MILITARY THOUGHT: THE FUNDAMENTAL SCHEME OF A FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL V. BASKAKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 n)(1-HI IM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
The Fundamental Scheme of a. Front Offensive Operation
by
Lieutenant-General V.. Baskakov
The concept. of .the "fundamental scheme of an operation" is
not familiar to our readers, so we shall define at once what we,mean
by, it.
All operations of one war are waged by almost one. and,.the
same means of armed combat, and most, often .the organizational
forms of troops in.all operations likewise remain, unchanged. Thus,
within. the extreme diversity, of :the . specific features of.the: front
offensive, operations. of the, Second World War,. one can discern
.specific traits characteristic of almost all of them. This was also
noted in..the operations of .the First World War,
The substance of.these general traits characteristic .of all.
operations of a given. war and. taken in total we propose'.to.call
.the fundamental scheme of an operation. By summarizing .the
basic characteristics of operations- into a, single scheme,..it is
easy to understand not only the substance and meaning of each
...of these characteristics,, but also the mutual relationship. and
meaning of them in .the -operation as a whole. Such an. examina -
.tion.of the basic. characteristics of an operation of the last war
..is very convenient, and..makes it easier to establish graphically
their, suitability or unsuitability under modern conditions and.to
determine the fundamental scheme of an operation in a. future. war.
The fundamental scheme,.put forth by us,; of an. offensive
operation. of a.front in.the period of.the- Second World War;,(diagram
1) .is not. a. copy of any operation..that took.place.. Nonetheless,
among the great number of operations,. there,is none whose basic
and.fundamental characteristics would not be reflected. on. the
given diagram.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12: CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
:1 I
50X1-HUM
. We shall make clear why the fundamental scheme of a front
offensive. operation..in.the last war was the way, it was.
The basic features of an operation are determined first of all
by what type of armed forces, what arm of troops is the main. one
and what constitutes .the basis of their. combat. strength. As is known,
in the last war the chief means for conducting military operations
and-the basic combat strength of the armed forces were ground
troops, consisting of combined arms armies (which-in turn con-
sisted of rifle divisions) and partly, of large units of armored
troops .(tank and mechanized corps organized. by brigades).
Besides this, the level of development: of industrial production,
science, and of technology in many countries was,, by .the beginning
of .the. Second World War,, already high. enough to 'guarantee produc -
.tion of a variety of military equipment and arms. : This also per-
mitted-the belligerents to bring their. operational art out from the
stagnant position in. which. it found itself at the end of .the First
World War. . At the same time, it was still impossible to bring
about complete motorization of all ground .troops, as a. result of
which.the basic combat complement of armies and-fronts remained
the rifle-divisions. . The quantitative growth and.the ?qualitative
development of artillery, aviation,. and. other means of neutrali-
zation,, the raising of their destructive capabilities, striking
power' and .range of 'operation. still could. not essentially, alter- their
roles- as combat and operations support weapons.
The aviation, artillery, chemical, engineer,, airborne and
other arms of troops with all of their combat equipment only
assisted in accomplishing major combat and operational. tasks,
but independently, they could not completely accomplish them.
By, virtue of this, the outcome of combat and o:'~' an opLmation
.depended mainly on.the success of the operations of the infantry
divisions, which. constituted not only the basis but also the abso-
lute majority of the forces of ground troops. . The destruction of
the most important groupings 'of the enemy's ground troops was
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
50X1-HUM
the main purpose-,, the basic. content of operations and of combat
operations in general. In this, all attention was concentrated on
.routing the enemy in the tactical and immediate operational depth,
where the significant part of his infantry divisions was located.
This was reflected in essence in the whole character of the
last war and in.the methods and forms of conducting combat opera-
tions,, including the fundamental scheme for mounting an.. offensive
operation of a.front.
The depth of a front operation was determined by the. disposi-
Lion of the ground troops,. the means for reinforcement, the control
.points, the rear installations and the basic forces of .the. tactical avia-
tion of the group of enemy armies, and was 200- to 300. kilometers.
An offensive began, as a rule, with a breakthrough of the
solid front of the enemy's combat formations on..the most. impor-
..tant axes and swiftly developed to the immediate operational depth,
frequently leading to the encirclement of enemy troops.. Such a
method of conducting an operation was the only one possible,, because N
the weapons of neutralization in that period, with all. allowance for
their concentration,. could not by themselves destroy :the enemy's
divisions of ground.troops and the means for their reinforcement.
Our analogous divisions could rout, destroy, or capture the person-
nel
of the enemy divisions only when they had.the necessary superi-
ority in forces and with advantageous operational preconditions.
Under these conditions,an important role in, taking .the decision
.for planning a front operation was played by the choice of the.: axes
for the main and auxiliary strikes, the concentration on those axes
of the necessary forces, and the establishment Over the enemy of
a.superior.ity which guaranteed the. success of combat operations,
The theory of the main..strike was fundamental in the operational
art of the period of the Second World War. Therefore,. the main
strike also occupies the most important place on Diagram 1, which
Declassified in Part'- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
The exploitation of a breakthrough was accomplished by commit-
ting tank and mechanized troops into the battle, which assured high
speeds for. the. offensive. The study of the operational exploitation of
a breakthrough utilizing a mobile. arm of troops, of .the deployment of
this arm of troops, and of the bases of the organization and prepara-
tion of its large, units was also the. most important. in..the operational
art and in the military science of that Perj , a -a .wwaoia.
In the fundamental scheme of a.front offensive operation of the
last. war there was. shown the. use. of large, units of armored troops for
purposes of operational exploitation.of a. breakthrough. and completion
of the encirclement. of the basic grouping of .the enemy's .troops.
Obviously, there,.is no need to prove.. that, the fundamental
scheme of a.. front offensive operation. of the last war, can, no longer
express the content of an. operation in a modern nuclear/missile war.
Consequently,, the problem consists of discovering in what
measure. the new fundamental scheme of an operation in a modern
war differs from the former scheme, which elements from the. old
scheme retain.their significance, which. will disappear completely,
and.which will be. transformed under. the new conditions.
The degree, of these differences is determined by the changes
which occurred. in . the postwar period.and which, can occur. in..the
future, primarily in.the development of the productive forces and
the. political conditions of life. in .a society. , The significant devel-
opment of the. productive. forces of a. society and of the,weapons of
armed.combat cannot fail to cause a substantial change in. the forms
and methods of conducting combat operations in modern warfare
and, certainly, introduces specific corrections into the fundamental
scheme of a front operation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
 i r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
. The basic means of armed combat and of the basic combat
strength of the belligerents, as we have already examined earlier,
will not be divisions of ground troops and not ground troops as a
whole, no matter how they might be supplied with the weapons neces -
sary for conducting,a mobile war, but nuclear/missile weapons and
the. troops which assure.their. use,. the destruction of which .is the
main goal of the military operations of the belligerents. 50X1-HUM
In connection. with this, the. number of divisions in.the com-
plement of a front. will decrease significantly, and additional .large
units and units which ensure. the use of nuclear/missile weapons
will be included. However, this does not mean. a belittling or nega-
tion of the, important role of ground troops in routing of the enemy.
The role of ground. and airborne troops will be determined by the
need.to complete the rout of an enemy who has been subjected to
nuclear, strikes,. to take and. consolidate an. area, to establish the
forward edge of contact with the enemy's troops,, and to protect
and defend the operational rear area.
The content of the fundamental scheme of a front offensive
operation in modern.warfare must also specify all of .this.
Considering the nature of nuclear/missile warfare, one. can
raise .the question: will a front offensive operation take place at
all? Will the. war not end with the conduct of the .initial massive
nuclear/missile strike, in conjunction with the utilization of chem~
c l and bacteriological weapons? Indeed, at the moment there
exist bases for raising such questions. It is enough. to cite, for
example,. the, possibility of the, complete annihilation of whole
countries by nuclear weapons in short periods of time. Despite 50X1-HUM
this, however,. we. consider that the operation.. as a. specific form
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
50X1-HUM
of armed combat is also retained in modern warfare. It is impos-
sible to reduce a future war only to an initial strategic nuclear, strike.
Such a strike, unquestionably, is a definite part,. a stage, of such
an operation. After. these strikes an attempt must be made to con.-
duct simultaneously and successively a series of operations in
various theaters of military operations and operational axes. . The
basic content of these operations will be the conduct, of powerful
nuclear/missile strikes and vigorous actions by ground and air-
borne troops, the Air Force, and the Navy.
The main purpose of a modern operation,, as is known, is the
destruction of the enemy's nuclear/ missile. weapons. The front,
which operates in. specific demarcated lines and under the condi-
tions existing in one theater, cannot carry on. combat against, for
example, intercontinental missile bases located on different. conti-
nents because.. it does, not have the necessary intelligence organs
and weapons of destruction. It is clear that..it is necessary to call
on.the weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High
,.Command for combat against them.
In connection, with this,, the place of the, front operation.in
modern warfare.will be determined, in our view, by which enemy
nuclear weapons the front must destroy, under the given. conditions.
It is known that the nuclear/missile weapons of the USA are dis-
tributed in groups: the weapons of operational-tactical designation
.for ground troops, with limited tactical -technical potentialities,
the majority of which are located close to the line of contact of
the troops,and a part ,not farther than 100 to 150 kilometers, medium
range missiles (2, 000. to 3, 000 kilometers), which are distributed
at a depth of 500 to 1, 500..to 2, 000 kmfrom the line of contact of
the belligerents; and.finally intercontinental missiles with a range
of 8, 000. to 10, 000 kilometers or more.
The front's composition will be changed, depending on which
group (groups) of nuclear/missile weapons it must destroy. Thus,
if the mission of a.front is to destroy and annihilate the operational-
tactical nuclear/missile weapons and the first echelon of ground
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
troops, then its composition can be close to that currently accepted
and the depth of such an operation will not change substantially in
comparison with the experience of the last war. In-this casethe
destruction of the operational and strategic. nuclear/missile weapons
and the following echelons of ground troops, located beyond the
limits of the depth of the front operation, must be accomplished with
weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
.or it will be necessary to organize either a group of fronts or. a.com-
mand and staff for the theater- of. rnilitary. operations with the appro-
priate combat weapons to perform these missions,
In our view, the most acceptable version of the mii.on of a
front is the liquidation.of all nuclear/missile weapons designated
by the enemy for combat on, a given axis and distributed within the
boundaries of a given continent.. In.this case, the meaning of a
.front as the basic level of command in. the organization. of armed
combat is preserved and removes the necessity of establishing
intervening levels (a group of fronts or a command.for. the theater
of :military operations is eliminated). The.General Headquarters
is thus freed from carrying out the missions which the front forma-
tions are able to perform. Besides this, destruction.of the enemy's
nuclear/mis'sile weapons requires the immediate deployment of the
operations of ground and.airborne landing troops throughout the
depth.of the given axis. This will be more difficult for. the General
Headquarters of the. Supreme High Command to carry out than
for the front, which has these troops at .its disposal and is able
to organize their coordinated. operations. In this case, the nuclear/
missile weapons located outside the boundaries of the offensive
zone and of the missions of the fronts and chiefly on other continents
and on the ocean will be destroyed by weapons of the General
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
In connection with this, the-d. th of a front operation must
be sharply increased, and this will be-its new identifying charac-
teristic. It should be noted that the calculated.- depth of a.front
operation since the last war has grown repeatedly.. In, the postwar
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3 1_.
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
years it was 300, to 400 kilometers, with the appearance of nuclear/
missile weapons it was 500 to 600 kilometers, and at the present
time it reaches 1, 000 kilometers and more.
It seems to us that the depth of a-front bperation, as well as
the width of its offensive zone, must. be defined on. the basis of the
role of the front in routing the enemy. Taking.the above statements
into account
, we consider that. the depth of a. modern front opera-
tion must reach 2, 000 to 3, 000 kilometers. All enemy nuclear/
missile weapons designated for combat in a given axis will be
distributed within the. boundaries of this area.. The width of -the
front zone.will also grow. to 500 to 700 kilometers and more.
Thus, the front operation. of the future must become an actual
deep operation which meets the modern requirements for the
simultaneous' destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons
throughout the depth -of a given theater of military operations.
In the operations of past wars, simultaneous fire effect
against the entire depth of the enemy's defense could, dot be
realized beca esu of the 12ck of sufficiently powerful and long-
range weapons of neutralization (with the exception, of course,
of aviation) and in practice did not exert a decisive influence -on
the outcome of an .operation. Nuclear/missile weapons permit
accomplishment of the simultaneous neutralization. of the enemy
at a depth of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, and the
full motorization and mechanization of the armies and the mass
use of airborne troops ensures the swift transfer of operations to
.the operational depth where the enemy's basic weapons of nuclear
attack will be located. In.connection with this, modern, front opera-
tions will. be distinguished mainly by the delivery of massive nuclear/
missile strikes on the enemy's nuclear weapons and other important
objectives and by the quick exploitation of the results of these strikes
by ground and airborne. landing troops.
An.e.ssential modification will occur, in,par.ticular,. in, the
operations of the ground troops.. Full. motorization and mechanization
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
of ground troops, it would seem, facilitates swift. operations for the
purpose of the most rapid penetration into the enemy's operational
depth, of exploiting the results of the nuclear/missile strikes
delivered against him, and of completing his rout. However, the
possible speed of advance of large units of ground troops and the
rate of the offensive .(100 kilometers and more per, 24-hour period)
still will not guarantee the immediate gaining of nuclear and other
targets of operational significance or their destruction.
Even the maximum speeds of a modern operation allow an
enemy to reorganize to a, certain degree, to transfer the surviv-
ing nuclear, weapons to other regions, to bring up new forces from
the zone of :interior, and to organize resistance to .the attacking
troops. Therefore, we must look for something else, namely, for
the operations of troops with significantly greater speed than.that
which ground troops have.
During the Civil War and the Second World War. the assign-
ment and skillful use of the mobile. arm of. troops as an. independent
operational category yielded great advantage, and. there are no
grounds to consider that. in modern.warfare this principle will not
be accepted.
The conduct of deep operations and the transfer. of vigorous
operations to a significant operational depth of the enemy's forma-
tion in short periods of time will be more essential now than in
past wars. Therefore, the significance of the mobile arm of
troops not only does not decrease.,but even increase s. .
The mobility of troops must be such that they can get to
regions where the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons are.located
literally just a few hours after, the delivery of our nuclear strikes
and before the enemy 'succeeds. in re-establishing his own combat
effectiveness and in eliminating consequences of.these strikes.
This can be achieved only by airborne landing troops, as
well as motorized rifle units and large units, transferred to the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
enemy's operational depth by air transport. However, one must speak
not of the dropping or landing of separate operational airborne landing
forces into the enemy's deep rear area, but of the massive use in
the operation of airborne and motorized rifle troops as a mobile arm
of the troops.
weapons were shown. The need to create cumbersome groupings
of ground troops which are, a good target for the enemy's nuclear
attacks is precluded by the solution in.the operation.
Such will be,. in our opinion, the basic characteristics of
an offensive operation of a front in a future war. which also must
but on several axes as separate large units and even as units,
while carrying out a broad maneuver during the operation.
As an example, I should like to note the decision.taken by
the commander of the southern side in. an operational exercise
in.1960. One of the most important characteristics of this deci-
sion, in. our view, is that in. it several new means of conducting
an. operation under conditions of the mass use of nuclear/missile
Reviewing the fundamental scheme of an operation in modern
warfare (Diagram 2.), I should like to draw the reader's attention to
the question of the principle of the main strike and its role in. a
-modern operation. We examined t isFi" p oblem in detail in an article
published in the first issue of the. Special Collection in. 1960.. Under
modern conditions, to attach the operations of.the basic forces of
the front and primarily. of nuclear/missile weapons to a, specific
axis, even a very important one for the operations of ground troops
in the front zone,, is completely incorrect. , The concentration of
forces and weapons on a specific axis in. an operation can no longer
be a definite operational principle and must be replaced by the
principle of concentration of the basic efforts of a front on the
destruction .of. the,enemy's.. nuclear/ mis.sile_ w.eap.ons._.and.the. basic
groupings of his ground troops. Ina is, the-ground troops of a'
front will- function not as large groupings and not on. a solid front,
operation.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
The diagram presented reflects these characteristics and.. can be
looked upon as typical for a~front offeris'ive operation.
This diagram shows that the primary weapon, for routing the
enemy in an operation is nuclear/missile weapons and not ground
troops and, that divisions of ground troops and airborne troops are
used only for purposes of completing the enemy's destruction.
The operation .begins with a .powerful nuclear strike on the
nuclear/missile weapons and the basic groupings of ground and'
airborne troops, the aviation and the navy of the enemy. - Simul-
taneously.with this strike or immediately, thereafter the .troops of
the first operational echelonshift'to the'offensive, and -:an,*.air borne
landing operation is carried out. Graphically the destruction. of
nuclear. weapons and the defeat of the enemy's troops by the
nuclear weapons of a front are indicated on,the diagram by. areas
of complete neutralization and by zones with high levels of
radiation.
The basic groups of missile troops and. the fundamental
apportionment of missions among them are reflected on the dia-
gram. The -use of mediuium r_a.nge_missiles with a firing range of
up to 1, 000 to 1, 500 kilometers, which are designated for .the.
destruction of the troops of/a group of the enemy's armies and
nuclear/missile weapons'within .the limits of this range, must
be closely coordinated with. the operations of the first operational
echelon' of-the ground-troops and airborne troops which have. been
thrown into the immediate operational depth. The use of long
range missiles with a firing range of 4, 000 to 5, 000 kilometers
must coordinated with,-.the execution of basic airborne land-
ing operations in the operational, depth of dispositio of tl'ie
enemy's troops. It is possible that the number of classes and
groups of nuclear/missile weapons can also be different if
this depends on considerations of an economic or. technical
nature. From an operational viewpoint,. however,. it is suffi-
cient to have missiles of the indicated classes as the weapons
of a.front.
50X1-HUM
l
i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
The most important principle of a deep operation is expressed
on the diagram as the simultaneous neutralization by nuclear weapons
of all of the most important targets and primarily of .the. ene,y's
weapons of mass destruction, his ground, and airborne troop and
his aviation in the entire depth. of their possible disposition to the
borders of the continent, in conjunction with the offensive of the
first echelon of ground troops and with the operations of powerful
airborne forces in the deep operational rear area of the enemy.
The ground troops have been represented as two echelons.
The first operational echelon consists of two armies consisting in
.all of 12 to 15 divisions and designated for completion of the rout
of the troops of the enemy's group of armies. . The second opera=
-tional echelon consists of one army with 7 or 8 divisions, ..whose
mission is not to develop success in..the operation,. as was done
formerly,, but defense of the operational rear area of the front
and combat with the operational airborne landing forces of the
enemy during the whole operation. The large units of the second
echelon.. of the front can be utilized in case of the need to augment
the efforts of the attacking armies of the first echelon. and also
as operational landing forces. The divisions which have been
operating in the first echelon and have lost. their combat effec-
tiveness are removed from combat and are used to. fill out. the
.complement of the second echelon.
The airborne landing troops are represented on the dia-
gram as an.. airborne army consisting of .three or four. airborne
divisions assigned to seize a landing area for the. operational
landing forces of the front, and also for coordinated operations
with the first operational echelon..of the ground troops.
On the whole, according to the diagram of an operation,
the composition of a front consists of four army commands-'in all
uniting 25 to 30 motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions.
As is known, during the last, war approximately, 30 to 35 and
more divisions were included. in the composition of a front.
Considering that now the.front's zone will be.increased by two
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3 __
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
or three times,. the number of divisions of ground troops and airborne
troops in a modern operation will be :reduced approximately by three
times.
As rough operational calculations show, a..front needs approxi-
mately 250 to 300 nuclear (including about 50 hydrogen) warheads
with an overall yield .of 120, 000 to 150, 000 kilotons to accomplish
its missions. Up to 100 missile launching. mounts and about 30 to
40 delivery aircraft are needed by the front-in order to utilize these
warheads. With.. effective use of this quantity of nuclear/missile
.weapons, about 25 to 30 missile bases and depots of nuclear war-
heads, 30 to 40 airfields, 25 to 30 divisions of ground.troops,
15 to 20 naval bases, and other objectives can be destroyed.
The forces and weapons of the front. will be echeloned to a
depth of 2, 000 to 3, 000 kilometers. A depth of distribution of the
forces of a front of 200 to 300 kilometers,, as was .the case. in the
last war,. does not answer the new conditions.
A front control echelon of the existing organization will no "\
longer be able to direct a front operation conducted according to
the proposed scheme. The modern field control echelon. of a
front, besides a.headquarters, must have commanders and staffs
of the missile, ground, and airborne troops, antiaircraft defense,
and aviation. This will correspond. to the. composition of the
.front and the particular features of troop operations in, the
operation.
A front operation, obviously, must be planned by stages.
The first stage, for example, might. include the neutralization
and destruction of the enemy's main forces and weapons. The
main content of it must be the. repelling of the initial nuclear
strike of the enemy and the delivery of the first nuclear/missile
strike by forces of the front.. The, second stage can consist: of
completing the rout of the enemy's forces and weapons. Its
content will. be an offensive by ground troops,..the execution of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
landing operations, and.the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes during
the offensive..
In our opinion, this is the way the fundamental scheme of a
front offensive operation in a future war must appear.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
0
0 Id
Z
a) o
a) a)
.C C!)
U
C!) a)
CO
!-P CH
Z O
a)
~ TS
Cd
?O
r(
xr
a)
9
-16-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
I
Legend to Diagram 1:
1. Reserves of a group of armies (5 to 10 percent of the
forces).
2. Second defense zone and reserves of the armies (10 to 15
percent of the forces of the group of armies).
3. First (main) defense zone (75 to 85 percent of the forces of
the group of armies).
ii . Army - 10 rifle divisions.
5. 2nd echelon (reserve) of the army.
.6. Tank division, tank corps, mechanizcI;corps.
7. Army - 9 rifle divisions. 2nd echelon of the front.
8. Army 7 rifle divisions.
9. 2nd echelon (reserve) of the army
10. Army - 5 rifle divisions.
11. Resiprve of the army rifle division.
12. Rifle division.
13. Mobile group-of the front - tank army (tank corps,
mechanized.-carp').
11f. Second echelon (reserve) of the front (Army rifle corps).
15. Depth of a front operation - 200 to 300 km.
16. Depth of an army operation - 120 to 150 km.
.17. Depth of the disposition of troops and.rear service elements
of the front - 200 km.
-17- 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
one. of
Diagram L7e7 -Fundamental Scheme of a: Front Offensive Operation in- a Modern War
4.- - y.;Z ?w o9`
50X1-HUM '
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3
Legend to Diagram 2:
1. Airborne landing army - 5 or 6 divisions.
2. Neutral countries.
3. 1 army - 5 to 7 divisions.
if. Medium-range miss-files (range 1,000 to 1,500 km).
5. Long-range missiles (range 4,000 to 5,000 km).
6. Echelon of airborne landing troops (airborne landing army-
3 or if divisions).
7. Tank division.
8. Tank division.
9. Tank division.
10. 2 army - 5 to ,7 divisions. 1st operational echelon of ground
troops.
11. 2nd operational echelon of ground troops (defense army of the
operational rear area) - 7 or 8 divisions.
l-2e Depth of echeloning troops of a ,front - 29000 to 3,000 km.
13i Depth of the front operation - 2,000'to 3,000 km.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500010001-3