MILITARY NEWS: RECONNAISSANCE OF THE ENEMY ATOMIC MEANS, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL OF ARTILLERY G. NADYSEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400330001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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MISSILES, ARTILLERY, PVO
Reconnaissance of the Enemy Atomic Means
by
Lieutenant-General of Artillery G. Nadysev
Before launching an offensive, the main task of the
troops lies in the dependable neutralization or
destruction of enemy atomic means, first and foremost
his atomic artillery, his launchers (ustanovka) for
guided missiles and free rockets (upravlyaemyy..i
neupravlyaemyy snaryad)and cruise missiles (samolet-
snaryad), his atomic ammunition (atomnyye boyepripasy)
at the places where it is stored, at depots, during
transport, at the places where they are assembled, the
missile guidance systems (sistema navedeniya snaryadov),
his technical subunits (podrazdelenie), etc.
At the present time, in the U.S. Army the principal
means for delivering nuclear charges to targets are
missiles (snaryad) and cruise missiles
(samolet-snaryad)
of the "surface-to-surface" type of various designations.
It is with these,weapons that infantry and tank large
units are being armed and army corps, field armies, and
army groups are being strengthened. Thus, a U.S.
field army may have the following: 30.to 40 batteries
of atomic artillery (203.2 mm howitzers, 280 mm guns);
up to 18 free rocket (NURS -neupravlyay_emyy'reaktivnyy
snaryad) batteries of the "Honest John" type; 4 or 5
guided missile (URS - upravlyayemyy raketnyy snaryad)
battalions of the "Corporal" and "Sergeant" type; 2 to
4 "Redstone" guided missile batteries; and 3 "Matador"
cruise missile detachments (otryad). In addition, in
the army zone (polosa) there may be up to 6 depots (sklad)
with ammunition (boyepripasy) and cruise missiles with
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conventional and atomic warheads (atomnoye snaryazheniye).
Thus, when preparations are being made to launch a
front offensive operation, reconnaissance will have to
detect the location of up to 60 to 70 objectives of
enemy atomic means of the "surface-to-surface"--type.
in support of operational-tactical (operativno-
takticheskaya) and tactical (takticheskaya) missiles,
aviation, and artillery.
In the performance of this task the role of artillery
reconnaissance, which must determine the coordinates
of targets accurately and in good time, has increased
greatly.
In this connection let us state some considerations
concerning reconnaissance of enemy atomic means on
the basis of experience gained at command staff and
tactical exercises.
It is known that the instruments with which artillery
reconnaissance is equipped (sound, optical) can determine
the coordinates of targets only at the main line of
resistance and of enemy batteries firing from the
immediate tactical depth of up to 8 to 10 km. Consequent-
ly, sound and optical reconnaissance cannot be regarded
to any extent as a major means for determining the
coordinates of atomic batteries and of guided missiles
and free rocket launchers (ustanovka) which may possibly
be located at the limits of the maximum range of these
weapons. At best, subunits equipped with sound-ranging
and optical instruments will be able to fix the location
of launchers or guns at the moment of firing or launching.
But the coordinates so received cannot serve as a basis
on which we can strike back, for, in the first place,
they are not accurate, and secondly, the target will
change its location immediately after firing and our
strike will be against a vacant area.
For many reasons, the radiotechnical stations of
ground artillery are also unable to fulfil such tasks.
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At the present time, only spotter-reconnaissance
aviation (korrektirovochano-razvedyvatelnaya aviatsiya)
is capable of fulfilling the task of reconnoitering
euemy.-atomic weapons to any extent. However, the IL-28
and IL-28-R aircraft, and the MI-lkr helicopters
available for this purpose cannot satisfy us. In
reality the depth of reconnaissance has greatly
increased, the artillery staffs require the coordinates
of targets at a depth of up to 350 kms-or more. The
aircraft referred to above are unable to carry out
reconnaissance or final reconnaissance (dorazvedka)
at such a depth. Moreover, the crew of an aircraft,
provided with small-scale maps, cannot determine the
location of a target accurately by visual observation;
the best they can do is to give only the approximate
area in which it is located. The results of aerial
photography also often lose their value owing to the
length of time it takes to process them. Aircraft
and helicopters are not equipped for carrying out
reconnaissance at night, whereas in modern battle
conditions most of the changes in locations, especially
of subunits and units of atomic means, are made at night.
As is known, MI,-lkr helicopters carry out
reconnaissance from the area in which their troops are
disposed to an insignificant depth. Observation from
a helicopter by means of existing optical instruments
is very difficult. Cotnsequently, from a helicopter it
is impossible to reconnoiter not only atomic means, but
even batteries of conventional field artillery.
The need arises to have spotter-reconnaissance
aviation capable of carrying out not only the tasks of
final reconnaissance of targets, but also to reconnoiter
them, fulfilling both the'tactical and the operational
reconnaissance tasks. In our opinion, the operation of
spotter-reconnaissance aviation should be subordinated. to
the interests of missile troops, in order to ensure, in
the best possible way, the fulfilment of the task of
combatting enemy atomic means. For this it is essential
that aircraft (including pilotless ones) be equipped with
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the latest instruments, enabling enemy targets to be
seen and photographed from great heights and at great
speeds, and also be able to carry out reconnaissance
to a greater depth than at present, so that their
equipment would permit the crew to determine the
coordinates of targets rapidly and accurately, under
any conditions, and to report them immediately to
the interested headquarters. These requirements also
apply to helicopters.
We suggest that the time has come to reorganize
the whole organizational structure of spotter-reconnaissance aviation. Like other means of technical
reconnaissance, it must be included organizationally
in the composition of motorized-rifle and tank large
units (soyedineniye) and of field armies. This is
called for by the appearance of subunits and units of
tactical and operational-tactical missiles and by the
need to provide them with accurate reconnaissance data
in good time.
The: headquarters of an artillery division should
have at its command a flight (zveno) of helicopters
or aircraft, the-.artillery headquarters of an army -
a spotter-reconnaissance squadron, and the headquarters
of artillery of a front - one or two separate spotter-
reconnaissance aviation regiments (OKRAP - otdelnyy
korrektirovochno-razvedyvatelnyy aviatsionnyy polk).
.Despite all its technical perfections, artillery
reconnaissance cannot, of course, fulfil the full range
of tasks of reconnoitering enemy atomic means. Only
by close cooperation between all forms of reconnaissance
can the grouping'(gruppirovka) of these means be fully
disclosed. The intelligence elements (razvedyvatelnyy
organ) of all arms and types of troops are also obliged
to undertake reconnaissance in the interests of the
missile troops, and must consider this to'be one of their
main missions.
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It is thought than an effective way of reconnoitering
enemy atomic means would be to send special groups to
various depths into the enemy rear area. If the personnel
of such units are thoroughly trained, and this. must be
organized now, in peacetime, if they have good equipment,
and if their operating areas are correctly chosen (taking
into account the probable disposition of atomic means),
if control of the units is centralized and they have
uninterrupted communications, they can obtain very
valuable information.
The main mission of groups sent into the enemy
rear area should be reconnaissance of atomic means for
the benefit of artillery and missile troops.. Success
in this depends to a great extent on efficient cooperation
between all the various forms of reconnaissance. They must
be directed toward final reconnaissance and reconnaissance
of those targets about which information has been received
from other sources. In this connection, a greater role
should be played by the combined-arms intelligence
elements in obtaining information on targets which will
be fixed on by tactical and operational-tactical missiles.
We consider that it will be incorrect to concentrate
the efforts of many forms of reconnaissance only on the
detection of atomic artillery batteries and of the
launchers of guided missiles and free rockets.
It is known that the launchers and guns of atomic
artillery remaintin their firing and launching positions
for a minimum time, as a rule, the time required to carry
out only one launching or firing. For instance,. launchers
of the "Honest John" type remain in position for only
15 to 20 minutes, "Corporal" - for 2 to 21 hours, and
launchers of "Redstone" ballistic missiles - up to
4 . hours.
Experience shows that the amount of time that elapses
from the moment that the target is detected in a firing
position until it is hit by a missile is such that enemy
launchers and guns can change their position. Consequently,
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when launchers of any designation are detected in
positions, it is essential to watch them continuously
until the moment of their destruction. This requires
a concentration of numerous reconnaissance means, all
the more so because atomic subunits move, as a rule, at
night.
.
er
headquarters of a front and of an army, it is important
to draw up a detailed plan for the reconnoitering of
enemy atomic means which should constitute a basic part
of, the general plan of artillery reconnaissance.
However, the measures. taken by the artillery
headquarters to reconnoiter atomic means make up only
part of the measures which must be provided for in the
reconnaissance plan of a combined-arms intelligence
element. The essence of these measures lies in the
coordination of the efforts of all reconnaissance forms.
and means of a front. (army) in regard to place and time.
The organization of cooperation in this matter should,
of course, be placed on the shoulders of the intelligence
On the,'. other hand, the destruction of one or two
launchers, for instance, in "Honest John" battalions
of free rockets or "Corporal" guided missiles, or one
or.two batteries of 203.2 mm howitzers or 280 mm guns,
does not mean that the enemy will no longer be able to
continue his atomic strikes. In order to exclude the
possibility of mass atomic strikes by the enemy, it is
necessary first of all to destroy his atomic ammunition
in the places. where it is stored, assembled, at depots,
during transport, etc. The targets against which strikes"
should be carried out should include radar stations,
missile guidance systems, plants (installations) for
producing fuel, storage depots, and technipal subunits.
It will be much more difficult for the enemy to.restore
such targets than to replace destroyed launchers and
guns. For this reason the main efforts of reconnaissance
should be directed toward the discovery of; such targets.
The most important facet in organizing reconnaissance
is its thorough and careful planning
At the artill
y
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directorate of a front and the intelligence department
(otdel) of an army with instructions to the effect
that in drawing up plans for reconnaissance cooperation
they should give priority to the interests of the missile
troops.
Experience gained during exercises shows that the
reconnaissance plan of an artillery headquarters of a
front (army) has in essence already become a plan for
reconnoitering atomic means, as these questions constitute
the main part of the plan.
The distribution of tasks and targets between
artillery headquarters, of various sizes, has great
significance in the planning of reconnaissance. Thus,
it is expedient to concentrate the planning of reconnaissance
of enemy tactical atomic means (atomic artillery, missiles and free rockets such as "Honest John", "Little
John", '.'Lacrosse") in the army, because the main role
in combatting these means is played by the army artillery,
while in the case of means intended for operational-
tactical purposes (guided missiles such as "Corporal",Sergeant", "Redstone", the cruise missile "Matador") -
the planning should be the responsibility of the front.
The reconnaissance of enemy conventional field artillery
must be planned mainly by the headquarters of division
artillery. In this connection, the question. arises of
resolutely equipping the artillery of motorized-rifle
and tank divisions, armies, and fronts with powerful means
for carrying out reconnaissance.
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