COMPOSITE REPORT ON THE SHCHEKINO CHEMICAL COMBINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A031000360001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 17, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFOkMA1 ION REPORT INFORMATIO,N REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is hibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T 50X1-HUM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD 50X1
COUNTRY USSR (Tula Oblast)
REPORT
SUBJECT Composite Report on the Shchekino DATE DISTR. /7 October 1963
Chemical Combine '
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACG
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
1. A 15-page report on the Shhhekino Chemical Combine
The report contains
information on sources -)f raw materials, electric power, ma 50X1 _Humter supply,
transportation facilities, bi-eilzbhbfolo the plant construction, plant con-
struction, co-operation between Soviet officials and the Western representatives,
official and non-official contacts, supply of construction materials, relations
between the construction site and Moscow, management from Moscow, accidents at
the site, number of personnel, supprvision, wages, trade,unions, building
costs, tools used and shortages of tools, construction methods, building
program, mechanization and automation at the plant, production costs, and
the integration of the plant into the economy. 50X1-HUM
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Excluded from automatic
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STATE I DIA I ARMY
NAVY I AIR
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(Note: Field distribution indicated by "*".)
INF ORMA I ION RLPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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sECRET
1.. Resources 50X1-HUM
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A. Source of Raw Materials
Are not transported to or imported here. The basic
products for making urea (namely liquid ammonia and
carbonic acid gas) both come from a liquid ammonia
plant on the Shchekino Chimkombinat grounds. This
liquid ammonia plant is run on natural gas. Theoreti-
cally both liquid ammonia and carbonic acid gas can be
supplied in sufficient amounts for urea plant
to work at full capacity. Whether these theoretical 50X1-HUM
calculations agree with what happens in practice re-
mains to be seen.
B. Source of Electric Power
The Shchekino Chimkombinat has its own electric power
plant, whose capacity is estimated at about 60 MW. The
kombinat is also connected to a grid system which covers
all of Central Russia and of which the closest large
(thermal) power plant is located at Sovjetsk, about
15 km. southeast of Shchekino. 50X1
Consumption of electric 50X1
power urea plant is estimated at 8,000 t05ox1 -HUM
10,000 KW. The cost of the electric power is not known.
C. Available Manpower
1) The (chemical) urea plant for the large part has
automation in the processing section. To run the
machine part (the installation), very specialized
operators are required. They were not available.
The operating personnel had only had some school
training and had to be further trained at the instal-
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lation itself.
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2) Besides the operators, there are people for shipping,
keeping things generally clean, and the general ser-
vices (including maintenance). According to Western
standards, about 40 to 50 people are needed.
3)
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It is not known what staff the Soviets want to make
available for the plant. Information on this can
only be provided after a few months. Untrained and
little-trained personnel will certainly be used in
far greater numbers than is customary in the West.
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the Soviets see such projects as a
sort of means to provide employment1
4) Housing for the workers is already present and,
according to Soviet standards, is fairly good.
About four km. from the urea plant is Pervomayskiy,
where there is a settlement of about 18,000 people.
The personnel for the Shchekino Chimkombinat (and
thus for the urea plant) is recruited from these
working people.
5) Naturally, there is, as everywhere else in the USSR,
a housing shortage. In Pervomayskiy, there is a lot
of building which is also being done quickly, but it
is of poor quality. For the regular personnel (and
certainly for the Staff) the housing is fairly good.
For the foreign assembly personnel, there is little
housing because this personnel is rather temporary.
The great building program at the large Chimkombinat
is causing this assembly personnel to be there a num-
ber of years, however.
6) The workers' quarters lie in Pervomayskiy (old
village and new settlement).
D. Water Supply
There are difficulties with the plant water supply. It
comes from underground sources and is insufficient to
let the water flow off without recirculation. Conse-
quently, intensive use of cooling towers is made; divided
in various groups, they are spread out all over the whole
Chimkombinat grounds. At present, the urea plant is sup-
plied with water by means of a small supply line (the
grading work is not yet in operation). During the month
of May, the water supply was stopped two or three times
for unknown reasons. To what extent the water will be
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sufficient in quantity and quality in any further
expansion cannot yet be determined. The steam needed
for the urea process will be furnished by the steam
generators present.
E. Transportation Facilities
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The Shchekino Chimkombinat is situated right along the
Moscow-Kursk main railline to the Black Sea and is con-
nected to this line. The kombinat is also about one and
one-half km. from the Moscow-Tula-Orel-Kursk highway and
is connected to this highway by a good asphalt road.
2. Location of Plant
There are no disadvantages in the location of the plant nor
of the whole Shchekino Chimkombinat. The connection with
the natural gas network (Pervomayskiy pump station) is par-
ticularly favorable.
REASONS LEADING TO THE CONSTRUCTION
1. According to Khrushchev's own statements during a visit to
the plant in April 1963, the USSR is behind the West in the
chemical sector. There is also a great lag in agricultural
production which they want to solve by using the most modern
artificial fertilizers. (Urea has a very high nitrogen con-
tent.) 50X1 -HUM
2. The Soviets have tried to develop their own urea process.
The Soviet plant's capacity is
140 tons per day. It was built according to the Pechiney
type (French process)
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Up to now, nothing has
come of it; the plant is still not in operation. Great dif-
ficulties have arisen, including a few explosions; there was
a fire in the prill tower (presumably because in plastering
benzol was used); and regularly there are serious leaks (on
15 May 1963 eight Soviet workers were admitted to the hospital
in Tula with ammonia poisoning). 50X1
3. The Soviets had also ordered separately (in addition to the
four complete plants ordered) loose apparatus, that is, the
parts such as reactors and carbomate pumps, etc., which are
the most difficult to make. Originally, it was intended to
build plants themselves with this additionally ordered ap-
paratus. 50X1-HUM
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one can conclude
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manufacture.
the lack of capacity in Soviet apparatus
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DESCRIPTION OF PLANT
2. Mechanization and Automation
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In general, it can be said that the mechanization and automa-
tion in the urea plant are not different from what is normal
for a similar chemical installation. 50X1-HUM
the Soviets wanted to do a lot of automation, using the argu-
ment of personnel shortage or high cost of personnel. Accord-
ing to the Soviets, this was also a question of Moscow's
hobby. This hobbyism went to the absurd. They wanted to
make the compressors in the plant automatic (a 50X1-HUM
crazy idea). The Soviets insisted on this, and the compressors
are now operated from a panel by the machine. The Soviets
would have preferred to have remote control. It is typical
that such automation is insisted upon where in fact it is
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inefficient and costs a lot of money. It is not only a
question of a few extra gauges, but also of maintaining
these instruments (which is a weak point with the Soviets).
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3. Production Means
A. Equipment
The equipment of the plant was imported entirely from
the West.
B. Technology
No Soviet parts were installed in the plant.
C. Corresponding Soviet Equipment
No corresponding Soviet equipment was observed. A lot
of apparatus for other plants lay on the Chimkombinat 50X1-HUM
grounds. This apparatus was mainly from Czechoslovakia,
East Germany Very little was
from the USSR itself. Western technicians have the im-
pression that plants for making apparatus are still in
their infancy in the USSR, at least for the chemical
industry. There are still very few specialized plants
or else these plants are concerned with other products.
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PRODUCTION COSTS
1. Planned Costs Per Unit
Production costs per unit are not known, considering absolutely
nothing is known about the write-off policies which in a
chemical installation now is the most important factor in
determining production costs. What policy the Soviets follow
in write-offs is absolutely unknown.
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2. Standards for Replacement
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The future will show what standards the Soviets use in
replacing machines.
3. Maintenance Provisions
Maintenance provisions up to the present are completely
insufficient.
END RESULTS
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1. Type of Product and Capacity
The product is urea, and 500 tons per day will be produced.
Eighty per cent will be agricultural urea, and part of it is
suitable to add to cattle feed (cattle feed prills). The
remaining 20 per cent can be supplied as wished--in the form
of "foliorgrade" (spraying crops) or in the form of technical
urea (basis for further processing to resins, plastics, mela-
mine, bakelite, types of glue, etc.).
2. Expansion Plans
At present, there are negotiations on the possibility of
turning the expansion apparatus ordered by the Soviets into
complete plants (thus, four plants of 500 tons per day extra).
The total production capacity of the plants delivered and to
be delivered would come to 4,000 tons of urea50X1-HUM
per day. With an average of 300 production days per year,
this would mean a yearly production of 1.2 million tons of
urea.
3. Production Costs
Whether production costs will be above those planned is not
known.
4. Development
Nothing is known concerning what development possibilities
are to be expected.
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INTEGRATION OF PLANT INTO THE ECONOMY
1. Similar Plants
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At present, building four urea plants in the50K1 -HUM
USSR: in Tula (Pervomayskiy), in Ufa (Salavat), in Tashkent
(Chirchik), and in Lisichansk (Severodonetsk). All these
plants are run on natural gas. In view of the results of
recent Soviet developments in urea production (see second 50X1-HUM
section, number 2--page 3), their own production will not be
greater than the production capacity imported
It is impossible that the Soviets plan to take the50X1-HUM
installed machines to other plants. One cannot do this very
well with a chemical plant.
2. Level of Technology 50X1-HUM
the Soviet technologists have insuf-
ficient
experiences, such as with pilot plants
in which the process is worked out and tested. Evidently,
they do not have the time or the means to test ideas in
actual trial set-ups. They also do not have enough person-
nel to build the pilot plant, to man it, and later to turn
it into producing plants.
3. Distribution of the Product
The product can be transported by rail and by truck. The
storage capacity of the prilled product is 40 days produc-
tion, that is, 20,000 tons of urea. The storage capacity
for the bagged product is about 10,000 tons. On both sides
of the plant, there is a railline and it presumably is
planned to transport most of the end product by rail. The
product will goirimarily to sovchozes and kolchozes.
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