TACTICAL MISSILE AND ARTILLERY COLLECTION: SOME QUESTIONS IN THE CONTROL OF MISSILE LARGE UNITS, UNITS, AND THE ARTILLERY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Some Questions in the Control of Missile
Large Units, Units, and the Artillery
At the present time it is generally recognized that
the decisive role in routing the enemy in a modern battle
and operation belongs to fire and primarily to nuclear/missile
strikes. However, as was shown by the experience of many
exercises that have been carried out, fire can have a
decisive importance only under firm, continuous and
exceptionally clear-cut control of the missile large units,
units, and the artillery. The control of these weapons
must be such that it would be possible to deliver powerful
fire strikes against the enemy in the shortest possible
time, during a highly dynamic offensive operation with
high speed troop operations inherent in it, and with
sharp changes in the situation.
The chief shortcoming in controlling missile large
units and units, which was noted in a series of exercises,
is that commanders and staffs spend much time, sometimes
up to several hours, for the preparation of nuclear/missile
strikes and the transmission of fire missions to those who
will execute them directly. As a result of this, the
strikes are delivered late and are not always effective,
particularly against mobile targets.
With the aim of determining the most advisable methods
of control, at one of the exercises which was conducted,
a series of means of automation and mechanization wA.s used
for control at the level of the army corps, missile brigade,
missile battalion and tank division, tactical missile
battalion of a tank division, and artillery battalion.
The exercise showed that even the use of means with slight
mechanization increases to a considerable degree the
reliability of control and decreases the time periods for
delivering nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy.
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The purpose of this article is to make the experience
of this exercise known to generals and officers who are
studying problems of controlling missile units and
artillery. Therefore, the positions set forth in the
article should be adopted, in conformance with the
specific situation, but some positions need further study
and checking.
In the army corps and division, the control of missile
units and the artillery in the exercise was carried out
by the chiefs of artillery and their staffs on the basis
of adopted decisions and instructions from the corps
(division) commanding officer.
In taking into consideration the experience of
previous exercises, the work of the artillery staffs was
organized in such a way that the control of missile units
and artillery was stable and continuous during the
preparation for the offensive as well as during the
course of it, and also when one of the control points was
put out of action. For this purpose, two control groups
were organized beforehand from the composition of the
staffs. It was intended to use one of these groups for
control from the command post and the other from the forward
command post. The existence of two groups was also to have
facilitated control when shifting command posts during an
offensive.
Two mobile control points ,sere prepared in the artillery
staff of the army coxr',s based in buses of the staff.
For con;rol from the forward command post, the mobile
point had a table for working on the fire control map,
a signal-code device, an extension device of an R-118 radio
set, a telephone apparatus linked with a secrecy device,
a subscriber's set of the dispatcher's loudspeaker device
(dispetcherskoye gromkogovoryashcheye ustroystvo-DGU),
and telephone apparatus for wire communications. Besides
the listed means, the forward command post had R-104AM,
R-125, and R-118 radio sets. Control from the forward
command post was carried out by the chief of artillery of
the army corps, to whom a group of staff officers was
subordinate, consisting of two off icer-operators, an
intelligence officer, and a signalman.
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At the corps command post, from which control was
to be executed by the chief of staff of the artillery
with one intelligence officer subordinate to him, there
were R-125 and 11 .-?118 radio sets and also a secrecy
(zasekrechivayushchaya - ZAS) device.
In the division, both mobile control points were
mounted on armored carriers (BTR-50 PU) (Armored Carrier-
50 Control Point (bronetransporter-50 punkt upravleniya) ),
and the radio means were housed in special radio vehicles.
The experience of the exercise showed that this or-
ganization of the work of artillery staffs is justified
only when the control groups are staffed with the necessary
number of officers and are supplied with technical means
of control and communications. For example, in an army
corps it is necessary to have in the composition of each
of the control groups a minimum of two officer -operators,
an intelligence officer, and a signalman, to control the
missile brigade, the artillery of 3 or 4 divisions, the
antitank reserve, and other weapons.
When this requirement was not met in the exercise
because of the small size of the artillery staffs and also
because of several other reasons, it led to the fact that
in the army corps, control was actually carried out by the
chief of artillery from one point, namely from the forward
command post. With the relocation of the forward command
post, the chief of artillery was forced to carry out control
from short stops, which, naturally, did not ensure continuity
of control to the proper degree, primarily control of the
missile brigade.
The chief of staff of the artillery of the corps was
limited in his means of control and therefore could not have
timely information on the enemy, on the operations of friendly
troops, and on the status, security, and missions of the
missile units and the artillery. When the forward command
post was put out of action, the chief of staff, who was at
the command post, was not in a position to take control upon
himself, which could lead to a complete loss of control at
the most crucial moments of combat.
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The experience of the exercise also shows that control
of the missile units and the artillery from the forward
command post and the command post is not completely advisable.
It is more advisable to control from one command post, and
in the event it is put out of action to have a previously
prepared alternate command post. In this case, the chief
of artillery and the artillery staff of the corps (division)
are located at the command post. In this, the work of the
staff is organized in such a fashion that control is ef-
fective and guarantees the adoption of decisions and in-
forming subordinates of their missions in the shortest
possible time. Each officer of the staff must know his
functional duties and have all the necessary means to fulfil
them.
It is advisable to have one or two officers from the
artillery staff and previously organized communications at
the alternate command post, in the event control is trans-
ferred to it. During control from the command post, the
communications means of the alternate command post must
receive only, so that the staff officers are constantly
abreast of the situation and know the position of the missile
units and the artillery, their security, and the missions
being accomplished.
The chief of artillery and the chief of staff of the
artillery must also report to the alternate command post
about all the orders given by them. The transfer of control
from the command post to the alternate post can be carried
out according to a previously established signal, upon the
command of the chief of the corps (division) artillery or
of the chief of staff of the artillery.
The control point of the chief of artillery is an
inseparable component part of the command post of the
corps (division) commanding officer. In order to guarantee
effective use of the missile units and the artillery, the
chief of artillery and his staff must be located in place,
in the immediate vicinity of the corps (division) commanding
officer; and in the event of a transfer, he must follow the
vehicle of the corps (division) commanding officer, thus
ensuring the capability rapid preparation of the
nuclear/missile strikes to be delivered ;?-'yh the
decision mad'a ,:. thy,:::.
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The separation of the chief and the artillery staff from
the corps (division) commanding officer and his staff
during a shift of control points was one of the reasons
for the delay in the timeliness of delivering nuclear
strikes.
At the exercise which was held, the chief of artillery
of the army corps and division did not possess specially
equipped mobile control posts, which negatively affected
control during the offensive. Control posts which are
based in buses and armored carriers do not accomplish
the task because they do not have the necessary control
and communications means and, moreover, do not ensure
convenience of work. Control, and communications means
must be located in a mobile point in such a way that pre-
paring them for work takes a minimum amount of time and
the work of one means does not hinder the work of the other.
Communications of the chief of artillery of the corps
with the missile brigade was organized on a radio network
with R-118 radio sets in which, besides the radio station
of the brigade commanding officer, were included the radio
stations of the staff of the brigade and of the missile
battalions.
In addition, two radio networks with R-125 radio sets
were organized by the corps headquarters to connect the
artillery staff with the missile brigade.
Communications of the artillery chief and staff of
the corps with the artillery chiefs and staffs of the
divisions were organized with R-104 and R-108 radio sets.
Radio relay communications in the corps were organized
toward the control points of the divisions and of the
missile brigade. In this, one of the telephone radio
relay communications channels of the forward command post
with the missile brigade was made secure with a ZAS device.
The exercise showed that it was not advisable to
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include the radio sets of the commanding officer of the
missile brigade and the commanding officers of the missile
battalions in the radio network of the chief of the corps
artillery because this leads to a severe overloading of
this network. In the exercise the chief of the corps
artillery did not in practice have any reliable communications
with the commanding officers of the missile battalions on
this network. The attempt of the staff to reduce the work
load of the R-118 radio network by using ultra shortwave
R-105 radio sets for communication with the commanding of-
ficer of the missile brigade also did not give the needed
results because when on the march and after shifting
control points, the distances between them exceeded the
range of these types of radio sets.
It is most advisable to organize radio communications
with missile units, particularly with the commanding officer
of the missile brigade, in certain directions. In this,
R-118 radio sets can be the basic means for radio communi-
cations in the army corps and higher. When the users were
70 to 80 kilometers from each other, these sets ensured
good communications by microphone, audio telegraph, and
printer.
A correct determination of the working frequencies
for antennas of ground and space radiation has great signi-
ficance for the stability of radio communications. In
the exercise there were frequfnt instances when communi-
cations by R-118 radio sets were lost precisely for these
reasons. Frequencies must be determined by the staff of the
front, taking into consideration the specific conditions of
the combat activities of the large unit (unit) and con-
forming to the distances over which, stable radio communi-
cation must be maintained during the course of combat.
In the exercise, the chief and the staff of the corps
artillery did not have independent channels for radio
relay and wire communications with the ZAS device, and as
a result there were instances of unjustified delay in trans-
mitting orders and commands to missile units. Thus,
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for example, because communication lines were being used by
the corps staff, a combat order for the missile brigade
to prepare a nuclear strike was transmitted 15 minutes
late. In another instance, for the very same reasons, an
order for a brigade to move was delayed for 55 minutes.
All this could result in the untimely fulfilment of
assigned missions by the missile brigade.
The experience of this exercise, as well as of
previous ones, once more showed teat to ensure stable
control of missile units, the chief of artillery must
be given independent secure communication channels.
Of the communication channels having the ZAS device,
the one most used in the exercise was the telephone
communication channel. Radio relay communication
channels proved to be less suitable for this purpose
because even with the presence of ZAS, much time was lost
in delivering telegrams to the communications center, which
prevented staff officers from doing operational work. In
order to decrease the time in using the telegraph
communication channel, it would be advisable to have a
teletype right at the mobile point of the chief of artillery.
It should be pointed out that one of the shortcomings
in using the ZAS device was the tendency of the staffs to
transmit information without proper processing, which led
to a lowering of the requirement for brevity in orders.
With this, control became less specific, and the time
required to transmit information increased. The experience
of the exercise indicates the need to formalize the most
frequently encountered orders and reports in controlling
missile units and artillery in order to make them as short
as possible and in this way to reduce to a minimum the
time needed for their transmission. In this connection,
it is advisable for each level of control to work out and
establish a list of the basic data needed to control
subordinate large units (units and subunits). In particular,
the artillery headquarters of the corps, as was shown by
the experience of the exercise, must constantly have
information about the location of launch batteries and how
they are provided with missiles according to the periods of
launching, about the availability and yields of the missiles
in the technical support platoons of the battalions, and in
the technical battery of the brigade, about the location of
the brigade command post, and other information.
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Besides telephone and radio relay channels having the
ZAS device, at the level of the artillery staff of the
corps, missile brigade, and battalion, a signal-code
device was used to transmit commands and individual
messages. Experience from the exercise showed that the
signal-code device is a very reliable means of communica-
tion. For example, in the exercise there was not a
single instance when a transmission was distorted, and
the artillery staff of the corps required an average of
1.5 minutes to inform the brigade of its missions.
In the exercise, the means of communication used
allowed us to decrease by 5 to 7 times the time needed
for informing the missile units of their missions in
comparison with the time spent when using prearranged
message codes. This, in turn, allowed the chiefs and
staffs of the artillery of the army corps and division to
control missile units and the artillery more effectively.
The staffs were freed from the need to spend time on
coding and decoding commands and orders and as a result
of this could render their subordinate units more practical
assistance in preparing and carrying out strikes.
The loudspeaker communication apparatus undoubtedly
made for convenience in the work of the artillery staff
of the corps. It allowed all the officers of the staff
constantly to have knowledge of the situation and, in
addition, in transmitting orders each staff officer could
write down the part pertaining to him, enter the necessary
information an the map, and prepare suggestions for the
chief of artillery or orders for subordinate units.
When the corps commanding officer and the chief of
artillery exercise control, while located at some distance
from each other, there is a great need for technical means
which would facilitate their contact. The result of the
absence of such means is that in working out a decision for
a nuclear/missile strike, the chief of artillery and the
chief of staff of the artillery are frequently called to
the corps commanding officer for joint work and because
of this are not able to exercise direct control of the
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missile units for a prolonged period of time.
The experience of the exercise also indicated the need
to have sound recording apparatus in the artillery staff. This
would make it possible to free staff officers from writing
down combat orders as they are received; much useful time
is wasted on this. In particular, portable dictaphones
capable of recording for 30 to 40 minutes can be used for
this purpose. These same dictaphones could be used to
record orders and commands transmitted over a telephone
channel which has the ZAS device.
In selecting the yield of nuclear charges needed to des-
troy objectives (targets), the artillery headquarters of
the corps used the P-1 graph. A device for planning fire
was used for this purpose in the artillery staff of the
division. This device had been suggested by the
Military Artillery Academy (a description of the device
is given in the Collected Works of the Academy, No. 36).
In the course of the exercise, it was established that the
device for planning fire allowed us to carry out the selec-
tion of the charge with the required yield in a shorter time
than with the P-1 graph.
For working convenience, it is advisable to have a
set of devices in the artillery staff which would embrace all
existing yields of nuclear charges for a given type of missile.
With the existence of a device for planning fire,
graphs, including the one proposed in the present Collected
Works, can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
firing, particularly in those instances when there are
missiles with nuclear charges of ditfurent yields.
In the missile brigade two mobile control points were
organized to control its fire and mobility.
The mobile control point of the commanding officer
of the missile brigade which was mounted on the chassis
of a GAZ-63 truck, had a table for working on the fire
control map, had working places for the brigade commanding
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officer, two staff officers, and a duty telephone operator,
as well as places for the telephone apparatus, portable
components of the R-118 radio set and a loudspeaking device.
Along both sides of the body of the truck snap-on (pristyazh-
noy) tents were attached in which two sets of signal-
code devices were located (for communication with the chief
of the corps artillery and the battalion commanding officers) as well
as working places for officers of the brigade staff.
The mobile control point of the chief of staff of the
brigade was mounted on the chassis of the GAZ-63 truck with
a trailer; it had a table for working on the fire control
map, working places for the chief of staff, the staff officers,
and the telephone operators, as well as places for the loud-
speaker communication apparatus, portable components of the
radio sets, and an illuminated diagram (tablo). The apparatus
for the signal-coding device was located in the trailer.
For fire planning at control points there were P-1 plotting
boards, a set of stencils for plotting the radiation situa-
tion, and stamping-drafting sets.
In the exercise, a special place was given to organizing
stable and continuous communications. Communications over
different channels were organized for this purpose: with bat-
talion commanding officers, over R-118 (in the network of the
chief of artillery), R-104, and R-105 radio sets as well as
over the radio relay channel; with the chief of corps artil-
lery, over R-118 and R-105 radio sets and radio relay and
telephone channels having the secrecy device.
Loudspeaker communications of the commanding officer
and the chief of staff of the brigade ware provided for
communication with the operator working on the signal-code
device, the vehicle where the ZAS device was located, the
secret unit, the cipher section, and the commanding officer
of the control battery.
In order to ensure continuity of control, the staff
of the brigade was divided into two groups. One of these
groups, consisting of the chief of the operations section,
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the chief of intelligence, the chief of the chemical
services, the deputy chief of staff for topographical and
meteorological support, and the chief of communications,
was headed by the brigade commanding officer, and the
other consisting of the deputy chief of the operations
section, a staff officer, the deputy chief of communications,
the commanding officer of the control battery, and an
officer of artillery armament, was headed by the chief of
staff of the brigade. The chief engineer of the brigade
was also found here.
When located in place, the full complement of the
staff was used for control, and the presence of two groups
which had previously been organized out of its complement
made it possible to ensure that missions would be accomplished
at any time and, in addition, to organize a normal rest
period for the personnel.
In shifting one of the brigade's battalions, the bri-
gade commanding officer, with a control group, was moved
forward to a new command post from which he organized control.
At this time the chief of staff remained at the old command
post and directed the brigade's fire until the commanding
;officer reached the new command post and control was or-
ganized there. The chief of staff was usually shifted si-
multaneously-with the shift of the battalion which had re-
mained.
The organization of control which was used in the
exercise, on the whole, justified itself. At the same time,
however, there were a number of shortcomings in the technical
support of control. The mobile points themselves did not
meet the requirements of control in modern combat and opera-
tion either by their size or by their cross-country ability.
The mobile points of the missile brigade must have
high cross-country ability, have the essential devices for
planning, and reliable means of communications that ensure
steady control when located in place or on the move. The
exercise showed the need to have at the mobile control point
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a signal-code device, an illuminated diagram, a folding
table for working on the fire control map, and also pre-
pared places for telephone apparatus, portable components
of the radio sets, and an apparatus for loudspeaker com-
munication. As the means of control improve, there should
also be an improvement in the equipment for the mobile
control points.
Radio sets of the R-118 type best fulfil the re-
quirements for controlling missile units during combat."
The use of ultra shortwave radio sets is. primarily pos-
sible when the brigade is located in place.
Taking into account the possible bounds of movement
of missile units, radio sets which would ensure steady
reception and transmission over a distance of not less than
150 to 200 kilometers under any conditions of combat activi-
ties, day and night, are essential for them.
As a rule, the brigade commanding officer received
commands to prepare nuclear strikes from the chief of
artillery of the corps by telephone through the secrecy
apparatus and through the signal-code device. The missions
were sent to the battalions by the signal-code device or
by radio with the use of prearranged message codes. Use of
secrecy communication channels and the signal-code device
made it possible to decrease the time of sending missions
to the battalion by 2 to 2.5 times in comparison with pre-
vious exercises. A sharper decrease in the time for
preparing nuclear strikes, as was shown by the exercise,
can be achieved only when the conversation secrecy device
is found at all levels of control right up to the missile
battalion and battery inclusively. In this instance, the
chief of artillery could, by using secure channels of
communication, transmit commands for the preparation of
a nuclear strike directly to the battalion, bypassing
the brigade commanding officer, and when necessary to
the battery, particularly if it is on duty.
To increase efficiency in the work of the missile
brigade staff, there must be afurther improvement in
devices for controlling the fire of the missile units.
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To determine the effectiveness of the firing, the
"P-1" plotting board is inconvenient to handle, and the
set of stamping devices could not be used by missile
units because of the absence of needed code signs; the
set of rulers and stencils for entering the radiation.i
situation is cumbersome; it has a large set of rulers
which causes inconvenience in the work. Work in this
direction must be conducted both in military educational
institutions as well as among the troops.
In the missile battalion, control of fire and maneuver
must be carried out by the battalion commanding officer
from a mobile control point on the chassis of a GAZ-63
truck with a single axle trailer where the battalion staff
is located. The battalion's section for preparation of
data was located in the trailer. In deploying into combat
formation, the trailer was joined to the body of the
vehicle by a tarpaulin cover and, with the rear door of
the bus open, formed a single unit with it. This ensured
personal contact of the battalion commanding officer and
chief of staff with the data preparation section.
The equipment inside the control point included a
table for working on the fire control map and places for
locating the signal-code devices and telephone apparatus.
The trailer was equipped with places for the work of the
data preparation section.
Of the mechanized means, the battalion used an
electronic computing machine (elektronno-vychislitelnaya
mashina--EVM) to calculate the fire settings. This
machine was located at the battalion control point., The
exercise showed that it is more efficient to have the EVM
for preparing data in the battalion fire control vehicle.
This will make it possible to avoid technical means of
communications between the battalion commanding officer and
the EVM operator and, consequently, to decrease the time
needed for preparing firing data. In addition, the commanding
officer and the chief of staff of the battalion will be able,
in this instance, to control the work of the EVM operator be-
cause they will be able personally to observe the initial
data fed into the EVM and the results of the computations
which are received.
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The use of an EVM in the battalion to prepare initial
data made it possible to decrease the time for passing
the command at the battalion or battery level by more
than 2.5 times. It must be noted that the EVM assures
reliable control over the accuracy of the computations
made and releases the battalion commanding officer and
the battery commanding officers from this task.
Thus,, the use of mechanized means in a missile
battalion together with significantly decreasing the
time for preparing nuclearfmissile strikes makes it
possible to increase the reliability of fulfilling
missions. It is advisable to have all the technical means
for control and communications in the battalion's mobile control
point. The battalion's mobile control point must have
cross-country ability and ensure fire control under any
conditions of a situation and any time of the year or
day.
The conditions for conducting modern combat make
exceptionally high demands on all missile units, in-
cluding tactical missile battalions, in regard to speed
in the preparation and delivery of nuclear strikes. The
most specific problem in the use of tactical missile
battalions is, as is well known, the calculation of
initial data for firing. According to the experience of-
a series of exercises, up to 50 to 60 percent of the total
time spent in the preparation of a nuclear strike was
spent on this.
The use of an electronic computing machine in the
tactical missile battalion during the exercise made it
possible to decrease the time in determining the fire
settings by 15 to 20 times while there was greater
accuracy in the calculations themselves. This will make
it possible for tactical missile battalions to deliver
strikes in the shortest possible time against any objective
in enemy territory, depending on the range of fire.
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AS was sown by the exercise, it is advisable to
have an EVM to prepare initial data in the long range
tube artillery battalions also, keeping in mind that
they can and must be drawn into the combat against enemy
nuclear weapons, during the destruction of which time
limits and accuracy of fire frequently have a decisive
importance.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500210001-1