considered in this paper
are those the Chinese Communists have the theoretical capability to
mount in addition to those described in USIB Memorandum, "Chinese
Communist Ground Threat Against India from Tibet sad Sinkiang,"
dated 28 May 1963, and '~ Eati;nate of the Coaffiunist Chinese 25X1X7
Air Threat Agafnat India" dated 17 January 1963.
ASSUMPTIONS
i. Although this study does not estimate the reactions of
the Burmese goverrmient to a Chinese Communist incursion, it is
essumed that the Chinese would, as a normal military precaution,
deploy security forces along their lines of communication.
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2< Tt~e Chinese would not augment ground end air forces along
Chinas borders with countries in southeast Asia,
3. The Chinese would use port end rail. facilities in North
Vietnam.
CONCLUSIONS
A. ~ ern attack on India through Burma, we believe that the
Chinese Communists would establish stockpiles on the Siao-Burmese
frontier in the Hsi-Chieh/Tang-Chung area using Kunming as their
base of suppay. T~nnfn$ is served by a rail 13ne frc~n Hanoi in
North Vietneut end by rued. frcma the Chinese railhead at Anshan, and
these facilities covYd support limited operations in the China-
Burma-India theater< The Chinese could use two principal routes
to move supplies through Burma,: {a) the redo Road via N~itkyina
and {b) the Lashio-Maud,algy-~-rphal road. {Pares. I-2}
$. After esseartial road improvements the Chinese could move
a total of Sup tons per day to support ground operations in India.
We estimate that the maximum ground force the Chinese could deploy
in en attack into India through Burma would be about 132,500 men,
composed of s!ppro~rim~,~y eight ~~ry divisions under the command
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of an army headquarters. The meat favorable period for operations
in the area eccurs after the beginning of the dry season in
November. (Pass. 3-9)
C. We estimate the force advancing aver the Ledo Road would
consist of one standard infantry division, four light infantry
divisions, and one artillery regiment. The attack, we believe,
would have the objective of destroying Indian forces, the seizuxe
of the Digboi oi:L f~.elds and the event~zal l:i.n'~-up with Chinese
forces advanc.n~ from Tibet into the eo.st~~rn pert of. the T3?o.~`theast
Frontier Agency (I:v'E;.a'.A) a W~ egtiznate tY~_e f~~:~en ac~va~!c'?g through
L~nphal would consist of the ma,~or elem?=~:zj.s of two light infantry
divisioxs and one standar.~, infantry division. 2'f.ss attack, we
believe, would have the objective of dee-troy3ng Ia~.kl.an farces and,
together with the attacks from Tibet, the occupation of important
areas of northeast Ix:dia, (i'aras. 8-ll)
D. We eatimste the Chinese co~zl.d support two independent
infantry reg;.ments both n~~rvh of ;ior~,l.in and through the Diphu
pass, These units would be suppli~tid by pack animals and porters,
and could be supported up to 50 miles into India. Sf air supply
were available, they could penetrate deeper. (Pass. 12-13)
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E. We believe the Chinese would employ about 395 combat
aircraft in operations agai.n~ct nortliea.st India. This force would
probably consist of 300 NiIG-1537 het fighters, 75 IL-2$ light ,het
bombers, and 2Q '.ItT-2 light piston bombers. We estimate that these
aircraft would provide a daisy sortie rate of about 360. Approximately
120 transport aircraft wau13 be available to support operations .f`t~an
Burma,, (Pass. 1/+-1$)
F. We believe that the Chinese have the purely military
resources -- personnel, equipment, weapons, and ammun3.tion -- to
conduct operations through Burma and simultaneously attack along
the 83ma1ayan front. If such operations were undertaken, logistic
support would require approximately 25 percent (50,000 of the
nation's truck park and, an an annual basis, more than 50 percent
(750,000 tons of the motor gasoline available in all of China in
1962. Tt would necessitate a drastic reallocation of the nation's
txanspaxtation and P0L resources, and the Chinese would be confronted
with extremely foxmidable maintena;~ce and replacement problems.
(Paws. 19-21)
G. We believe that the Chinese could launch attacks from
Tibet and Sinkiang with little or no warning. We believe the attack
through Burma, on the other hand, would glue Indian defenses several
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? ,,
weeks of warning. Ewen ii the Chinese could do the read rebuilding
surreptitiously or u~1er the guise of same peaceful purpose, the
atteakiag columns would requixe approximately two weeks to close
in their attack positions at the Indo?Burma border, and probably
would be quickly detected. (Para. 22)
$. The foregoing coaclusiona relate to the .y,p~tnn~n feasible
scale of attack across Burma against India, entailing maximum
logistic difficulties and warning time. A fortiori, the Chinese
i ~'
could attack in lase force with less difficulty and less warning.
I. ~fDOUND OPERATIONS
sties
1. The theater of operations far a Chinese communist offensive
against India through Burma encompasses Yunnan Province in China,
northern Burma, and the states of Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur in
nartheaat India, The Chinese would probably locate their base depot
at Kunming which is served by read from the railhead at Anshan and
by rai]. via Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam. Forurard stockpiles
mast likely would be established in the Hsin-Chieh and Tang-Chung areas.
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2. Supplies for Chinese ground forces engaged in operations
in India would have to be ai~~~.?ed over distances ranging from 800 to
1,700 miles from Kunming. ~'he initial transportation leg would
cover the route by rail between Kunming and Ipinglang, and then by
road to Hsinchieh, which is near the S3.no-Burmese border some 330
miles west of Kunming. From, llsinclxieh the Chinese could move
supplies across Burma to the Indo-:~urmese border via the following
main supply routes: ~a) over the Ledo Road via N~yitkyina, and
(b) over the Burma Road to Rirx;xdalt;y and thence by way of ?+.:he
Mandalay-Iiri;~ht~7. road. Some yuppli~:s could a_'Lso be delivered to
Mandalay via the route thro;xgh malo and Keng Tung. Available
intelligence indicates thab extensive road xepairs and bridging
to tY^.e Shingbwiyaxg-Pangsau Fass s~:etion of the Ledo Road ar_d on
parts of the Mandalay~Imph,-.,1 road would be required before these
logistic routes could support the scale of military operations
envisaged. (See map at Anne.)
3? The li7miting factor governing Chinese attack3 on India
from Burma would be the amount of supplies which could be moved
across the Indo-Burmese frontier. We estimate that the Chinese
could move a daily maximum of about 1,330 tons forward from the
stockpiles at Hsin-Chien and Teng-Chung. This tonnage, we believe,
would be used as follows: 70 tons for engineer units, 220 tons for
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motor transport, 840 ton?~'to support ground operations in India,
and 200 tons for air units in Burma.
Composition of the Attacking Forces
~+. We estimate that the composition of the Chinese Communist
force could include an a~qy headquarters to provide operational
control along the axes of advance, lightly equipped infantry divi-
sions for the initial phase across the mountainous bungle terrain
along the Indo-Burmese border, and an operational reserve consisting
of standard infantry divisions, with their organic medium artillery
and some tanks, to be employed on the Assam plain.
5. These ground units could be provided from the two armies
located. in the Kunming Military Region, or, if necessary, could be
deployed from China's strategic ground reserve. In at~y case,
sufficient numbers of trained and equipped infanntry divisions are
readily available from China's standing army.
Operational Considerations
6. 2'hese troops probably would be staged in Chinese territory
near the Sino-Burmese border. Forward movement from the staging
areas would have to await nece~asary road repairs. We 'believe that
essential improvement of the Ledo Road would require the employment
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of six engineer regiments and take up to one month. Three engineer
regiments would probably '~~: sufficient to make the necessary im-
provements to and maintain the Mandala`v..~hal road. After essential
road repair, it is estimai:ed that the a~tack forces could clone in
their attack positions at the Indo-Burma border in approximately
two wee~:s.
7? An offensive during the southwest monsoon (May-September)
would be extreme?y difficult, but not impossible, to support
logistically. The mc:st favorable period for military opesiations
in the area occurs after the beginning of the dry season in November.
Refer to Annex D for a detailed discussion of the climatic effects
on ground and air operai:ions.
B. We estimate that the Chinese would utilize two mayor and
twa cross country avenues of advance into northeast Irlc3ia. One
mayor avenue leads from Pangsau Pass th:rough Ledo and: across the
Digboi oil fields to Dibrugaxh; the other is via Iniphal, ICohima,
and into Gauhati. Grass country trails lead from Bhamo via Indian
and Iiomalin to the Inch-Burmese frontier and from Y.un-Shan in
Chamdo Province through the Diphu pass to Walong in Eastern Assam.
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9? In simultaneous advaxices over the two principal avenues of
attack into India, the Chinese could employ and 3.ogstoe-lly support
a force estimated at 1.18,500 troops, organized into approximately
eight infantry divisions under the command of any army headquarters.:
Tables of personnel and equipment for the a~qy headquarters and for
the standard infantry division are sha~wn in Armexes B and C,
respetively. Over the two cross country trails., the Chinese could
support foux independent infantry regiments (1t1~,000 troops).
10. t~long the northern a.~cis lea3ing to Dibxu.garh (v.a the
Ledo Road) the Chinese force evuld consist of one standard infantry
division and four light infantry divisions with one additonal
artillery regiment (7,000 troops). Chinese objectives in this
attack, we believe, would be the destruction of Indian Army forces,
the seizure of the I7igboi o?J.Z fields, and the eventual link.-up
with Chinese opexations from Tibet into the eastern part of the
Northeast Frontier Agency (11Tr~'A) .~
The rla,ily through-put capacities of the Ledo Road and the
Mandalay-Imphal route xequired to support this force are 520
tone and ~2t~ tc~ns~ respectively,
2/ 1JSIB Memorandum, "'Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against
India from Tibet and Sinkiang, " dated 28 May 1863.
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11. In the advance towards western Assam (vie. the Mandalay-
Imphal route) the Chinese could employ the ma.,~or elements oi' two
light infantry divisions and one standard infantry division (k~,50Q
troops) . This atte,cls anal the ~ztt~zclts from Tibet would probably
have the objective of destroying Tndian forces and the occupation
of important areas oi' northeast India.
12. Ta assist forces attacking on the Imphal route and from
Tibet in the Rima area,, the Chinese could support pack animal and
porter supplied units from roadheads at Hamelin in BLUVia and Kun-span
in China. Appraximstely 50 tons t~rould be available at each place
to support tyro infantx^,~ regiments 3p-50 miles north of Hamelin, and
an additional two regiments from Hun-shun through the Diphu Pass to
the ti~dalong area. These units could penetrate deeper 3f air supply
was available.
13? In addition, by using surplus tonna~,e available on the
Leda Road at Shingbwiyang and at r~~yiLl~yyina, the Chinese could support
small parties of li~tly equipped ir~axrtry operating on the Indian
frontier north of Putaa and west of Shingbwlryang. Ode have na intelli-
gence on the tracks anal trails in these areas but from t7orld tdar II
experience t~re believe this is possible. It is considered that the
c~nployment of these additional troops, the number of which cannot be
accurately estimcLted, ~rould not materially affect the Chinese capability
to achieve the3x overall objectives in Assam.
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