THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 6, 2013
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 21, 1963
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3.pdf152.08 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3 I -FluR!' 1111111. OCLKC I IN RMAT'ION REp0R INFoRMATION REPORT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 50X1-HUM This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the E.plunage aws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. imm111111111111111111 01111111111111alin 50X1-HUM COUNTRY USSR SUBJECT DATE OF INFO. PLACE & DATE ACQ. The Soviet ICBM Program REPORT DATE DISTR. / February 1963 10. PAGES 3 tEFERENCES RD IELD REPORT NO. 50X1 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM THIS Is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. 10 be a jump powers Khrushchev's basic idea in the entire matter is to ahead of and to impress the leaders of the Western to represent that which he does not have or that 5 4 3 1.111.1111111111111110 2 1 STATE 1 6 1 ARMY 1121 NAVY I 10 AIR nornmsrms SECRET NSA 1201 1 3 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM 50X1 5 4 GROUP 1 3 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND 2 DECLASSIFICATION DIA I 2 1 JCS 50X1-HUM NPIC 6 JAG 1 NIC 1 ONE 1 OCI I OSI 3 ORR .250X1-HUM, (Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-31 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3 0-. ? 'M., ?opt 'NO SECRET illiiI1111111111 III11111110011110 rek--; *Mt which he has in insignificant quantities as something which he has already in hand. There are tests of one nature or another which in many cases are successful, but he is already ranting as though this were an accomplished thing. Thus the whole idea of Khrushchev and of the Presidium is to demonstrate and to illustrate in one way or another such as by launching of an earth satellite, even of a man in space, in order to impress Western military leaders that the Soviet Union has everything. This is to force Western government leaders and military people to do their planning on the assumption that the Soviet Union already has a tremendous military potential when in reality it is only being developed." 2. a senior general officer of artillery, responsible for one aspect of the Soviet missile program, in early 19611 I"We are only thinking about these things, only planning, even though we have had some successes lhere and there. But in order to get anywhere one has to increase production tremendously and to train cadres." This officer has constantly said that there is an enormous amount of work to be done not only with cadres, but also with equipment, missile types, etc., while Khrushchev is shouting that we already have all this. The officer stated further that the Soviets have in their arsenal tactical missiles, and missiles that can reach South America, the United States, or Canada, but not accurately. 50X1-HUM 50X1 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM 3. These are test missiles which are still undergoing 50X1-HUM further tests and are not on bases. The USSR does not have the capability of even firing one or two -- there are not hundreds even in a testing status. 'There may be only tens in that category. Even in sending up a satellite or a man in space all scientists are mobilized for the effort, and before a satellite is launched they have several failures. The main idea now of Khrushchev's statements is to create an effect on foreign ears, but the preparations are being carried out intensively. The objective is to attain mass production. -2- 'pp ? -101* v A x-SooSillIPP* ? SECRET anumiumimiaimines 50X1 50X1-HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3 ? EMS SECRET 50X1-HUM 50X1 4. EThose missiles which have already been developed 50X1-HUM are being produced in great quantities, and they can be launched at any time to the extent of their operational ranges, but with respect to ICBM's the Soviets have had one failure after another. They continue to throw millions into the effort, and if they have one success it is used to impress the West by pretending that there are hundreds. But there are no such hundreds. That is only idle talk. However, one day they will be there, since the entire economy and policy are geared for such development. The basic problem is to develop a missile with a large war- head yield, but with a high-calorie fuel which requires little space. On paper the Soviets have had some success there, but when one considers that millions of men's efforts are directed to this work and that the entire economy of a nation is directed by a one-party system to which all is subordinate, they can do this. Eventually they will perfect such missiles and they will ultimately be mass-produced. 5. Even now it may be possible that somewhere in the 50X1-HUM Far East or at Kapustin Yar there may be some missiles which could reach other continents and detonate with an atomic, even hydrogen explosion, but such launchings would be completely unplanned, uncontrolled, and certainly not of a mass variety, in two or 50X1 HUM three years there will be a different picture.I In111111111111111111111111! -3- 50X1 MN SECRET 50X1-HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3