THE SOVIET OCCUPATION 1940-41

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A002800010011-8
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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This is UNEVALUATED Information) L
The Soviet Occupation, 191+0-1+1
A. The Situation in Brief
1. The Soviet occupation of 19140-41 had definite policies under which it
operated; to restore old Russian-German boundaries, to incorporate
Lithuania into the USSR, and to completely communize the economic
and political structure of the Lithuanian state. Lithuania was brought
under the direction of the Communist Party aided by the Red Army and
Security police. A quiet but cruel reign of terror was instituted.
Urban and county governments were appointed by Soviet-appointed commit-
tees which acted as instruments of Communist economic and political
doctrine. The administrative divisions of the country were not altered.
The censorship and single press system of the USSR were introduced.
2. In economic matters the Soviets moved more slowly than in political
affairs, gradually introducing a semi-socialized system under which
certain industries were supported and others discouraged. This policy
was aided by the former trend toward state socialism under the Lithu-
anian Repitblic. Socialization of the railroads, the post office,
telegraph and telephone, forestry, and distilling had already largely
been completed or had been in progress. The most noticeable effect
of the Soviet economic policy was the seizure of private property.
All forests, even those as small as one hectare, were seized and
small arable areas were given in exchange. By this measure, practi-
cally all forest land became state property. Owners of over 30 hec-
tares of property lost all their property without compensation and it
was divided among landless peasants. The best of the expropriated
estates were made Sovkhozes. Land parcels under 30 hectares were
left in the owner's possession, but taxed very heavily. There was
no official policy combining these parcels into kolkhozes, but the
high taxes were a prelude to such a policy.
3.
All laws and regulations were flexible and could be strengthened or
relaxed at the will of the administration. Laborers were given spe-
cial treatment and elevated., in many cases, to high economic and poli-
tical positions. Since most of these persons were uneducated and unused
to positions of responsibility, however, they were unhappy in their new
positions and were terrified of the Soviet Communists under whom they
had to work. The peasant masses were affected the least by the new
regime and were left largely alone.
1+. The price structure was the weakest point in the new economic policy.
Lithuanian prices could not be adjusted to ruble values and the price
structure imposed was an artificial one. The value of the Soviet ruble
was several times lower than the value of the Lithuanian litas. The
litas was suspended and salaries were paid in an equivalent number of
rubles (i.e. one ruble for one litas). As a result, purchasing power
dropped sharply, although the wages of laborers and minor officials
were raised somewhat (top salaries were cut to a maximum of 1,000
rubles per month). The fixed price system brought on a black market
and a shortage of goods. Severe punishment and government propaganda
did not alleviate the situation.
5.
Administrative offices were left mainly intact, but their directors
were replaced. Most professionals were left in their posts. Only the
highest in rank or reputation were removed. In general, the Communists
respected professional ability even though they surrounded the profes-
sionals with Communist officials and humiliating restrictions. The
Lithuanian national police were completely replaced. Under the pressure
of terror, all administrative offices worked long, hard hours of unpaid
overtime. In every instance, the Communists fomented class hatreds;
dividing the population into "enemies of the people" and the "peace-
loving element" in order to better control the country.
B. The Status of the Soviet Forest Economy During the Period
1. Following World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet forest
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economy had been in a very bad condition. The high war-time consumption of
wood and the post-war chaos had put a great load on the more easily accessible
forests and caused-a severe wood shortage in the sparsely forested regions
of central and southern European Russia. In Central Russtar,and the Ukraine,
the forests, which had earlier suffered most intensive cutting and were
being rehabilitated, were again subjected to indiscriminate and improper
cutting. The Ukraine suffered particularly under the German occupation
of 1917 and, by the time of the German withdrawal, the Ukrainian forests
were almost completely devastated. From 1914-24, the Ukrainian forest
density dropped as much as 30%-(l) As a result, severe erosion occurred
in certain areas and rivers became shallower. The White Ruthenian forests
were almost as badly treated as the Ukrainian(~rests, but the remote Siberian
forests were almost untouched during the period. In 1916-18, under the chao-
tic conditions then present, no regular forest activities were possible.
Many ranges were cut down, including trees which would not have matured for
40-60 years. Vast areas around Moscow and Leningrad were completely devas-
tated. Lenin claimed that free access to the wood of these forests saved
the Bolshevik Revolution.(3)
2. 1921-26 was a period of stabilization in Russian forestry. By 1926, the
forests were under firm state control and their chaotic exploitation had
been halted. A Forestry Code issued in 1923 contained many helpful gene-
ral regulations which contributed to the ordering of the forest economy.
Work plans were begun as early as 1923 in the central portions of European
Russia. Cutting limits were set, but they were not generally followed.
The Sirst Five Year Plan, 1927-33, was distinguished by a conflict between
professional foresters advocating the principle of sustained yield and the
new aggressive Communist leaders who were anxious to exploit the forests
in order to encourage cqa ectivization of agriculture and industrialization,
especially around Moscow the Ukraine. The latter group, of course, won.
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3. In 1930, the People's Commissariat for Forest Industry was established to
take the place of the former Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agri-
culture. The new Commissariat considered the forests as a wood producing
factory. The administrative forest units (combinations of former forest
master districts) were called "lespromkhoz" and were placed under the
direction of a Communist Party member, not necessarily a professional
forester. The professionals became mere technicians with routine duties
(reforestation, conservations, etc,). Scientific principles were aban-
doned. Timber was cut because it was accessible.. As a result, there
was severe danger of deforestation,and flood danger and erosion increased
sharply. In 1932, a parallel institution, "larkomles," was established
with a mission to manage the forests, along vital rivers according to
scientific principles in order to protect the water sheds and control
floods. Thus, there were two types of forests managed under different
principles. The 1932-37 period was the most active period of reform in
Soviet forestry.
4. The Second Five Year Plan (1933-37) was marked by, an attempt to build up
the wood industry and to increase exports (1930 was marked by Soviet dump-
ing of wood products)14) The industrialization aim of Russian forestry
was stronger than the oervation trend. Increased demand, as a result
of general Soviet industrialization, was unable to be supplied from the
easily accessible forests, and a considerable shortage resulted. The inade-
quate Russian transportation system was unable to deliver timber from remote
areas in adequate quantities. The severe results of deforestation (erosion,
flood, etc.) began to be felt and the conservation policy along the rivers
was expedited. A new law in 1936 eased the export situation and exports
declined. This marked the triumph of professional forestry over the indus-
trialization faction, and from this point forest exploitation in European
Russia began to slow down. The wood shortage continued, however, as indus-
trialization progressed.
C. The Status of the White Ruthenian and Ukrainian Forest Economics During the Period
1. The law of 1936 had divided Soviet forests into two areas: cultivated zones,
and industrialization zones. The White Ruthenian and Ukrainian forests were
included in the first zone, run under the sustained yield principle, and
mainly exploited to satify local demands. The forests of both areas were
in very bad condition and the forest economies were ruined. The Ukrainian
industrialization and consequent increased wood demand had made the wood
shortage especially severe. In White Ruthenia, natural production exceeded
demand and it was able to export small amounts. In 1936, for example, its
production was 5,168,000 fest-meters of timber and it was able to ship 2,137,000
festmeters (41,4%),(5) in the same year, the Moscow province produced 4,227P 00
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festmeters and imported 12,704,000 (75%) and the Ukraine produced 1,870,000
festmeters and imported 10,888,000 (85.3%). Ukrainian wood consumption
increased three times from 1912-36.(6)
2. Until 1938, the Ukrainian saw mills annually received about 800 thousand
festmeters of timber from the White Ruthenian forests. This amount ful-
filled only 20% of the Ukrainian demand. The balance had to be imported
from the northern and western Siberian forests. The White Ruthenian
timber production was as high as 11,000,000 festmeters annually until
1936, but, after it was transformed into a cultivated (water shed) forest
zone, yearly production declined to 180,000 festmeters (1938). The
decline in the White Ruthenian supply and the exhausted condition of
the Russian and Ukrainian forests forced the Soviets to turn their atten-
tion to conquered portions of eastern Poland and the Baltic countries.
The forests in these areas, though badly decimated, were in much better
shape than the Russian forests.
D. The Lithuanian Forest Economy Under the Soviets
1. The Soviet occupation of Lithuania met no resistance and was accomplished
smoothly within a few days. During the year in which the occupation lasted,
all private forests were seized and. placed in the state forest system. Accord-
ing to the very imperfect statistics of the time, there were 996,000 hectares
of forest 'M This included 70 thousand hectares of water area managed by the
Ministry of Food Industry. The Lithuanian SSR organized by the Soviets in-
cluded 59,602 sq km with 3,032,864 inhabitants. Forest density was esti-
mated, at 16.7%,, 0.3 hectares per person and 1.05 F.I.Y., far below average
demand. Official estimates of normal production were 2,785,000 festmeters
per year'18) The cutting ratio did not change. The forest stands were
badly dec ted. But in Vilno, and in Zarasai, Utena, and Trakai Counties
ripe timber was still available in some quantity. The pine forests were
overcut and light, the spruce forests in:the west were exhausted, and 60
year old stands were already gone (the stands were overcut by 10-12 years).(q
There were no changes in logging techniques or methods (clear cut).
2. In the one year of the occupation, the Russians cut approximately 6,ooo,000
festmeters, two years! normal cutting. The army cut uncontrolled amounts in
building defenses along the German border. The defense installations were
largely of wood and additional large quantities were consumed as fuel and
in road and bridge construction and repair .1(11p1l The army alone cut about
2,500,000 festmeters, about half of which (l0 thousand hectares) was cut
simply to clear strips along the border or for airfields. As a result of
the Russian cutting, general forest density dropped about 1%.
3. In former times, 70% of timber production was consumed as fuel and 30% by
industry and export. In spite of the heavy Soviet cutting, however, the
Lithuanian population received hardly any structural timber. Almost all
of the Soviet production in Lithuania went to supply and build endless new
institutions which were established by them. The peasants who were resettled
on expropriated land were promised adequate wood supplies to establish them-
selves, but very little was delivered because the land reform was largely
propaganda and collectivization was the end purpose. Fuel wood was in short
supply during the occupation but adequate for the time .(11 There was little
coal. Supplies promised from the Ukraine never arrived, although a small
amount of Silesian coal arrived from Leningrad early in 1941.
4. While the Soviet forestry program had reached an advanced stage of its
development by 1940, the Soviets were unable to apply the system to the
Lithuanian forests and left the Lithuanian Forestry Department practically
intact, especially in the local units. The few changes made included:
a. The Forestry Department was separated from the Ministry of Agriculture
and reorganized as the "Forest Authority." It followed the pattern on
a smaller scale of the Soviet Commissariat of Wood Industry. In addi
tion to the usual divisions, there were four other units which provided
technical support, and three miscellaneous boards. The number of workers
rose considerably, and more than 60% of them were non-professionals.
lee end of report for availability of a sketch of the Soviet Lithuanian
Forestry Administration of 1941]
b. The system was further centralized' and the details of organization,
plus much investigation and inquiry, took many man hours. The official
eight-hour day was insufficient and a great deal of unpaid overtime
was needed.
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c. An attempt was made to follow Soviet forestry law (Lesnoi Kodeks), but,
because the system was in development, circulars were issued constantly
and were sometimes changed the same day they were issued. 1~22 Al]. work
was supervised or checked by Lithuanian Communists or Moseo )represen-
tatives.
5.
6.
d. The chief change in the local units was the great increase in the amount
of work required. Most Lithuanian state employees had been members of
the Nationalist Party and were deeply engrossed in politics. This was
especially true in the rural areas. These people were basically hostile
to the Communists but could not be replaced because of the lack of per-
sonnel. The Communists squelched the effectiveness of the hostility
somewhat by transferring the people to new locations but this wasted a
great deal of time and effort. The increased demands on the forests
and the new administrative procedures forced all personnel to work long,
hard hours. Urgent projects were accomplished under threat of severe
punishment.
e. Forestry officials were accountable not only to the central administration
and their direct supervisors but-to local Communist officials, whose
interference considerably hampered their activities. In spite of all
difficulties, however, huge amounts of work were accomplished. The
shift to payment in rubles decreased the living standards of forestry
officials 3-4 times. Their supplements in land, etc., became more
important to them than ever before. In June 1941, just before the
German invasion, there were mass repatriations of Germans (and Lithu-
anians) to Germany. About 30 forestry officials were included.
f. The only change in the forestry schools was in the leadership and in
the attempt to build up a pro-Communist organization among the students.
This was largely ineffectual. Most of the faculty and students were
not Communist minded and, as a result, the forestry schools in Alytus
and Vilno were anti-Communist. The educational standards, and number
of students and faculty remained about the same. Research efforts did
not change appreciably, but there was almost no application of research
results to the forests. Research had never been particularly active
and the Soviets did not do much to stimulate it. No serious work was
published and even publication of Musu Girios was suspended after a
few issues. The Association of Lithuanian Foresters was also dissolved.
The only forestry articles which appeared were published in official
papers. They were mainly for propaganda purposes. They condemned the
former forest leadership and praised the Communist aims without listing
details, definite goals, or projects.
The production of the large quantities of timber and wood products demanded
by the Soviets was very difficult for the new Communist regime and was com-
plicated by the hostility of the Lithuanian forestry officials. Basically,
the new leaders accepted the old forestry systems except for increasing the
cutting rate as much as two times. The overcutting was publicly recognized,
but the administration promised to decrease the rate as soon as possible.
The heaviest cutting was done in Vilno and eastern Lithuania proper. Pine
and spruce logs (4 cm and up in mid diameter, and 4 meters and up in length)
were produced in four quality classes. Birch, northern alder, aspen, and
oak (same diameter, from two meters up in length) were also produced in
four quality classes. Fuel wood was produced in 1-2 meter lengths in two
quality classes. Other production included:
Structural bolts (evergreen, alder, and aspen) of equal size
Mine props - various lengths, up to 25 cm in mid diameter
Pine and spruce stumps
Ties (pine)--for both normal and narrow gauge railroads
Beams (pine)--five meters and up--30 x 30 and up
Telegraph poles (pine and oak)--10 meters and up--20-25 cm in mid
diameter
Boards--a by-product of tie production.(13)
Reforestation
a. The Soviets had little concern for the reforestation of Lithuania, but
they issued a great deal of propaganda to advertise their supposed inter-
est. The autumn reforestation work (seed collection, soil preparation,
nursery expansion) was done according to old plans. A new plan existed
calling for twice as much as the old yearly quota of reforestation work
but it was not fulfilled. The Soviets announced plans for widespread
introduction of the black poplar (populus n i gra), but no new work was
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accomplished. The spring (19+1) work was not accomplished in full
because the peasants, badly paid and terrorized, made excuses to
avoid the work. Reforestation was not allowed, of course, along
the border strips which the forestry administration was forbidden
to enter. It may be estimated that about one-half of the proposed
reforestation was not fulfilled. Any work which was done was done
badly, not in order to achieve good results, but to make a showing
which could provide propaganda material. The methods and results
were both unsatisfactory but on about the same scale as in earlier
years.
b. Most of the talk about reforestation-concerned plantings on unproduc-
tive soils and sand dunes, especially along the Baltic and in the
Merkys River area. These projects to date have still not been accom-
plished. Nothing was planned concerning the establishment of entirely
new forests or underbrush control, but a great deal of the latter was
cut for fuel in northern Lithuania and in Marijampole and Vilkaviskis
before the plan was even officially considered. Efforts were made to
produce gum products by the introduction of the herb, cocksagyz, and
the cultivation of the native shrubs, evonymus verrucosa and European
and verrucosa spindle trees. (The latter, native to almost all the
USSR as well as Lithuania, grow 10-15 ft high and have typical verru-
cose twigs. The root bark contains 25% of dry weight gutta-percha.
The shrubs grow well in Lithuania on well-drained, loamy upland so}'ls
at the edge of forests, in forest laNes, and in clear-cut areas. /
They grow dispersed among other formations, not in pure stands, but
their artificial reforestation is very possible.)
c. Another problem considered by the Communists was the restoration of
the decimated oak forests in the Lithuanian uplands. There were four
regions of optimum oak production in Europe: (1) Slavonia (formerly
Austria-Hungary), (2) Volhynia (formerly in Poland), (3) Spessart
(Germany), and (4) Lithuania. The Russians had studied the possibili-
ties of oak production on the steppes and were very much interested
in oak trees as pioneer reforestation material. Some stands were
planted in the 19th Century.(lu) In Lithuania oak was important for
its protective value in Norway spruce stands and as a producer of
veneer and naval timber.
7:. Conservation
a. The Communists were seriously interested in preserving the forests in
spite of the amount pf overcutting performed. They immediately incor-
porated the expropriated private forests into the state forest system.
The forest guard system worked fairly well since the guards were res-
ponsible for damage to their forests and the peasants were terrorized.
The Soviets talked of saving the main forest areas, but proposed to
follow the old Russian method of transforming the isolated, fragmentary
forests which were hard to guard into agricultural land.
b. As said above, the peasants were too terrorized by the Soviet occupation
to dare to steal much wood from the forests. As rumors of a Soviet-
German war spread, however, wood thefts increased, especially around
the cities which were more short of fuel. There were no extensive
forest fires during the period of the occupation. The peasants, who
ordinarily were the cause of most fires, were afraid to enter the forests
and this kept fire danger at a minimum. There were no changes in the
techniques of combating insects and fungi.
c. The severities of the Communist regime drove many elements of the
population into hiding. These persons lived as they could, hiding
in barns and sheds and travelling only by night and preferably in
the forests. They were not organized and were not in active opposition
to the regime. They only desired to remain hidden and to be left alone.
The Communists were greatly concerned about their presence and the
forest guards had strong orders to watch for them and to report their
presence so that local police or NKVD units could hunt them down.
Since some of the guards were not in sympathy with Communist rule,
they did not always report the presence of fugitives and sometimes
hid them in their own buildings. After the order was issued to
deport Lithuanians to Siberia, the number of fugitives increased
greatly. When the Soviet forces began to withdraw before the Germans,
these fugitives formed bands and with other Lithuanian patriots attacked
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the Soviets, inflicting many casualties. There were fugitives hiding
in the forests through World War II and afterwards, but there are few
ranges in Lithuania which are large enough to hide large groups for
more than a short time. The larger forests include the Rudniki and
Kazlu-Rudos and the stands north of Panevezys.
E. The Lithuanian Wood Economy Under the Soviets
1. Supply and Demand
a. As noted above, the Communists largely ignored the wood needs of the
local population. There was a general shortage of all vital goods,
and as a result, while the wood supply was short, the average demand
rose to approximately two F.I.Y., or a total of 6,000,000 festmeters.
Regulations against private enterprise stifled wood trade and transport.
The result of all the Communist innovations was a supply of no more
than one-half F.I.Y. or a total of 1,500,000 festmeters, about one-
quarter of the demand. Prices rose on the black market to as much
as 20-30 rubles for a raummeter of fuel wood. Severe restrictions
and punishments did not succeed in stabilizing the situation and
the shortages of fuel caused severe hardship during the winter of
194o-41.
b. The new Communist regime set up an endless number of new state enter-
prises which required large amounts of wood. Some of them issued
requisitions for 10 times as much wood as they could consume. Those
in the wood industry field worked two shifts and consumed about
1,200,000 festmeters (fuel included) of timber. There were proposals
for exporting approximately 800 thousand festmeters, almost all to
the Ukraine and White Ruthenia plus a little to complete old agree-
ments with other European countries. Most of the usual export assort-
ments were manufactured, but lack of labor and transport and overcut-
ting caused most of the timber (about 75%) to be left in the forests
where it was seized by the advancing Germans. The difficulties which
the population had in getting wood were also experienced by the various
wood industries. They could not depend upon scheduled deliveries, and
there were serious shortage problems which led to tension, criticism,
and even arrests and punishments in these industries.
c. The only agency which did not suffer from shortages of wood was the
Red Army which had abundant transportation and did not hesitate to
impress forced labor. The Red Army's logging operations were care-
less and a great deal of useful residual material was left to the
Germans or the local populace when the Soviets retreated. In effect,
most of the timber cut during the Soviet occupation never left the
country because of the various transportation and other difficulties.
d. The estimated occupation production of 6,000,000 festmeters of timber
was consumed approximately as follows:
(1)
Red Army
2,500,000 festmeters
(2)
Native populace
1,500,000
It
(3)
Industry and other state
institutions
1,200,000
(4)
Export
800, 000
TOTAL 6,000,000
15)
2. Transportation
a. Local transportation of forest products continued to be supplied by
the peasantry. Most of the peasants owned horses, wagons or carts,
and tools. Under Soviet occupation, they were ordered to supply
local transport and labor and coerced to this duty by threats and
propaganda. No one refused the duty since in addition to the coercion,
relatively high wages were paid and the workers were entitled to buy
additional rations of wood. They were also allowed to purchase at
official prices oats, hay, nails, and horse shoes, which had already
disappeared from the open market. In spite of these inducements and
threats, however, vast quantities of untransported wood remained in
the forests because of the lack of available transport. Transportation
costs were high because various state enterprises competed with each
other for the available labor and equipment.
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b. Long distance transport in Lithuania was revolutionized under the
Soviet occupation. Historically, wood and wood products had moved
westward. Under the occupation, the flow was reversed. Because the
rivers flow westward they were of little use for rafting timber. Some
of the smaller rivers carried a little timber and the larger rivers
were of use above Kaunas. A special bureau was established to control
timber rafting. It was directed by professional foresters but its
activities were hampered by a shortage of skilled raftsmen. Prior
to the occupation, the raftsmen worked for private companies or worked
as individuals for the Forestry Department. Under the occupation the
raftsmen were forced to work under strict control. They were indivi-
dualists, proud of their trade, and more than any other forestry group,
they resented the Communist regime.
c. Railroads were forced to carry the bulk of the load in place of the
rivers. Russian railroad always have been unsatisfactory and in Lithu-
ania the available lines were even less adequate. They were converted
to the Soviet wide guage and operated on an overloaded schedule under
great pressure. Entire trains became lost in the resulting confusion
and individual cars were frequently lost and sometimes looted of their
contents. NKVD squads patrolled all important stations and special
officials watched over the shipments and operations. Severe punish-
ments were invoked when shipments were lost or delayed, but in spite
of every measure the railroad operation was always unsatisfactory and
large quantities of goods piled up at stations.
d. The Communists seized all private motor vehicles (730 trucks, mainly
five-ton capacity in 1940).(16 No new vehicles, except army types,
were brought into Lithuania. The forestry authority received about
30 of the trucks, in various stages of disrepair, and some driven by
charcoal. Other state institutions also received trucks for their
use and a number of unassigned trucks were placed in a motor pool
which rented them out (even to private individuals). Fifty to sixty
trucks were busy, mainly in Vilno and Kaunas, transporting fuel wood
from railroad dumps to distribution points. The majority of fuel
deliveries were still made, however, by cart. One objection to truck
transportation was the large amount of loss by theft.
3. Labor and Wages
a. The peasantry continued to be the main source of logging labor under
the occupation but they worked under conditions of force and duress.
Wages were relatively high (10-20 rubles a day at winter piece-work
rates), and additional fuel (and occasionally structural wood) rations
were sold to the workers. Wages for the workers who loaded freight
cars and handled timber were lower, only 6-10 rubles a day, an amount
sufficient to keep the worker himself alive but not his family. General
dissatisfaction with the wages led to a strike in 1940 which caused the
forestry administration a great deal of trouble.
b. Soviet wage and price policies were originally based on the old Lithu-
anian standards, expressed in rubles rather than lita3. The Labor
Commissariat set wage and price policy and in many cases allowed wages
to rise somewhat. Late in 1940 an official party arrived from Moscow
to adjust wages and prices to conform to the standards of the USSR.
In general, the prices of fats, leather goods, liquor, and manufactured
goods were raised, sometimes quite considerably. Wages were raised
very little and in some cases they dropped. These circumstances pro-
duced considerable dissatisfaction among the workers. (17) As a result
of the strike among the timber workers, the Labor Commissariat raised
wages somewhat, but the unhappiness continued. Intervention by the
NKVD, however, restored "peace and order" and ringleaders of the strike
were deported to Siberia. The forestry administration issued a great
deal of propaganda following the disturbances, promising the peasants
a new order. In order to keep the laborers happy, the administration
temporarily paid some wage supplements in kind. For example, sawmill
workers were given the litter and remnants for fuel and the transport
workers were given additional fuel wood. Most of these supplements
were placed on sale in the black market, causing additional trouble
for the forestry administration.
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i+ . Industry
a. The Lithuanian wood industry was immediately seized by Soviet authorities,
minutely inventoried, and placed under new management. Fantastic plans
were drawn to revive the industry. Worn out machinery and installations
were renovated and the industry was put on a two and three-shift basis.
Requisitions for timber were tremendous, sometimes exceeding supply by
10 times. This was the result of the inexperience of the Communist
functionaries and partially explains why so much timber was cut during
the period. The situation in industry was similar to that in 1939 except
that employment was 50-100% higher. Ordinary industry timber require-
ments were 200-300,000 festmeters. The Communists planned to consume
8oo,ooo-1,000,ooo festmeters. The logging of this amount could be accom-
plished, but the short period of time during which sled roads were usable
was not sufficient to bring all the timber out of the woods. The pea-
sants would only work in wood transport in spring and summer if wages
were set very high because these were the months in which they were busy
with their own work. Even if it had been possible to bring all the tim-
ber out of the forests, however, the railroads would have been unable
to deliver it further. Of the 1,200,000 festmeters requisitioned by
the wood industry, probably no more than 1E00 thousand were ever received.(18)
b. The increased production directed by inexperienced management in many
cases resulted in poor quality goods. The assortment manufactured did
not change. In Klaipeda, which the Soviets had received under an agree-
ment with Germany, the saw mill and plywood industry was nationalized
and the owners were compensated by the German government. A special
All-Union Commission, "Exportles," was responsible for fulfilling terms
of unexpired contracts with western countries. Most exports went to the
USSR proper (paper, cardboard, matches), part went to support other
domestic industries, and a very small portion went to supply the popula-
tion. Lithuanian wood industry production was of better quality than
that of the USSR. Its quality products, shipped to the USSR, were ex-
changed in part for inferior Soviet goods of the same type.
c. In general, Soviet policy was to exploit Lithuania at the expense of
Lithuania's standard of living. To cover its aims, the USSR issued
propaganda explaining that the shortages were only temporary. No new wood
industry installations of any consequence were established, and the
available installations were renovated only so that they could be
most fully exploited. Many of the oldest installations had to remain
idle because they were of English or German make and spare parts to
repair them did not exist in the USSR. Large foreign orders were
placed for new machines but they were never delivered.
5. Commerce
a. Most numerous installations in wood commerce were fuel-wood yards. They,
like all commercial enterprises, were seized by the new rulers of Lithu-
ania. Under the occupation, the commercial enterprises were generally
very inactive. The fuel yards, except those in the cities, were practi-
cally empty with almost no supply for the population. The yards were
run by the forestry administration or occasionally by the urban authori-
ties. Forest rangers sold some fuel in the forests according to instruc-
tions issued by the local Communist authorities. All prices were fixed
and most commercial exchanges were simply bookkeeping transactions between
one state enterprise and another. The only cash business was transacted
by the population and it was very inactive. The people did not concern
themselves with price, but only with the possibility of obtaining goods
at any price.
b. Fuel prices (rubles) in December 191+0 were:
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Fuel
(1st Quality)
(2nd Quality)
17.5
16.5
13.5
12.5
17.5
15.5
14.5
12.0
11.0
19.5
18.5
15.5
14.5
23.0
17.5
16.5
14.0
13.0
Retail
Outlets
30.0
24.0
22.0
21.0
20.0
27.0
23.0
21.0
19.0
18.0
(19
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Birch &
Hardwood
N. Alder
Pine
Spruce
Aspen
Birch &
Hardwood
N. Alder
Pine
Spruce
Aspen
Transport Riverside
Collection Receiving
Forest Yards Yards
13.5
20.5
26.0
12.0
11.0
10.0
9.0
9.0
8.0
7.7
7.0
6.7
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c. Timber prices (rubles) in December 1940 were:
PRICES AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS
For:sta,
Transport Collection
Yards
Riverside
Receiving Yards
Retail
Outlets
Mid-Diam
Qual
ity
i~t
(Cm)
II
III
I I
II i
.
ill' 1
~~
TV
iI
II.
8-15
16
15
14
12
30
29
28
25.5
39
38
37
35
43
42
41
38.5
26-29
39
30
22
13
53
44
36
26,5
62
53
45
36
66
57
49
39.5
40-up
52
39
27
14
66
53
41
27.5
75
62
50
37
79
66
54
40.5
Spruce
8-15
16
15
13
11
30
29
27
24.5
39
38
36
34
43
42
40
37.5
26-29
31
25
18
11.5
45
39
32
25
54
48
41
34.5
58
52
45
38
40-
45
34
22
12
59
48
36
25.5
68
57
45
35
72
61
49
38.5
-19
18
17
16
15
40
39
38
37
52
51
50
4E.5
57
56
55
53
25-29
31
27
21
15.5
53
49
43
37.5
65
61
55
49
70
66
60
54
30-up
45
36
25
16
67
58
47
38
79
70
59
49.5
84
75
64
54.5
8-15
21
20
20
18
43
42
42
40
57
58
55
54
63
62
62
60
28-35
81
60
39
18.5
103
82
61
40.5
117
96
75
54.5
123
r
81
60.5
45-up
119
86
51
19
141
108
73
41
155
122
87
55
161
128
93
61
50-up
156
178
192
198
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d. Prices (rubles of other assortments were:
PRICES AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS
Transport
Eiverside
Collection
Receiving
Retail
hssortments
Wood
Quality
Units
Forests
Yards
Yards
Outlets
Poles
All
I
1 piece
1.5
26
3.4
3.7
types
II
0.9
1.6
2.1
2.2
III
0.5
0.9
1.2
1.3
Pulpwood
Spruce
I (With bark)
Raummeter
23
0
7
50
II (" bark)
17.5
34.5
41
45
I (cleaned
26
1+3
50
53
perfectly)
II (cleaned
20.5
37.5
111.
1+8
perfectly)
I (normal)
"
211.
141
48
51
II (normal)
19
36
43
46
Mine timber
Aspen
with bark
1
31
38
1
w/o bark
17
314
41
1+14.
Spruce
with bark
12.5
29.5
36.0
39.5
& Pine
normal
11+.0
31
37.5
1+1
Shingles
Spruce
21
32
37.5
1.5
Pine
19.5
30.5
36.0
1+0
Alder
16
27
32.5
36.5
Aspen
13
24
29.5
33.5
Structural
Hardwood
"
15
26
'31.5
35.5
bundles
Alder
12
23
21.5
32.5
Spruce
10.5
21.5
27
31
Aspen
9.5
20.5
26
30
Ties
Pine
D, D1, D , E,
1 jiece
5.5
.0
9
10
El
E2
l,
M, M1,. 1.22
it
2.5
3.5
1.
1+.5
M3
3.5
5.0
6
6.5
N Nl N2
2.2
3.0
3.5
1+
Telephone &
Spruce
w/o bark
1 F.M.
24.0
38.0
7
51
telegraph
& Pine
poles
Stumps
All t o
Raummeter
7.5
18.5
2
28
Boards (short,
Pine
I
1 cu mete
70
90
100
X100
2 rats long,
II
"
50
70
80
9o
2. 5 "
Ties
Pine
1 piece
9.5
13.2
1
16.5
Poles
All type
0.2
0.
0.70
0. 0
Wagon Tongues
Birch
2.6
.0
0
.20
Timber
Pine
1 F.M.
59
81
93
98
Fuel wood
I
Raummeter
3.7
II
11
4.4
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6. Export
a. The Soviets were unable to undertake an active program of wood export.
The Lithuanian forests were insufficient to supply even the demands of
the Ukraine. One item of importance to the Soviets was aspen wood for
matchwood. The production of the Kaunas match factory was increased
and its consumption of aspen timber increased from 700 to 10-1200 fest-
meters per year. Plans were made for cutting 10 thousand festmeters
of aspen, the balance of which was to be shipped to White Ruthenia.(20)
Birch timber above 30 cm mid-diameter at chest height was greatly
prized for aircraft production, but birch was very scarce in Lithuania.
Huge amounts (approximately 300 thousand raummeters) of spruce pulpwood
were shipped to Germany to fulfill earlier contractual agreements.
Large shipments of mine timber were prepared and shipped in part to
the Ukraine. A few railroad ties were also exported, but most of this
production was consumed within Lithuania in repair of the idle railroad
line from Orany to Alytus.
b. Plans were proposed for an eventual export of about 800 thousand fest-
meters (400 thousand raummeters of pulpwood, 300 thousand festmeters
of mine timber, and 100 thousand festmeters of evergreen and deciduous
lumber).
F. Effects of the Soviet occupation on Lithuania
1. There is no systematic, complete set of data for the period covered by the
Soviet occupation. Many records were lost as a result of the German army
advance during the summer of 1941 and that which remains is very inaccurate.
The occupation was a period of feverish changeover from capitalism to Commu-
nism, which was never completed. In June 1941, the Lithuanian economy was
still a mixture of capitalism and socialism.
2. In general, the occupation brought terror, suspicion, and forced labor,
masked behind a screen of propaganda. On the economic scene, it brought
high prices, low wages, the black market, and a general shortage of all
goods. The Lithuanian people were told that they had sacrificed their
former living standard for the advantages of living under the security
of the Soviet system. The forests were robbed of valuable timber stocks
for the benefit of other areas of the USSR (diminishing forest density by
1%O). Under the occupation, transport failed; industry did not increase
as greatly as desired; the domestic wood market was destroyed and a grave
wood shortage developed; there was almost no cooperation between population
and government; and the relationship was that of the conqueror ruling the
conquered.
(1) Buchholz, E,
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid, p 80
(5) Ibid, p 125
(6) Ibid, p 136
x-x-x-x-rt
FOOTNOTES
"Wald and Forstrittschaft der Osten", 1943,
(7) "Miskininu Kalendorius"
(8) Ibid, 1941, Par 8, 10
(9) Author
(10) Jameikis, "Lietuvos Giriu Milzinai", 1950
(11) Ibid, p 96
(12) Ibid.
(13) "Miskininku Kalendorius",-1941, p 81-86
p 77
,sa,
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 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02800010011-8
(14) Korevo, "Kovenskaya Gubernia", 1867
(15) Jameikis, 1950, p 90
(16) Z.U. Statistika, 1948, p 125
(17) Jameikis, 1950, p 90
(18) Author
(19) "Miskininku Kalendorius", 191+1, par 84+-86
(20) Jameikis, 1950
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