RECENT KHRUSHCHEV-BULGARIA NEGOTIATIONS IN BELGRADE; YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80S01540R006800110002-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 6, 2007
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 3, 1955
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP80S01540R006800110002-9
V__11 A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any, manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited- by law.
Kr=/WO p ii' AUWla7[C
U8R OILY
COUNTRY Tuagosiav
SUBJECT Recent 1bruushc?a+svr Be ilia
Negotiatioaauein lelvadag
Yugoslav-soviet Relations
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE ACQUIRED
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR. 3" Outer 1955
NO. OF PAGES 2
REQUIREMENT NO.
REF EN
This is UNEVALUATED
Information
pose by the'U88R through its eaaabes r is Pelgradeo Both Tito and Vice-
President Edvard Kardelj have stated that )Marshal Makar vts~ personally
responsible for proposing the tanks. Tito accepted the proposal because
he felt completely imftpwdent and strong. 'cut willing to improve relations
and take help from a , Rye?a, be mould not a awhi self to be ever
tine reaeaat 8oviet $uagojlav tapes were pro,
again bound by the Soviet Unions there was no agenda 25X1
agreed upon in advaancce a nor were there any prior cesmenitaaaents o
2. After the failure of Khruskchav's initial aabit at Belgrade airpot,
the Soviet leaders respected Tito?s iah to be treated as head of the
Governaaaeaat rather than head of the Yugoslav O iat Party,. According
to both Tit s ,a 1 ar?delj9 thce Soviets rce friendly ald jovlalp and
applied no press= on Yn oe ,.via during they talks.
3. when eguueaBtioaaed by Tito as to v9 in kia airport
sp uaa ?utshebev
sit -to b2m o Rerilra for the break In Tua oslav-ZoYiet rel tioaasy
Rhrushcchev replied that the speech,. Tom for *h ee oon ~tiea. Tito has
stated that MUMAUX&T did not believe his c ,.tat ats about Neriya
Wand ieithher did %* hchav ac ttad that the Stalin regiaaa as a
whole arse at fault. Soviets did not 6" ear resior;?eefuul or Unhappy
abut the breaks but considered it an error.
4o Althougk the series of sbetinga started In a cold atnoapheres they soon
warmed because of the friendly attitt lce of the 8oviete 9 ` o were not
adamant on any points. Aoc ording to Tito uushcchev was the 0entrolling
Soviet pere lity9 but the Soviet aaantality has cha da and their dele-
gation worked as a team in re late Kara o iy joking among then elves, and
relating to the Yuugoeleve heap difficult thin users dining the Stalin regiz e
The Soviet delegation admixed Zhukov greatly and wore agreed that he is they
IM M/10 DI A /122 9 /- +0M- M USI 09=
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Wt/No DISSZM AD*QADILIKt6/i
Cin the So'v'iet Union.
5. Ac* 014g to the Yugos]avs,..?o*3 S teal. watters were- discussed pt
set
Ti
AM"?
to recd detl' to the Samvietls that they change their .
Delier of supporting local Cemmeemmist parties, ? and have relative -,erg offi-
cia 1, levels r,e. , the Soviet annex' vas that isybe the Tugoslave VWI were right. Tyr *and as attitude ?of wanting to know what to do next and
being quite- wil t-g vo accept luggtstiens. According to Tito, the Yugoslavs
wexe not unwilling to accept Molotov at the conference, tad were surprised
be did not co. neThe Yugoslav view is that Molotov is an old Stalinift
and will gradually be pushed aside. IChrus2 hev participated as s Gover* at
representative, i.e., a aasdier of the Presidium of the Say treat Soviet.
Dulganin was umber two art ,in the delegution.
According to Tito, no agreement was made on party relationships. Be does
net rule mat contacts between social groups like tutors, lagers, trade
unions; parliamentarians, a aieipal leaders, etc. The Yugo.lav draft 4un-
NUILLCtare of the confereale was accepted by the Soviets with only minor changes.
7? Yarshol. Tito will visit the Soviet Union in February,, (sic) and esniielers
it eft- of the question that he will be harmed, since aim such a ease my people
Till to to war. Only I can speak for Tugeslavia, and I must convince the
olds die-herds that they were right to chan their itew towards nngos3.vma _?
"T"o f believes that a change is evideit in the USSI* One. of UP signs
is- the rehabilitation of the families of TuMackovskly and ethers,, who have
nor been given pensiammms and decreed iaeaa . go has stated it the present
treemd- gee- 1n'oag and the Soviets change, we will change again. A weight
ha. ftr3lea off their shoulders. their leaders are happy and free. Zhukov .
NM controls- the Army, and the Candssars are out of the military.- Arq
officers- are-being put into meaey key positions in the (Soviet) Goveeat."
8. According to Tito, Ehrashe hav directed the l ulpariaas to change their atti-
tude towards Yugoslavia after he arrived in Sofia. Tito now feels that a
change is taking place is Poland and Sumegmry to ar?ds better re1aation i with
YvgseiVvia, but that things are moving slowly is Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
ltardel4 has stated that the Bulgarians want closer relations, but Yuguslevia
is tot yet ready. No herpes that Yugoslavia will succeed in luring the
Satellites into a new Balkan Pact with an in aced degree of i dependence
-and with the consent and s*ppert of the Soviet moo.
S ~~cat~s?T
1 of o~tlr/no DI8811lt AD1CI1D/I+I113 T1D
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