SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A033000510001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NOFORN
COUNTRY Ti. S. S. R. /Yugoslavia/East Germany/
Communist China
DA!E OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
Survey of Recent, Developments
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 4 March 1957
NO. OF PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
1. Attached isl
discussion of recent developments in Communist countries.
S-E-C-R-E- T
NOF ORN
3=11FOX18, Am "01! Oslofflklm
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4 February 1957
25X1
.a. 4 still unconfirmed
T nance of the
rurg . the., first h$
eharmansp of Par
$okaloveki, Vasil
Armed Porces of the
Q~ Red China. The m
com tries of the la
intelligence servic
in the ' conference - o
e onterence incline:
(1) The ea o dinat
to' the':
.b.
by General Se
of a coordinat
'intelligence a
nuclear w:trfar
~3) Re. appraisal a
'eportreaching here indicated that a mili
stern bloc was planned to take place i n k
:oec
of February.. The conference will be under e
tl Zhukov and will be attended by the Marsh e
ki, Konysy, Malinoveki, the commanders of the
Eastern Bloc, and a strong military delegatiogi
litary attachees of-the Soviet Union and the
tern Bloc and the exponents of the soviet military
abroad received order to be ready to participate
short notice. Subjects to be discussed at the
of tactical '.raining of ground troops with
of nuclear weaponss
egard
(2) The effects ofJovbeall strategic planning in connection with
tonwed foreign-pol
policy" arid ~ :thus m'
to ' an .available re
"he'-just resumed no
reorganization of the Soviet and satellite 'litary
,ces ' in the western World with the possible result
i ? of all branches by a spacial conorlttee headed 25X1
tiations accor4ing 25X1
't,. _iniUto a ",rev phase of Soviet coexisten$e
t poasib_y considered as an indication for
cy drive jy Moscow.
ip and Bulb yin's subsequent return visit to
'a .-num
cessions the Soviet Union
Although expectati ns 25X1
shay be disappointed Ion that score, certain economic concessions
25X
'n
the Middle East. Th
Soviet efforts for
The Western countri
conference. Availab
and to invite the
olicy ca
sdeL
visit
pr
yet
accept their dndit
#so)ate still -more
lcardel j is still, o
e report raid tha
Of the executiv=e co
n ilitary aid
%
to Belgrade in ord
Communist. Party. 4
Committee predd um
with Yugoelaviaa Fe
According to lone' re
1
e by the
.A
ow a nother rreport in.''.wat= ,rl flit the Soviet Uni n
to convener a $orld e&inony conference in I?rscow in late spr ng
erdeveloued countrita in ..aitionto the sa Mites.
s will'. also be at libel ,~y to participate in is
*:reports indicate a eer+: sttion Of.
th
n expansion of the SoI sere of influence in
trip which the delegate.-:. of the Supreme :o et
geed no positive reaul*i. Mtt:ieror not 's 25X1
result in stronger Soviet is-,,f' uence on 25X1
seen e
the Soviet Union plans to r'ke
?e v and Furtseva racdival
f the Communist Party of t=
to 'baring about a conciliation = -Lth
demand"at Tito publicly rej
and postpone his trig:
Vikmanovic Tempo and Rankovib, the
-il, advocate a rapprochement with
ed to Soviet influence. The Soviet
a rappro ement
I the ntral
fake a ip 25X1
the Yugoa v
vacs Area dents
ile
ugoslavia in the Bast ?
one and made, hi ip
. ; 7
111ilAOF01 R14
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SECRET
-NOFORN
It was again conf that Moscow is seeking the establishment of
$ new blanket-or zation for the Communist Parties based on
bilateral agreement between the individual Parties and the Commnuist
'arty of the Soviet Union. Delegates of the Communist Parties of
Czechoslovakia also made statements to that effect as 25X1
.they were negotiati g in Prague from 14 to 19 January 1957, A joint
information agency of directly controlled by ?scow is planned to
be established in ague and to exercise advisory and coordinatini
functions, The two omamuniet Parties voiced fears that the I'oscowl
party leaders may ntinue to make tactical maneuvers without tak4ng
Into consideration a Western Commmunist Parties which .they feel
are working under q. to different circumstances. These,fears of the
Czech C st leaders were occasioned by the restrictive 25X1
tendencies in the net policy toward the Eastern Bloc countries'
2.
and the Communist rties in East and West, which are becoming
increasingly apparent.
Sate litearanc Yosl v
a. Although the outoom of the Polish elections gave the regime of
Gomulka a definite eking toward the USSR,, the situation of this regime,
gccording to avails is reports, is still critical. Moscow reminded the
l'Olish Government tbrough its ambassador only one day after the
election that the basis of trust between the Soviet Union and Poland
would first have to restored by a vigorous campaign against anMi-
Soviet popular feelings and by the prevention of additional incidents
it Soviet military ;oats In Poland. Gomulka consequently has to continue
to make conciliatory gestures to ?:oscow, as indicated, for e*amplop by
the campaign for an intensified cultural exchange between Poland and the
Soviet Union. Gomul to appeal to the Hungarian workers to give the
I4adar Government'ev y possible support follows the same line but 1, aroused
Ill feelings by-the pulation. The morale of the working masses 4it 25X1
also not be improve by the fact that the establishment of additi nal
workers' councils. stopped at the factories on the grounds- that "this
question""must firs again be examined".
a majority for the o
the Central Labor Un
only in the second h
indicated that the
courses for the thi
the Hungarian revol
then planned to d
Imre Nagy, which is
persecution. of farm
Conmiunista, partic
situation by ateppi
population. 'heir r
refused to collabor
functionaries and
b. According to one re
t,"the Hungarian Government sent out leading party
liamentarians to investigate the moral of th
is-indicated that the Hungarian people cl ly
with the Kadar Goverment and the newly es blished
by. Following Soviet orders, Radar reacted this
up his suppression measures. The persecutio of
ly of writers and journalists who collaborated with
esently under- way, will soon be followed by the
a_ who left collective farms. Large show tr are
aerate the alleged collaboration between gro of
ion and their Western employers. Another re t
vernment postponed the resumption of univers ty
time to avoid demonstrations. Since Radar ted
position, the elections which had been plane for
one were also banned. The Parliament will co one
if of February.
QFORN
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d.
a e orta for the re PT-10n of diplomatic relations Radio
CRET'S'EcReT
-AtOF RN
A report stated that B garia's ties to the Soviet Union became still
stronger, At the begs lug of 1957, new Soviet advisors wielding
absolute powers were d tacked to all important ministries. Western
press dispatches on di turbances at military posts, the report said,
were an exaggeration, a-wave of political demonstration which bega$i
to spread after the H a
vian rebellion was subsiding, since the
r
oppositional elements e aware that they could do nothing against
the, arey,police and mi itia. The influence-of Tech erwenkoff, the former
Stalinist Prime Nini'st , who is now holding the office of First Deputy
Prime ?'inister,'again ncreased. Christozoff, the new chairman of the
State Planning Ccmmaiss on, is one of his truest followers. Christozof'f
seeks to fight the man unemployment by concluding contracts with the
Soviet Union by the ea ution of wage orders and by the dispatch of
Bulgarian seasonal war ere to the Soviet Union. Bulgaria's relations
with Yugoslavia reportedly were "still stagnant", with the two countries
waiting for further dev~elopnent. 25X1
According to one repor, the Albanian Government is present intensifying
it ff
Tirana made a friendly comment on the "heroic fight"
report said that the S at Union is su orti the Albanian efforts for
aliogpdiy prepared to ke border corrections in favor of The
ideological differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and
tneresumption or file ly relations and offered its good
offices. These Soviet- pired Albanian efforts follow that Soviet
political line of loosening western ties which had repeatedly
been mentioned in.pre us Uebersichts, since Yugoslavia is presently
unreliable for that p se because of her ideological differendes with
the USA, the newest Soviet offensive was made via Albania.
Tito's efforts to over Yugoslsvia'a present isolation with the help
of China failed, since, according to an available report, Chou En Lai;
stated that a Belgrade sit could not make any sense as long as
Yugoslavia failed to jo the Common Front against Imperialism. Under
these circumstances. Y osl*vs restrict themselves to blunting their
leaving the question of Yugoslavia's international position undecided.
Contradicting other inf oration
to which the Chief of Sate. and Commander-in-Chief planned to leave his
office as Secretary General of the party to Kardelj. Groups close tolthe
party believe that Tito may make such a decision in donnection with the
party congress which will presumably be held in the summer of 1957.
This certainty is underscored by rumors accordino+
3. S? let Zone of Germany
(1)
able report, Ulbricht made the following comment
tuition before the First Secretary of the SED
s on 14 January 1957:
lea are or were holding conferences in Moscow
we discussed with the Soviet Government in an
4efine the camps of Capitalism and Socialism
.
Along with our friends in i:oscow we established that the build-up
of Socialism is possible only on the basis of Marxism and Leninism.
We have also learned from many reports from our party friends living
in Capitalist countries that the Western mowers are again pushing
cold war policies.The Imperialist countries want to unleash a new
war. The Eisenhower-Doctrine again poisoned the political situation.
25X1
The GDR.must expect provocations
by one Federal Government on the zonal border,"
F p
C
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on the same probl
District Headquar
"All Socialist co
According to.a rel
on the political a
effort clearly to
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SECRET
NOFORN
(2) Commenting on the tasks of the SED, Ulbricht stated that they
(3)
(4)
1iad considerably.-to improve the ideological activities of the
arty and mass organizations to cover all strata of the
population and icularly the youth and at the samie time
reinforce the NVA and provide for that army the most modern
training, partic ly in partisan warfare and street-fighting,,
on the basis-mf fences made in Hungary. He also emphasized,
that they had to trengthen further the combat groups at factorjies
and to train them in street-fighting, marksmanship and athletics.
Commenting on the Western disarmament and reunification proposals
which were unacceptable for the Soviet Union, Ulbricht stated that
the Soviets would not agree to any reunification without a complete
withdrawal of all American Forces from Europe. He said that Moscow
would soon Come out with a new proposal on.the establishment of a
demilitarized zone in all of Germany. He added that, according to
the agreements ma a in Moscow, the Soviet troops would stay in the
zone as long as "stern Forces were stationed in West Germany. He
concluded that th -troop pact was still under discussion. '
Commenting on the economic situation of the GZR, Ulbricht stated 25X1
that the economic capacity of the Soviet Zone of Germany could
rbably not be creased in 1957, since because of Poland and
gary the pons lities were limited for the Soviet Union to give
aid. He stated t they would have to help themselves ahd would
have to buy raw .terials from the capitlist countries with the hard
currency. credits hey received from Moscow. He continued that in an
effort to put ication by contacts between which
he said represent the only possible way, they would have to employ
not only the.wor g classes but all strata of the population to
build up Socials . He insisted, however, that their economic
planning could no be dropped and the introduction of completeself-
administration of enterprises also was impossible, since it would
lead to anarchy. He added that their slogan was strengthening the
existing democrat c institutions and laws, securing state agencies
and improving and reinforcing the NVA" rather than "reinforcing the
GDR by further d - cratization".
In the same speech, Ul icht unexpectedly voiced sharp attacks against
Poland, stating that ie German Eastern.' territories had completely been
neglected and that the GDR newspapers had carried incorrect information
on that subject and had failed, for example, to report that all
construction projects had for 11 years been suspended in these areas
and that fields had not been cultivated and industries been allowed to
come to a complete standstill. He pointed out, however, that no information
on that situation must be carried by newspapers. These unfavorable comments,
which were made for the first time in many years in Pankow, are in line
with the present political view of P?'oscow as they exert pressure on
Warsaw and thus demonstrate to Poland that Soviet be.*ing is imperative,
for this country '(reno is even speak LIT. lanned policy of "isolation"
or even "encirclement" of Poland by Ulbricht may also have,
realized that he had attactive slogan for the population and may !thus
have tried to appeal ,tbe"nationalist feelings of the numerous
resettlers from the Eastern territories iiving in the zone.
Ulbricht also stated tiat the enlarged Central Committee Plenary Session
Which is scheduled to take place on 30 January to 1 February 1957 will
discuss the Moscow talks and the preparations of the local election$ which
will be held in the spring of 1957.
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.5?ECRET
.NOFO
RN
4.
a. Reappraising Chou En
a number of reports I
toward lb scow and thi
(1)
(2)
(30
Lai's trip to the countries of the Eastern Bloc,
Ave the following reasons for Chou's attitude,'
satellite countries in Eastern Europe:
Chou wanted to vercome all differences with J:oscow to secure,
Moscow's.suppor for the policy of Red China in Asia. In reply to
a question the ad Chinese Ambassador in Moscow stated after chou'a
visit that the viet Union and Red China have such a large nimber
of interests as to make it only natural for differences to co up.
The Soviet Unio , as well as Red China, is making every effort,
however, to ova-come all differences by friendly talks. This
diplomat's stat went may to some extent be correct,
The Soviet Union let it be known that the Soviets were prepared to
.help China be e a nuclear power. These Soviet concessions further
strengthen the 4oviet-Red Chinese alliance,
added that Peking
from Gomulka sa
that Gomuika wa
difficult situa
Chou who was
Eastern Bloc if
interfere with
assured in War
Chou considered
to avoid a furt
it necessary to bring E'.oscow and Warsaw together
er.wvakening of the Communist camp. Gomulka had
v that Poland would inevitably be lost to the
the Soviet and Czech consulates-continued to
lisp political affairs in favor of the Stalinists.
ling to present in Foscow the evidence he received
d to Eastern Bloc diplomats accredited in Moscow
the only statesman able. to overcome the particularly
ion in Poland along }arxist and Leninist lines and
would consequently support Gomulka,
Chou on the nth hand stated that Communism was not as firmly,
established in Satellite countries of the Eastern Bloc as had
been thought by Peking. Chou concluded that a further strengthening
of national C unist policies-would endanger the interests or both
Dtoscov and Peki , since Red China believed that she needed the
backing of the astern Bloc for her policiy in Asia.
A reliable report i icated that Peking considered Chou's Moscow trip a
success. The results which Chou obtained and which showed to the world
that tioscow is forool increasingly to take into consideration Pek4jng's
views even went beyo Pekingh expectations (it must be remembered,
however, that the cu-rent Soviet-Red Chines economic talks are still
under way). Since C u's influence increased in Peking, the politl.cjal line
he follows will probably be continued even after a possible resignation
of Mao The Tuna which is now again considered a possibility
o. Following up sharp 4 ti-American campaigns by Poking and Moscow, North
Vietnam some time started accusations against the USA that the
Americans wanted to ke South Vietnam a US bridgehead? It cannot at
present be decided if this'propajanda is to support the Soviet disarmament
demand which goes by!the slogan of "liquidating military bases onlforeign
soils" and which came up within the framework of the East-West disarmament
talks or serves other purposes.
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II.
!ueo a is
?SECI2Ei
NOFORN
Railroading including perations, maintenance and new construction is
extremely difficult in ugoslavia because of the mountainous character
of the country and par icularly since the about 12,000 km. of railroad
net available are Dona sod of a number of different and previously
separate state railroa a which do not easily make an organic whole and
since about one fourth of this net has different narrow gauges and large
areas have no railroad lines at all. Considerable war damage could also
not yet be fully removed and locomotives'and rolling stock are obsolete,
not uniform and unable to come up to the requirements which have reached
about 21 times the vol a of previous requirements since 1939 because of
the progressing induct ialization. (Only four percent more locomotives
are presently availabl than in 1939 and only 20 percent more freight'cara,)
Lines and junctions are not in many cases up to modern standards. Considerable
Yost war damages were ri
or changed from narrow
electrified,
efforts have been made.
since the war to overcome these traffic difficulties,
emoved, about 2,000 km of lines were newly constructed
gauge to normal gauge and about 200 kmi were
ao Lines built after the war.
?Savski Par" - K ovec. (northwest of Zagreb)
Lupoglav - Stalije (Istria)
Samac - Doboj - ajevo
Tuzia - Doboj - Ba jaluka (Tuzla northeast of Banovici, partially
converted from narrdgauge to normal gauge)
Pbdlugovi - Vanes north of Sarajevo, converted)
Sabac - Kovilface Zvornik (west of Belgrade, converts iartially)
Broko - Banovici
Bihac - Knin (north of Split)
Niksic - Despotova (southeast of Belgrade)
Skoplje - Tetovo Gostivar (Southern Serbia)
Kursumlica - Pristina (north of Skoplje)
b. Important lines under construction.
By-passing lines fdr the Belgrade junction
Belgrade - Titograd - Bar (Adriatic port)
Knin - Zadar
Sarajevo - Ploce (converted to`normal gauge)
c. Electrified lines
Rijeka - Drivenik completed up to here) - Karloaao - Zagreb (under
construction)
.Rijeka - Pivka (co pleted)
Triest - Pivka - R ek (completed) - Laibach (under construction)
Austrian border t e1 near Jesenice - Jesenice (completed) -
Laibach (under con truction)
Important lines were de able to carry more trains particularly as a
result of improvements of the Belgrade, Zagreb and Vinkovic junctionjs.
Vince considerable furds have recently been made available for improvement
of rolling stocks, the following locomotives and rolling stock are
scheduled to be procur :
Up to 1960: 40 electric locomotives
t-`ostly impnrta: 40 diesel locomotives
50 diesel shunting locomotives
SECt~L1
MOFORN
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In 1957: 30 locor^ot
20 rail b
about 1,
built in t
100 fr+igh
scheduled
S ng up, it r.~ay be. stat
h icar for the national
be exaected that the rails
Ea tern countries will so
further development of ind
es
8e8
freight cars of large load capacity to be
e country
care and freight car undercarriages are
be bought each year.
d that the Yugoslav railroad is still a serious
ncnny in spite of all efforts made. It is to'
d system of Yugoslavia like that of all other
cely be in-a position to keep abreast with the
etries during the years ahead.
25X1
ZII.
c
jagnomi
.1. The decision on modification of the 1956/1960 Five Year Plan by the
Central Committee of 'the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on
24 December 1956
The decision on the mo ifications of the Five-Year Plan, according to
a supplementary state t,-was "dictated by the development". 'Its
Implementation was sal to be."of vital importance for the soviet
Union".'The form, as 11 as the circumstances under which the
decision was made, dl ly indicate that the impending modifications,
differ from the change which had repeatedly been made in past years,
Pblitical.aspects in addition to those of a merely technical nature
became apparent this Via.
2. The Iacussions about a question of the living standard of the pop4atlon
which developed after talin'a death were continued after the remov of
Malenkov and the beg! n_ of the course initiated by Khrushchev in
January 1955. They sec ivied new impetus from the events in Poland and
Hungary. The Soviet Go nmetnt is trying to evade the pressure resulting.
from these discussions and their possible consequences by promising a
basic change in the p. nning system, thus. to avoid that the discussion
may come to the concl ion that any central planning and contAcol of the
. eeonc is basically suited to promote the economic development ofa
country because of their innumerable inherent weaknesses. They also
shifted the responsibility for the economic control from the level of
the state and the party to lower-level agencies by delegating at an
increased rate planni taske to regional administrations and large
enterprises and by in easing employment of experts in the planning'
machinery. They also t to make concessions in other fields (such a*
increase of social 'pen ions and reduction of working hours) by incr sing
wages and promoting th construction of housing for private individ s,
thus to avoid a decisi Iy improved supply with consumer goods which
woul3 call for a basic change of course for years to come.
Since the present in national situation also heavily taxes the sov4et
economy and particularly the Soviet heavy industries which are seriously
strained anyway, all available means and labor forces are planned toibe
concentrated on a small number of installations than had previously been
Onned..in order to avoid a basic change of course which would be
undesirable because of fits consequences. The Soviet government evidently
hopes to be able in th s manner to carry out the program for the priority
development of heavy i uatry to the extent previously planned in spite
of some concession to consumers and the continued armament effort. The
Eastern development pr gram which primarily concerns new constructions
of new installations , however, adversely affected by planned
cancellations of the ccnstriq2 t ev installations and concentration
on improvements or in s ng plans.
FOR
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4.
All the measures wen oned above must be viewed as real adjustment to
the new situation wh resulted from'the economic set-backs suffered
in the.Oatellite co lea. Only after some months will it be possible
to judge whether the present form is final or not.
IV.
= g ot G
Although the reorgani tion and re-equipment of the DIVA on the basis
of the Soviet patter have not yet been completed, the most subslafltial
organizational ch were executed by the end of 1956. Two tank
divisions, 3 mechani d. divisions and two infantry divisions (or 2'
mechanized divisions nd 3 Infantry divisions) were organized fromthe
three mechanized and our infantry divisions of the former KVP. The
total number of 7 di sions remained unchanged. Worthy of note is the
increase of tank uni , which are also emphasized by the ''oviets. the
number of irtillery is was also increased to achieve more intensive
fire power, The com efficiency of NWA divisions consequently is:'
higher than that bf a former.KVP divisions. An AAA division was
activated totaa a of air defense. Recruitment for the NVA, recently
stronly emphasized t voluntary principle evidently because the Soviet-
Zone,Government is ng to improve the reliability of the Armed
Forces, The NVA trai continued to be pushed. Training of combat
units was shifted fr posts to drill grounds as early as mid-Januory
as was done by the eta.
Y?yring the personnel ange program of the Soviet forces In the 'one,
about one thirdaof entire personnel was replaced by recruits* the
-lowest annual_eombat eadiness thus was reached in late 1956. The Intensive
greatly pushed win training shows that the Soviets are making eery
effort to overcome_ weakness as quickly as possible. Numerous units
already practiced f ng and river-crossing in January 1957. Rifle!
armies early started ercisee at division level.
NOFORN
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25X1
4e
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