OBSERVATIONS ON THE POLISH STUDENT JOURNAL PO PROSTU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A038700470001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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IN-FORMATION REPORT 1.:NFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY Poland
SUBJECT Observations on the Polish Student
Journal Po Prostu
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
STATE 41 X ARMY NAVY
AIR X FBI
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT
NO. RD
I N-FORMA-TION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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NO. OF PAGES: 4
Journal Po Prostu
1. The five day Warsaw demonstrations in early October 1957 were the result
of a decision of the Central Committee of the PZPR to ban the progressive
student publication Po Prostu. this act reflected
Gomulka's desire to eliminate what had become a source of irritation to both
Soviet and various Polish Communist leaders. up to 1955
Po Prostu had been a progressive newspaper which catered primarily to the
students attending various universities and higher educational institutions
in the Warsaw area. It acquired a definite program only after the March
1955 Party plenum when the PZPR came out against the excesses which brought
about the reorganization of the Polish security service in December 1954.
2. From the time of this plenum Po Prostu assumed a "progressive-democratic"
stand which reached a peak in the months following the Twentieth Party
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In an article entitled "What Shall
We Do?" (after the title of Lenin's work published two years after the
revolution of 1905) the youthful editors during April 1956 strongly endorsed
the abolition of the many controls which they felt still hampered the process
of "democratization." Its editor Eligjusz Lasota, his deputy Roman Cymand,
and an assistant Wladyslaw Godek gained widespread notoriety throughout
Poland, and the usual edition of 10,000 copies of Po Prostu soon expanded
to a circulation of 150,000. Even this was insufficient, and members of Clubs
of Intellectuals (Kluby Inteligencji - KI) which had sprung up throughout
Poland read each issue aloud or passed copies from hand to hand at each
meeting. Po Prostu devoted a special section of each edition to these
KIs. these clubs continued to play a very important
role in Polish political developments because they constituted the only
source of "progressive" thinking both within and outside the PZPR ranks in
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which had ruled the Kielce county and provincial administrations with an
"iron hand," The Po Protu editors actually charged the provincial
secretary of Kielce, the chief of the Peoples' Council and the head
procurator with having illegally jailed specific "progressive" individuals
without cause. As a result of the investigations launched by the PZPR
Central Committee from Warsaw, the Po Prostu charges were essentially
substantiated, and certain Kielce activists were dismissed from the PZPR
in 1957. Such successful campaigns undertaken by this publication
inspired the provincial KIs in turn to look into various excesses of
PZPR members in their own areas. The Communist activists retaliated
against this interference by violently attacking the young intellectuals
who were, in many cases, PZPR members. although 25X1
the Po PProstu articles contributed greatly to removing countless excesses
by unscrupulous PZPR members holding important jobs, they also undermined
the local authority of the Party causing much of the resulting dis-
satisfaction among the PZPR rank and file. This stemmed from the latter's
resentment that they were unable to profit personally from some of the
exposed corrupt practices by the Party officials.
3. During the April-October 1956 period, PP Prostu, in a series of articles
entitled the "Kielce Affair", unmasked the activities of a PZPR clique
4. The role of Po P` during the VIII PZPR Plenum in October 1956 was an
important one. Its editors worked closely with the former first secretary
of the Warsaw provincial Committee, Stefan Stassewski and his deputy
Kazimiers Olejniozak. They passed important information to Po Prostu
so that student action in support of Gomulka-could be undertaken at the
proper moment in Warsaw. such information was 25X1
intentionally "leaked" from Politburo sessions directly to these two
Gomulka supporters who worked with Lasota, Cymand, and the PZPR secretary
of the Zeran Automobile Factory, Gosdzik and his counterpart in the
Motorcycle Factory at Minsk Street in Praga district of Warsaw. 25X1
had seen Staszewski in one of the Polytechnic Institute auditorium wings
at the large student demonstration which took place on October 20, 1956
when Gozdsik asked the students to support Gomulka. Stassewski sent
regular two-hour bulletins to Gomulka by messenger to the Politburo so
that Gomulka could use this material as evidence of popular support by
the Polish masses. Because of close cooperation with Stassewski, PQ Prostu
had been able to print many of the details of the closed meetings of the
VIII PZPR Plenum between October 19-21, 1956. Since Gomulka must have
felt that the youthful elements within Po Prostu would never subject
themselves to the strict discipline required from a good party worker, he
gradually isolated himself from this group. That Po Pros did not
suffer as a re8Ult of this separation is demonstrated by the fact that
during the January 1957 elections its editor Lasota was elected to the
Polish Sejm.
The pressure of various PZPR elements antagonized by the Po Prostu
campaigns finally brought about Lasota's resignation from the editorial
board of the publication in the spring Of 1957. The Central Committee,
reflecting Gomulkate views, tried to force the editorial board to assume
a less critical and a more pro-government line. This decision to control
Po Prostu initiated by the Central Committee was actually implemented by
Artur Starewioz as chief of the Committee's Publication Division. The
final clash was postponed when the Po Proostn editors refused to accede to
these demands and closed the publication offices during the regular two
month summer vacation period. The conflict was renewed with .he first
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issue of Po Pros after the opening of the new school year. the Party
began its attack through the Administration for the Control of the Press
(Urzad Kontroli Prasy - UKP). After Trybuna Lu u, the official PZPR
daily, had charged Po P_ with bringing harm to Poland, the Central
Committee was faced with only two alternatives, (1) to permit the news-
paper to carry on its "harmful" work or (2) to revoke its permit. It
took the latter step.
6. In arriving at a decision regarding Po rostu Gomulka had to consider
various factors. By revoking the paperts permit, he would show
ingratitude to a publication which had actually planned most of the
demonstrations supporting his resistance to Soviet interference in
October 1956. Its banning could cause student demonstrations which might
spread to the dissatisfied workers. The move would also bring about a
loss of Gomulkafs popularity among the progressive students and many
Polish writers and intellectuals. This in turn would be reflected in the
substantial loss of his prestige in the West where broad circles had
begun to regard Gomulka as a supporter of "democratization" in Poland.
Despite all of these factors, Gomulka held to his decision to cancel the
paper's permit.
following factors:
Gomulka had been motivated in his decision by the 25X1
a. During the 1956-57 period, Po Prostu was so well known in Warsaw
student circles that it had become a symbol of a "progressive" trend
and method of thinking. Furthermore, great numbers of Soviet students
tended to agree with Po Pr?stu. Although it was banned in the USSR,
copies had been brought into the USSR by participants in the Moscow
Youth Festival and other more recent travellers from Poland. On a
number of occasions, heard Soviet Ambassador Ponomarenko 25X1
or other Soviet officials speak of Po Prostu with alarm. They asked
Polish activists "How can you permit the publication of this paper?"
Gomulka yielded to Soviet Party 25X1
Secretary Khrushchevls personal intervention in banning the publication
of Po Prostu.
b. During the spring and summer of 1957, the action of Chinese Communist
officials reflected a stiffening of the official line towards students.
Gomulka might have received criticism of Po Prostu from high-ranking
Chinese Communists, which advice coupled with Soviet pressure have
encouraged his decision to shut down Po Prostu at this time.
in China MAO Tse?tung's earlier promise of an 25X1
extension of freedom was eventually followed by use of force to curb
student unrest.
c. Khrushchev's antagonism towards the role of the Petofi circles in
Budapest, and Kadar's persecution of the press and intellectuals,
reflected the application of a firm stand in Hungary. In Czecho-
slovakia, the press and intellectuals were under such rigid control
that they not only refrained from criticism of their own government,
but even severely attacked the so-called excesses of the Polish press.
The Polish film The Blind Track, which received a Karlsbad Film
Festival award in 1956, was subjected to violent subsequent criticism
from the ideological standpoint by the Czechs.
-~4
d. In East Germany, the Harrich trial brought out the professor's alleged
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e. The Djilas trials in Yugoslavia reflected the Yugoslav a r~gzi
against "progressive thinking."
all of the above reflected the overall influence
exerted by Khrushchev to curb the new freedom of thought which had begun
to spread in Communist literary and intellectual circles. The Gomulka
decision to curb Po Prostu was an outward manifestation of this pressure
which appeared to have been launched by mutual agreement among the
leadership of all key Communist parties, including those of Yugoslavia
and Communist Chi a&,
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