PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE CHANGES IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES WILL HAVE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A010400340002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 208
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 15, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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PREDICTIONS ON THE EFFECT THE
CHANGES IN GOMULKA'S POLICIES-
WILL HAVE #N POLAND'S INTER-
NAL AFFAIRS
L. L x ?/ f
A5SIGN$MENTS OF Aft TOP PER I-
AZ IN POLAND
f RESPONSIBILITIES
AND DUTIES
PART I
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PARTICULAR ASSIGNEMENTS OF THE TOP LEADERS
IN POLAND-
The subject who is responsible for what within
1f
the leadership is a complicated one . Significant fea-
tures are hidden from public knowledge . This is dtie
to the system of " double " authority: t h party lea-
. ce.tU al
derahipr with is the tvw*ly leadership in4(?oland and the
"official " administrative executives who are exposed
1'blio and carry (on the ir-shoulders,tA
esponsibility,L This system allows the, party to direct
and govern the country without responsibility.
ZT c our eople realise tkiat power and
responsibility rest c the party leaders but this W
knowledge general_"natur , It is not always known
to the -In--vbe of thej_ art secretaries is
y responsible for a par cu ar area of activi-
ty . /.-,,
is completely unknown at t =
It-
fa- r internal security .v( security police andjt
Ministry of Inter Affair1s are%izeaz-
handled _ by the Secretary of the Central Com -
mittee/ Jerzy Albrecht. This ispurposely concealed
from public knowledge. L-14-le E Q_ is known o
the members of the Central Committee.
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that Jerzy Albrecht is in charge of these &ffalpe
o d7 c~a -~- '"--ker--
is of far--reaching ve
Albrecht himself does not favor awe sn
of tite securmty police - he has perso-
nal reasons- and this is the reason tit Gomulka
entrusted him with the handling of these affairs&
in 1956/57)
Another significant feature with respect to
dt of authority
among oadp JS the
fact that the exte t pf authority delegated chan-
ges frequently . Ti,' is an everlasting of
personal intrigues and shifts in the judgement and
?'appraisal of the executoves or party leaders,
in Gomulka's personal opinion and in Cyrankiewpcz 's
of authorit elegated to the within the
opinion. At present, these two men ecide the extent
prisinA'For example: Edward Ochab~ a member of the
h' se s if t s and changes Ireei sur-
top leaders/9f Poland.
was in charge,,(from 1956 - 1959 @f Agricul-
gress and ctltural matters. I
t,-ure 1 from 1960' is in charge of Propaganda
[ow can a mqn
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such a specialized and difficult economic$
1/.Lc.2~a' ~~-;/~~ "'" f,Zw,Ccc-,~th.c f~G~G%.~eLl~
as ariculture and I-ater assigned to
~y such as cultural a fairoc, educational affai-
rrs , propaganda press br&adcast and spiritual l-:e /
who a?s~
11
_ ? ~ ~ __ __
_
_
_
~
L
1_
ej//~)/~~ ~
~y~
I/
j
/~- ~
~
.~
~
,
This can be explained as follows:
The communists believe that there is only one universal
philosophy i.e. Marxism and feninism. All other areas of
knowledge and science are useful but it an inferior
significance in comparison N off. to this basic llscience
and faith cI as represented by Marxism. Therefore they believe
that a man who knows 4arxism is qualified to direct
any particular area of activity. They believe that
party background enables a man to fulfill all assign-
ments in any field of specialty.
u
This is obviWsly not true/and this is a source
of great mistakes. 'or example ohab, had no real back
ground a%d agriculture and ,, does not kbow
s flfi_i -~rtvly thids for which he as responsible
z c- -C ~-
1956 - 1959. / He 'grows t area of ptopaganda and
/l'GfC
culture and hedial-.work in this field a-e~
1945 t ;J54 4i .'cGLP'
from i an - before 1945./
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This, does not mean that the communists do not -~~
aY specialists. They do ,but only 1:e a limited
bev-e?. For example positions up to a Viceminister are
sometimes.' rarely) considere~~d// from the viewpoint of
and criterion of speeializ~ton and background in the
particular r~#e area of the (onsidered candidates
But above this level that-I--s-. Msters,Vicepremiers,
and of course party functions (even if they are respon
sible fora ? a economice& and speeialistgc areas)are
selected from the viewpoint of party background i.e. po
litical capability.
-e--to s like
Julian Tokarski;Vicepremier~in charge of Machine Industry
who w nothing about this field or
2
Kazimierz Witszewski ch ex of Army Intelligence who is
r intelligence etc.
here are Of course some exceptions.rr example ~4Y9r.~~~f
Minister of Health is an excellent professor of pediatrttZ(
r no t a -the party 4,cLe ~
C'Ini eavy Industry-Zemaitis
from 1947 ( but not hig4rated in
tartyarphy was an excellent metallurgist'
, .. ~~ - s ue
t o party and political b
.o specialist or ffia4ger4:el background.
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Therefore a party leader never `thal, he d
A1?4 a partic i area of $l- ac tivi t ,ri f f knows every
till
IIA-1 Wd) VT ,1 1 }` a"' ""
thing, f he knows marxi s ` r
This explains some ridiculous features o+P' the
behavior of party leaders in tKe communistA countries.-
~jf~iecl/&eysV)for example s
. that he is the .,bCS"t ex ert in
16
n
lId. Since he 1-1*es --fitftk~~ es
the USSR and -the satellites., B , 01
Gds claims +hae he fre 'an otan"~`~
f4-L~G4 ,2i~ 4 ,' 3 7` Gt-e~ e jr lr',,e~.as f at-v .c. 4 : 4 S,rr ~
Irlltl V liC W. Vllf, 14 1-1b '
tU1 vp In 1 Ulm
1Aq
t 1 d W.... TT ' '~LftA
~- in t~fs;4e ations i u-
eOQS'. T also believes that he is an expert
"c a-
' -
in architecture and construction. I8- i-s tSd Cze-
i
Diu.' C 1DSfo kia B lCC- ,,prefa~pricated
ofcein-V5-rded structures in the USSROin.creased from
4 million cubic meters in 195
22 million cubit meters
in 1959/60 "`replacing steel structures
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i' e~t't _ ' 7 r
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-Polish writers
and in the larger cities,nrt mi y 4rAZ
n Poland] far exampled B Brut personally approved ally
Ths--e~ ei~e akub Berman ictate -yring - 1955
are-to ba uAe
Gomulka
w'orked in a, coal mine, ..3-/there--
Pore he is convinced he i a~
9. Zn his youth
xpert.
beat expert in tunneling and subway construction.
For example: Roman Zambrowski in Poland member of the
subway V during construction. V
As secretary ofl/MMoscow a twice
Politbureau since 1945
ber ship-duri nit -Q
eab
i s known as~ expert,
in matters of party organization. IR ,r i. -`- 'to- -
ves , he
1&r planning i ndueet'y. He stared the so-
called planning from the " bottom". The workers themsel-
o- j.. A41"~ . i
the plans for their factory.
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eommittee$s were sue' each factoryj?~t
jourses were
o teach thews planning and accounting,
0. 7
'Cy during this four-month ac t
c oual3r.l It was a real mess.
wm?TMO, it
These eNample 1show that the Politbureau has--
Gc t2 e c. GL Gt1 - -e SZe _
As criterion requently mss' considered Peharacter
the
1 .01
of tie person. lVifti, --lot the jV y ruthlesspiv
to s or is n weak" to ou
~-O
4lso considered , whether a .mss obe-
dient and f-el-le -"blindly a 1 irecttives , -' e
A'> e"( !i c.aLV czc ~`~~ !/ ~(!~9 ~t I/ ~vt4 Cam! f~^ Z4..ma ~"e y
Adam Rapacki was shifter
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rol"r1
Minist r of Hig. ducation to Iirvster Rf Foreign Affair's
21-~a-e he was willing to cancel the
majority of factors that did cause the tensions between him and
the Russian Party. Already in Novemebr Gomulka visited Moscow
and offered
e y ~mrned~ tdyJ
Suppressing all anti- Russian attitudes and utterances.
Restituti~ as soon as poes~ble the recognition of the
supremacy of the Russian party min basic matters
Maintaining the Fed Army in Poland
Subordinating Nh Foreign Policy under Russian directives
r ~
Suppresi1 revisionistic tendencies in Poland
Stopping allll investigations started that would gave evidence
of the responsibilty of the Russian ",dvisers for the-
former terror in Poland
Forgiveness and good jobs for all Natolinists that is for all
Russian-adherents acting on orders from tie Russian
Party.
Restitut-on as soon as possible the power and authority of the
party as the supreme ~eV.el` above all managers and
adminstrators . In other vdords/restitution of the
supremacy and dietature of the party. Simultaneously he
acknowledged the leading role of the Russain party
above the Polish party . Both aspects together mean a
restitution of the supremacy of the Russian party indi-
rectly through the Polish party upon all q faires in Poland
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e subordination in foreign pot= cies was extended as far
as condemnation publicity by Gomulka of the Hungarian Revolution
as soon as possible / this was made later April 1957. by'
Gomulka/ ?approval of the Pussain suppression of the
I-Iungaria Revolution as a sad but justified necessity / This
statement Gomilka made already after return from Moscow/
lLmifEw Conformity of relations with Tito . These re3.itions
between Chrbszczew and Tito at this t--'.me wi'e not bad yet , bait
already some tensions were in the initial development.
This. package of concessions off,-.red by Gomilka. three weeks after
the revolution was convenient for Chruszczew.
Chruszczew accepted this ; Despite his personal bad feelings
against Gomulka he needed him at this time especially for restitution A
in Poland the Russian hegemony. From ?' Chr~szczew-a's point of view
there could hardly be founds. at this time a an who would be able
e.xtremil inflamed then
to overcomm the Polish hatred Against the USSR .. Only a leader
like Gomulka to whom the Polish people had at this time very much
confidence could be able to find and apply concealed methods leadin
calm down the blast o
Poland back under the Russian supremacy/ to '` p the inflammed
anti-Russian attitu4e&t., to deceive and outwit the Polish people
at least for the most critical time) in this matter.
For this price Chruszczew was ready to make some concessions
on his side such as : Tolerance'of C mulka's departure from the
ortohodox party line in.ecomomi.cs , agriculture1 religious matters,
person,--,l freedom , relative press freedom,e-te. and Certaiij
0 financial concessions
Chrdszczew did not agree with Gomulka's new ideas but he ':as
latee a
sure that there will a be e better opportunity to force Gomulkr
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intoa retreat from thane policies. Chrjs~czew only concessed one thing.
i. e. ke did not insist on claryfying these conflic~in~ matters
at once but later and gradually in proper time. He accepted ComulkP's
interpretation that things went so far in Poland that certain e
and
freedoms for a certain time m u s 1 be granted . Chruscz ew accepted
thsis viewpoint of (oilulka as a t a c t i c a 1 necessity but nat is
a permanent situation.
In result of t;_is mutua.l compromise Chruszczew accepted
kn Chnaszczews CP,nioh Gomubka was
Gomulka's role as a fact. 'r'a. convenient person for a certain time
may be even for a few years. As long, as Gomulka keeps yt,"o,&e the
obligations of this compromise there is no reason for Chruszczew to
fight Gomulka; in contrary Chru-zczetiv even,is interested in supporting
Gomulka or the period that is necesaary to 11 reeducate " the Polish people.
The development 1956 - 1959 sho-:?s that Gomulka followed -b?ze
all these outlined a--reements and Chruszczew his all reason to be
satisfied.
This is the basis of the Chruszczetiw;- Gomulka cooperation.
But as said before Chruszczew only delayed the final account and he
all affaires including
did not resign from ac ive control o?infernal affaires in Poland
il~hrov7h -Several; channels
This control in internal affaires is exercised ir~
tom;
ahd methads
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3.
4.
1. Control and Watching ho'w Gomukka is performing his job
as defined in the agreement and during soveral meetings later.
2. Urging'Gomulka to accelerate some developments of leading Poland
back to the wanted by Chrnszczew conditions.
This explains some vehement moves in this' determined by Chruszczzzer,
direction especially after the Third Congress of Party in Poland
March 1%9.
Forcing Gomulka to employ these men c;ho are selected or approved
by Chriiszczew. First of all to keep o:: key positions the same
Russian adherents almost agents who were before / under Bierut
un these higr, positions/' Gomulka must keep them regardless to
amon~ ?h e< , there
the resent of the Polish people and frequently, thee are his f orn er
personal enemies and adversaries in a bitter fight . But Gomulka
must employ these men on Moscow's order.
Control and forcing Gomulka to extend the list of t..ese men i. e.
to place more and more such " Russian" followe/rs and agents
at top positions.
Grouping around Gomulka more and more top personalities who
follow the Ryssiam instructions not only zs-ex~SY
when given by Gomailka and. through Gomulka1but who directly
are instructed by Moscow. In other words Comulka will be surrounded
more and more by such men who in case of a conflict bet:?een Go-rulka
abd Chriszczew would obey Chriszczews orders and not Gomulka's orders.
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There are no signs at present for such a conflict.
As long as Gomulka himself follows Chruszczew's directives these
pro-Russian men do not face the problem to choose between
obedience to Chruszczew and loyalty to Gomulka.
But there is no doubt that "ita.szewski for example works first at
all for Chruszczew and in second place for Gomulka and sometimes works
a g a i n s t Spy. zalski/ / There are bitter enemies /
servjna
5.ei era1 other men around Gomulka re in first-iplace se the Pussian
PartyI d in second place t4-e Polish party ?-nd in third p 3.ce Gomulka.
6. xwr Gomulka does not fight with Chruszcze:. he is obedient.
But after October 1959 Gomulka even could not thing of any controversy
with Chruszczew . In his own crew he would find men who in the hypothe-
tical case of a controversy would take Ctruszczew's side a g a i n s t
Gomulka.
7. At present Chrusczew evidently accelerated the course and
id demanding that Gomulka s goes further and establishes
Gun orm orfhodn~c order,
the !'Tow Chruszczew is not more satisfied with a equlibriuln of
power between his men and Gomulkai men , now he d "ands a clear
supremacy of his men among the leading per-onalities.
This development is inevitable . For Gomulka is only ons alternative
i.e. to join by himself the group of Chruszczew's mwn and to depart
from 2ny orIIn,l discern~N~ feaf~rey
of rulino , ?
In other words : The Pro- Russians are taking over and Gomulka goes with
them. , and also Gomulka's followers are going with him tc.the Pro-
Russian group. There is no alternative more to choose another way
p
because i n s i d e the leade)hip already the Pro-Russian group has beczrne
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too poti:uerful.
Hypothetically Gomilka could in c' e of n controversy again
appeal'to the people like in October 1956 but this would mean
a bloody revolution without chance of success,
But Gomulka does not think of such a hypothetical case.
Gomulka already is going w i t h the P o-Rissian wing,
There are still differences in several points / for example;
Police.
whether or not to resti to the security e s/- how fast to go
with collectiviza''ion , how rigidly and ruthlessly to lo:-:er
a sharp court api'nst
st_ndard of living,etc1 when to start the Church
etc. There is'~ still the personality of Gomulka himself and his
certain popularity, but in general the course of development is
obvious. The ProRussians are taking over.
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There is by no means " Unity" within the partyyalthough
the propaganda always emphasizes thistunity.t
The following groups can be distinguished within the
top party level.
a. Stalinists. These are Pro- Russians in this sense that ttez
they will obey the directives of the Russian Party
in first place. In case of d;fferences between the Russian Party
and the Polish Party / there are not likely to occur, but
if such a thing happens/ they will follow the Russian directives
against the Polish Party directives.
However this group does not identify its aims with
the Chruszczew policies. This group still can not forget
caused
the harm that Chruszczew me by his sensational speech
during the , Congress in 1956. They believe that Chru-
szczew for his p e r s o n a 1 carrier sacrified the power
of international communism ~nd weakened the strenght of the
Italian and French Communistic Pa_-ty and accelerated the
defeat of the English and American Communistic Parties
and produced heavy trouble forthe satelt'ite par-E-ies. l
This group was strong in 1956 and 1957 but it/wdeclines due
/~oerl
to some successes of Chruszczew's policies and his increasing
authority. This group lost influence after repulsion of
Molotow, MalenkowI Kaganowicz/Szepilow . / Bulganin and Zukow also
ex QQ2ed
Represent another position , for example Zukow was an anti-
stalinist
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The leaders of this group in Poland are :
vorakowski, Lapot , Mijal , Klosiewicz, Mazur.
khe call ~hem5eUes "Len''nist-01
b. Ideologists. These are follo:~ers of the Russian Party
They believe that personalities appear and disappear1but
the collective " mind" of the. Russian Party as the first
party that embodied the communistic ideology in practical
t?emain5 eawd '15 the erm2 t
form is-#}e greatest aut ority. They are called also
" Hegemonists" they belied in the invicible power of the
collective. leadership of the Russian Party. Blind obedience
toward the Central Committee of the Party of the USSR is their
outline. They openly affirm that the highest party level
in Poland the Polish Politbureau must be subordinated directly
under the Russian Politbureau.
But they admmt that individuals can commit errors.
They are against the "-Cult of the Leader", Stalin made errors,
Chruszczew might make eerrors/ mqkx Marx and Engels also
could not provide exactly the future in all details so they
was
also could make mistakes , only Lenin rinfallible.
Infallible also is the Party as a collective i.e. the
Central Committee of the RussiarjParty the heirs of the
I k
Bolszewiki" of Lenins party.
They support Chruszczew as the I Secretary of the Party
not as an individuality. As long as Chruszczew is the speaker for
the collective party mindI he is supported by this group , but
p
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all his steps are viewed by this group from the pout of
Leninistic criterias.
The moral power of this group is remarkable.
Chruszczew always emphasizes that he follows Lenin's doctrines.
Own WA)L-
He does not. He pretends on . This is necessary to get the
support of these party ideologists.
In the USSR Suslow represents this wing. In Poland
Finkelsztajn a member of the Central Committee / not known to
the public, but, still influencial / and partially Zambrowski.
.
To this group also belong the majority of the Part 'heo 4b.-46'
e
Danisz&iski, Tepicht, Professor Schaff,ZawadzkiI anon yr her5.
c. Internationalists.
These are followers of the former Komintern. They believe
in the supremacy of the ' orld Communists', in the collective
mind as represented by a representation of all communistic
parties throughout the V!orld . They acknowledge the leading
role of the Russian Party as a It Primus under Pares"
but they demand participation and acknowledgment of ideas
developed by other parties Iteo for exampl he Chinese Party
the Spain Party I the FrenchI and Italian Party ems. Mexican Party arc.
It is characteristic that Chruszczew does not want to restitute
officially the Komintern. Chruszczew prefers to have all other
parties as single partners. He does not want to meet a federation
of the other communistic parties, because all these parties together
might represent a great power , and even, hypothetically , vote
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differently to his suggestions.
These internationalists does not criticize the text of Chruszczew's
speech during the XX Congress but they believe that he had not the right
to decide by himself alone individually matters that are vital
to the other patties throughout the world.
They acknpvwledge the leading position of the Russian party but
they demand some " democracy" within the assembly of all
communistic parties. They claim that they are the true
Matxists"
They believe that Chruszezew's present policy impoverishes
the concepts of the World Communism . They say that there is ho basic
discussion on VTorld Communism affaires . Although the Russian pcrr
theSay -
is the wisest and sFiould be doubtlessly the leading party, nevertheless
a forum of exchange of experience and new ideas and concepts
should be created to avoid narrow mindness that is inevitable when
only one party makes decision for all parties.
To this group belong in Poland Komar,Hibner, '?'erfel, Wtcha
partially GierekI"Tierblowskif St 8P i?These are names not of the
highest administrative posts nevertheless these men have great
influence among the old communists in Polandand within the
Central Committee. In the USSR this group is weak and without
who belorI s to another wicj
power. It is believed that Edward Ochab supports this roup..
UnOf f toatt7
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This group cd?r that Chruszczew
almost
&iow5 a ter understanding
with the capitalists than with the world communists,
and that Chruszczew does not follow properly the M&tX philosophy.
Despite the fact that this group h,-?s not much power nevertheless
the potential and latent chances of this group are not neglectable.
d.'Polish communists 1ithin the Central Committee and the older
communists there is a remarkable group of prewar communists
that deny the ideoligical supremacy of the Russian party.
They acknowlege that the Russian party as representant o? the
comMUrt%stic Coo ntTj
most powerful party should have a leading voice in. all decisions
involv.'ng world communisn/but they deny the ideological or moral
supremacy-of this ;arty.
They hate Stalin because he c1*4d the prewar Polish Polwtbureau
the members of the Central Committee of the prewar K.P.P.
Kommunistyczna?Partia Polski, The Communistic Party of Polana7
05,4e01 a sta~emaot
Besides Stalil'aeetised? in 193Zrt-hat the Polish Central Committee
accordin fo the belief. of this 9roopu
consists of provocateurs and slanderedy~ the good name
of the Poir,h party.
They also accuse Chruszczew that he dislikes Poland and that in his
speech at the XX Congress he listed all cringes of Stalin but
did not say any word about Stalins crimes against the Polish peope
and the Polish Communistic Party.
They also accuse the Russian Central Committee of neglecting
the other communistic parties . ',hey say that dictature of the
party
pxmtWcmid proletariat andTleadership or +re-';~abrty does not mean
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dictature of one party upon the other communistic parties. They demand
" equal rights " for each party in ideological matters Iregardles
whether this part represents a powerful or less powerful country.
They also say that the Russian party after Lenin's death committed
many errors and that the Stalin period was a defeat for
the ideological development of World Communism.
They say that if not Stalin the World Communisn would be much better
off. The accuse the Russian party ofByzantinism" of complete lack of
knowlege.of the psychological features of other countries, of
poor leadership
They also dosagree with Chrusczew's methods.
The leadere of this wing are:
an4 of hers
Burgin, Kuryluk, SztachelskiI Delabinska rA i-ho ^4; lg
In October 1956 this group supported unanimously Gomulka
against Chriszczew although they differ in several matters from
Gomulka's viewpoint-
e. Pati tic Communists
This are also Polish Communists . They differ from the former
group in this point that they are not concerned too much ~?,ith
ideological phil hical and b is theorettW matters. - 'w'hey are
pragmatists, focysing the*r activities on current tactical
problems. They acknowledge the merits of the Russian party
but hhey do not want this Russian party to middle in Polish
1'.1
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of tees. They even are readZT to acknowledge the ideological.
leadership of the Russian Party but they treat the Russian party
as " teachers" but nat as superiors. 'T'hey say that the ruling party
is a party of its country and must regard the specific features
qn4
and conditions of this country,)6f the people.
only
They say: Ideological matters are most important I butyas a future goal.
At present the tactical forms must be adjusted to the Polish people.
1n eui hn4 Coh tIonS
der-e}:_ The party leads Poland hove TOOhis can not be done
.permanently againdt the will of the people only by terr.nr. For euat'np(e
}b~ei P
Communists are atheists. But if the Polish people in it-16- masses
are
is catholicsthe communists must acknowledge this fact and govern
a c- ~ holic country. Compromises are nece:ary and allowed. They say '.
~lThis is not a departure from the ideology this is - flexible tactic.
The patriotic communists emphasize that they are Poles of a communi
stic ideology. But first of all Poles. !\s communists they believe that
Polands future will be the best under communism
/ The Polish communists described in paragraph d. say that they -re first
communists and later Poles/
They say that being a communist is a patristico constructive duly
she of a good Pole. Therefore terror should be avoided
because a patriot does not suppress his o -n people . He loves his people
and hos country even with all its defects.
A patriot can demend sacrifices f o r his country and f o r his
people but not a g a i n s t his fellow-countrymen.
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The leaders of this group are Gomulka, Bienkowski, Spychalski,
Kliszko, Loga- Sowinski, Hochfeld
',ithin the Central Committee this group is not lrrge . e strength
.OUhdCO
sad on the low rank members o.0 the commoners
not on the leaders.
It might be noted that Chruszczew is also not to r:iuch concerned with
basic/ideological matters,he also is a socalled pragmatist.
Despite fundamental contrasts these Up 7C
r3gmatisi on both sides (Poland a ussA)
are able to develop some compromises and " modus vivendi" and /
even cooperate temporary by delaying the basic debats
i}1 to t-he
and arguments f-er-a- futute,
f-Chruszezew-ists This is not a correct title. There
are no re 'l Chruszczewists in thiS sense that they are
his 1x admirers of his personality. As a matter of fact
Chruszczew himself has a bad reputation in Poland bec?'use of
persecution of the Polish people during the war when Chruszczewr ::as
Stalins plenipotent for Ukraina.
The group cited hereithere are adherents of the actual secretary
of the Russian arty whoever i't would be, Not only of the party
leadership but,adherents of the aria Chief of the USSR.
'''heir subordinatio is not only ideological not only within party
matters but also adminstrative. They treat Poland aiL ready as
17 -th republic of the USSR. They see in the Russian ambassador
in .Yarsaw the real representant of governement. They treat
the Polish chief only as a deputy of the real leader that is the n
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Chief of the USSR. Under Stalin they were Stalinists
under Chruszczew they are Chruszczewists. During the short period
of L'alenkow's ruling they iyere t 1alelnkowists 1
These men have no patriotic feelings and they also h've no
ties to a sort of world communism lmke the internationalist /
ther are not " Polish " communists not " T"orld communists"
they have no ideology I only blind obedience to the actual
russian leader. The Polish people treat them as Russian agents
The leaders of this group are
Nowak, Witaszewski, 'rokarski, Sznek, Alster,
Pawlak, Kruczek/Pryma, Ruminski, Galinski1 . MatusZew5U aria cthers-
In 1956 this numerous within the party functionaires group
m=de an alliance with the groups
a/ Stalinists
b/ Ideologists
and together established the alliance of the Natolinists
to take over the power in Poland and to rule Poland almost as a
17-th republic of the USSR or dt least as the most obedient
satellite.
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g. Centrists. This is a group of flexible status
Since they are not tied to a rigid doctrine they often
play a decisive role in the balance of power within the
leadership. There are not Patriotmc Communists and not
Russian tlgents. Neverthejess they are Pro-Russian . They agree
to Polands role as satellite but they want to have stele
ellboW--room in ruling Poland.
Frequently these are the top adminstaDtors and top managers
in Poland . First of all they are ''ro- Russian but they acknowledge
that Russian methods applied to Polish people are often
fallacious . They are for pressure but not for drastic e-
terror methods.
The leaders of this group are C
yrankiewicz, Rapacki,
0
chab IJedrychowski/ Jaroszewicz.
This group is numerous within the Central Committee bfit it
in itself not a precisely degined group; the members of this
group represent scattered viewpoints but ususally they join
for a common goal.
They are mostly interested in keeping ti:eir positions
and their strength is based not on ideological factors
but on the instinct to join in the right moment this group that
is likely to win the battle. Therefore the -position of these
group is shifting frequently . During the October revolution
this group Md su
pporte; Comulka against Chruszezeva.
r' ow this group is shifting more and more to the- positions of the
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blind obedience to the Russians i. e. to the positions of
the i'?a.tolinists.
h. Revisionists. This group consist of r-ther younger people
1_........1- a-g_
_,
They Are communists who ranee.
t
c
no
the
or
They figure that the theories of MarxI Engels 1Eenin,Stalin re
have become obsolete and should be revised. This revision
shall be extended on all parties includ_ ng the Russian p:-.rty.
In this aspect there can not be any supremacy of any party.
~- a
To find tote new tactics andYnew strategy/ a review of all rules
and theories i6 necessary and a free critical unhampered
dispute is--~~eee&e . Shat 6e all o vied.
This is the wing that is most disliked by the Russian Party.
Tee yeyisioaio5t5 deny not only
the supremacy and the ultimative wisdom
of Chruszczew , and of the Russian Party as fie" collective" mind
they also deny the wisdom of the " ?Porld Communism LIind" of the
Kominterm and finally they say that the class?c theories
are obsolete.
This is not a difference in tactics only but in basic princikples.
They are a4-so convinced communists but the Russian Party
sees them as the greatest A= enemy,
The revisionists not only deny the supremacy of the Russian party
they go further. They demend a great discussion and after this
the Russian pr_rty is supposed to obey the results of this discussion.
The leaders of this group are now concealed because this group
is suppressed, In 1956 the leaders were Kuzinski / he is shifting now
16
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to Pro-Russian positions as a meber of the Polish parl-mentJ
GozdzilkI Kolaczkowski, Andrzejewski / a writer who de ted
demonstrat;vely from the party in 1958 / and the editors of
the former " Poprostu" periodic. ??orawski and Matwin were
sympathics of this group but to a certain extent only.
The power of this group is now small and they concentrate their
activity on minrr-queetireTrs cultural end social affaires.
In 1956 this group supported Gomulka and represented the most
" revolutionaire " wing.
Summary.
The various groups within the party higher levels
are listed below in a little different sequence:
1. Stalinists
2. Ideologists socalled / Leninists/
3 Chruszczewists / the core of the Natolinis s/
4. Revisionists
5. Patriotic Communists
6 Polish Communists
7. Centrists
8 Internationalists
In Poland the first three groups are called Rea.ctionaire
communists , the groups 4,5,6 Progresiv Communists
or liberal communists the group 7 and 8 Centrists
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in three age ~ v,?,~is
However such a break own~does not illustrate the differences
within each of these .tea . 9 ro U p .
In 1956 the first wing was Prd- Russian and Pro- Chruszczew
the second wing was Pro- Gomulka and anti-Chruszczew, the third
wing shifted after some consideration on Gomulka's side.
- el ht
In 1959 already 8,1 7 groups are Pro-Russian but to dif*rent extents.
only the revisionists are still ant!Russian a-nd strAvlfaneovsly
the revisionists are n o w against Gomulka.
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PUSFIAN AGENTS ON KEY POSITIONS
In October 1956 Gomulka won the battle against Chruszczew
and against Chruszczew's supporters Wj~thin the Polish party that i- the
rihl-MaPoly
,cSti- y/because of two reasons
First : Chruszczewr was wreak at this time' it was ajspeciz' situ-
ation after the XX Congress ; Chruszczew had many adverslaries in his own
party Iin his own country, and within all communistkic parties
in the non ommunis,_,4V countries and also within the Eastern
bloc, Hungary, Poland , d~? -y 6, r 1 q ~ 4 ~~~So ver i!-nc@ i rl' etc .
Second: Gomulka was backed by the centrists/ revisionists
Polish communists/Patriotic Communists and interantion 2lists. V)CI
6y ~E'te pe?I7te
After October 1956 Comulka made a compromise with Chruszczew.
This cleared to some degree the relation to the Pussian party
however Comulka had to pay a price for this . He lost the support
of the revisionists and of the intelligence
This process developed further and in 1959 Gomulka lost apre^,ay
[ 1
the support of the Polish communists
/ h c's i.:.c ev : ioni::ts/
f
the Patriotic Communists / He also lost the support of the farm popu-
lation anf now he is loosing popularity ,,among the vorlkers.
But in exchange he gained the support of the Natolinists
Now Gomulka already is surrounded by Natolinists and
by+.Ehe bii_ large group of centrists. But these centrists are
changing their posstion ; they are shifting to the Natolinists.
~5 Surrounded by a r~,ajorat-y that-is died
This means that Gomulka no,' es ate m^r? ^p
B4
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Pro
tamed with the Russian groups.
In a hipotheticalk controversy with Chruszczew Gomulka would have be-
hind him only the following men of the le,_ :_.Q_ t expo its G - but at present th {iia `f rket cP?-
cetf~ iS Cam? =
er surply
used to export rewap} le qua s-?crf eggs, bacon et
!'t44 p-'e-A A 1101%r-7
i.let'ea7 export % alb _> al
even increased t4 exported ge es of bacon it 9: 4
Tfl & -e reverish1almost desperate I attempts are made to
GZ ~C_. tttc/~cu-~ 'j
export machinery,? h_+Q-een e prospects with respect
to the satellite countries, China, Vietn _ orea(in small ON,
to.thesae two latter countries y. r.Polish machinery
CL-
h found uukt?FM the underdeveeoped countries Asia and .`?frica.,
Pdbish machinery must be sold to incredibily low prices because of competi-
tion b of T'entern countries and even pf East Germany and Czechoslovakia
Hungary . Th chine industry ;, d? is = -/ _ V h .
but this advantage is re ~e~ri., by low productivity. &Jt land m u s t
Cost of production high and quality. low. Especially the materials
used are of low quality because of lack of high quality steel, and
L r4 r/~
soo ored metal / copper, brass ,tin~ nie utc./
act
The only Qni5 competitive factor i-s the low wages of the Polish ,,workers,
ex~ort machinery regardless price and losses. The small quantities o~
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high quality steel and'redlor White metal that is available
in Poland is used for exported machinery that must be sh e -(delivered)
with two complete sets of spare parts. Machinery for domestic
use is manufactured of lotger quality material and sold w i t h o u t
TAe re, 15
spare parts on the domestic market.pradue-i-ftg a tremendous shortage
0.4.E, .e o f
of spare parts. ,uipment,tin the construction industry
_ >
is idle because of/shortage of spare parts. The picture i'
in other industries!! .vv P/ Ple-e-i2 v7-
e.irect losses of the machinery export business are very
large1but be indirect losses for the entire industrial development
and exploita'stion of existing plant and equipment in Poland ire
. la rger A
Export of machinery became a great factor o ie Polish exporto
/ /J11'
"bile the share of machinery export in We total exports of----2oian
in 1949 vt9s 2.4 ,i tl share - w 1959- 26.5
this is presented as a success of the Polish economy by the party,
however the export of machinery gi es no p of't only losses The only-
~? ^?^+y+ ie t.". - Flan receives ` dol ars on oth ester currency
~
.Of
economy '
Exchange'X..I-ram-a member of the jmmittee of engineering
Information Exchange and Scientific Cooperation " in the a
z'
ez 11 t ineerJfor example
Li.t to Aoeeda to praet: n a metallurgical plant. '`fter
bat f requo;4tfy
6 months he - urns. is "ate signed a job in a complete - iff er e nt
aR4s~ ransferred to a t e r jo 66b7o ng--to na eat - ~-en
made in 1957 c 5tTp~ of the construction engineers sent
to the USSR for specialization in a certain field duriig
1951 - 1957 a~i-ztonV/ n Poland.
They go obs nod r Iated to t'r~ s Ytieh they were
sent t-~se. Tlais..s:,.the-~= ~~xas_::turnover
and fluctue.tiorr-CThi~s turn -~+b---s-icus.na`_~`~p
.s.- 1&w. T4w,q hi-ab-utl nwr t e quali y
State Planning Commission Polish economists ? e~~--
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world. 'edrychovwski 4-i tralso is eenin-
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`4P ntion ~ e Viceminister
saw in Eng:_and/ France and ?Jest
~,~//, 4P~~R+pp? ' } c6~3xrr~v~of
ype?/
best and most
Poland, c obsolete
/ ~2~ ~~/~_ and so tr Vice ire ear Jarv?xe +~c~ ?~
e t.. e::chan,,e -.:ith the '-est ? orld' its trend itr
v did not sav leR1 mnrh
and specialists visited ?'stern Countries after 1956,,xK
in the USSR ter 1956. n Severl Roman ministers
te3-~_
ea-u? ~~ter return
r _
Germany i twice or three times
This opinion ie-deflnt in Poland.
Keh told m e that machinery t he
ww~
they admitted t 4rt z
" eyes opened" and t
criticized Fp-'the level
IT
qnd
of engir eerin devveelooppment in the USSR in. r satellite
1e tyre ,hat a similar project made by designers
when compared -4th the Acaeent level of modern foundry construction.
4ke with Flsi equipment would give 35 ;~ higher productivity.
The gaps in of -,er industries is much greater especiplly in
aarlaing:~rr~e~tsr3af---t~rtre
/% /Z_
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III Gomulka ' s
Assistance. It is-=s
de Port
complete plants; 4i /
The trend to export complete plants is p part of a hughA pro-
gram initiated and spore Fred by the Council of Mutual Economic
arallel entry
into a specific country both by the USS by the satelli countries.
a Gomulka ~~~~~~~ with
'y err ie--C.e ey.l
q.
this pr_ pre. complete nlw s _a e expor+-a
f Co
rho es sPrva?I by +h~_~?o~_z i '
x/11 wT'r
Eastern bloc , of mouth AmericaAfrica
Asia. a-e, o- -