MILITARY THOUGHT: SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN A MOUNTAINOUS THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, BY MAJOR-GENERAL S. TARASOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700450001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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"C Cr'ZCT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
IRONBARK
1 2 JUL 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Special Features
of the Organization and Conduct of Operations
in a Mountainous Theater of Military Operations",
by Major-General S. Tarasov
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the
SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"
published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down
to the level of division commander.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your
office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utili-
zation of any part of this document in any other form should be
addressed to the originating office.
DuvnCraded. to Secret by Authority
of Ri.chvri Helris, DD/P, per no
iat:,d 1.L; Dec o l9 y 1 Si ~~660
Deputy Director (Plans)
EClRE
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Divison of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National. Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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Now qF/Dr-T
IRONBARK
COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Special
Features of the Organization and Conduct
of Operations in a Mountainous Theater of
Military Operations", by Major-General S.
Tarasov
DATE OF INFO: December 1961
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT Documentary
SOURCE : A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
entitled "Special Features of the Organization and Conduct
of Operations in a Mountainous Theater of Military Operations",
by Major-General S. Tarasov. This article appeared in Issue
6 (61) of a special version of the Soviet journal Military
Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is
published irregularly.
Issue 6 (61) was sent to press on 7 December 1961.
Comment: Military Thought is published by the
USSR Ministry of e ense in three versions, classified
RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version
has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two
versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version
was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues
of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during
1961.
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COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE
Special Features of the Organization and Conduct
of Operations in a Mountainous Theater
of Military Operations
by
Major-General S. Tarasov
Study and analysis of problems connected with the
organization and conduct of operations in mountainous
areas during the initial period of a war, based on the
experience of postwar exercises,are acquiring ever greater
significance. In this connection, the theoretical sum-
maries and recommendations presented in the article by
General of the Army K. Galitskiy* are of undoubted interest.
In our opinion, however, some of them lack convincing
substantiation.
In particular, let us examine the question of using
nuclear and chemical weapons.
In mountainous terrain, because of the difficulties
of troop movement and of the deeper echelonment of the
most important enemy objectives, the delivery of suc-
cessive, rather. than massed, concentrated nuclear strikes
will be more frequently advisable than it would be under
normal conditions. When selecting objectives for such
strikes the effectiveness of their destruction and possi-
ble changes in terrain resulting from a nuclear burst
must be taken into account in all cases. Not only ground,,
but air bursts, as distinct from those that occur on flat
ground may create avalanches and enormous destruction,
especially in areas where there are passes, gaps, and gorges,
while ground bursts may also create areas of contamination
with high levels of radiation. All this will impede and,
in some cases, entirely preclude operations by advancing
troops for a considerable length of time. Therefore, to
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"
No. 3(53) 1960.
SECRET
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destroy the enemy under such conditions, single air nuclear
bursts of low yield should be used mainly. When these can-
not be delivered, or when the troops will not be able to
make timely use of nuclear strikes, it is advisable to anni-
hilate the enemy with the fire of conventional means of de-
struction, using chemical toxic agents. Moreover, consider-
ably fewer nuclear war ea s w apparently be allotted to
an operation in mountainous areas than under usual conditions.
The role of chemical weapons will therefore become more
important, and they will be widely used. When planning the
use of toxic agents in mountainous areas, it is necessary
to determine with special care safe-distance lines for our
troops and the areas (depressions, gorges, passes) in which
troops will have to be in anti-chemical protection equipment.
The rate of advance of 60 to 80 km, proposed by General
Galitskiy, can be achieved in a mountainous area only when
the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons, and his main ground
troop and aviation groupings have been effectively neutralized
and destroyed. To achieve the rate of advance indicated by
the author, it is also necessary to provide for the wide-
spread use of operational and tactical airborne forces, and
diversionary-reconnaissance groups to seize passes, gaps, and
airfields and to destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack
and his control and guidance points. Engineer and chemical
subunits should be included in the complement of the airborne
forces to clear mines and remove obstacles.
Lastly, an attack in a mountainous area at a rate of 60
to 80 km is possible against a weak opponent who does not
have at his disposal a sufficient quantity of nuclear wea-
pons and tanks. As a rule, however, rates of advance will
be extremely uneven and, on the whole, considerably lower
than those achieved under normal conditions. Only in wide
valleys and on mountain plateaus could the rates reach the
figures indicated. At command-staff and troop exercises
conducted during recent years in mountainous areas, the rate
of advance did not exceed 50 km.
We know that there are also other features of an army
. SFaF.
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offensive operation in mountainous and mountainous-wooded
areas which differ somewhat from those of an operation on
moderately rugged terrain. Thus, an offensive zone afford-
ing only a few accessible axes will become wider; the depth
of an operation may vary considerably depending on the aim
of the operation, on the enemy grouping, on the army's com-
bat capabilities, and especially on the distance of the areas
and objectives vitally important to the enemy, toward whose
seizure the operation is directed; the duration of the oper-
ation will also increase.
The direction of the main strike must ensure that use
is made of the results of employing the main forces of nu-
clear weapons and airborne forces for the rapid destruction
of the main enemy grouping, and also for the destruction
and capture of his means of nuclear attack and of the areas
whose seizure constitutes the goal of the operation.
In this connection, both the main and the other strikes
are decided upon in accordance with the purpose of the oper-
ation and the specific ,conditions of the situation. Here,
it is important, first of all, to determine the enemy's
nuclear/missile and other groupings and their weak and
vulnerable spots. The main direction of an offensive may
be changed during its course, depending on the way in which
the situation develops.
Thus, a main strike may coincide with the direction of
main roads, of the most important passes, and of the through
valleys leading the troops of the army to the areas and ob-
jectives with whose seizure the aim of the operation is
achieved. When there is a possibility of gaining the rear
of the enemy's main grouping by surprise, the main strike
may also be delivered on difficult terrain, shifting sub-
sequently to a more passable axis.
The operational formation of the troops of a front in
the conditions under examination is characterized by the
creation of several groupings of troops in accordance with
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the number of axes selected for the delivery of strikes
and by deep echelonment of forces and means along each of
these axes. The troop groupings should be able to per-
form the tasks confronting them independently throughout
the entire depth of the operation.
The operational formation of the