SOVIET SEMIOFFICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE MOSCOW PURGES OF JUNE 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A041000710001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROCESSING COPY'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
SUBJECT soviet. Semiofficial Explanations of DATE DISTR. 11 March 1958
the . MoscowPurges.of June :1957.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
NO. PAGES
REQUIREMENT
NO.
20 The,report is an.analyysis of articles . which: appeared. in. three Soviet .periodicals
.of 1957: Partinaya.Zhizh,.No 13; Agitator..., No..11+; and.Kommunist dated
.1 July.-1957.
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION ..REPORT
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Semiofficial Explanations of the June Moscow Purges 4-
A lead article appearing in Partinaya Zhizn, No, 13 (released to press
on 17 July 1957) gives more details than heretofore available on the June
purges and the reasons for it. Another quite interesting lead article on
the same subject appears in the periodical Agitator, No 14 (released to
press on 13 August 1957). Both of these articles merit examination, al-
though they do not materially alter the views thus far gained of the reasons
for the purge.
In regard to the conducting of the Central Committee meeting, the
Partinaya Zhizn article says that the degree of isolation of the Malenkov,
Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov antiparty group from the party and the
people is unprecedented in the existence of the CPSU. The full meeting of
the Central Committed lasted for a week. It was attended by the regular and
deputy members of the Central Committee and the members of the Central re-
vision committee, with a total of 309 participants. Unlimited democracy
prevailed, without any limiting regulations being applied to the speakers.
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The discussion was attended by 215 persons, and 60 of them made speeches.
Those who had no opportunity to speak, presented their views in written form.
Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov each spoke twice, and their written state=
ments were read at the final session. Not one of those present supported the
antiparty group.
The article states that the antiparty group sought to seize the party
leadership, and that the struggle that developed in the Central Committee
was of a deeply fundamental nature, since it was not concerned with personages,
but instead, the policy into which they wished to force the party. The task
of the party organizations now is to show the people the successes that have
been achieved during the past three years by following the present policy.
The assumption formerly prevailing in Marxist-Leninist thought, the
article continues, was that wars are inevitable as long as there is imper-
ialism. However, the strength of the socialist camp has grown to such an
extent that this former concept can now be revised to state that wars are no
longer inevitable, although vigilance must be exercised in respect to imper-
ialism, which is the policy that has been followed by the USSR during recent
years. But the antiparty group could not conform to this point of view, and
Molotov, in particular, continued to oppose the improvement of relations
with Yugoslavia, the treaty with Japan, the Austrian state treaty, and like
measures.
the issue of the "inevitability or non-inevitability
of wars" actually had a considerable part in the controversy.)
In internal policy likewise, the article says, the antiparty group has
opposed the reorganizing of the economic administration and the new agricul-
tural policy, although the status of agriculture in 1953 was such that it
rOT
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threatened to hamper the entire economy. Nor could the antiparty group offer
any alternatives to the positive measures adopted by the party. The policy
of the antiparty group "would have led to the decline of industry and agri-
culture and to broken relations between workers and peasants, and even to
hunger."
Furthermore, the antiparty group opposed the measures for eliminating the
remaining vestiges of the cult:-of personality, and it is greatly guilty of the
gross errors committed during earlier times. The group opposed all measures
for countering bureaucracy, it opposed the personnel reductions in the party
machine, and it has quoted classical Marxism-Leninism in an effort to hamper
the carrying out of the new Marxism-Leninism, as set forth in the decisions
of the 20th Congress.
One of the most important party principles, the article continues, is
the preservation of party unity, but the antiparty group engaged, instead, in
conspiracies against the collective party leadership; nor, was it able to com-
prehend the increase in the sense of responsibility to the party that the
If
members have gained during the last three or four years.
In conclusion, the article discusses the attitudes of the Communist
parties of other countries to the June decisions, stating that all of those
parties have given those decisions their full support.
The lead article in Agitator presents many of the same views as the
Partinaya Zhizn article. However, the former stresses particular that
the antiparty group opposed the,increasing of the rights of the member re-
publics, and therefore, also the growth of friendship among the peoples of
the USSR.
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The following definition of the Malenkov et al group given in the
article is of particular interest: "In issues involving both internal
policy and foreign policy, the recently exposed heretics (raskol'nikiiiin
current usage the word also means "dispersive elements") are sectarians
(sektanty) and dogmatists (dogmatiki), and they represent a pedantic
A
(nachetnicheskiy) attitude toward Marxism-Leninism that is not true to
life."
All of these terms have been borrowed from the vocabulary of the
'I A
Orthodox Church. The raskol'niki were those who represented antiquated
beliefs in the time of Peter the Great; the"nachetnikii"in the services
of the Orthodox Church are those who have become accustomed to rote reading
of theological literature.
The article says also: "Dogmatism and the clinging to doctrines are
not a smaller enemy than revisionism. When Lenin branded Kautsky a re-
visionist, he also showed him to be a dogmatist and a doctrinarian." And
again: "Everyone is able to read Marx and Lenin, but the ability to under-
stand them hIS. been given only to those who can feel the pulse in the artery
of life." . . . "How did Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov dare to call
themselves Leninists when they trampled underfoot the Leninist principles
of party unity, deformed the party and its Leninist Central Committee, and
disrupted the pay and the work of its leadership, the Central Committee?"
"The party rose against anti-Leninism.".... "The pitiful renegades." Etc.
a--,i 1e.cL
The propagandists have thus been terms as severe as these, which
for a long time will be repeated in speeches and articles. Whether they
will lead to a heightening of popular indignation against the antiparty
group remains to be seen.
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The quotations
the controversy that erupted in June involves not only disagreements con-
cerning issues of practical policy, but also doctrinal controversies, the
appearance of which shows the importance attached to doctrine, not only
in the search of substance for the propaganda needed in the party inter-
nal struggle, but also in such differences of concept as "conservatism",
which is alien to the experience of some, and the "creative interpretation"
of Marxist and Leninist doctrine that is alien to others.
The 1 July issue of Kommunist, the leading party theoretical journal,
was not released to the press until 27 July, although it is generally
published early each month. The lead article in it also is devoted to the
June decisions. While the article presents nothing really new, it stresses
throughout the decisive importance of proper unity in the party.
The following quote is of interest: "Those in the antiparty group
deviated from the Leninist concept of the leadership function of the com-
munist party in a system of proletarian dictatorship. It is a fact that
some of them, while pretending to profess that party dictatorship prevails
in the USSR, actually repeated the Trotskyite defamation of the party, and
some of the others, in seeking to establish that the position of govern-
mental elements is more important than that of the party elements, dis-
torted Leninist doctrine on the functions of the party after the victory
of the proletarian revolution."
these expressions contain both an explanation and a cer-
tain amount of threatening verbiage. Apparently the vanquished opposition
had found it necessary, during the attack on Khrushchev, to support its
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position by referring to excessive party influence an also to emphasize
the greater importance of the governmental elements, in order to appeal
to the bureaucrats, as stated directly elsewhere. The reference to the
Trotskyite attitude seems to be a threat against the vanquished.
The vanquished group is accused also of continuing its activity be-
hind the backs of the Presidium and the Central Committee, even after
these bodies had pointed out the views of the opposition to be erroneous.
The group is accused also of appealing to party unity after it saw that it
had no support in the Central Committee. But, the article says, unity
achieved on that basis necessarily lacks principle.
"It was not by chance that the White Guards and other enemies of the
Soviet Union based their hopes of overthrowing the Soviet government on
party disunity." (This is also a threat to the opposition.)
One of the most important conditions, it is stated, for party unity
is unity in the leadership; the unanimous decision of the Central Com-
mittee preserved party unity.
The article also gives particular emphasis to the extremely great
significance of the criticism arising from the cult of personality. It
is stated that the sister communist parties did not all correctly understand
the nature of the attack launched against the party by the imperialists and
certain social democratic quarters when they undertook to criticize the cult
of personality.
The antiparty group attempted to obscure their designs by appealing
to the principles of collective leadership. (The intent of this apparently
is that the opposition tried to gain the leadership in the Presidium and
the Central Committee through a vote taken in the Presidium, in which it
apparently had a majority at one time. eaw.) The article speaks exten-
sively of the "correct" concept of collective leadership, one aspect of
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which is close contact with local organizations and groups of members.
The expression "aristocrats who believe themselves too important"
is used &t one point in regard to the vanquished.
In previous times when there have been crises in the CPSU, the de-
cisive importance of party unity has always been stressed in connection
with them, just as now, that the party really has monolithic unity. That
sits
has also been the case the death of Stalin. No new definitions or
bits of doctrine have thus far been proposed in this respect. But it may
not be possible to appeal to unity constantly if the course of events
should lead to new controversies in the party in regard to procedural
methods and objectives, as has happened on two occasions since Stalin's
death, considering only the most dramatic of them, namely, the over-
throw of Beriya and the changes that took place in June in the party
leadership.
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