COMMENTS ON THE REPLACEMENT OF SHEPILOV AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A034100220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SUBJECT Comments on the Replacement of Shepilov DATE DISTR.
as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR
NO. PAGES
REQUIREMENT
NO.
as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
A three-page analysis of the reasons behind the replacement of Dmitriy T. Shepilov 25X1
must have played a deciaive role in a recent intra-Party struggle, which resulted
in personnel changes within the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
~thesis is that the Leningrad Party
STATE X ARMY I I NAVY X AIR I X FBI AEC
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by ".#".)
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24+ April 1957
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~ a decision remove SHEPILOV was reached after the Session
.of the Su rem Soviet, at the Plenum of the Central Comm tee on 13-114
February 957. This decision had not been formulated in the Presidium
of the C tral Committee, and had not been adopted prior to the Plenum
of the C tral Committee. Because of this, SHEPILOV was allowed to
present e policy speech to the Session of the Supreme Soviet. The
fact that SHEPILOV's policy speech was approved by the Supreme Soviet,
but nevertheless SHEPILOV was removed from his post, is indicative that
the inter-Party struggle at the Plenum of the Central Committee was
extremely intense, since the Plenum chose to ignore even the basic
rules of polite behavior in regard to the Supreme Soviet (sudden removal
of SHED V, immediately upon the approval of his policy speech by the
Supreme S viet). This is particularly noticeable in view of the recent
Soviet pr ss campaign directed at increasing the authority of the
Supreme S viet as the legitimate source of power in the Soviet Union.
What caul the removal of SHEPILOV from the post of the Minister of
Foreign A fairs? The primary cause was the struggle within the factions
of the Presidium for the right to influence the external policy of the
Soviegt Union. SHEPILOV was a candidate of one of these factions, possibly
KHRTJ HEV's faction. This faction had secured the majority vote within
the Presidium and was instrumental for SHEPILOV's policy speech and
for all i elements. The minority faction (or factions) carried the
struggle into the Plenum of the Central Committee after SHEPILOV's
speech was made public. This faction (or factions) had failed to capture
the Ministry of reign Affairs. It managed, however, to deprive its
opposition (KHM HEV's faction) of exclusive control over the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and to place this Ministry outside of the inter-
Party fac ons' manipulation. The Ministry was thus placed into the
hands of abureaucrat official, GROMYKO, who is not a member of the
Presidium,iwhich represented a form of a compromise. In this new type
of position, GROMYKO is considerably less independent than was SHEPILOV,
and is guided primarily by the decisions of the Presidium as a whole, and
not by any, one particular faction thereof. The formulation of Soviet
foreign policy, as of now, also becomes the domain of the entire
Presidium group, and not of certain elements within this body. The
direct cause which prompted the attack on SHEPIIOV and on the faction
SECRET'
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which supported him, it is supposed, was the thesis on co-existence
in its "nevi" form. In the speech of SHEPILOV this thesis appears as
follows: 'Peaceful co-existence is not a tranquil life. As long as
there are various social and political systems, the contradictions
among them are unavoidable. Peaceful co-existence is a struggle-
political truff~le, economic struggle, ideo o c ~sstrruggglee ." It is
a known faitthat 6til now the o et thesis emphasized primarily the
"ideological struggle." SHEPILOV, in his speech, has formulated the
principles of "cold war," the principles of total struggle in all
endeavors of life, so far, however, without the application of military
means. This thesis expressed by SHEPILOV in his speech on 12 February
1957 was i$mediately played up by the Soviet press. On 13 and 111
February 157 the thesis was presented in a number of leading newspapers,
in the forI of editorials (see, for instance, "Literaturnaya Gazeta,"
)J February 1957). Upon the removal of SHEPILOV as the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, references to the thesis presented by SHEPILOV in his
speech on 1.2 February 1957 were eliminated. The editorial in "Pravda,"
19 February 1957, dedicated to the subject of Soviet foreign policy,
makes no mention of SHEPILOV's speech. Only on 20 February 1957, did
"Pravda" d monstr to a reaction to SHEPILOV's thesis. "Pravda" carried
a speeegch KHRUSCHEV given at the Bulgarian Embassy in Moscow, in which
KHRUSCHEV defended the substance of SHEPILOV's speech of 12 February,
stating th.t the political lines set by SHEPILOV remain unchanged.
KHEU HEV articularly stressed, although politely, "What should we do,
smile and pretend that we do not notice it?" (Referring to the activities
of the "capitalists" in reference to SHEPILOV's definition of "peaceful
co-existende," above.)
"The removal of SHEPILOV represented a victory of one faction of the
Presidium over others, at the session of the Plenum of the Central
Committee, and led to a further expansion of the circle of the Soviet
elite entrusted with real political power. For instance, into the
Presidiumas a candidate was admitted the Secretary of the Leningrad
Gorkom (City Committee) and Obkom (Oblast Committee) of the Party,
F. KOZLOV. This indicates that the vote of the Leningrad Party delegation at
the Plenum must have been instrumental in defeating the faction supporting
SHEPILOV. As the reward for Leningrad delegation action, KOZLOV was
admitted into the inner Party circle and was allowed limited access to
power. This supports the basic natural law which seems to apply to
Soviet internal political manipulations, namely, "Each new struggle
for power within the collective leadership group tends to enlarge the
circle ofholders of power." This law, applicable since the days of the
MALENKOV-1*)LOTOV-BER11A Triumvirate, appears to retain its validity to the
present day.
"It should be pointed out. and stressed that the avoidance of
identification of the various factions withip Presidium with the
names of the members of the Presidium (KHRU HEV's MALENKOV's, MDLOTOV'S,
etc.) in this evaluation is intentional. It is due to the fact that the
factions within the Presidium lack ideological foundations, and are based
almost entirely upon strategic, and more often, upon tactical positions.
As such, the constant changes in the composition of these factions within
the Presidium are unprincipled in character.
Ur_R t
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"The removal of SHEPILOV after the session of the Supreme Soviet,
and a directive of the Plenum of the Central Committee relative to
KHRI1 HEV'$ report ("Pravda, "16 February 1957, see directive No. 2,
"To delegate to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the USSR and to the Council of Ministers of the
USSR ... "), indicates that the Council of Ministers is being trans-
formed, more and more, into a technical executive organ in contrast
to the initial post-Stalin era attempts to transfer to the Council of
Ministers the real power of the Soviet regime."
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