(SANITIZED)APPRAISAL OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND ITS LEADERS(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A037200420001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03: CIA-RDP80T00246AO37200420001-2
PROCESSING COPY
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY China/Poland
China and Its Leaders
Appraisal of Communist
DATE DISTR. /3 September 1957 25X1
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Appraisal of Communist China and Its Leaders
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SUBJECT:
Appraisal of Communist China
an its- adore
DATE: 6 Aug 57
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GhIM3e Attitudes toward Poland
3.
MAO Tse-tong's
attitude toward Poland as that of an elder brother who would not allow
harm to oera.Li a rju+ aj mow- - - MAO demonstrated
an intimate knowledge of the latest developments ~nrsaw. He
particularly asked about Gwnulka'a health and the attitude of the
Part rank-and-file toward the new Part secretor
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4. IMAO in 1955 had expressed what appeared
to be sincere feelings of respect anal concern not only for the Polish
state, but also for the Polish people. In emphasizing how the Poles
had been oppressed and exploited by occupying powers for many years,
he even gave specific examples which demonstrated intimate knowledge
of historical facts known only to specialists in Polish history.
An Annraiaal of Pe1xina Leaders
5.
MAO Too-tMpg
L
power stemmed from an entirely different source than that of the
Soviet leaders. MAO seemed to be regarded by his countrymen as their
true spiritual and intellectual leader who was respected for his
wisdom and knowledge.
the wave of condemnation of Stalin apd the "cult of the personality"
which followed the 20th Soviet Party Congress in 1956 had no parallel
in China simply because the masses really felt that MAO was above.
reproach.
Icovers the leaders of the USSR and` China.
from the standpoint of intelligence, culture, and even
personal behaviour, this'. was no comparison between "gentlemanly" MAO
and bin "boorish" Soviet counterparts.. MAO appeared exceptionally
well-informed on a wide variety of subjects and, even though modest
at all times, he dwgonetrated no sign of inferiority or subservience
to Soviet officials
Chifeee'Communist leader expressed
\ no effusive praise or hr
endship toward the USSR, but
Soviet a evgmen a..
JMAO lgft the handling o domestic, as well
as foreign affairs, to CIOU En-aai. MAO gave the impression of
wishi.g.to retain. and expand bie position as Asian Marxist theoretio-
ian and spiritualleader. In 4irect contrast to MAO, CHOU impressed
as a polit cian, diplomat and the real economic
head of the Communist Governme*t His intelligence, combined with.
extensive and excellent trainigg received in the Soviet Union
his a competent administra
he had no intention of becoming a Moscow puppet.
Ayoraisal of Chinese r i'1'cj
8.
-7 Communist China, certainly
could not be clonsidered a Soviet satellite or even a partner, in the
sense of a co-equal. The Chinese Coprlunista made it very plain
~j that they regarded their civilization and culture as superior to
that of the USSR. Their Russian "brother" was a friendly neighbor in
whose territory historical depe1 pments had permitted advanced
induatri*lization and the creation of conditions for the "Construction
of Sooi4ism" but nothing more. Pronouncements from Moscow which spoke
of a "new Communist culture" or "improvement of the backward East" were
not with polite smiles by Chinese officials
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9. According tol levidence of the tremendous
development taking place in various sections of China during recent years,
one should not speak of industrial backwardness in China. In spite of
the primitive methods still employed in construction, a number of the
factories and industrial enterprises surpassed in quality those being
built at the present time in the Soviet Union.
however, at this earl stn a of its
industrial expansion, China could not stand alone.
finding employment for the tremendous mass of Chinese cheap labor posed
a great problem. The government was using this cheap labor force for
the construction of dams and other large projects. The state had also
taken over the production and distribution of the basic food commodity,
rice, and of the padded cotton clothes worn by the bulk of the population,
thus simplifying maintenance of this cheap labor force. By handing out
rice for practically nothing, the Communists had eliminated the scourge
of hunger which haunted the nation for generations. This was contribut-
ing to the creation of a new Chinese social environment in which the
average person could not accumulate great wealth, but on the other hand,
was no longer faced with starvation. This ability to feed the masses
and to use them for economically sound projects was having far-reaching
beneficial effects upon the nation's redit for improvement
bestowed upon MAO. as a result of these
developments in China during the pas f ve years, the government of
MAO was preferred to that of Chiang Kai-shek.
10. The elastic application of Marxist principles in China had greatly contri-
buted to the popularity of the Communist regime. The utilization of
"capitalists" for the "building of Socialism" had won many adherents to
Communism from among the ranks of the educated and the skilled technicians.
the so-called "private-national"
enterprises in China by far surpassed in efficiency their
Soviet state-controlled counterparts.
11. Finally, Mao was directly credited with reducing graft, eliminating inter-
necine strife and doing away with the ravages of bandits. Despite the
fact that they complained about one Communist regulations, the Chinese
citizens[ usl appeared to be living better than
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