THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3 I -FluR!'
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IN RMAT'ION REp0R INFoRMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the E.plunage aws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
The Soviet ICBM Program
REPORT
DATE DISTR. / February 1963
10. PAGES 3
tEFERENCES RD
IELD REPORT NO.
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THIS Is UNEVALUATED
INFORMATION.
SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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Khrushchev's basic idea in the entire matter is to
ahead of and to impress the leaders of the Western
to represent that which he does not have or that
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-31
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which he has in insignificant quantities as something which
he has already in hand. There are tests of one nature or
another which in many cases are successful, but he is
already ranting as though this were an accomplished thing.
Thus the whole idea of Khrushchev and of the Presidium is
to demonstrate and to illustrate in one way or another such
as by launching of an earth satellite, even of a man in
space, in order to impress Western military leaders that
the Soviet Union has everything. This is to force Western
government leaders and military people to do their planning
on the assumption that the Soviet Union already has a
tremendous military potential when in reality it is only
being developed."
2.
a senior general officer of artillery,
responsible for one aspect of the Soviet missile program,
in early 19611 I"We are only
thinking about these things, only planning, even though we
have had some successes lhere and there. But in order to
get anywhere one has to increase production tremendously
and to train cadres." This
officer has constantly said that there is an enormous amount
of work to be done not only with cadres, but also with
equipment, missile types, etc., while Khrushchev is shouting
that we already have all this. The officer stated further
that the Soviets have in their arsenal tactical missiles,
and missiles that can reach South America, the United States,
or Canada, but not accurately.
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3. These are test missiles which are still undergoing 50X1-HUM
further tests and are not on bases. The USSR does not have
the capability of even firing one or two -- there are not
hundreds even in a testing status. 'There may be only tens in
that category. Even in sending up a satellite or a man in
space all scientists are mobilized for the effort, and before
a satellite is launched they have several failures. The
main idea now of Khrushchev's statements is to create an
effect on foreign ears, but the preparations are being carried
out intensively. The objective is to attain mass production.
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4. EThose missiles which have already been developed 50X1-HUM
are being produced in great quantities, and they can be
launched at any time to the extent of their operational
ranges, but with respect to ICBM's the Soviets have had
one failure after another. They continue to throw millions
into the effort, and if they have one success it is used
to impress the West by pretending that there are hundreds.
But there are no such hundreds. That is only idle talk.
However, one day they will be there, since the entire
economy and policy are geared for such development. The
basic problem is to develop a missile with a large war-
head yield, but with a high-calorie fuel which requires little
space. On paper the Soviets have had some success there,
but when one considers that millions of men's efforts are
directed to this work and that the entire economy of a
nation is directed by a one-party system to which all is
subordinate, they can do this. Eventually they will perfect
such missiles and they will ultimately be mass-produced.
5. Even now it may be possible that somewhere in the 50X1-HUM
Far East or at Kapustin Yar there may be some missiles which
could reach other continents and detonate with an atomic,
even hydrogen explosion, but such launchings would be
completely unplanned, uncontrolled, and certainly not of a
mass variety, in two or
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three years there will be a different picture.I
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/06: CIA-RDP80T00246A030100210001-3