(SANITIZED)POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC SUMMARY(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A041600070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 9, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP80T00246A041600070001-2
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY East Germany
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ
REPORT
Political, and Economic DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES
Is APR 1955
STATE X ARMY X 101 AVY X IAIR X F a I AEC
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
I N FORMATION REPORT I N FORMAT ION REPORT
V
I T77[--- -I
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NnJ?Er
A . Po' t .{ a -EeoneeMic
1. -it C erena1
Political observers in Moscow hold the view that present Soviet
policies are aiming at an extension of preliminary discussions
over at least one year for the following reasons:
a. No major compromises can be expected from the West at the
present moment. Moscow needs another year or two in order to
increase the technical advantage in the developcent of rocket
weapons to such a degree that this advantage ray be effectively
used in future discussions.
Moscow objects in principle to the delivery of modern rocket
weapons to European satellite countries. The continued discussion
on the Rapacki Plan is expected to result in a certain relaxation
of Western efforts in the field of atomic armament. Although,
for the above reasons, Moscow., at present, is not interested
in agreements with the West possibly to be reached at a snit
conference, pertinent activities are being continued not only
for propagandistic purposes but also in order to foster differences
in the Western camp and to prevent or at least delay atarie
armament of additional European countries
C a s The above assumptions, are believed to be generally correct.
The continued modification of the Rapacki Plan, with the recently
suggested destroyal of nuclear weapons, thus is to furnish constantly
changing topics of discussion and to delay results of preliminary
negotiations by offers unacceptable for the West.)
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SE t ty
ll!
A~ 9 ]
N1
25X1
5.
Available information on 1957 results of the Soviet industry
corresponds to previous estimates, even with regard to over-fulfilment
in individual branches of. industry as, for exarple, coal, crude
oil, and non-ferrous retals. Although, as a result of a revision
in early 1957, the 1957-plan had been considerably reduced,
investments of preceding years continued effective, thus raking possible
an over-fulfilment in various fields. However, even in these fields
the original plan targets could not be reached. In spite of the
fact that 1960 production targets of the 6th Five-Year-Plan are
still being propagated, they are believed to be unrealizable, particularly
with regard to basic industries. The USSR therefore is presently
preparing a new 7-Year Plan for 1959-1965, which is to be based
on actual conditions to a larger degree as was the case with the -
original 6th Five-Year Plan. Similar to 1957, 1958 is thus also
considered as transitional year, with plan figures apparently
having been considerably reduced in same instances.
These reductions had been necessitated ty various reasons as f,e',
the economic crisis, in satellite countries uhich prevented the
execution of scheduled industrial deliveries;
the apparent overestimation of progress in the nechanizatiori'and
automatization in the civilian economy;
the labor shortage which was further increased by the delay in the
mechanization and automatization; and
the reorganization of industrial administration in the summer of
1957.
The latter is believed to be the ruin reason for the necessity to
prepare a provisional plan also for 1958' In spite of the satisfactory
1957 results in most industries, the large difficulties which were
caused by the establishment of local Economic Councils are discernable
everywhere. These difficulties originate mainly from poor cooperation
which, in turn, is due to the self-sufficient attitude of the new
administrations. The latter try to keep for themselves as many
agricultural enterprises as possible and, at the same time; to
become as independent as possible from the adjoining districts.
This tendency has already led to the result that, regardless of their
national importance, highly specialized enterprises are being
occupied with local orders. This caused major difficulties in other
production fields, forcing factories to manufacture such special
products themselves, naturally at a considerably higher price and
simultaneously of poorer quality. Products concerned were predominantly
special instruments which are being manufactured only in a few plants
and the output of which does not show in production data published.
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tr kk ,_
~s o it
Yet, further &ndustrial development in the USSR to a large extent
depends an coordination. It is being hoped that this aim will to
achieved in 1958.
it has recently been suggested to unite certain branches of industry
foe. wood and peat, under one Economic Council of the various they
belong to at present.
The industrial potential of the USSR is already large enough to
enable Moscow to overcame temporary production difficulties in
individual branches of industry either by extenaioa of?production
as f.e. with the electro-technical products or else by imposts
from other countries as is the case with eleetro-locomotives.
577.E .LL. 4';1
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