MILITARY THOUGHT: SUPPORT OF THE STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN RESPECT TO TRANSPORT, BY MAJOR-GENERAL OF TECHNICAL TROOPS YA. SHCHEPENNIKOV
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A029500260001-6
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Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
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Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 12, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 20, 1962
Content Type:
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Support of the Strategic Concentration
and
Deployment of the Armed Forces
in Respect to Transport
by
Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov
Transportation support is one of the factors that exerts
great influence on the strategic concentration and deployment
of the armed forces. Nevertheless, in numerous works devoted
to the theory of strategic concentration and deployment, the
position and capabilities of transportation are not fully
considered. While noting the direct dependence of the
success of strategic concentration and deployment on the
preparation and work of transportation and realizing the
great probability of serious difficulties in carrying out
shipments, many analysts do not, in their work, make even a
cursory analysis of the conditions of transportation work
during the period. of threat, and at the beginning and
during the course of a war, they do not arrive at any con-
clusions on the influence of these conditions on the organi-
zation of the strategic concentration and deployment of the
armed forces in theaters of military operations and in
internal areas of the country.
In this article, the dependence of deployment of the
armed forces on the condition and work of transportation and
also the basic requirements for preparing the transportation
network for the purposes of carrying out shipments for stra-
tegic concentration are examined.
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The existing contradictions in individual theoretical
problems give rise to the necessity for a preliminary
clarification of certain initial positions.
First of all, it should be noted that the term "stra-
tegic concentration and deployment of the armed forces" in
the following text refers to the concentration and deploy-
ment not only of operational formations, troop large units,
etc., themselves, but also of materiel (for example, muni-
tions and fuel). In accordance with this, shipments of
troops and the materiel necessary for their support are also
included in the concept of "shipments for strategic con-
centration".
In speaking of strategic echelons, we mean that the
first of these consist of the forces and weapons necessary for
achieving the strategic aims of the initial period of a war;
it is divided into several (not less than three) operational
echelons. The first includes the troops and materiel that
are in a full state of readiness for immediate operations,
the second is the forces and weapons designated for in-
creasing the efforts of the initial operations with readiness
for proceeding to areas of concentration after several days;
the third is the forces and weapons to be used only several
weeks after the beginning of full mobilization, for the
development of the subsequent operations of the initial
period of a war.
In certain analyses,l three possibilities for the stra-
tegic concentration and deployment of the armed forces are
considered. The first is most favorable, when it is executed
in advance as the threat of war becomes more intense; the
second, when concentration and deployment starts during the
threatening period and terminates after the beginning of wary
and the third and least favorable, when deployment takes
place after the enemy has initiated military operations.
1. Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhov,"Strategic Concentration
and Deployment". Collection of Articles of the Journal
"Military Thought"., Nuinber, 3 9 1 0.
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In this article, we shall consider transportation support
of the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in
the second situation, which is more convenient for analysis
and is the most probable.
Many analysts distinguish the following periods in the
course of the rise and development of military operations:
the threatening (which may not even exist), the initial,
and the subsequent. Certain authors emphasize the necessity
for dividing the second of these into two parts: the actual
beginning of a war and the subsequent phase of development
of military operations during the initial period of a war.l
This is motivated by the great difference in the composition
of each of the phases of the initial period of a war. We
share such a point of view and adhere to it in the following
discourse.
To determine even approximately the conditions of the
strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces
after the completion of initial operations is extremely
difficult. Therefore, the following analysis of the problems
of supporting strategic concentration and deployment in res-
pect to transport is limited to the period of threat and the
beginning of a nuclear/missile war.
In numerous analyses, the authors, while not rejecting
the possibility of a sudden initiation of war, consider it
no less probable that it will be preceded by a certain period
of intensification of the immediate threat of war, a period
of threat. It is necessary to use this period for increasing
the readiness of the armed forces and the rear area of the
country to repel the probable enemy attack and for creating
conditions for the complete and final destruction of the enemy
in a short period of time.
1. General of the Army A. Gorbatov. "The Nature of Modern
Armed Combat" Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought;`, Third Issue, 1 .
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In regard to the armed forces, such measures include
bringing the forces and weapons of the first operational
echelon (first of all--missile troops, armored and PVO troops)
up to full combat readiness and making appropriate changes
in their operational formation. At the same time, bring-
ing the troops up to full strength, their provision with
materiel, the movement of the second operational echelon to
areas of concentration and deployment, and the delivery of
various supplies to these areas are carried out. Full mo-
bilization and the formation of new troop large units, units,
and rear establishments to be included in the composition
of the third operational echelon will commence.
At the same time, during the period of. threat a transfer
of the national economy to satisfy the requirements of an
approaching war is accomplished, including partial mobilization
of industry and transportation, increasing materiel reserves
for the most important industrial enterprises, protection
of the population, etc.
All of the enumerated measures are accomplished as secretly
as possible which narrows their scope. The period of time
for carrying out these measures is directly dependent on the
duration of the period . of threat, which can presumably
consist of several hours to several calendar days.
For an analysis of the capabilities of transport for sup-
porting the strategic concentration and deployment of the
armed forces, we are arbitrarily assuming an eight-day period
of threat. During this time, it will be necessary to carry
out a large volume of military (mobilization, for strategic
concentration, operational, etc.) and national economic ship-
ments.
The possible timing for commencing the shipment of any
troop large unit (unit, establishment) depends on the readi-
ness for this of both the troops and the transportation means.
The estimated time for the completion of a shipment is deter-
mined by its volume, speed, distance, and the rate of movement
on the given route.
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Rail transport is best prepared for carrying out military
shipments; 24 hours after the declaration of mobilization it
is capable of carrying out very large military shipments while
simultaneously continuing its former operations and coping with
new national economic shipments. Military shipments of rela-
tively small dimensions can start several hours after the
declaration of mobilization.
It should be emphasized that the use of rail transport for
shipping connected with the strategic concentration of troops
depends primarily on two conditions: the observance of secrecy
in these shipments and the magnitude of other shipments being
carried out during the very same period. These conditions
assume special significance in those instances when troops
are shipped for strategic concentration to a foreign section
of the theaters of military operations, on railroads with
West European gauge. Along with the special difficulty of
ensuring the secrecy of shipments, it is necessary to consider
that they will be carried out simultaneously with national
economic shipments between the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries. At the present time, the volume of the
turnover of rail cars at transshipment areas at the junctions
of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges is already
so vast that it takes up from 30 to 60 percent of the total
traffic capacity of the railway sectors in these areas (Brest,
Chop-Mukachevo, Ungeny). In line with the development of
industrial communications between the countries of the Socialist
Camp, the volume of turnover is steadily increasing. It is
not possible to cease these shipments during the period-of
threat, since this will impede the work of defense industry
enterprises and, in addition, it will reveal preparations for
war. Therefore, we feel that shipments for strategic concen-
tration during the p e rio d'of threat must be carried out at
comparatively low rates, not exceeding approximately 30 to 35
percent of the traffic capacity of the railroad lines.
Since it requires considerably more time to prepare water
transportation means (river and sea) for military shipping
than railroads, it is advisable to ship by water transportation
(when it is possible to use it) those troop large units and
units that require several days to prepare for movement.
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The timing for beginning troop march movements on any
vehicular road is dependent on the speed in deploying refuel-
ing points on it and the creation of sufficient fuel reserves.
In order to support the march movement of a motorized rifle
division for 100 km, up to 450 tons of fuel are required, and for
a tank division, up to 530 tons, The march movement of troops
for long distances requires a well organized fuel supply system.The
equirement for secrecy should be considered in determining
the route speeds of movement of large units and units on ve-
hicular roads. Observation of this requirement can often
necessitate the execution of a march only during the hours of
darkness.
Let us consider what is the permissible distance for
shipments for strategic concentration executed during the
period of threat.,.
The maximum permissible (calculated) distance of shipments
carried out in the course of a definite period of time is
determined on the basis of the calculated rate of speed along
the given route, the expenditure of time for preparatory
loading, unloading, and other work, and also for the march
movement of the troops.
The permissible expenditure of time for the movement of
an echelon from a loading point to an unloading point (Tdv)l
is determined by the difference between the duration of the
calculated (threatening) period and the expenditure of time
for all other work, the march movement, etc., (Tup - rT).
The results of the determination of the maximum permis-
sible distance for shipping a troop large unit (unit, esta-
blishment) under various conditions are listed in the table.
Co e t. Probable meaning of Tdv - Time of
movement of troops. See table on page 9 for probable
meanings of subsequent symbols.
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The expenditure of time for the preparation of troops
and shipping means, for a march movement to the loading
point, and for the loading of the first echelon (Tpd) is
established as within the limits of from 1 to 4 calendar
days.
The expenditure of time for the dispatch of all echelons
of a large unit or unit being transported from the loading
area (To) is assumed to be from 2 to 4 calendar days.
The expenditure of time for the march movement from the
moment of the completion of unloading of the last echelon
of a large unit up to the completion of its deployment in
the appropriate area(Tsr) is assumed to be within the limits
of 1 to 2 calendar days.
The route speeds of movement (Vm) are assumed to be within
the limits of from 200 to 500 km per calendar day. The higher
limit is for favorable conditions of shipment by rail transport
and the lower is for difficult conditions of shipment by river
transport.
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Table for Permissible Distances for a Shipment
Vm Km
calendar
days
Permissible distance for a shipment in kilometer
500
2000
1500
1000
500
1500
1000
500
--
1000
500
--
500
-- i
350
1400
1050
700
350
1050
700
350
--
700
350
--
350
--
200
8
6001 400,
200,
600
400,
200,
--
400,
200,
--
200
--
Comment
Probable meanings of
Tpd - Length of time
To - Length of time
Tsr - Length of time
Tup - Length of time
Vm - Route speed of
symbols:
for loading operations
for dispatch
for strategic deployment
of period of threat
movement.
Expenditure of time in calendar days
Tpd
1
2
3
4
To-
2
3
4
2,
3 4
2
3 4
2
3 1 4
Tsr-
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
ET-
4
5
6
7
5
6
7 8
6
7
8
9
7
8
9 10
Tup - -ET
4
3
2
1
3: 2
1-
2
1
-
-
1
-
- -
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As can be seen from the table, the maximum permissible
distance for a shipment does not exceed 2000 km. This dis-
tance can be achieved under conditions when the first echelon
is dispatched from the loading area 24 hours after the start
of the Period, of threat, the dispatch of all the echelons
takes no more than two calendar days, and the time from the
moment of completion of the unloading of the last echelon to
the completion of deployment consists of no more than one
calendar day with the route speed of movement of the echelons
being transported being equal to 500 km per calendar day.
If, however, the total time expended for preparation,
loading, dispatch of the echelons, unloading, and march move-
ment consists of 5 to 7 calendar days, with the route speed
averaging 350 to 400 km, then with a period of ,threat of
8 calendar days duration, the maximum permissible distance
will be 400 to 1000 km. And since a decrease in the duration
of the per io d.`.of threat is more probable than an increase,
it is advisable to consider the permissible distance for ship-
ments to be 400 to 700 km.
Another computation will result in a similar conclusion.
As is known, it is envisaged that the build-up of the efforts
of the troops of a front during the first offensive operation
will be achieved by means of maneuver by the nuclear/missile
weapons and the commitment to the operation of the troops
arriving from the zone near the front and the internal areas
of the country. Let us consider the maximum distance from
the border (front line) at which the operational formations
and troop large units designated for increasing the efforts
of the front during the progress of the operation. can be
located.
To explain this problem, we shall refer to the example
shown on the diagram. The diagram is a graph of the movement
of troops on which are indicated the possible time periods for
"overtaking" ("nagon") the advancing troops of the front by
the troop large units being transported.
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The distance of the disposition areas of the troops of an
operational formation (combined arms army) designat.@d for
increasing the efforts of a front in an operation is approxi-
mately 1000 km. The first offensive operation must be carried
out to a depth of about 800 km at a rate of 80 to 100 km per
calendar day. The duration of the period of threat (cal-
culated) is 8 calendar days. The duration of the operation is
10 calendar days.
The volume of shipment of an operational formation on
available railways (West European gauge) consists of 360 troop
trains (eshelon). The first troop trains can be dispatched
on each of the railroad lines one calendar day after the
start of the period of threat. The possible rate of shipment
of an army during the period of threat is 30 trains (echelons)
per calendar day, and at the beginning of the operation 60
troop trains. The possible route speed of movement of the
troop trains during the period of threat is 500 km per calendar
day, and 300 km per calendar day at the beginning of an opera-
tion, in view of disruptions of the work of the railroads.
With this average route speed, troop large units can execute
march movements following the advancing troops of a front.
Reconstruction of railroads is carried out at a rate of 50 km
per calendar day along each of the lines being reconstructed
to the extent that the troops of the front move forward in an
operation. Echelons of tanks and so far as possible other
large units are dispatched to the forward unloading areas as
they arrive. The march movements of troops are supported with
everything necessary.
Thus, we create sufficiently favorable conditions for the
execution of rail shipments and march movements of troops
during the period of threat and during the course of the first
operation. But even in this (see graph, diagram 2) during
the period of threat, before the beginning of the operation, no
more than 150 echelons will be able to reach the unloading
areas, and the remaining echelons will arrive during the course
of the operation' and after unloading will proceed to "over-
take" the advancing front troops by executing a march move-
ment over long distances. The last echelons of the incoming
large units will be able to "overtake" the advancing troops
only on the ninth day of the operation.
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700 WO 0
-1 Vi -I
Ald
1 171
1
14
4
800 700 6co 500 4co j xn ?00100 100 2M 300 I00 500 6X-O0 F300 9cp rOo
Graphic pla.. for shipment of a combined arms army in the threatening period
and after the beginning of war
Co i,xna Signs
Line of reconstruction of railways
----- Lines of movement of rifle
- - and tank troops
0 Unloading areas on reconstructed sectors of railways
&eZ
1. Rate of shipments: 60 echelons per calendar,day, speed 300 km per
calendlar day.
2. Dispatch by rail: rate 30 w:helons per calendar day, speed 500 km
per calendar day.
3. The preparation of troops and transport means for shipment.
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Thus, even under favorable conditions, it will be possible
to use only part of the troops that make up the complement
of the combined arms army for increasing the efforts of a
front in the first operation. The other part, consisting of
no less than 50 percent of the troops, as may be seen from
the graph, cannot be used for this in view of the great ex-
penditure of time for their transfer from areas of initial
disposition.
One should not count on the possibility of decreasing
the expenditure of time by means of a still greater increase
of the rates and route speeds for shipments and march movements
of troops since there are no sufficient bases for this. Conse-
quently, it is possible to decrease the time for movement and
shipment only by means of bringing the initial disposition areas
of the troops closer to the border (front line).
In order to commit the troops of a combined arms army to
an operation on the third or fourth day, it is necessary to
execute parallel troop march movements along with and at the
same rate as rail shipments during the period of threat, and
to have the troop disposition areas at a distance of 600 km
from the border.
The calculated distance for the delivery of technical
equipment by rail, motor vehicle, and water transport during
a period of threat of 6 to 8 calendar days'duration is deter-
mined within approximately these same limits of 400 to 700 km.
Consequently, if prior to the beginning of war we will have
a period of threat of the duration assumed by us, then during
the course of this period the shipment of troops for strategic
concentration can be carried out only on a small scale and
at comparatively slow rates; the permissible distance for rail
shipments of troops whose concentration and deployment must
be completed prior to the expiration of this period will consist
of 700 to 500 km (and less). The distance of troop march
movements is limited by approximately the same restrictions.
It makes sense to include in the number of large units and
units being transported only those whose readiness will enable
them to begin to move not later than during the first two or
three days of the period of threat.
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All of the remaining shipments initiated during the period
of threat will be in progress at the moment of the start of
military operations. It will be necessary to complete them
during the course of the war, under completely different
conditions. We shall turn to an analysis of these conditions
later.
In certain theoretical works it is proposed to consider
the beginning of a war as a special phase of its initial
period, after which (in case of lengthy combat) follows another
phase which is characterized by a different content. This
position is sufficiently valid.
The beginning of a war is distinguished by the highest
possible intensity of operations. Each of the sides will
be striving to achieve victory in the shortest period of time
and will exert the greatest efforts for this. Mutually in-
flicted strikes will be of maximum power, and their results
will be unprecedented devastation. But for this very reason,
the period of the actual beginning of combat cannot be lengthy.
After several days of a nuclear/missile;war,both sides will
sustain such great personnel and materiel losses that to con-
tinue combat at its previous intensity will be impossible.
The resources of even the powers that are strongest economi-
cally and which possess a large territory will to some extent
be exhausted. It will become intolerable to expend forces and
weapons on the previous scale; on the contrary, in continuing
combat, it will be necessary to accumulate them as rapidly as
possible for delivering powerful new strikes against the enemy.
This is the way the next phase of the initial period of a war
will ensue: stubborn, fierce, but lengthy combat under sharply
changed conditions of the situation.
In the beginning of a war, during its first hours and days,
very major changes will occur in the strategic, economic, and
political situation in the theaters of military operations
and in the rear areas of the coalitions that are taking part in
the combat. Can one assume that they will not reflect on the
previously prepared plan for the strategic concentration and
deployment of the armed forces? Obviously, such an assumption
is not correct. Is it advisable to amend this plan during the
first days of a war? In our opinion it is also necessary to
give a negative reply to this question.
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The situation at the beginning of a war will be changing
so sharply, substantially, and rapidly that it will be ex-
tremely difficult immediately to take into account the changes
that are occurring, to evaluate them correctly, and to adopt
&.decision to change the strategic concentration and deploy-
ment of the armed forces. In addition, it is doubtful that
this is necessary since during the course of the next days the
situation can again change sharply.
Consequently, changes in the plan for strategic concentra-
tion and deployment will be unavoidable, but to adopt a final
decision on these changes and to proceed to put them into effect
will be advisable only after the termination of the actual
starting phase of the war and the advent of the next phase of
its initial period which will have different characteristics.
If one agrees with this conclusion, still another question
arises: should troop movements be continued in the first
days of a war according to the previous plan or is it advisable
to suspend these until necessary modifications have been
incorporated in the plan? We feel that a general suspension of
the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces
is unlikely at the beginning of a war. Such a measure is
completely possible, however, on certain axes, or in certain
areas, under especially complex conditions.
The success of strategic concentration and deployment of the
armed forces under any conditions depends, to a large degree,
on the condition and capabilities of transportation; but this
dependence is especially intensified at the beginning of a war.
The beginning of a war immediately exerts the strongest
influence on the condition and use of the transportation net-
work in theaters of military operations and in the internal
areas of the country.
Nuclear/missile strikes on major administrative, indus-
trial, and power centers and on strategically important areas
will bring about destruction of transportation centers and
the annihilation of transportation installations and struc-
tures, shipping means, and reserves of fuel and materiel.
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Individual, most important elements of the rail networks
(developed centers, transshipment areas at junctions of rail-
roads of Soviet and West European gauges, large seaports,
sectors of locks on river ways, and major man-made structures
outside cities) may, in some cases, also be independent ob-
jectives for strikes. The enemy will also execute attacks on
relatively small objectives on the territories of the fronts:
stations and wharves, highways, airfields, etc., Through
traffic on rail lines, main highways, and canals will be
interrupted at many points, often for a long time. A number
of sectors of the transportation network will be contaminated.
Frequent and sharp changes in the condition on the network,
disruption of communications and coordination between transport
and other organs of control will strongly complicate the control
of shipping. Thus, from the very first hours of war, the
working conditions of the network will become very complex and
difficult.
But, simultaneously with the rise of difficulties in the
working of the transportation network and the significant
curtailment of its shipping capability, demands for shipments
will also be curtailed with the beginning of a war.
In the first days of a war, when entire areas in the
theaters of military operations and in the rear of the country
will be subjected to massed nuclear strikes, mass economic,
local, and intercity passenger travel will be significantly
curtailed. It is highly probable that during these days it
will be advisable to curtail the sizes of mass military ship-
ments also, both of personnel and of goods, in order to avoid
increased losses.
The volume of shipments executed in the first days of a
war must be strictly limited. Major shipments at high speeds
must not be planned. This leads to an accumulation of per-
sonnel, equipment, and goods at the approaches to destroyed
centers, man-made structures, and in areas of the junctions
of various types of transportation.
Along with a strict limitation of the volume of shipments,
their distance should also be limited. We believe that
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shipments by land and water transport in the first days of
a war can best be carried out at distances of 600 to 800 km.
In organizing shipments, it is unthinkable to count on
filling to a high degree the traffic and hauling capacity of
the routes of communication. In order to ensure the flow of
shipping and also to accomplish urgent unanticipated shipments,
it is absolutely necessary to have reserves of transportation
means.
Thus, it may be concluded that in the period of threat,
as well as in the first days of a war, shipments for the
strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces
can be accomplished in relatively small volumes, at low
speeds, and at distances not exceeding 600 to a maximum of
800 km.
Obviously, all this will exert an influence on the or-
ganization of the strategic concentration and deployment
of the armed forces which, in our opinion, comes to the
following.
1. In the period of threat, and even more in the first
days of a war, it will be possible to accomplish shipments for
strategic concentration and march movements of troops only at
a small fraction of their overall volume and for relatively
short distances.
2. In peacetime, the actual capabilities for accomplishing
shipments and march movements of troops must betaken inter`;.,.
*,cccount in determining the disposition of forces and weapons
in the probable theaters of military operations.
3. Transportation capabilities must be strictly considered
in determining permissible distances between the operational
echelons of the strategic formation of the armed forces, be-
tween the areas of disposition, loading, unloading, concen-
tration and deployment of troops and reserves of materiel in
accordance with the plan for conducting initial operations.
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With the shift of military operations into the next phase
of the initial period of a war, strategic concentration and
ac-
deployment of the armed forces will continue, but then another
cording to a plan which has been altered in one way e
to accord with the new conditions.
Success in the further conduct of a war will depend to a
significant degree on the periods of time needed to ready our
forces for active and decisive operations; tremendous influence
on this will be exerted by the degree to which transportation
has been prepared for work in wartime.
Advanced preparation of transportation for war, primarily
for supporting strategic concentration and deployment, assumes
especially great importance today. The preparation of transport
should ensure the viability of the entire transportation network
and the continuity of shipping; a shipping capability sufficient
to accomplish previously planned military. and economic shipments
at the beginning of a war, with the retention of considerable
reserves for the regulation of planned,and the execution of
unplanned shipments; a capability for the rapid movement of
flows of shipments and of transportation reserves;' the constant
readiness of transportation for working under the conditions
of a war which has begun.
The following are the basic measures directed at fulfilling
these requirements: organization of the comprehensive use of
all modern types of transportation for military purposes, an
increase in the operational efficiency of the control of their
joint work; prior development of the transportation network,
ensuring this by special means for preserving the continuity
of shipping and the rapid elimination of disruptions in traffic;
protection of the network from contamination by radioactive and
toxic substances.
The necessity for the comprehensive use of all types of
transportation for carrying out shipments in wartime and the
organization of their preparation and joint work according to
a unified plan and under unified direction has now been gen-
erally recognized. However, in the proposed solutions to
individual problems in this organization, considerable diversity
of opinion is encountered.
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Certain analysts, in appraising the possibilities for
using various types of transportation in anulear/mi nuclear/missile
war, believe that rail transportation is poorly of lengte
hy
work in wartime in view of ~'~f igra,ttmanybpointsyof the railway
interruptions of through tra
network, and that water transportation
oncseabandsriverlchannels
certain axes. To this,theY add
and river sectors with
arisekthantonlralnger ilroadsnteFromtthis,o
through traffic will work in ground theaters
it is concluded that the basic shipping
of military operations and in the zone of. interiOa`_.must.,l#e.
accomplished by motor vehicle and air transportation.)
We consider such a conclusion to be incorrect. iIttis , and known that at the prese~tthetime
otherocountriesyof the Socialist
of
overwhelming majority
Camp, rail transportation carries the greatesatlproportioneofn
plan play
the overall freight turnover~o the will
for the development
the future also. According the specific propor-
of our transportation network in 1965,
of rail transportation in the overall ifreig 5tlturnovnr;
tion
will be 71.3 percent; sea, 10.5 percent; and air,
motor vehicle, 6.2 percent; pipeline, 6.8 percent;
0.07 percent. Consequently, to shift the largest part of the
shipping work to vehicular andlavii~rotransportationiinenartime
will be simply impossible in
capacity for this.
In addition, on main vehicular fhighways
andiothernimportant
vehicular roads, the destruction
major bridges, etc., will also cause interruptions of through
by-
to conduct traffic along by-
traffic. It will be necessary passages and river crossings to
passes, to establish temporary P
overcome contaminated sectors of routes.
veAlluthisrwill de-
crease the traffic-carrying capacity of and
will increase the expenditure of vehicular transportation in
carrying out shipping wor.
1. "Modern War", General Staff Academy (Akademiya GSh),
Moscow, 1960, p. 71.
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The rise of lengthy interruptions of traffic at many
points on the rail network does not at all mean
undamaged sectors of the networkremaining contrary, it
points cannot be used for shipping. O the nary, if
is completely possible to retain the working sectors of interior
these sectors. The same also app ties to tins major
water routes. Of course, destruction of centers, p
man-made structures, and the liquidation of part of traffthecshipping, the i and
means will lead to a significant lowering of
hauling capacity of railways and river routes. But, with proper
preparation, they can carry out a considerable share of the
shipping work in wartime, especially if it is considered that
the required volume of shipping will decrease in comparison
with prewar.
In wartime, the work of rail transportation in zones near
the front both in theaters of military operations and in in-
ternal areas of the country must carry the greatest proportion.
Because of this very condition, it is necessary to guarantee
the comprehensive use of various types of transportation for
military purposes.
A capability for their comprehensive use in wartime should
be ensured beforehand both technically and organizationally.
infrom
The solution to this problem
thetdevelopmentloftvartoust
consists of mutual coordination
and their
types of communications routes
onenmeanssofstr2~nsng
means, means of transferring goods from ans-
portation to another and in the coordination of their joint
work. Continuity of shipping is ensured by spec tear
in cases f destruction and centers, ob-
centers, major man-made s
jectives.
From the organizational standpoint, unified direction of
the preparation and working of various types of transportation
in wartime has the moit ministry
in view of their s spec
or department and not one service of thecatanion.
t
direct the comprehensive use of all types
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Therefore, it seems to us that unified direction of the pre-
paration of the transportn~iandneachrdistrictelocated in on
the territory of each fro
zones near the front and in the internal areas of the country
should be accomplished by special organs. Obviously, t
structure and functions of these organs can be determined
only by governmental decisions.
Various solutions to the problem of securing unity of
direction in the preparation and employment of the rious
types of transportation for accomplishing shipping on
territory of the front are proposed.
In certain works the idea is advanced of using for this
purpose a control organization very similar to the one used
during World War II. In view of the increasing complexity of directing shipments under the conditions of modernudingwar, it
the
is envisaged to improve this organization by
transportation department in the rear area staff of a front.
It is considered, however, that this department should dt
the use of various types of transportation,
direct only
for all types of shipments but only for transporting materiel
1 direction of the preparation of all
and for evacuation. Thus,
types of transportation for joint work andoalso ;unifif
of all types of shipments according
As
are not included in the functions of the 3rd Department-.
a result, neither unity in the preparation of the transporta-w tion network of a front aoservicesnofyalfront w~lllre-
is ensured. The transportation
problems oofvdirectionncannot
ceive instructions on these
echelons. Obviously, such organization
of transportat-
ion the comprehensive use of all the types
ion of a front.
Operations; Rear Services Staff
The Rear Area in Modern
1. of Moscow District, Moscow, 1959, p. 293. 50X1-HUM
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Other authors consider that the 3rd__Department of the
unable
area staff of a front is, by its very position, e
to resolve the practical Problems of planning and coordinating
In-
the work of all the types of transportation of a front.
stead of this department, they propose the creation in a front 7
of a unified transportation service (directorate) prorodvidded use with
of
the necessary authority for organizing the i all the types of transportation subordinate to terontitn
with appropriate powers for coordinating problems m of departments. military
shipping with the necessary ministries and depa to work
secure direction of military shipping, it is proposed
out schedules and plans for shipping which are coordinated
among the various types of transportation and to create a unifeyd
dispatcher control over shipments.1 The given version of the
es of trans-
portation ion of first of all, also doestnot provide a
porttatio in a a preparation of the transportation
solution to the problems of p unwieldy and
network. Secondly, such a directorate is very
not
inefficient: it will fetter thaofothe proposalsndoo _
trio services. Thirdly, the authors
indicate the subordination of the
this problem haslcons~derable
of a front, while the solution significance.
A third version of the organization of unified .di The
of the various types of transportation is proposed. trans-
direction of the preparation and use of all types ed
portation is centralized directly inothefhands of the deputy
portation -
to the commander of troops of
the chiefs of the military transportation services directly
subordinate to him. It thaoft
area of the front must
ments (including operational) and also of the march movements
of troops along the military vehicular roads of the front.
1. Lieutenant-General I. Kovalev, Major-General P. Bakarev,
in a
Colonel K.~PavlovihCollectionsoffArticlesroftthe Journal
Modern War, Special
"Military Thought , , Third Issue.
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It is proposed to accomplish the organization and control
of mutual coordination of the preparation of the various types
of transportation and their comprehensive use for supporting are operations in the transportation roveralledirectioneof thea
des
staff of the front. Thus, unity of
preparation and use of all types of transportation coincinciid are
with the known independence eachrof the whic
specialized according to types how- tion; One can agree with such a version of the tdirectorateashould not
ever, in our opinion, the he transportation
be directly subordinated to the chief of the rear area ss taff o
a front. It is known that up to the present time,
aff
ample, aff
and supply) is charged to various organs (the s
ra
P the rear area staff of a front). In this situa
o front, cion,
it t is advisable to have the trootatr??psl?fctheafrontmedi-
ately subordinate to the commander s of theon the
This guarantees unity of direction of the preparation art of of tha-
op
transportation network of the fOettallrtypessofpmilitary
tions and its use for carrying
shipping.
New means of action against the transportation network
give rise to the necessity for changes in the methods and
the continuity of s ipping?
means o ensuring
a wider dispersal of shipping is required
In a modern war, of various technical
i.e, dispersal of communications routes,
installations, and of shipping means.
Parallel communications routes of various types should be
dispersed so that in cases of lengthy interruptions of traffic
on one of them, continuity of traffic on the others is pre-
serv this, it is necessary to ensure a capa-
bilityy. for Along transferring flows of shipments from a route put
ilit
out of commission to those still operative.
1. Works of the Military Academ of Rear:Services. and Trans-
P. 184. 50X1-HUM
ortatio No. 43, 1959,
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In order to prevent lengthy interruptions of through traffic
from the destruction of
of trains and motor convoys resulting
transportation centers), rail-
way cities (and corresponding ared in advance at
way and vehicular bypasses should be prep nceiaon
a sufficient ithooutefailmforethecuseeof theseofor,national
must t b be made wi
economic shipments in peacetime which will enableeusato avoid
immobilizing capital investments. It is al ne
roaches to
prepare in advance rail anbridges vehicuand c~ossings over major
places at which temporary
river barriers are constructed in case permanent bridge cross-
ings are destroyed.
In the period of threat, and even more at the beginning of
and unloading work, the
a war, the greater amount of loading of transported troops,
preparation of shipping means, support etc.., must be taken beyond the limits of transportationacenters
in the shortest period of time. For this, aairfields
prepare in advance appropriate stations, wharves, and
dih
at their approaches and to provide support
forces and means.
In order to have a capability of using for shipping un-
damaged sectors of railways andiinternal waryateconsr
on destroyed installations,
uantity of rolling stock, fuel, and
maintain an undiminished q
materiel at these sectors in wartime.
At the beginning of a war, in order to effect reconstrucrful,
tion and construction work on routes of communications, powks
highly productive means, capable of accomplishing
under conditions of mass destruction and in contaminated areas
will be required immediately.
The primary efforts of reconstruction personnel, especially
in zones near the f ront and in the rear area of the country, , are
required in order to concentrate on overcoming lcoun task Tarriees
which obstruct transportation
communications between the sectors
will consist of restoring on "barriers". This task can be
of the network bordering the comprehensive use of
accomplished most successfully by
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construction, operational, and shipping
the reconstruction, i eline, water, and air
k
resources of rail, vehicular, p P
transportation for overcoming obstructedlareas. All workn
in the reconstruction, development, p
and use of the transportation network inechnarea chnuld
be accomplished according to a unified plan
ually coordinated.
A very important role in overcoming "barriers" can be
played by special means of transporting railroad cars: trailers with a large load-carrying capacity (up to 100
tons), special ferries, ferries made from barges and pon-
toons with rails laid on them for carrying cars across
large rivers when bridges have been destroyed, helicopters
with a large load-carrying capacity, etc.
a sharp reduction
The existence of such means permits
shipment areas,
in the volume of work in preparing temporary
.the avoidance of duplicate shipments, and in-
crease in the speed of restoring
railway sectors bordering a destroyed installation.
It is obvious that the preparation of transportation
for war and specifically for supporting the strategic
troops
concentration and deployment
more complex than before and
Among the most important of these are the following:
1. In the initial period of a modern war, as in other
periods, shipments for strategic concentration
uandodeplo -
ment can be accomplished only by the ce various
ation
transportation means. tion close mutual
forrworking
and continuous coordina
jointly in wartime has become absolutely mandatory. One
of the most important alnetwork forcmilitaryrpurposes
and using the transportation operational direction of
is the organization of unified othe work of all types of transportation on the territory
of each front, district near the front, and internal area
of the country.
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2. Paramount significance is acquired by the main-
tenance at the beginning and during the course of a war
of the viability and working capability of the network
countryltaln the
and continuity otheprearsareatheaters
operations and in
prior development oif tthastbecomeressentialtfirstfof all
military purposes, shipments to ensure a for transporta-
out
for carrying
tion centers, for the rapid transfer of a flow of
forhipe
ments from one type of transport to others,
restoration in eriods time of
between sectors of
installations.
3. The role of special (reconstruction, construction,
hours osf war
shipping) means of overcoming major "barriers" bordering on communications routes in the very first increased.
as a result of nuclear strikes has sharply cThe creation of such powerful and highly mobile
transportation
during the advanced preparation of the transp
network is now much more logical than prior development
of installations within centers, increasing the num
of permanent bridge crossings over major rivers, etc.
This means that in solving the problems of strategic
concentration and deployment of the armed forces,
it new in
ces of pps absolutely stransportationlnetwork forlwork during
aredndness of the P the actual possibilities
the initial period of a war, of transport, the main-
tenance the combined use of all types o capacity and mobility
tenance of the necessary working caand the continuity of
of the transportation network,
shipping. Only on the basis of an analysis of these
data can one make a correct estimate to provide for
strategic concentration and deployment from the stand-
point of transportation and derive from this estimate
wholly valid conclusions.
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