COMMUNIST CHINESE AIR CAPABILITY AGAINST INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01499R000100050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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1. The object of this study is to examine overall
Chinese air capability and to assess its effectiveness in
operations against India.
I. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE AIR FORCE
History
2. From a humble beginning in 1949 the Communist Chinese
Air Force has developed rapidly into a significant force; in-
deed, in combat strength it is now the third largest Air Force
in the world. Initially, and for a number of years, its
expansion was made possible by the provision of technical
advisers, instructors, and aircraft by the USSR. An impetus
to development was given by the Korean War. An aircraft
GROUP 1
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Declassification
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industry was built up with extensive aid from the Soviet Union
and the manufacture of relatively modern Soviet types, such as
MIG-17 (FRESCO) fighters was started in the late fifties.
Economic and Political Considerations
3. The development of the aircraft industry was part of a
wide programme of forced industrial development, designed to
transform China into a powerful self-sufficient industrialised
nation in the shortest possible time. Initial progress was impres-
sive but in 1958 the regime ordered the adoption of radical pro-
grammes which attempted to accelerate greatly the pace of production
and development. At the same time they introduced the communes
in the countryside. It is now clear that those policies failed
and aggravated by the bad weather conditions in the past three
years, they have resulted in poor harvests and a severe setback
to the economy as a whole. A serious food shortage caused a pro-
nounced deterioration in the health, strength and morale of a
significant part of the populace. A drastic reorganisation of
economic priorities in 1961 has now resulted in heavy industry
being placed after agriculture and light industry A slight improve-
ment in the food situation has been experienced in 1962.
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L+. The abrupt irithdrawal in 1960 of most of the Soviet
engineers, technicians and economic advisers, plus the sharp
reduction in imports of Soviet equipment, have seriously reduced
production in industries of defence importance. Unless this
situation is remedied, China will be unable to build such equipment
as modern aircraft (e.g., the MG-21 FISHBED and TU-16 3=ER) in
significant quantitities for some years.
5. We believe that as a result of the discord in Sino-Soviet
relations the Soviet Union has not supplied any modern offensive
aircraft to China in the past two years, although she has been
willing to make them available to other countries such as Iraq,
Indonesia, and the UAR. We consider that as long as the serious
rift in relations remains the Soviet Union will be reluctant to
supply modern aircraft to China and China will be faced with growing
obsolescence in her Air Forces. Even in the unlikely event of
her economic problems and ideological differences being resolved
in the near future, it would be several years before China could
significantly improve her air capability, unless combat aircraft
were directly supplied by the USSR.
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Organisation of the Air Force
6. The Communist Chinese Air Force (C.C.A.F.), subordinate
to the Ministry of Defence, is organised as a single entity encom-
passing all phases of air operations and has no operational commands.
However, in most other respects it reflects Soviet concepts and
principles. C.C.A.F. headquarters is located at Peking and consists
of operational, logistic and training elements. The Communist
Chinese Naval Mr Force (C.C.N.A.F.) is an integral part of the
Navy with its Headquarters also at Peking.
7. The air defence system is controlled from Peking through
at least seven district air defence headquarters, which are res-
ponsible for the co-ordination and control of activities in their
particular areas. During air defence operations naval fighter
units are under the operational control of the C.C.A.F., through
these district headquarters.
Strength and Deployment
8. The C.C.A.F. and C.C.N.A.F. have a combined strength of
about 2,650 aircraft; the majority of which are jet fighters
(1,920) deployed along the coastal periphery and adjacent to major
inland centres. The IL-28 jet light bomber force (325), the piston
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TU-2 light bombers (105), the special ground attack aircraft
(40 IL-10 and 30 MCG-15), and a few obsolescent TU-4 medium piston-
engined bombers (15) are deployed mainly in northern areas.
We estimate the strength of the trar.;sport force to be
approximately 195 obsolescent piston-engined srhort-range aircraft,
made up mainly of the LI-2 CAB, the IL-12 C0AC2i and tie IL-14
CRA~c'E. (CAS is very similar to the Dakota or DC-3o COACH and
CRATE resemble the Convair 240.)
Airfields
9. There is a well-developed airfield system in China.
Approximately 260 airfields are distributed throughout the country,
including 135 which are suitable for jet fighters or jet light
bombers, and 30 which can be used for jet medium bombers.
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10. The distribution includes a network of airfields stretch-
ing some 400 miles inland, providing a strong support for the
coastal bases. It also provides facilities for redeployment of
aircraft (mobility is stressed in the C.C.A.F./C.C.N.A.F.) to
any sector in eastern and coastal regions from North Korea to
the Indo-China borders.
11. Most Chinese airfields adjacent to the Indian border
are at very high altitudes and have natural or gca e1 surfaces,
rendering them generally unsuitable for sustained jet operations.
However, the Chinese do possess some airfields in the area which
are not at very high altitudes and which would be usable for light
bomber or fighter action against India. The airfields most likely
to be used for operations against the Ladakh-Jammu-Kashmir area,
are Hotien (Khotan) at 3,000 feet elevation with a crushed rock
runway, and Soche (Yarkand) at Z,400 feet elevation with a sod or
natural surface.
12. High elevation and natural runway surfaces alone would
not prevent the Chinese from conducting militarily significant
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jet operations. A number of operational factors must be considered.
Air temperature as well as runway length is important in estimating
required take-off distances. We do not believe that reduction in
radius of action and/or bomb load would arbitrarily be required in
all instances. For example, at Lhasa, at 14,000 feet elevation
and 00 Centigrade, we believe that a BEAGLE could tlzike off with a
full 4,400 pound load using less than 5,000 feet of the available
13,000 foot runway.
Offensive Capability
13. The C.C.A.F. jet light bomber force has had no operational
experience, but has been carrying out operational training for
several years in the bombing role. It probably has a limited
radar bombing and E.C.M. capability, and we estimate that it has
the ability to mount reasonably effective operations. A piston-
engined light bomber force is still retainedl5ut its effectiveness
in the race of opposition would be very low.
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14. The medium bomber force possesses a very limited strategic
bombing capability due to its small size. The BULL, a piston-
engined bomber dating from 1948, would be highly vulnerable to
jet interception.
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The BAT, with a 440
nautical mile (n.m.) radius and normal bomb load of 3,300 pounds,
would be the most reliable aircraft for tactical strikes because
of its slower take-off speed and greater maneuverability at by
levels. The BEAGLE could bomb targets in northern India from
bases in Szechuan (Chengtu), Tibet, Yunnan, and possibly Sinkiang.
The BULL and the BAKER, with combat radii of over 1,600 nautical
miles, could cover northern and northeastern India, including New
Delhi and Calcutta, from their base in Sian.
Defensive Capability
16. The C.C.A.F./C.C.N.A.F. is basically a defensive force.
About three-fourths of its aircraft are fighters, of which less
than 10 percent have an all-weather capability. Its air defence
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role is restricted by lack of the most modern types of aircraft,
insufficient flying time for combat proficiency, lack of air-to-air
missiles, and logistical weaknesses in POL and aircraft engines and
parts for sustained combat.
17. A comprehensive radar network
exists along the coast from Hainan in the south to the Soviet
frontier. Inland there is a partial coverage up to a depth of
about 500 miles.
18. Despite the deficiencies listed above, as well as
weaknesses in pilot proficiency and fighter tactics, in China
proper the C.C.A.F./C.C.N.A.F. would have a good chance of inter-
cepting intruding aircraft during daylight hours in clear
visibility.
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the Chinese are not equipped to handle tactical intercept air
operations from bases in Tibet. The nearest jet fighter unit is
probably located at Chengtu, but units could be swiftly redeployed
to Tibet and Sinkiang.
19. Within China proper we have firm evidence of a small
number of surface-to-air missile sites at Peiping San Yuan (near
Sian), and at the Shuang-cheng-tzu missile test facility. More-
over. China has a well co-oridnated conventional. anti-ail-Craft
defence system in her coastal provinces. Inland, howevr_r, the
scale of defence decreases rapidly and only the more important
cities are known to have reasonable A.A. cover.
Air Transport Capabilities.
20. The operating capability of the air transport force is
low by Western standards
21. Air transport plays an important part in Chinese defence
plans. The main task is to provide logistic and tactical support
of all Armed Forces. In view of China's size and comparatively
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poor transport facilities, the available air transport effort is
inadequate. However, a considerable part of the small civil air
force is regularly used for carrying freight, and conversion to
military use of a small part of this fleet could quickly be
effected.
22. The Chinese Communists would use transport aircraft in
airborne operations; however, extensive airborne operations are
unlikely if they would cause a major disruption of essential air
transport operations. The Chinese are severely handicapped by a
lack of aircrews trained for airborne operations, and by lack of
suitable transport aircraft with a "heavy drop" capability. Never-
theless, in favorable circumstances a limited operation might be
undertaken. Supply dropping could also be carried out.
II. AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST INDIA
23. Communist China is extremely sensitive to the possibility
of an attack by Nationalist China in the present period of economic
difficulties, but we do not believe the resulting desire to main-
tain a strong air posture in China proper would seriously handicap
Communist China's ability to wage an air campaign against India.
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Even so, it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists could deploy
and logistically support more than 290 tactical aircraft for
operations against India (i.e., 180 jet fighters, 50 jet light
bombers, and 60 piston light bombers).
LoCistic 1 ort
24. The key to air operations against India would be the
amount of logistic support, particularly 110L, V.:i1.ca the Chinese
could provide to forward bases. We have little evidence of stock-
piling of air supplies in the Tibetan area. Theore ticca3.3.y, if
the Chinese exerted a maximum effort, they might be able over a
short period to deliver a total of 2,20 tons daily to the Tibetan
area for all purposes. Of this daily total 2,000 tons would
come by road and 240 tons by air (assuming the use of virtually
all available military and civil transport aircraft). It is not
likely that the Chinese would choose to make such an all-out
effort. ]Despite the recent border fighting, the total tonnage
currently delivered into Tibet is estimated to be no more than
500 to 700 tons daily, virtually all by road.
25. Because of Army demands, the amount that could be
brought in by land routes to support air operations against India
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would be limited. However, we believe that up to 50 transport
aircraft could be diverted to support such air operations without
imposing unacceptable restrictions on the overall Chinese air
transport system. Under optimum conditions, these 50 transports
could supply some 60 tons daily for a sustained period from
railheads in China proper. This daily tonnage by itself would
suffice to support the following alternate operations:
(a) 6 light bomber sorties at 3 short tons per
flying hour, or
(b) 16 piston light bomber sorties at 1 short ton
per flying hour, or
28-31 jet fighter sorties at 1 1/2 short tons
per flying hour, or
(d) 32-3T Jet ground support sorties at 2 short tons
per flying hour.
Stockpiling prior to operations would, of course, allow an
26. There is no reason, however, to assume that Chinese
Communist tactical air operations would be restricted to supplies
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which could be delivered by air. Of the potential daily maximum
tonnage which could be supplied by ground and air to the frontier
areas of Tibet and Sinkiang in an all-out effort, we believe
some 500 tons could be allocated for the support of the 290
tactical aircraft listed in paragraph 23-
27. Strategic air operations by medium bomber from bases
in China proper are unlikely to be restricted by logistic con-
siderations.
Offensive Operations
28. There is no evidence of light bomber deployment into
South-West China or Tibet. However, if China adopted such a
course, a few jet light bombers, operating from Lhasa or, more
likely, from Nagchhu Dzong, could carry out attacks in the NE A
area. BEAGLEs, operating from Kunming or Cheng-Tu could also
cover most of the NEFA area. The piston-engined BAT would be
suitable for operations, and in comparison with jet aircraft,
would probably give a higher rate of utilisation. However, it
would be highly vulnerable to jet interception. The Chinese could
only provide very limited close support of their troops; in some
areas terrain would limit the effectiveness of such attacks.
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29. By day, in a strategic role, BEAGLE could also operate
against cities such as Delhi and Calcutta from Soche (Yarkand) and
Nagchhu Dzong. By night, because of difficulties of operating
from Tibetan airfields, we do not consider it likely that the
Chinese would attempt such operations with the BEAGLE aircraft.
However, we believe that the light bomber force is probably
capable of night operations and that a few sporadic raids could
be mounted. The medium bombers, operating from such bases as
Hsi-ning, Ka-erh-mu (Golmo), and Lhasa, would have the capability
to reach strategic targets such as New Delhi by day or night.
Approximately four to six BULL could be launched in an attack,
but these aircraft would not have long-range fighter protection
and would be vulnerable to jet interception if detected. If
either of the two BADGERs previously identified should be
operational, they could be employed with considerably more effect
in a limited strategic bombing role.
30. It is reasonable to assume that the continuing expansion
of early warning radar facilities in China has by now placed some
radar equipment in the northwestern frontier area.. and if such is
the case, that a limited air defence radar capability exists in
the general Ladakh region. It would be possible to operate a few
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fighters in the air defence role in Tibet although our evidence
does not suggest that fighters are currently deployed there. Such
aircraft would encounter difficult operating conditions, and
terrain would limit radar effectiveness. In southwestern China
air defences would attain a higher standard but effectiveness
would be very limited at night or in poor weather.
Airborne and Air S_1. Operations
31. In view of the limitations of and other calls upon the
transport force, extensive airborne operations are unlikely. The
air situation, however, would not necessarily be unfavorable to
the Chinese in all areas where they might contemplate limited
airborne operations.
III. CONCLUSIONS
32. Although the Communist Chinese Air Forces are numeri-
cally large, the aircraft are obsolescent, few have an all-weather
capability, they lack such advanced weapons as air-to-air missiles,
and pilot combat proficiency is only fair. Moreover, China is
unlikely to obtain more than a few modern combat aircraft in the
next few years, either from their own industry or from the Soviet
Union.
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33. China's ability to wage a tactical air campaign against
India would be seriously handicapped by difficulties in the pro-
vision of logistic support. The scarcity of suitable airfields
in Tibet and Sinkiang would constitute an added hindrance.
Although the Chinese could deploy and support approximately 290
tactical aircraft for operations against India without seriously
weakening their defence posture toward Taiwan, we estimate that
they would initiate tactical air operations only if the leader-
ship considered it necessary for the achievement of basic objectives.
We believe that China is unlikely to undertake air attacks deep
into India except in retaliation or in the event of a change in
their military objectives.
34. The Chinese could mount only light, sporadic raids
against India with piston bombers (BATS and BULLS) and such air-
craft would be highly vulnerable to jet interception if detected.
However, it is likely that Chinese BEAGLEs could be effective
against Indian targets in sustained operations involving limited
numbers of aircraft. If China's two fADGERs should prove to be
operational, they could play a small but important strategic
bombing role. Moreover, we would hesitate to ignore or minimize
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the psychological significance of even token Chinese raids on
Indian cities and military targets.
35. Although Chinese air defences in the Himalayan frontier
area generally are weak, we believe the Chinese Air Force could
provide adequate defence for a few localities. The five airfields
in the Sinkiang-Tibetan area most likely to be used in operations
against India (Hotien, Soche, Lhasa, Nagcbhu Dung, and Yu Shu)
would be vulnerable to air attack. However, we do not believe
that this alone would deter the Chinese from mounting operations
from them.
36. We believe that the Chinese are capable of undertaking
limited airborne operations, although this appears unlikely in
present circumstances. There is some evidence that limited
supply drops have already taken place.
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