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July 27, 2009
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January 28, 1958
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USAF review completed. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 2 NFADQUAKTF"R5 o!'1ANIZATION of THE 66TH HUNGARIAN FIGHTER AIR DIVISION AT KrCSXF3 T AIRFIr7.D (4655N/1945F), HUNGAll7. IV. TtiIVISION HISTDRTs A. The Birth and Establishment of the 66th Fighter Air Division. Although the Hungarian Air Force already had a mimed regiment at SZ'PTKIRALTSZABAnJA airfield (4?30F/175U) and the 25th Fighter Air Division already existed, the establishment of the 66th FAD in 1951 meant the birth of the first actual combat unit of the Hungarian Air Force. The mixed regiment at SZTflT?CIRALTS7ABADJA could only be considered as the place of origin for the first commanders and pilots of the various Hungarian Air Force (RAF) units. Actually, this regiment had been an initial training unit wherd all WW II aircraft which were still useable were flown to their death. These aircraft were "small" and "jargon ARArC'e, BUFKKER's, ZRIN-365's, YAK-9's, and the like. Flying training was accomplished here and this was also the location 25X1 where the old technical personnel (cadre-mechanics, eta.) trained the now aircraft SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 technicians. 3' 1 The 25th FAD existed mainly only on paper at that time. The 66th PAD was established in 1951 at IMMAAARAS airfield (47241i2047E). This airfield was the first to have a more or less complete and useable concrete runway. According to the original plans it was to be a bomber airfield with two (2) concrete runways, one for take-off, and the other for landing. In 1951 one of the mays was completed, along withs only those taxi I strips which were absolutely necessary for airfield operations. Ranway dimensions were 2,600 by 80 asters and the runway's direction (in A lmuth) was from 55 degrees toward 235 degrees. This direction was well chosen, for it was that of the prevailing winds in this area for 350 days out of the year. The old runway, which had been build by the Germans, was still there, about forty (40) meters north of the new one; the two vonways ]I paralleled each other. In 1951 the necessary buildings and facilities were also completed to such an extent that the 66th Division could now be activated. Establishment of the division was considered such an important step that KUNMAPARAS airfield was visited on more then one occasion by General FARKAS, MIHAL?, the U Minister of Military affairs, and by the former Prime Minister of Hungary, RAKOSI, h'ATYAS, ret*lishwent of the division was completed ahead of schedule. Prime motivation for this was the report that the )aG-15's intended for the equipping of this division were to be delivered within a short period. At this time the degree of personnel training was of secondary importance. The main thing was that the personnel should be assembled into a division for the receipt of the M10-15's from the USSR. Organisation and establishment of a division staff was the initial ooncern; therefore, this was accomplished early in 1951. Officers, RCO's, and enlisted men were billeted in half-finished quarters and barracks even before the official acceptance of the installation. Plumbing in wash rooms and latrines was SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 L1 r ~' 4 c not yet cowasctedj the only a~ra43a ae drinking water available on the installation was in the mess hall, plus that which personnel could obtain from other sources and which they had to boil. Personnel coming from more cultured environamnte than this were extremely dissatisfied with the primitive living conditions. The remoteness of the nearest town, B KARCA(3 (471914/2055E), which was about sintesa (16) kilometers away, coupled with the Usk of transportation to the town, only added to this discontent. Inhabitants of the nearby village of KUN ADARAS showed a pronounced hostility toward the soldiers for two (2) reasons: 1. The labor battalions who built the airfield proved to be a nuisance. 2. The AYH (internal security pines) had moved several of the villagers out of their homes and had sent them to concentration camps under the ruse of "poor reliability". The reasons for these arrests were to obtain more housing for the military and to keep the "politically unreliable" distant from the new 1410-15's. The airfield was finally completed and accepted in the first quarter of the calender year 1954. Be Cross Training Into the HIO-15's. The cross training began in May 1951 and constituted the initial working phase of the division. In the first group of trainees were those persons IM selected for division command positions. The training itself was divided into two (2) categories: 1. Theoretical Training, which began about May 1951 and lasted about three (3) months. It was conducted by Soviet advisors with the aid of interpreters and through the use of Soviet regulations, directives, and wall charts. Upon completion of the theoretical phase an examination had to be passed by the students. The results of the examinations were evaluated by a board headed by Brigadier General PA7I, SANT)OR, at that time Commander of the Hungarian Air Force. Other board s SECREr Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 5 members weret the staff of HAF Headquarters, several Soviet advisors, and some of the Soviet instructors. Upon eoapletion of the exam a log was prepared on the a results achieved by the student in each submit. Based on these logs, ant HAF order was issued which authorised by new those students allowed to participate in the actual arose training on the MI0-15. Pilots who did not obtain a passing score in any one or sore of the subjects were re-assigned to auxiliary courses and re-examined upon coapletion of such course(s). The coaacander of the first training course was Lieutenant Colonel ?ZOFI, ISTVAN, who ales was 66th division ooss ender at that time Members of the training staff worst Major FORI, :LF.K; Captain IVAN, DFZSO; Captain ! AGT) ASI, J17NO; Lieutenant PAAR, FFRFAICZ; M/Sgt SIRAK, G';ZAl M/Sgt BT7,KF, SAWR; Senior Lieutenant KOP lTl, I37VAN; Lieutenant TURXSANTI; N,/Sgt GROSS, JC)7.SFP-, and others. Biographical data on the above-oentioned persons can be found either in IR-1201-57 or later in this report under paragraphs IV C, and VII, below. 2. Actual Flight Training (KM-15), which began in July 1951 in WA S accordance with a Headquarters HAT order. The training"acoosplished in three (j) phaeest a. Ground Preparation. This phase consisted of a set of questions which a pilot had to answer concerning a pgvwlously workad?out simulated flight. The pilot had to obtain a grade of at least "good", equivalent to our "C" school grades. Then the siatlated flight was "played' on the ground)outsids on the airfield. Next, the pilot, while blindfolded, had to pass a cockpit shack, I.e., point to an instrooents, controls, and levers. Finally he had to preflight the aircraft from the cockpit while blindfolded, be Phase two (2) consisted of flying in a UTI II4IO'-15 dual-control jet trainer. SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 F-T-% o. The third phase of the training we solo flight. The division comasnder, Lt Ool KKSZOPI, ISTVAN, a member of the first training gip, was the t first Hungarian to solo in a jet aircraft. This happened near the latter part of July or in early August 1951. The event was considered of great ioiportanee in high 1*mgarian military and goverment circles. Training progress we. carefully watched by General PARKAS, MIHALT, Minister of Military Affairs at that ties, and by other high officials who were under personal supervision of Prime Minister RAKOSI; RAKOSI hi=e1 requested weekly training progress reports. When the first group completed theoretical training and started flight training, the second group arrived at INU MADARAS airfield for training. This then became the first group of HAP officers to graduate from an officer pilot training school equivalent to two (2) years of callege. SOURCS was the coriander of this second group, and he graduated from the school with the rank of Senior Lieutenant. Besides SOURCE, the officers who still revained alive in the HAP in November 1956 worse SZIXVI# LAJOS; CSERNAK, JA1108; VASAS, ~ JAN05; JODOVICS, JANOS; FFRE CZ, ISTQAN; S?OCSI, YUL05 and FODAR, ZOLTAN The flight training was started with three (3) or four (4) UTI MIO-15's (a/c # 320 and 343 were among these). Initially, there were twenty (2)) to thirty (30) single seat PI0-15's. The second delivery of MID-15'9 was received SECRT Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 6 3?- Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 late in the fall of 1951 and consisted of another thirty (30) aircraft. ?he period of cross training was spent by the pilots wider an almost inhuman work lead. Since training still continued in the other, older, types of aircraft mentioned above, there wars trainl*g missions in five (5) different types of 25X1 aircraft in the same day, The year 1952 was especially difficuly because the "Ilot Officer Training School graduated more students to the division. After thate the sratsnto$ further training became the responsibility of the squadron commanders. During several months of that year instructor pilots got only about twenty (20) to twenty-two (22) hours of rest per week. C. Activation of the Division's Regiments. As in the establishment of the division, the initial task was to form the command staff of the regiment. This was accomplished sisn].taneously with the cross training into MIO-15's. The first regiment of the division was the 62nd Fighter Air Regiment (FAR) Its comaeurider was Captain C 25X1 HWT AS!, JM. !!2l Prior to titivation of the regiment ~ the 42nd OREM (an abbreviation for CIUTALO POW *3SZAKI Z.ASZL)AL?, meaning "Independent !'light Technical Hattaliom") was assigned to and located at KURMADARAS airfield, 25X1 This base support battalion supported the 62nd PAR. As the division and regiment were located at the same 25X1 airfield, the division did not have a separate OTD40Z for its support but rather, was supported by the saes battalion which served the regiment. The 62nd PAR remained the most advanced it of the division in training and combat readiness. The second regiment of the 66th PAD to be established was the 31st FAR. The command and political staff of this regiment was also selected and appointed from the first training rronp (Y-10-15) of the division. This secured during July 1951. Nf Sgt "IM, SANDOR became regimental oommander. The division commander had him promoted a Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO02900510002-2 6 3 to Senior Lieutenant by taking a few "short outs". Another OREMUZ (support battalion) was activated siaaltansously with the regiment. Tbw, by fall of 19510 there were a division Hsadgnarters, two (2) regimsnts, and twd (2) suport battalions located at XU? 1 ADARAS airfield. Each of the regiments consisted of only two (2) squadrons at that time. Both regiments were brought up to strength in 1952 and this was the first time that both units reached those miwinum requirements by which they could be considered complete regiments. The division's third regiment was formed in 1953. Under command of Captain SZCCSI, MIKLOs, this, the 47th FAR, was located at KISBUNLACHAZA airfield (4711N/19008). Up to the fall of 1955 it was considered as the "training regiment" of the division. Then more experienced personnel were assigned to strengthen the uait. From the division aircraft pool the 47th FAR rsesived the ant eztsnsivsly used RIO-15's. D. Cross Training to the RIO-15313. From time to time aircraft were delivered to the HAF from the USSR DNI to replenish the aircraft pool of the divisions. By agreement between Hangar, and the Soviet Union, the HAF fighter divisions were to be equipped with HIO-15815 type aircraft as soon as possible. Although the shiprent of these aircraft did not arrive tmltil the first quarter of 1933, cross training into this type was aooomplished in the suomer of 1952. The difference between the MIO-15 and the MIO-15Bx5 was that the former was driven by the IN)-45-T power plant while the latter was powered by the improved 91.l engine. Initial training into the MIO-15BIS we only for the oosranders, i.e., the oommanders down to "Flight" level. In order to accomplish the training before the Hungarian divisions were re-equipped with the now type MI4, a flight of MIG-15BISiwith all necessary flight and teehnioal ground personnel arrived at MY ADAM airfield from PAPA (472(1/17268) airfield, hone bass of the 1Ningarlan- Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 based Soviet Fighter Air Division. They supervised all phases of the cross training. The tbsorstisal phase consisted only or emphasis on the diffe e:aoss between the old MIG-15 and the new type. Plight-preparation training on the ground followed, and the training was accosplished in accordance with the L.V.H.K.?. (LE(1HAJTA3es VADASZ RAJOZO KBKEPZESI TSRV - JET FIGHTER PILOT TRAIEING 1'LAW), i.e., L.V.H.K.T. After the training was oomplsted, Soviet personnel and their aircraft loft KUNM,ADARAS airfield. The 1IG-15BIS shipment for the HAP arrived early in the first quarter of the calendar year 1953. E. Pilot Classification and O.3Z.P. Training. C.SZ.P. wa an abbreviation adopted from the Russian 0.5.P. (OBLICHNATA SISTEMA POLY$A - OVERCAST FLIGHT SYsTw). This system, operating by radio, provided radio bwr which guided aircraft to their field of destination. From themes, the system, through the use of a longs-range and short- range direction finder station located in line with the wain r+azway, provided for a let-down of an aircraft after iii it had described a prescribed pattern. However, the let-down phase of the system had its ^iniaw limitations. 05ZP training was initiated in the HAP in the summer of 1953. All flying personnel who were chosen by Headquarters HAP to undergs OBZP training were trained at the 66th Air Division at KEC3KEN~!'T airfield. Interceptor pilots received their pilot classification according to their flying qualifications. A 7.hird Class Pilot was one who could fly an intercept mission only under good weather conditions during daylight hours. A 5esond Class Pilot could fly ani SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 10 3Z interception during good or bad weather conditions in daytime and ender clear weather conditions at might. A First Class Pilot could fly an intercept mission in obscure or clear weather, both day and might. F. Relocation of the 25th and 66th Fighter Air Divisions. In the fall of 1952, the 25th FAD moved from KFKF?ET airfield to the fewly completed TASZAR (4622H/17543) airfield, while the 66th FAD was coved from KURMADARAS airfield to KRCSKFHF? airfield. This enabled Headquarters HAF to implement the lull, plan of Hungarian air defense with divided areas of responsibility 0, Cross Training to 1410-17's. Each of the two (2) Hungarian Fighter Air Divisions (the 25th and the 66th) received six (6) MM47PF's OF - radar?after~bns~ner) In 1955. Crow training into this type aircraft Mee not begs until delivery of the aircraft to Hungarian emits. After some time each division received AM eight (A) sets Mt1a-17's, but these was equipped only with afterburner, not with radar, so their designation was not 1-17M as the first shipment of MIO-17's, but merely VI0-17F. Pilots received lectures on the difference between flying the NIO-15's and the MI0-17's and an the use of the radar on intercept missions. After that a the pilots were simply instructed to take the 1110.17's up on flniliarisation flights. in 1956, the 66th division had a approximately eighteen (18) to twenty (20) pilots qualified in Milo-17'9, while the Hungarian Air Pores as a whole had about forty (40) to forty-five (45) such pilots. H. National Air Defense Oosbat Readiness. In 1952, while pilot training for Ia0.15's w still in full operation, OCI and combat readiness alert was initiated. Initially, this worked considerable Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 11 3 hardships on pilots since there were only a few who could render scramble-alert duty, and they themselves were actually still in training. The situation was corrected in time when a sufficient number of pilots were fully trained and alert requirements were eased. 1. Schooling of ,orsannel in the USSR. In 1955 and 1956 an extensive movement toward sending personnel to the USSR for various schools was initiated. Approximately eight (P) to ten (10) percent of the 66th FAD officer staff were in some school or attending some course in the USSR at that time. Generally, military academies and schools in the USSR were five (5) to seven (7) years long, with special courses lasting about six (6) months. J. Soviet Advisors and Training Instructors. From the time of the establishment of the 66th PAD in 1951 till 1955 L Soviet Lieutenant Colonel RD;I'CFDAZSR was assigned to the division as an advisor to the division comaaander. He was a lot or 2nd Class 141 -15 pilot. During %f II he had been a regimental osmmander. 25X1 '?;'w the 1I10-?15's arrived at EUNMAAARAS airfield, the Soviets assigned an entire team of technical instructors and flying instructors to the division. jith the aid of interpreters, training charts, and other visual training aide they trained the first 1hs garian crews and pilots. Subsequent training programs were all based on these methods, as well as mom later changes that originated in i4GSKVA (5545W/3735F). 7.n effect, ninety percent (90x) of all the equipment as won as the procedures, doctrines, regulations, tables of organisation, and canning authorisations were of Soviet origin. V. 11ISSIC1i OF Tfl PIVISIORe The mission of the 66th Hungarian Fighter Air Division was the air defense of Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 12 3-e- VI. C1fANIZATICN AND FUNC'flC s For Headquarters organisation of this division refer to Inca 1, this report, sketch of the 66th FAD organisational ahart. Pt 3. . Headquarters, HUNiARIAN AIR FORCt (OLP). Pt 2 O DIVISION COfMAN'DER. a. Functions carried overall responsibility of division oomand. Responsible to the Goxmndsr, Hungarian Air Fares. Was advised in decisions by an assigned Soviet advisor who was consulted at all times in order to assure adhernce to Soviet policies. The Soviet advisor made a monthly report to the chief Soviet advisor at OLP in BUDAPEST (47 /l9O5E) on the activities of the division. Operational control U of divisional combat forces was the division e ?owmander's main responsibility. For instance, if one third or more of his forces were airborne the division 6oassnder was required to lead the formation. A division 6ommande*, although perhaps holding the rank of only a Lieutenant Colonel, was considered to be a general officer and received all the prestige and benefits of that position. The division ?omaander was the final authority on promotion and demotion recommendations of all enlisted men and NCO's in the division, Recommendations pertaining to officers were forwarded to OLP for final perusal; in most cases, however, the division 6om ander'a recommendations were followed. b. Personal t tas Names EORI, ELEN; ranks Lieutenant Colonel; First Class MIG-17PF pilot. In 1951 he was the Assistant Commander of the 66th FAD, later he became the Fighter Observer at Headquarters, RAF. In October 1956 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 13 ,3 G "ORI was in the IXSR attending a special school. of unknown nature. In his absence the division Executive Officer assumed his position sad responsibilities. o. Aides Besides his regular staff, he had three (3) persons directly assigned to hiss an interpreter for liaison between him and the division Soviet advisor, a chauffeur, and an aide. !'t 3 - CCUETER.INTELLIOFNCE DEPARTIENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BrLUGY 2'.1l".2 ZT".RIUM). This section was repponsible only to the Ministry of Interior. The chief of this section IM had the option of submitting his reports directly to the Ministry of Interior with information copies to the eounter?intelligsnoe section of Headquarters, RAF and the division eoms+ander, or through the C-i section of Headquarters, HAP to the Ministry of Interior. The C-I section of Headquarters, HAF had a seniority over the division C-I section only by virtue of its being at a higher echelon. On the other hand, the C-i section at Headquarters, HAP served as a distributing agent for most of the general instructions emanating from the Ministry of Interior. Outward]y, the division section maintained the appearance of subordination to the division oommander. The section's overt mission was to maintain internal security chiefly against penetration, sabotage, and espionage. This overt status and mission served as a cover for its additional covert function of collecting compromising information on division personnel. Methods employed In gaining this type of information ranged from trying to win the confidence of an individual by taking his side against a superior or subordinate to the use of female "plants". "hysically, the C-I section was located either in a u separate building or in the wing of a building which was seofred by barred windows and a constant armed guard. During off-duty hours, there was always a duty officer present. organisationally, twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) individuals were assigned to this section. They included the section chief, three (3) to four (4) a E C Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 SECRET 14 3'' officers, one (1) typist who more civilian clothes, ten (10) to twelve (12) oouinter.intelligenao enlisted men (sub-machine gunners), one (1) to three (3) -dare+?y staff car drivers and one (1) or two (2) truekid.^ Even the drivers were land-picked personnel who were specially trained (e.g., to shoot at targest while driving). Assigned drivers were all military personnel, although some more civilian attire only. R`vi the office clssning-+marn were specially screened. Pt 3a - Ministry of the Interior. Pt 4 - *)IVISIC (POLITICAL) ASSISTANT CO YANPFRI Ono (1) officer assisted by one (1) E0. Aided the division Commander in political matters. Was In charge of the political department and the officer's club. Until 1953, the Political Assistant Commander was on an equal level with the division Oommoanderj the latter could not release an order without the signature of the former. Because this hindered the division Commander too such, the Political Assistant Cos=der was subordinated directly to the division Commander after that time. The Political Assistant C9om nder was sort of a "political chaplain" who lista ied to personal problems of division personnel, as he was responsible for personnel morels as well as political eduestion. He arranged political lectures, morality lectures, etc., In accordance with the Communist doctrine. Pt 4a - POLITICAL DEPARTI NTI Made arrangements for and conducted political training sessions, Save political examd,nations, distributed pamphlets and other forms of propaganda and took cars of Communist Party matters within the division. Fight (8) officers, one (1) NCO, one (1) enlisted man, and one (1) civilian assigned. Pt 4b - T1'IVISION STMT CO14WIIIST PARTY SECRFTARTs Consisted of one (1) officer. Supervised Co. gist Party meetings. Represented the interests of the "arty in the division. Had to be a member of the CA. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 r.mm w-7-00 15 3 Pt 4e - PARTY WCORD s t tairned OP anebsrship records and books. Kept files on present and proposed aembre, One (1) NOO, a CP member. Pt 4d - PARTY SUPPRTISORX ODW.ITTFIs Acted on reooneenrations for CP membership or empuleion. Was presiding body at political trials for infractions by division mesrbere (the commander and his immediate start excepted) of CP doctrine and procedures. This committee established political guilt or innocence and determined the type and degree of pmnishment of the.. convicted, Committee members were elected from military pereonnel(party ambers) throughout division Headquarters. Being a committee member was a secondary duty. Number of eoeeittee members unknormp one (1) officer, however, was constantly assigned. Pt 4e - OPFICS.RS' CLUBS Two (2) officers, we (1) NCO, and eighteen (18) civilian employee d. Pt 5 - DIVISION ASSISTANT C013IAINDE1ts One (1) officer assisted by one (1) a enlisted men. Was representative of the Commander in Aviation and operational matters. His rank was Major, and he was a First Class PSG-17PF pilot. H. had one (1) staff oar driver assigned. Ft 6 - EXFCUTIYE 0lPICERs Responsible for overall supervision of division administrative matters. Supervised the work of the Combat Operations Department. Conducted monthly staff inspections. Was repraswtative of the Commander In disciplinary matters, Exsept during important instances, he represented the Commander at daily staff meetings. He had one (1) driver assigned. Pt ? - DIVISION COMBAT TPAININ(3 DEPARIMTs a (1) officer in charge. This was the largest staff section in the division. Responsible to the division eows^ander through as The Assistant Commander (Pt 5) for operational setters. b. The Political Assistant Ooapander (Pt 4) for political matters. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 16 3 21- 25X1 a. The Mosoutin Officer (Pt 6) for matters pertaining to administration. This department coordinated and supervised the functions of its sub-sections in pilot training matters, both theoretical and practical. It maintained the prescribed records, logs, training graphs and charts, and prepared the quarterly and long-range training plans. The department chief was a pilot. Pt 7a - DIVISION OBSFRVFRs One (1) officer, a pilot. Responsible for instrument and navigation training of pilots. The section maintained records of pilots' progress in this type of training. Responsible for keeping the division supplied with the latest, most accurate navigational aids, i.e., maps, charts, eta. One (1) NCO, an expert on maps, was assigned here. The officer In charge of this section had to be able to fly any- type of aircraft assigned to the division, and he had to be able to fly any given training problem required of division pilots. Pt 7b - DIVISION AVIATION-TECHNIQUE OBSERVP.Rs One (1) officer, a pilot. Sams functions as Pt 7a, ahoy., except that his responsibilities included everything concerning flight technique except navigation. Specificall,T, this z meant formations, maneuvers, tactless and flying proficiency training. Pt 7os? AERIAL GU ERT LEADERS One (1) officer, a pilot. 'While the officer at Ft lb, above, was responsible for teaching pilots how to execute certain maneuvers, this officer was responsible for teaching than when to apply these tbotics in combat. He was also responsible for aerial gunnery training and a evaluation. He also maintained adequate training aids for serial gunnery, i.e., tow targets, ground targets, etc. Pt 7d - DIVISION: COURSER PILOTS Was assigned a TAX-12 or "?1ZSELER STC RCH" for courier flying purposes. Pt 7e - PLANNIWO AND !CORDING OFFICEfU Responsible for the accomplishment of 7- Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 SECF1,.-.- 17 administrative work connected with the entire oossbat training department. Pt ?f - DIVISION PARACHUTE SERYICX c Ig!-s Ores (1) officer. Responsible for parachute training of division flying personnel. This included supervision of theoretical training in parachuting as well as supervision of the twa (2) training J s required of all pilots annually. Asspsnsible for maintenance of parachute training reeordi. Pt 7g - PARACHU'! > TZT'O?s Sines the division was physically located on the same airfield as one of its regiments, it did not maintain its own parachute depot. Division parachutes were therefore stored, maintained, and repacked at the w/ o regimental parachute depot. Personnel which normally would staff this division depot were assigned to the regimental depot as additional help. Pt 7h - DIVISION ATHLETIC OFFICT:Rs Responsible for phyei4 training, both formal and informal, of division personnel. Supervised major sport events, maintained athletic equipment. Pt 71 - SASE GYM O Subordinate to Pt 7h,r above. ''t ?3 - CIVIUA! ?V ISTs Did all w%classified typing for the combat training department. Pt 7k - T)F.1ART1 :N+)T DRAFTS] ANis An enlisted man. Prepared training aids, graphs, and charts. Pt 71 - PAP ANI) CHART NOW Subordinate to the Division Observer, Pt Tai above. Pt A - C -YBA T O RA fl Ohs DP A R' E1 TI (Training and Plans )o Title of this department was d.sleading as to its actual functions, which were the planning and supervision of base defense procedures and all ground training activities connected thereto, i.e., security, small arms proficiency, chemical defense, eta. Cne (1) officer. Pt Aa - ASSISTAWT TO 'Hr, CC RA? OPF,RATItN S DEPAR'1!" NT l4MM9, Pt B, above. SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 28 3 Z-. Pt 8b - SECOND ASSISTA??. Pt So - WarMAISSANCE OFFICERs Received through dissemination from higher echelons up-to-date intelligence on 'ansaq" capabilities. He applied this information to the training and planning policies of the division. In addition, he cooperated with the Division Observer on the planning of reconnaissance problems and on the evaluation of the results of reconnaissance missions flown by the division. He kept division pilots up to date on recognition and performance data of "snsegr" aircraft. Sources of intelligence material were unknown Pt Pad . CHEMICAL DiFF'ASF OFFICERs Conducted training II of division personnel in chemical, nuclear, and bacteriological defines. During practice attacks he commanded defense and decontamination tear* he was also responsible for obtaining and storing special clothing, equipment, and decontamination agentse Pt S. - DRAFTSMANs An enlisted men. rrspared drawings, graphic, and charts for the department. Pt Sf . FIRING RANGE SQUADS One (1) officer, eight (8) enlisted men. Maintained small arms range, aerial gunnery range, and gun calibration pits. Pt 8g - POSSIBLE HEADQUARTERS GROUND DEFENSE T'IATOOAs SOURCE was not sure whether or not this force actually existed at this division. If so, they consisted of one (1) officer and about thirty (30) enlisted mini whose mission was to protect division Headquarters in the event of enesr ground attack. This force we armed with sub-machine guns. Pt 9 - AIRCRAFT PISPAT fl' ?RVIC1 As the division was located physically adjacent to an operational regiment, this section, within division structure, existed only on paper. The regimental dispatch service (control tower) actually took care of this section's function on this airfield. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 SEC 19 The division assigned nine (9) enlisted men of this section to the equivalent regimental section to help out. Pt 10 - CLASSIFIED CONTROL AND PREPARATIONS Took oars of tyt4eg, dispatching, receiving, recording, and storing of all classified documents of the division. One (1) officer, two (2) N00's. Pt lOa - CODING OFFICERs Although his office was located physioally adjacent to the classified control office, his section was an independent entity. He encrypted and deeyphered classified transmissions with the help of tables. There was no mechanical or electrical cyphering or decyphering equipiaent. Pt 10b - CI,ASSIFIEI) YATFRIALS 1711W SECTIONS Throe (3) civilians employed. Pt 11 - Cut 1NIQATIOPS DEPARTi NTs One (1) overall officer in charge assisted by one (1) enlisted mono Operationally, this department was subordinate to the directives of Headquarters, HAF, Communisations Department. It we the responsibility of each Headquarters ocommications section to establish and maintain a communications system only with its subordinate units (e.g., Headquarters, HAP Comeamioations Department had to build and maintain a system connecting it with its divisions, while division Communications Departments built and maintained systems connecting them with their subordinate ragimawts.) The department was responsible for all ground point-to-point and ground?to-air oommications including radio, telephone, and teletype facilities. These responsibilities also included radio equipment and telephones for the division direction center and fighter control center. Administratively, the department was subordinate to the division Fxecutivs Officer. met lla - Comic ations Compatp (szZAD). Three (3) officers, eighty-sewn (87) enlisted men, three (3) NCO's. Might also have been only a platoon, twenty- seven (27) to thirty (30) Caen. These communications men operated and maintained Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Firm ECr"- 2O ft5 division ooasxaications equipment and We assigned either to '711b, lie, lid, or lie. Pt lib - 141W. CHDP z Officer in charge of all wire ooaar mioations services. Pt no - RADIO CFFICFRs In charge of all ground radio and teletype facilities. Pt lid - RADAR OFFICER, Responsible for operation and maintenance of the 001 unit located on this bass. Was also called upon to give lectures on radar theory to division pilots. Pt Ile - PFLI1 W0ATOR (P.?.) OPFICSRs It is possible that in the case of this division no such officer we assigned, although it was normal practice. If not, then it vould have been the radar officer's responsibility to operate and maintain the pelle Bator, as it we called in HAF. This D.F. was used to give pilots the z reverse a*ienth reading from the D.F*o station upon request. Pt llf - GFWFRAI, O0MM ICATIONS OFFICFRs He was familiar with all phases of the division communications system and assisted the division Commrnioations Chief, He acoomplishsd for the Oom ixeloations Chief, all of the ad dmistrative work of the (bamunications Oepartmssnt, including the handling of such documents as authentication tables, frequency authorisations, pall sign lists, SCP's, etc. Pt 12 - ADF?INISTRAT1 F DEPARTHENTs One (1) officer, sixteen (16) civilian employees. ^reparsd and stored all of the wolassifled documents, directives, and orders. They also handled all of the administrative work pertaining to enlisted personnel, i.e., clothing issue, duty rosters, food service administration, disciplinary action, eta. Also issued hand-weapons to enlisted won. Issued meal and trip tickets to traveling persornsl. This department also had a civilian employment office for the hiring of cleaning Mown, secretaries, etc. They also inspected enlisted quarters and mess halls. In addition, they assigned motor veheeles at the instruction of the Executive Officer. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 SEC 21 Pt 12a: GUAFU) PLAT'sOlg. Twenty (20) enlisted men. These can supervised various manual details that had to be accomplished on base. In the event of ground attack, they supplemented the force at Pt Sg, above. They were armed with sub-"chins guns. Pt 12b: RORDING NCO. Accomplished the recording and dissemination of incoming and outgoing unclassified administrative coreespondence as well as official and personal rail. Pt 12c: CIVILIAL TYPIST. Pt 12d: ADMINIST[tATIV ' LIBRARY. One (1) NCO. For offidial use only, this library contained files of HAF regulations, base regulations, division regulations and orders, etc. Pt 13: P ftS , '3L 5UB-D 'PART ENT. Officer personnel administration, files, eta. One (1) officer in charge. Pt 13a: ASSIT OIC, UFFIC i PERS0NNEJL SECTION. Pt 13b: TYPIST. Civilian employee. Officer records were considered classified and all personnel working on them, including this typist, had to be specially cleared. Pt 14: DIVISION COMII4AND POST& This was the fighter control ffj ~ center for all_acf of all three (3) regiments in the 66th FAD. From here, all fighters tn~ were scrambled either by instructions fromILOLP command post or, in some emergency instances, by the division commander directly. In the event OLP's command post was not functioning, this division command post was normally designated and used as the alternate Cooaaand Post for the entire HAF. Although the 66th FAD Command Post had the capability of directing all fighters of all its regio:ents, it actually aged only coordinated the fighter direction of its regimental command postsl'direotly controlled fighters of only the 62nd Fighter Air Regiment, as that regiment's Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 command post, located on the same airfield with the division, was maintained as a backup direction center with a skeleton arm only. Following personnel Ness assigned to'division command posts Twenty-two (22) officers, six (6) NCO's, six (6) enlisted men. They were broken down as follows a. Three (3) duty commanders (one for each shift) b. One (1) administrative commander a. Three (3) observers d. Three (3) P-40 (OCI) observers who directed only radar-equipped 14I0-17's. e. Three (3) fighter directors f. Six (6) liaison officers who maintained commm.tsioations liaison with regimental command posts of any cooperating satellite or Soviet tenant forces, g. Three (3) interpreters who assisted the liaison officers, h. six (6) plotters i. sioi (6) tellers who called plots from radar .it.. to the plotters and other ooaseand post personnel. Pte 14a & 14bs AUXIIJRT C0$U AND POSTS. Physically discontinued In 1956, they still existed on paper. Formerly, each auxiliary command post was occupied by three (3) officer controllers and three (3) = enlisted mren. Their job had been to take over the control of aircraft which the did elan command post could not handle due to loss o control over certain aircraft at certain times. These auxiliary command posts had been physically located at KUNMADARAS and 5ZEGD (4615N/2009E). Pt 15s MOTOR VEHICLE FLIGHT. Responsible for minor maintenance, and dispatch of motor vehicles and drivers for membere of the division staff. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 C 23 3'&,- Pt 15as MOTOR V:4HICL6 OARAG%. Repaired all vehicles for the division, base support battalion, and 62nd fighter Air Regiment. Pt l5bi MOTOR ;HICLE FUEL D!PO?. Had underground tanks. Pt 16, MEDICAL S ,VICE. Since the division was #qb~cx located physically adjacent to a regiment, both pooled their medical facilities and personnel. Normally, four (4) doctors constituted the division medical service. The division furnished some persosssl for the following dispensary sections Pt l6as AMBUUNCS SECTION. Two (2) enlisted men, two (2) vehicles. Pt 16bs MEDICAL DUTY S".CTION. Three (3) NCO's and three (3) enlisted men who were assigned to the base dispensary from the division to serve in shifts so that someone was always on duty at the out-patient section of the dispensary. Pt 16es ?wO(2) NURSES, who were also furnished by division. Pt 16ds OUTPA?I`WT RECI:PTIONIST. Pt 16e s X-RAY LAN Pt 16fs DENTAL WARD. Named by regimental personnel only. Pt 16gs ISOLATION WARD. Pt 16Hs HOSPITAL BATH HOUSE. One (1) civilian employee. 'A 17t DIVISION F11GIN:RING DEPARTWNT. One (1) officer, one (1) enlisted man, other personnel strengths unknown. Responsible for procurement and distri- bution of all -ate and *6 ft components of the division. Also responsible for inspection of regimental engineers to see that all of their procedures regarding soft maintenance conformed to HAF policies. Also responsible for distribution of tech orders, modification orders, maintenance manuals and directives for all division adit, their components, and their airborne equipment. The department's Jil rnr(i inspection jurisdiction also extended over the major aft repair unit described under Pt 18, below. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 SECF! 24 3"w Pt 17as RADIOGINF.1. One (1) officer with a required degree in electrical engineering. The division engineer was directly superiow to hl*, both operation- ally and administratively. The radio engineer's responsibility was strictly confined to airborne radio equipment. tie saw to airborne radio maintenance, overhaul, and requisitions of equipment and parts. These requisitions were submitted to the Division nginser (Pt 17, above). The radio engineer maintained working records on every airborne radio in every a of the division; dates of repair, overhaul, replaoeoent, person accomplishing the work, eta. Records an file covered these details over a period of the last five (5) years. Pt 17bs RADIO LAB. Workshop of the radio engineer. Contained his calibration equipment, test instruments, tools, work benches, and parts storage. Pt 17cs SPECIAL ! GI$ R. One (1) officer. His job requirements coincided with those of the radio engineer (Pt 17x, above), except that they applied strictly cave7ft to d f instruments. Pt 17ds INSTRUMENT WORK SHOP. Pt 17e: W APONNS ENGINE. Same as Point 176 with regard to aerial weapons, ejection seats, and gun cameras. Pt 17fs POW PLANT ENGIN~ . His existence within the division organise- tional structure was questionable. If he existed, his responsibilities were aiir~vft the same as Pt 17x, above, but pertaining to cleft engines. Pt 17gs AIRFRAM13 B1GIN% . Same as Pt 17f, above, with regard to airframes. w:xi tense in division also questionable. Pt 17h: T1OIN'171ERING DMa ART! T RECORDING OFFICER. Maintained necessary maintenance and requisition files for the entird engineering department. Was assigned one (1) NCO and (1) one enlisted man for assistance. f 2d Pt 17is gATT: i7 SHOP. SOURCE wau not sure it this section i into division Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 SAC 25 organisation or if it belonged to the base support battalion or the 62nd Fighter Air Regiment. The shop's !motion was to recharge all electrical storage batteries on the bass; it also recharged batteries of external aircraft-starting equipment. Two (2) 1100'., four (4) enlisted men. Pt 17js DIVISION COMM POST. A flying unit consisting of a MIO-1501M for the Division Comdr, one for his Deputy for Operations, one for the Division Observer, and one for the Division Aerial Ounnery Leader, it also included a FIESELE.R STORCH and a YAK-12 type liaison plane for the Division Courier and a UTI-MIC-15 trainer. The flight had altogether six (6) officers, nine (9) NCO'., and nine (9) enlisted men assigned, who maintained these aircraft. Pt 18: .N(3INMEM IN CHARGE OP"TARK 4". "TARN" was an abbreviation for 2 "TEKNIIICHESKAYA AVIATSIOIQATA Rq1OI1T11AYA MASTY?iSKAYA"(Technical Aviation Repair :,hop), a major aircraft-overhaul unit assigned to each division and accomplishing major aircraft repairs for all division aircraft (including all regiments of a the division). The officer in charge of TARN 4 had to hold a degree in"uniwrsal" engineering, as it was referred to. It required a general mschanioal-technical background. This officer was directly responsible to the Division Engineer for all aircraft repairs accomplished in his shops. Pt 191 TARK 4. See Pt 18, above. 2 whenever aircraft --,,- repairs could not be handled by the maintenance crew assigned to each aircraft from squadron or by their regimental supervisors, TARN 4 accomplished the repairs. Aircraft belonging to the regiments not physically located at the same field (KWSKP'39 T) as division, were either shipped to TARN 4 or, if possible, TAR)! 4 personnel with necessary equipment were sent to the location of the crirnled aircraft and made Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 SEC 26 37- on.-the-spot repairs. This situation eadsted until 1954 when the large part of the repair jobs from this and other "TARNS" me given to the PES?VIDAKI G POXAR on CuISPtL ISLAND in BUDAPEST. TARN 4 thereafter only took care of repairs which were not major in nature, but which squadron maintenance crew could not handle. However, TARM's still maintained their aagsad* capability for major overhauls and, in emergencies non-scheduled or non anticipated overhauls ware still accomplished by them. TARN 4 occupied one (1) hangar on KSCS1 LET airfield. It had one (1) administrative commanders the engineer mentioned under Pt la, above, an assistant commander (administrative), and one (1) records NCO. TARN 4 was divided functionally into the following emotions. Pt 19as RADIO SHOP, Airborne radio repairs. Harmed by one (1) officer and one (1) NCO. Pt 19bs RADIO LAB. Airborne radio inspections and calibrations. Manned by the one (1) officer and one (1) NCO cited in Pt 19a above. Pt 19cs INSTRUM tT SHOP. Repair functions. Harmed by one (1) officer and one (1) NCO. Pt 19ds INSTRUM NTS LAB. Instection and calibration functions. Manned by the one (1) officer and one (1) 1ICO cited in Pt 190 above. Pt 19es WIAPONS SHOP. One (1) officer, one (1) 1400, two (2) enlisted men, Accomplished weapons repair. Pt 19fs POWM PLANT SHOP. Repair of aircraft Jet powered plants by one (1) officer, one (1) NCO, three (3) or four (4) enlisted men. Pt 19gs AIRFRAME SHOP. Repair of airframe, landing gears, 1p-draulics, fuel systems, and control surfaces. One (1) o:ticer, two (2) to three (3) MCO's, five (5) or six (6) enlisted men. Pt 19hs MACHINE SHOP. Machine tools shop that could be used by anyone of SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO02900510002-2 SEC the ?ARM sections. 1 One (1) NCO, three (3) to four (4) enlisted man. Pt 19it PAINT SHOT. Two (2) or three (3) enlisted men. Pt 19j: TARM 4 PARTS & E 13I`'ME1T DEPOT. One R (1) NCO. This gave the 66th Division Headquarters, includinP TARK 4, an approximate total of ninety-nine (99) officers, forty-seven (47) NCO's, and two hundred (200) enlisted melst as well as thirty`-eight (38) civilian employees. These figures do include the following organisations: Pt 201 H K:DQUAitT: iS, HAF CENTRAL SUPPLY DEPc7r. Pt 211 62nd FIOHTM AIR R",GT?r'NT. Refer to I:-1207-57. Pt 21a: 42 MEMUZ. Refer to paragraph IV., 3., above and to IR-1209-57. Pt 22: 31st FIGHTER AIR R;:0IMSN?. Pt 22x1 OEI4UZ (Support battalion of the 31st Regiment) Pt 23: OR}UZ of the 47th PAR Pt 23as 47th FAR Pt 23bt Unkno, SEC Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP80T00246AO02900510002-2 Approved For Release 2009/07/27 : CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 c ;o. a. N. ya. ': i zJ XLL J ZJ II. 1 1 A g1J j4. I IIU. ~ IIIR. ~ /, 173. l7c J /7e. /7b,J / "l d sx~rca op a r# ff si R MR P IV. 3RSNi~AtioNA~ cNARr tY, At KEG5XE/1ET 14 fieGP y6ss#/i9 ySE N vm;, T 2 5. /3. i Rd -/7/i Approved For Release 2009/07/27 : CIA-RDP80T00246A002900510002-2 3a. /S. J Ij i:i 'i (v).J _?!Li _LJ 4LLJ i71