STRATEGIC MISSILE BULLETIN: THE CONTROL OF THE MEANS OF STRATEGIC ATTACK OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500530001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGE44CE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25\\D. C.
1 MAY 1967
.MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : STRATEGIC MISSILE BULLETIN: "The Control of
the Means of Strategic Attack of the Armed
Forces of the Capitalist Countries"
1,. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an,article which
appeared in a Soviet Ministry of Defense publication called
Information Bulletin of the Missile Troops (Informatsionyy
Byulleten Raketnykh Voysk). This publication is classified
TOP SECRET,by the Soviets and was first issued in 1961. It is
intended for generals and officers of the Missile Troops.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should.be addressed
to the originating office.
J ?
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, Special Investigation
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
+SFk?FT
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IV LEkRET
SUBJECT STRATEGIC MISSILE BULLETIN: "The Control
of the Means of Strategic-Attack of the
Armed Forces of the Capitalist Countries"
DATE OF INFO: September 1961
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT Documentary
SOURCE Reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
titled "The Control of the Means of Strategic Attack of
the Armed Forces of the Capitalist Countries", which
appeared in the 1961 Second Issue of a TOP SECRET Soviet
publication titled Information Bulletin of the Missile
Troops (Informatsionnyy Byulleten-RaketnyEff Voysk). he
39ZT ~econ issue was sent to press on 19 September 1961.
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SE XRET
The Control of the Means of Strategic Attack
of the Armed Forces of the Capitalist Countries
One of the basic factors which determines a high degree
of combat readiness is the prior organization of wartime
control organs, possessing various means of communications
(mainly multichannel and automated lines of communication&)
which must provide reliable control of troops in the
theaters of war and theaters of military operations (TVD).
By theater of war is understood the totality of the
territories and sea expanses on which the necessary armed
forces are deployed and which might be enveloped in direct
military operations. A theater of military operations
forms a part of a theater of war, large enough to conduct
operations with ground troops, air forces, and naval forces
with their materiel and technical supply.
The political and military direction of a country (or' of
a bloc), according to the evaluation of the command of the
USA and its partners, must ensure the accomplishment of the
following main tasks:
* working out a political and military strategy
and determining a single foreign policy and economic
policy, mainly in relation to the Soviet Union and
other countries of the Socialist Camp;
,w- working out views on the nature of a future
war, operations, and combat, and based upon this the
establishment of principles and the practical organi-
zation of the armed forces, determination of their
strength, battle composition, and groupings in peace
and wartime;
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- the prior organization of the necessary organs
of control of the armed forces in the theaters of war
and theaters of military operations, as well as in
formations of ground, air, and naval forces
--r- working out plans for conducting the war
(operations) with the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and passing down the combat tasks to the actual
units concerned, and checking these plans during
exercises and maneuvers;
the maintenance of the armed forces in a
state of high combat readiness;
bs- the preparation of the theaters of military
operations for war and creation of munitions (including
nuclear), of fuels and lubricants, and other materiel
and technical means necessary for the first 90 days
of war;
7- /Tour words missing] military-economic mea-
sures Teveral words missing .
Control of the armed forces and the coordination of
foreign with national troops within the bloc are organized
so as to provide for:
- a sudden attack with the employment of
nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction;
unity of command, flexibility, and efficient
control;
the possibility of effective and full use of
all types of armed forces in combined operations;
.-a- the maximum use of the characteristics and
capabilities of each type of armed forces, arms of
troops, and weapons.
SF(1RFT
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40b SECT
The control structure of the armed forces in each
theater of military operations will have its own features
arising from the military-political tasks to be performed
in a given theater, geographical. conditions, the degree of
preparation in the theater for military operations, the
military-political situation in other theaters, and several
other preconditions.
The nature of this total. war between coalitions, the
employment during it of weapons of mass destruction, as
well as the progress in the field of electronics and communi-
cations required a radical review of the principles and
methods of controlling armed forces.
The basis of a stable and continuous direction of troops
in a future war, and especially in the initial period, is
considered to be the timely creation and deployment of
command posts dispersed in place, which must be well equipped
from the engineer point of view and provided with reliable
communications. As the analysis of documentary material
shows, the military direction of the capitalist states, and
primarily the aggressive NATO Bloc, envisages the establish-
ment and deployment of main, forward, alternate and rear
command posts for the control of troops during wartime.
The main command posts are planned to be set up at all
levels o command from division upward. At these posts
will be located the main departments and directorates of the
staffs, whose function will in.lude the immediate direction
of the combat operations of the. troops.
The forward command posts are intended to be organized
at the levels of division to a group of armies of ground
troops, and of the corresponding large units and formations
of the other types of armed forces, to ensure direction of
the main groupings of troops on the decisive axes. The
forward posts must be mobile, with a small staff, and located
in places from which they could quickly influence the course
of combat operations.
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4M SET
Under conditions of nuclear weapon employment, the
alternate command posts are to be set up and deployecat
all levels of command. At these posts there must be the
requisite number of officers with means of communications
so that if the main command posts are put out of action
they can take over the direction of the troops.
The rear command posts will be established only in
field armies and army corps to direct the rear installations
and units. It is planned to locate the rear (second)
echelons of the headquarters at these posts.
In accordance with the views of the Anglo-American
Command, command posts must be located in underground
structures (in mountainous terrain - in mountains, cliffs,
etc.) with a thickness of overhead cover up to 200 m and
at a distance of not less than 16 km from any objective
against which a nuclear strike may be delivered. Cases
have been noted when the structures were built with an
overhead cover of 3 m of concrete and up to 6.5 m of soil.
Besides this, these structures must have lighting and
power installations (with a fuel supply for one month),
a heating system calculated to maintain constant tempera-
ture of +180 centigrade, two artesian wells with a'water-
supply system to all parts of the premises, a ventilation
system, sewage system, and air conditioning.
The main command posts of gtcaps of armies in atheater of
war must be prepared at a distance from the peacetime
locations of the headquarters that will ensure that the
move of the headquarters from their peacetime locations
to the wartime command posts could be done within 24 hours.
When locating the field control points of field armies
and army corps and building structures for them, one should be
guided by the following:
.- to ensure security it is considered inadvisable
in principle to have a headquarters located in the same
place in peace and wartime;
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~SE~CR.ET
, wartime command posts are set in underground
structures; they must also be located at a distance '
from the peacetime headquarters that ensures that the
move of the headquarters from its peace to its war
location can be completed in not more than 24 hours;
the communications centers must be common to,
both peacetime and wartime headquarters, and their
location must take into account the disposition of
the above-mentioned headquarters; therefore they
require suitable equipping, means of defense, and
reserve communications equipment.
Communications are one of the main means of controlling
the armed forces in a future war, and this control is
becoming more and more automated. The system of communi-
cations must include the system of strategic communications
of the various armed forces and the system of communications
in the theaters of war and their component theaters of mili-
tary operations.
The system of strategic communications created by the
American command is intended for the direction of the
various armed forces located in different theaters of war.
This includes the strategic communications systems of the
ground, air, and naval forces. The above-mentioned systems
of communications employ radio, radio relay, tropospheric,
ionospheric, and wire communications, ensuring telegraphic,
facsimile, machine-cipher (mashinno-tsifrovaya) and tele-
phonic communications. Radio is considered the main means
of communications and the only means of communication for control of
aircraft in the air and surface and submarine naval forces
on the move.
The strategic communications system of the ground troops
provides the Department of the Army organs of control with
communications with troops in overseas theaters of military
operations as well as with those in the continental USA.
On the whole, this system provides reliable, rapid,
flexible, and secure communications for the control of the
ground troops.
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SE6itET
The strategic communications system of the Air Force
permits the Department of the Air Force to maintain'communi--
cationsdown to individual squadrons. Organizationally, this
system is composed of three communications networks of the
Air Force and of two prin#r radio-telephone networks of the
Strategic Air Command. The last two networks are intended
only for the direction of the US Air Force strategic means
of attack.
The strategic communications system of the naval forces
embraces all important theaters of naval operations and
provides a central control of the surface and submarine
naval forces, of naval bases and of marine units.
A great deal of attention is given to the strategic
communications of the Air Force and first of ally to that of
the Strategic Air Command of the USA as the main organization
in whose hands are concentrated all the means of strategic
attack. Notwithstanding the adequate extent of the strategic
communications system of the US Air Force, it does not at
present satisfy all the requirements which have appeared
with the development of the means of air attack (strategic
aircraft, missiles) both as for range of communications and.for
speed of transmission~as well as for capacity. A requirement
for an increase in range of communications and in the number
of channels has been caused by the growth of the number of
bases in distant overseas territories, by the increase in the
volume of information and of the operational radius of
strategic bombers, and by the practice of refueling aircraft
in the air.
Taking into account that the Strategic Air Command takes
up 75 percent of all the channels of the strategic communi-
cations system, since 1958 the command of the US Air Force
has been taking measures to improve technically the existing
systems of strategic communications (Project "Aircom").
At the present time the following complex automated
systems are at the stage of being worked out and built for
the US Air Force: the control of the attack weapons of the
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Strategic Air Command and of the early warning antimissile
defense; control of antiaircraft defense means in the
continental USA; control of the forces and weapons of the
Air Force in theaters of military operations; control of
the tactical aircraft; control of air movement; the service
for supply of technical equipment; weather reconnaissance;
collection and collation of intelligence data from radio
intercept; transmission and processing of air reconnais-
sance data; and processing data to keep the air commands
and the headquarters of the Air Force briefed. The
Americans consider that a need has now arisen to introduce
into the strategic communications system of the Air Force
such networks as a network for alerting units of Strategic
Air Command, a command network for the Air Force, an
administrative network, and a network for collecting
intelligence data from all theaters of war.
According to preliminary calculations, the cost to
complete the entire improvement project is more than one
billion dollars. It is proposed to carry out the project
in 12 years and in three phases:
-,- From 1958 to 1962 - expanding the existing
communications networks and improving the equip-
ment employed; creating a special radio communications
network with intercontinental ballistic missile and
cruise-missile units and subunits, as"well as with
the installations supporting the combat activities of
these units and subunits. At the present time this
network is already partly established. Radio traffic
on it is carried out on short-wave radio links with
multichannel cipher communications, making use of the
strategic communication centers of the Air Force;
-_- From 1962 to 1965 - a further increase in
the number of communications links, during which the
most important task is considered to be the Utro-
duction of new types of communications and fiew
equipment developed before 1962.
SE T
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-- From 1965 to 1970 - the organization of com-
municationslinks using artificial earth satellites,
communications links with intercontinental craft
(mezhkontinentalnyy korab1' as well as the development
of new equipment based on the achievements of science
and technology in recent years.
The automated control system of the forces and means
of Strategic Air Command is intended for the control of the
forces and means of strategic attack. This system will
consist of the following subsystems: automatic communi-
cations which will include the communications centers of the
air and missile bases and 'their headquarters; control of
transmission of reports with centers of automatic control
of communications; and processing information and presenta-
tionof the data in the appropriate centers located with
the headquarters of Strategic Air Command and of the air
armies.
It is planned to bring the system into full operation
by the beginning of 1965. The main element of the system
is the subsystem for processing information received from
the communication centers of headquarters; and divisions.(armies)
through the automatic control centers of the air, and missile
bases. The processing of information at headquarters will
be done with the aid of high-speed electronic computers.
According to American calculations, the above-mentioned
automated system will permit the commander to receive informa*
tion about the actual state of the means of strategic attack
in the course of a few minutes (with a non-automated control
system it would take several hours) and pass the decisions
taken to Strategic Air Force and ballistic missile units in
a few seconds.
The experience of exercises and maneuvers has shown that
it is essential to organize centers for target study at
control points. According to preliminary information, it has
been established that those large units (formations) which
had such centers organized at their headquarters were able to
destroy up to 70 percent of all detected targets with nuclear
SE T
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weapons. At the same.,time~those large units (formations)
where these centers were not organized were able to destroy
only up to 45 percent of the targets detected.
In connection with the possibility that the ground control
points of the strategic weapons might be put out of action,
the US command has taken the decision to create an alternate
-command post in the air. For this purpose three jet tanker
KC-135 aircraft were re-equipped, and for each one a special
operational group was prepared, consisting of 25 men, headed
by a responsible general from the headquarters of Strategic
Air Command.
In the event the main command post is put out of action,
this command post located in the air has the right to enter
into direct communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.'.
and to control all aircraft units and large units both on
the ground and in, the air. This considerably increases the
strength andleflectiveness of control of Strategic Air Force
units. Since August 1960, the Americans have started working
out in practice the direct control of Strategic Air Force
units and large units from an airborne command post.
It is intended to carry out strategic air operations
using piloted and pilotless means simultaneously along all
strategic air axes according to a unified plan. These
operations will be closely coordinated with operations
being carried out by tactical aircraft and naval aircraft
as far as both time and space are concerned. At the same
time the plans for the delivery of nuclear strikes in
theaters of war and theaters of military operations are
worked out in detail in peacetime by army groups, especially
for the first 3 to 7 days of war. In conjunction with this,
the control of the means of attack in the initial period of
war as a rule will be carried out with the aid of short
signals which will be transmitted primarily by telephone
cable lines. If it is necessary to send orders by radio,
it is planned to use frequencies not known to have been
used before.
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TOP SFC~RFT
Immediate direction of missile units is carried out by
Strategic Air Command on specially organized communications.
In the continental USA, cable and radio relay lines are used
for communications with squadrons of intercontinental bal-
listic missiles and cruise-missiles; and the short-wave
radio links are in reserve. Communications with ballistic
missile squadrons based in Europe are maintained through
the channels of the main radio and cable communications
links through the principal radio relaying centers of the
Air Force which provide automatic passage of transit telegrams.
The missile base,. of a medium-range ballistic missile
squadron represents a complex of stationary structures and equip-
ment, intended to support the launching of ballistic misAlles.
It contains five launch sites, on each of which three launch-
ing mounts are located, and a supply center with a maintenance
position and a storage area for nose cones of the ballistic
missiles. Organizationally, the squadrons form part of the
air force of the country on whose territory they are based.
However, before the ballistic missiles are used in combat,
permission is required from the American command under whose
immediate command the warheads of the missiles with nuclear
charges are held. In view of this dual subordination each
squadron possesses direct communications with its senior
headquarters of the national air force and with the head-
quarters of the US Strategic Air Command. Besides the
direct radio-telephone, radio-telegraph, and cipher channels
of communications, each squadron can make use of a consider-
able number of alternate channels within the strategic
communications system.
For control of squadron subunits a special internal
communications system is organized at the missile base.
Communications between the squadron headquarters and the
launch sites (including the alternate ones)are carried out
by multichannel underground cable lines or by radio relay
links. The internal communications of the squadrons have
to meet the following basic requirements:
-r- the communications equipment must be continuously
ready to be switched on for the immediate transmission of
commands;
-11-
P T
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sF(RFT
-- the communications system must provide a
reliable, rapid, and secure control of the units with
weapons of strategic attack;
, the communications equipment must conform to
the special features of the weapon system ("Jupiter" or
"Thor") ;
the communications equipment must be simple
to use and be capable of joint operation and coupling
with other communications equipment;
-- the transmission of commands and messages
along the network must be carried out by telephone,
as being the most simple and convenient method for
operational use.
Within the internal communications system of a squadron
the following networks are organized:
command network - for the transmission of
commands, orders, and operational reports; the network
connects the squadron command post with the control
points at the maintenance site, in the warhead storage
area, and at the launch sites; the squadron controller
(dispatcher) can maintain communications with all
controllers of control points simultaneously as well
as individually; the network has a 24-hour duty system;
a network for combat and technical maintenance -
for linking the maintenance site and the warhead stor-
age area with the squadron headquarters and launch sites;
the controller of the storage area and the controller
of the maintenance site maintain contact with each
launch site individually; the network has a.24-hour
duty system; .
a network for strategic alert - for transmit-
ting sound signals at which all the squadron. subunits
are brought to complete combat readiness;
SFhPFT
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-- a network for technical service of launch
sites - for coordinating the work of the launching
mount combat crews and the subunits maintaining them
with supplies of technical equipment;
-- administrative network - for everyday communi-
cations on problems of squadron administrative-economic
activities.
The communications equipment of the squadron control
points used on operational networks is uniform and consists
of push-button switchboards, microphone-telephone instru-
ments, and loudspeakers. The switchboards are placed at
the control panels of the squadron command post, control
points of the launch sites, the maintenance site, and the
warhead storage area. Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-
trailers used for servicing the launching mounts with sup-
plies and equipment are provided with the simplest telephone
sets (interphone system with loudspeakers) which can be
connected to cable lines laid to the transport parking
places. In the area of the launching mounts, 14 outside
interphone systems are laid out and placed at the most
convenient points.
The organizational structure, the numerous lines, and
the capacity of the internal communication system of a
medium-range ballistic missile squadron ensures secure
operational control of its subunits.
Resides the organization of aboveground and underground
stationary missiiebases, the Americans are conducting tests on
railroad rolling stock with "Minuteman" guided missiles.
It is intended to have one railroad car with radio equipment
working on side-band frequencies for communications in the
train. For communications with the operational group and
with the control point for these trains as well as with
Strategic Air Command, one of the cars is'equipped with an
ultra short-wave radio station.
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SF('QFT
In the
_
using cable and radio~
l
l
ystem
c
otu
r
ay links is
n
viable. Thus, re
sufficientl
at present the USA is conducting research in
the use of an underground radio communications system,
whereby the radio station and its antenna devices are
placed in underground shelters, and the top layer of soil
and the layer of air next to it are the means of radio
wave propagation.
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