MILITARY THOUGHT: A NEW COMBAT VEHICLE, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. SHEVCHENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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A New Combat Vehicle
by
Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko
Recently, in our military press and in the military press
abroad there has been wide discussion of the role of the
armed forces and the arms of troops in a future war and of
the directions of future development and improvement of
combat equipment and armaments. A significant place in this
discussion is devoted to determining the role of tanks in
a modern battle and operation. This is not accidental
because the firepower, armor protection, and mobility which
are combined in tanks have always given them certain advan-
tages over the other arms of troops and permitted the suc-
cessful conduct of combat operations.
At the present time tank formations and large units
also have the greatest mobility and resistance to-destruction
by nuclear weapons; therefore, in modern operations too they
are able to fulfil the quite complex and responsible missions
that are assigned to them.
But this does not mean that the modern tank must be
considered the ultimate in the perfection of combat equipment
and that it is fully Suited to conducting combat operations
under the new, complex conditions. We share the opinion of
Marshal of Armored Troops P. A. Rotmistrov* about the need to
increase the relative proportion of the tank troops at the
front level and in the armed forces as a whole, and we con-
sider it advisable and feasible to create and introduce into
the ground troops, instead of the tank, an armored vehicle of
a new type that, in its characteristics and utility, would
* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", First Issue, 1961.
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fulfil the modern requirements to the maximum.
With the appearance of antitank guided missiles with
shaped charges (PTURS) that have high armor-piercing capa-
bility, tanks lose one of their basic qualities - effective
protection from the fire of these new weapons.
One cannot disagree with the opinion of Colonel-General
A. Kh. Babadzhanyan*, who maintains that in single combat with
an antitank missile launcher a tank will be defeated, and
with the adequate saturation of the troops with these launchers,
any tank attack may be broken up and a large part of the tanks
participating in it destroyed,together with their crews.
It is true that antitank missiles have not yet been tried
in combat and still have several shortcomings, but this is one
of the types of weapons having the best long-range prospects
and one which will be constantly improved. Therefore, there
is little justification for the attempt by Marshal of Armored
Troops P. A. Rotmistrov to prove that the new antitank missile
weapons, with the availability of weapons of mass destruction,
are not very dangerous for tanks and that their use allegedly
will not greatly influence the employment and operations of
tank troops.
In the near future, antitank missiles will comprise the
greatest danger for tanks with any armor protectlibn, and the
use of the PTURS on armored vehicles and the improvement of
the means of guiding the missile to the target will make
them even more menacing weapons.
Should we pose the problem of further increasing the
thickness of tank armor under these conditions? Of course
not. One should speak of a sharp increase in the firepower
of the tank by replacing the gun with a missile launcher.
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Though it, First Issue, 1961.
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A correct solution of this problem is offered by General
of the Army A. S. Zhadov*, when he speaks of the need to
arm the modern tank with the most advanced missile weapons,
that ensure the destruction of any enemy tanks or other
objectives at great distances during combat.
As far as the mobility of the tank is concerned, it
is relative and does not fully meet the requirements of
a modern operation and battle, which are conducted at
high tempos. Just as before, water barriers are a serious
obstacle for heavy and medium tanks.
Therefore, destructibility by the fire of new antitank
weapons, the comparatively weak firepower, and the inadequate
cross-country ability and mobility of the tank demand its
replacement by a combat vehicle of a more improved type, which
is capable of performing comprehensive combat'missions.
In a modern battle and operation, success is achieved
by the joint efforts of the missile, tank, motorized rifle,
artillery, and other large units and units in close coordi-
nation. But the fact that at the present time each arm of
troops has different combat capabilities, unequal protective
capability against the destructive factors of nuclear weapons,
and therefore is not suited for the fulfilment of all the
comprehensive operational and combat missions independently,
can lead not only to the disruption of coordination but in
several instances to the loss of the combat effectiveness of
formations and large units.
That is why it is necessary to have a combat vehicle
that, at the very least, would combine in itself the combat
features that are inherent in tanks, missiles (artillery),
and motorized rifle subunits. Such a vehicle must ensure the
successful fulfilment of various combat tasks successively
accomplished in the offensive and on defense, have maximum
protection from weapons of mass destruction, and at the same
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", Second Issue, 1961.
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time serve as a means of transportation for personnel and
armament. Firepower, armor protection, and mobility have
to find a new balance in it, in the presence of a new
quality - versatile, universal. utility.
The new combat vehicle must have the following:
--improved means of reconnaissance and communications
permitting the detection of enemy targets and objec-
tives at great distances arg.the maintenance of reliable
communications between vehicles, subunits, and units;
--powerful armament capable of destroying enemy personnel
in armored vehicles and outside them and also various
combat equipment at considerable distances;
--an adequate amount of ammunition, calculated for 1
to 2 calendar days of combat operations.
The speed of such a vehicle must reach up to 80 kph
on roads and up to 50 kph off roads, and must have a supply
of fuel for. 700 to 1000 km and high cross-country ability,
including rapid crossing of zones of radioactive contamination,
water barriers, and various obstacles and obstructions.
Armor protection and hermetic sealing of the vehicle
must ensure reliable protection of personnel from small-
arms and fragmentation injuries and from the effects of
radioactive and toxic substances, bacteriological agents,
thermal radiation, arr.,if possible, the shock wave.
It is proposed to have the vehicle hold 7 or 8 persons,
preferably with means for digging themselves in: a crew
of 2 or 3 persons and a combat team of 4 or 5 persons having
the capability of conducting fire directly from the vehicle
in motion, and when necessary of performing combat missions
after dismounting. At the same time, the team is assigned
the duties of operating instruments, servicing the vehicle,
concealing it, etc.
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Consequently, unlike the tank,on which riflemen can
operate only as riders, in the proposed vehicle the team
is an integral part of the vehicle, as well as of the combat
element. It is planned to have the new combat vehicle
simultaneously replace the tank, armored personnel carrier,
and partially the gun with a prime mover.
Lieutenant-General N. F. Slyunin* also speaks of the
need to create a new combat vehicle to replace the existing
tank. However, he examines it from slightly different posi-
tions, taking the concept of atomic resistance as the basis
for its creation and defending the retention of the combat
vehicles for the infantry and artillery (for example, an
artillery regiment remains in the division, etc.). Naturally,
a vehicle of this type will not be a universal vehicle, but
an improved armored personnel carrier which cannot eliminate
the existence of tanks.
In the combat vehicle it is not absolutely necessary to
have large stocks of foodstuffs and water, much less bunks
to provide rest for the personnel, as proposed by Lieutenant-
General N. F. S1yunin.
It appears to us that, besides the proposed combat vehicle,
it is necessary to have vehicles capable of performing more
complex fire missions. For this purpose, the means for
using nuclear weapons, and also antiaircraft weapons, are
mounted on such vehicles. The creation of groups of such
vehicles in companies and regiments will strengthen the
fire support of line subunits, give them great independence,
and will ensure the successful fulfilment of combat missions.
For the firm and continuous control of troops, it is
also necessary to have command combat vehicles with modern
armament and equipped with the necessary means of communi-
cations.
Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought , No. 1 (56), 1961.__
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The basis of the combat formations of subunits and
units under these conditions will be made up of line,
command combat vehicles and a certain number of special
combat vehicles comprising groups of fire support.
At the modern stage of development of Soviet tank
building, the amphibious tank or the amphibious armored
personnel carrier serve as the basis for creating a uni-
versal combat vehicle.
The introduction of a new type of combat vehicle into
the armament of the troops will fundamentally influence the
organization of the troops. First of all, the need ceases
for arms, of troops such as tank, motorized rifle, and artil-
lery. To replace them, it is necessary to create unified
armored troops with subunits, units, and large units of a
unitary type.
The crew and team of each combat vehicle may be a squad,
and 5 to 7 squads (vehicles) comprise a platoon. In the
line vehicles of the platoon, it is advisable to have means
for combating personnel, including those located in shelters,
and enemy armored vehicles, for which it is possible to use
missile weapons, large-caliber machine guns, and grenade
launchers. It is desirable to have PTURS mounted on all
vehicles.
In the company, it is advisable to have three platoons
and a fire group (2 or 3 vehicles, including the commander's
vehicle) with means for using nuclear weapons.
At the present time a tendency exists to have one or
two intermediate levels between the company and the division.
It appearsto us that a division should consist of regiments
in which it is advisable to have companies, but excluding
the battalion level. The elimination of the battalion level
with the presence of new combat vehicles of one type will
not have a negative influence on the fulfilment of tasks by
the regiment even though the battalion, with the loss of
combat effectiveness by two companies, will obviously lose
itsindependence. Troop control and their dispersal during 50X1-HUM
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combat operations will also become simplified. Besides
that, the battalion level is not directly tied in with
materiel and technical support measures.
With the introduction of the new combat vehicle,
the regiment can consist of up to five companies, a fire
group, means of combat support, and corresponding rear
services.
The regimental commanding officer's fire group must
include missile launchers, antiaircraft guns for combat
with low-flying enemy airplanes, means for combating radio-
technical equipment, and special vehicles for conducting
reconnaissance. Special subunits to eliminate the after-
effects of an enemy nuclear attack should be introduced
into the regiment.
The unitary division may include 4 or 5 regiments
having the same composition. This number of regiments
will permit the execution of a broad maneuver on the battle-
field, form the most diverse combat order, and disperse the
troops even more, especially in depth. Naturally the divi-
sion, apart from the regiments, will have the means of com-
bat, materiel, and technical support. A division with the
proposed complement will have a total of 500 to 600 combat
vehicles, and it will have a strength of 6000 to 7000 men.
Such a division will surpass a modern tank and, especially,
a motorized rifle division, in fire and striking power,
and also in mobility and maneuverability.
In our opinion, the army must mainly have divisions
with identical organization. When necessary, separate
divisions may vary from the standard organization - for
example, divisions intended for operations in a mountainous
area, as an airborne force, etc.
We consider that for the timely reinforcement of divi-
sions, wider use of airborne forces, and for performing
other tasks, it is necessary to have one or two reserve
regiments - 12 to 18 companies - in an army.
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These are our proposals for troop organization.
At the present stage of development of the organizational 50X1-HUM
structure of troops, the creation of new large units may
be carried out on the basis of tank and motorized rifle
divisions. For example, from two tank and two motorized
rifle regiments it is possible to create a division com-
posed of four regiments with four companies in each regi-
ment. Initially, the company can have 10 to 15 tanks, 4
or 5 armored personnel carriers, and fire support weapons.
At first the basis of the combat power of such subunits
will consist of tanks.
Closer coordination of tank and motorized rifle subunits
is ensured with such organization. These will be detachments
of a special type, having high maneuverability, great striking
force, and the capability of performing combat tasks that are
more varied in nature. Moreover, the faults of modern tank
and motorized rifle regiments are eliminated, and measures
connected with the dispersal of troops and increasing their
viability will be conducted with greater success.
At the same time, the army may include separate divi-
sions with a complement of modern motorized rifle regiments,
but without tanks, with an adequate quantity of antitank
weapons and more powerful weapons to neutralize the enemy
with fire. Such "light" divisions may be designated for the
consolidation of lines, for conducting combat operations in
populated points and on terrain that is difficult for tanks
to transit, and also may operate as airborne forces.
The proposed organizational measures permit the use
among the troops, during combat training, of new methods of
combat operations which meet modern requirements.
Only general questions of the creation of a new combat
vehicle and the improvement of troop organization are set
forth in this article. It seems to us that the time has
come for a broader discussion in print of problems pertaining
to this field of military theory and practice. 50X1-HUM
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